Teamworking under Lean in UK Public Services: Lean Teams and Team Targets in HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC)

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TEAMWORKING UNDER LEAN IN UK PUBLIC SERVICES:

LEAN TEAMS AND TEAM TARGETS IN

HER MAJESTY'S REVENUE & CUSTOMS (HMRC)

Introduction

The authors of *The Machine that Changed the World* were in no doubt about the
importance of team working in lean production: 'in the end,' they say (Womack *et al*.,
1990, p. 99), 'it is the dynamic work team that emerges as the heart of the lean
factory'. It is with this bold statement in mind that we seek to explore and develop
our conceptual and practical understanding of how teamworking operates under Lean.
We examine these issues in the context of a high-profile case of Lean implementation
in the UK public sector, the Pacesetter programme of the UK's tax assessment and
collection service, Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs (HMRC). We find that
although the teams themselves were ostensibly set up on a lean basis, they were
largely unable to operate as such as a result of the pressures they faced to meet their
work targets. This in turn suggests particular ways in which we might better
understand how Lean interacts with the context or environment into which it is
introduced.

　　　　The paper thus addresses four main questions:

1. Given the stated importance of teamworking in lean production, what would we
   expect teams to look like as part of the contemporary application of Lean
   thinking?

2. What can we say about lean teams in practice on the basis of an in-depth study of
   the large-scale, high-profile implementation of Lean in HMRC? As part of this,

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how do our findings stand in relation to the largely negative portrayal of Lean in

HMRC put forward by Carter et al. (2011a, 2011b, 2013a, 2013b)?

3. In light of our prior expectations, how we can explain the form that teamworking

takes in practice?

4. What are the implications of our analysis for our understanding of Lean and the

way it is introduced and operated in organizations?

In order to address these questions, the remainder of the paper divides into

four main parts. Following this introduction, our review of the secondary literature

focuses on the first of our questions. We look at the form we might expect

teamworking to take under Lean, setting this in the context of the current widespread

application of Lean in the UK.   Second, we describe the methods and approach

employed in the empirical research upon which the paper draws. In the paper's next

section, the findings, we turn to the question of what teams and teamworking look like

in practice under Lean. In our discussion and conclusion section, we address the third

and fourth of our questions, trying to explain the form that Lean teamworking takes in

practice, and using this in an attempt to develop our wider understanding of Lean.

Lean, lean teams and teamworking

Principles of lean production

If, as Womack et al. (1990, p. 99) claim, the work team is at the 'heart' of lean

production, then we need first of all to understand what that team might look like.

The development of the basic principles of lean production has been widely discussed

(see Ohno 1988; Womack et al. 1990; Womack and Jones 2003; Hines et al. 2004;

Holweg 2007) and only a brief recap is necessary here. The term 'lean' arose from

the US-based International Motor Vehicle Program, a project which resulted in the

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publication of *The Machine that Changed the World* (Womack et al., 1990).   Lean

production, it was claimed, 'uses less of everything compared with mass production'

(1990, p. 13). Although the term was new, the principles upon which it was based

originated in the practices of the Toyota Motor Corporation in the 1950s, and if lean

production has any real meaning as a concept, then this resides in the idea of

just-in-time production (JIT).   In a manufacturing context this means that rather than

defining an optimum level of stock or work-in-progress, the objective is to reduce that

level to zero (Oliver, 1991). At each stage of the manufacturing process, in other

words, production takes place 'just in time' for it to be used at the next stage of the

process.   Production takes place ultimately in response to customer demand from

outside the factory: it is 'pulled' from outside rather than being 'pushed' from within.

While these might appear to be rather technical considerations of concern only

to operations managers, the implications for the management of labour are, at least in

principle, quite profound.   At the level of the individual worker, the application of

the JIT principle implies that there are times when it best for them to stop working

and to be what in more conventional terms would be described as 'idle'. As is made

clear by the creator of the JIT system in Toyota, Taiichi Ohno (1988, pp. 59-60), all

that employees achieve by working beyond the immediate requirements of customer

demand is the creation of unnecessary cost. But how would a work *team* operate

under these circumstances? Ohno himself is rather cryptic on this point, relying on a

series of sports metaphors (1988, pp. 23-25).   Other authors have sought to be more

concrete in their analysis of lean teams. In the next section we see how such teams

have been characterised by the nature of the autonomy they are able to exercise.

Autonomy in Lean Teams

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Any consideration of teamworking in a lean context has to take account of the fact

that there appears to be an inherent inconsistency between the two things. A lean

plant, claimed Womack et al. (1990, p. 99), 'transfers the maximum number of tasks

and responsibilities to those workers actually adding value to the car on the line'.

From an employee's point of view, this sounds very positive. Moreover, it seems to

fit with the notion that the work team should be able to exercise a degree of

discretion. This is the notion that underpins the idea of the team as an autonomous

work group (AWG) in the tradition of sociotechnical systems theory (see Benders and

Van Hootegem, 1999).   The difficulty, however, is reconciling this autonomy with

the operational principles of just-in-time. With the flow of production tightly

controlled in response to customer demand, the degree of discretion that the team is

able to exercise is likely to be severely circumscribed (Klein, 1989). This apparent

inconsistency is what Benders and Van Hootegem (1999) call the 'issue of

autonomy'.

The nature of lean teams in practice has been investigated by a number of

authors. Benders and Van Hootegem (2000), for example, drawing on such classic

studies as Dore's (1973), see one of the key characteristics of the Japanese model as

being the detailed description and rigorous regulation of work through Standard

Operating Procedures (SOPs).   This is a picture backed up by more recent research.

Delbridge et al. (2000) examined managerial perceptions of employee responsibilities

in lean plants in the automotive components manufacturing sector. Their main

findings were that the role of production workers was quite limited in areas such as

maintenance and production management.

First of all, we might question the often implicit assumption that autonomy is

something that is necessarily welcomed by employees. Vidal's (2007) work on the

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introduction of 'post-Fordist' production systems in the US is critical of what he

describes as 'the empowerment theory of job satisfaction'. His own research in a

variety of settings reveals many workers with little desire for empowerment,

preferring instead the predictability of more Fordist work arrangements. Job

satisfaction in these circumstances is related more to a 'fair day's work for a fair day's

pay; while empowerment or autonomy is associated more with higher levels of stress.

In any case, rather than seeing lean teams as a diluted version of the

sociotechnically-inspired AWG, we can look at them as operating a different kind of

autonomy. In the case of Lean we can say that an indirect form of autonomy exists,

one that is effective through the responsibility that employees have for shaping the

SOPs. Thus on a day-to-day basis, the team might have to work in a highly

prescribed way, following the SOPs that have been established. The question,

however, is what should these procedures be and, in some ways more importantly,

who should decide this? In the Toyota Production System, a key part of the worker's

role is to contribute in this way to the continuous improvement of the production

process. It is these ideas that have given rise to what has been described as

'democratic Taylorism' (Adler and Cole, 1993).

At the same time, however, we need to consider just how important these

activities are for the workers involved. Schouteten and Benders (2004), for example,

in their study of the Netherlands-based plant of a Taiwanese bicycle manufacturer,

found that workers' involvement in continuous improvement activities accounted for

only a small proportion of their working time. Their study resonates with the

'contradiction' identified by Conti and Warner (1993) in their examination of the

nature of work in a number of Japanese manufacturing plants. Conti and Warner

(1993: 39) described how 'employees [work] four hours a month in a very non-Taylorist manner to make their work for the rest of the month even more Taylor-like.'

Related to this is the question of the degree to which the nature of work is shaped or constrained by the system of production. Schouteten and Benders (2004) draw attention to the short-cycle, repetitive nature of the bicycle-manufacturing process. They acknowledged that workers were not under excessive strain, but concluded that this was due to the undemanding nature of the job rather than the degree of latitude or autonomy that the workers were able to exercise. Other work by Benders (eg Benders 1995) has emphasised the importance of what he calls 'output characteristics'—most especially, the variety of products being produced. As is made clear in Hasle et al.'s (2012) recent review, it can in fact be quite difficult to establish any direct link between Lean and the working environment. The effects of Lean *per se* can be difficult to isolate from the effects of the nature of the outputs being produced.

Second-wave Lean in the UK

These debates around teams and teamworking were very much connected with the emergence of lean concepts in the late-1980s and 1990s. In the last ten years or so we have seen what we might describe as 'second-wave' Lean, the chief concern of its many advocates being to establish that lean concepts can be applied in any organizational setting. The essence of this new version of Lean has been expressed in the now-familiar 'five principles' of 'lean thinking' put forward by Womack and Jones (2003). For our purposes, what is most significant about these principles is that, just as with the original ideas of the ideas of lean production, they contain very

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little in the way of direct implication about how Lean will or should be experienced

by employees.

This, however, has done little to deter the upsurge of interest in lean on the

part of both practitioners and researchers. In recent years we have seen the

widespread adoption of the idea of Lean across a range of public services in the UK

(Radnor and Walley, 2008; Radnor, 2010a).   In a recent review focusing on the use

of business process improvement methodologies in the public sector, 51% of

publications were found to be focused on Lean (Radnor, 2010b).

Despite the growing importance of Lean, research into its implementation in

the UK has given rise to a picture in which its impact has, in a number of ways, been

quite limited.   Within a large organization, for example, the implementation might be

restricted to a small part of its operations. Lodge and Bamford (2008), for example,

looked at the impact of Lean on waiting times in the radiology department of a

hospital.   Lean implementations have been limited in depth as well as in scope.   In

Radnor et al.'s (2012) expression, the research shows evidence of a 'tools-based'

approach—and very often a very limited range of tools at that.

But while positive outcomes have been reported (eg Silvester et al., 2004;

Radnor and Boaden, 2008), they do need to be looked at with great caution. Rather

than representing the transformation of thinking and systems in an organization, the

results are quite consistent with the kind of limited, low-level application of Lean that

we have identified here. Radnor et al. (2012) have argued that the current focus of

Lean has been around immediate and quantifiable outcomes such efficiency and

cost-cutting, rather than more fundamental objectives such as effectiveness and

systems development.   It is difficult to say that the results we observe actually

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represent an enhancement of 'value' in the sense put forward by advocates of Lean

(Young and McClean, 2008).

Teamworking and work restructuring in the UK public sector

Despite the work team supposedly lying at the 'heart' of lean production, research

into second-wave Lean has had little to say about the part played by employees. A

full understanding of Lean would seem to require that this omission be addressed.

We do have a number of attempts to place the employees centre-stage, and one of

these, the work of Carter et al. (2011a, 2011b, 2013a, 2013b), we look at it in more

detail below. We should also mention Waring and Bishop's (2010) ethnographic

study, which emphasises the degree to which employees' compliance with lean

practices was often only of a symbolic or ritualistic nature.

But our focus on lean teams also allows us to make use of other research into

the more general restructuring of work in the UK public sector. Whether lean teams

or not, a large part of this restructuring has taken place on the basis of team-based

forms of work organization. Thus in the area of health services, for example, we have

seen the development of teams in areas such as surgical operations (Finn, 2008),

genetic services (Finn et al., 2010) and community mental health services (Onyett,

2011). Other work has pointed to the link between teamworking and various

measures of organizational performance (West et al., 2002) There has been some

questioning of what is understood by 'team' or 'teamworking' in these circumstances,

and this has been accompanied by calls for much greater clarity in definition (West

and Lyubovnikova, 2013). West (2012: 14-15) has argued that around 50% of staff in

the UK health service are working in 'pseudo teams': these are the staff who respond

in the affirmative when asked if they work in a team, but in the negative when asked

if their teams possess certain properties by which a team might be defined.

The same issue also arises if we focus on research undertaken into

teamworking in our case study organization, HMRC, prior to its introduction of Lean.

Procter and Currie (2004; see also Currie and Procter, 2003) examined the

development of teamworking in the Inland Revenue, HMRC's main predecessor

organization. Like West and others in the health service, Procter and Currie found a

form of teamworking in which autonomy played little part. Rather than dismissing

this as 'pseudo-teamworking', however, they focussed on how teamworking could be

understood through placing greater emphasis on the idea of interdependence between

team members. In the form of what they described as 'target-based teamworking',

they argued that teamworking was effective through the collective responsibility that

team members felt for meeting the team's work targets.

In our study of Lean in HMRC, we also need to consider work on the same

subject undertaken by Carter et al. (2011a, 2011b, 2013a, 2013b). Their findings are

based on interviews and a questionnaire survey undertaken at six processing sites. In

contrast to a number of the other studies to which we have already referred, Lean is

portrayed as having a fundamental effect on the work of the organization. This effect,

moreover, is seen as unequivocally a negative one. Underpinning this conclusion is a

labour process perspective which sees Lean in HMRC as the application in a clerical

public-sector setting of an almost unadulterated form of Taylorism (Carter et al.,

2011b). Lean, argue Carter et al., degrades work; it removes from employees any

degree of discretion they might previously have been able to exercise (Carter et al.,

2011a, 2011b); it subjects employees to an intensified system of performance

monitoring (Carter et al. 2011b); and it undermines the public service ethos which had

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allowed employees to see value in their work (Carter et al., 2013a). According to

Carter et al.'s (2011b: 91 & 92) survey, for example, 91% of respondents reported a

reduction of skills and 91% a decrease in control over work. It is claimed, moreover,

that Lean is not even effective on its own, limited terms. The increased levels of

efficiency claimed by HMRC, argue Carter et al. (2013a), have been attained only

through significant reductions in the *quality* of work performed; and targets have been

met only by ignoring some areas of work altogether. At the same time, the survey

results suggest that occupational ill-health in HMRC has increased significantly as a

result of the introduction of Lean (Carter et al., 2013b).

As we shall see, our own findings do not tally exactly with those of Carter

et al. Our findings suggest a rather wider range of experience, both across individual

employees and across different parts of the organization. How the differences in

findings might be explained is an issue we return to in the discussion section of the

present paper. As well as differences in coverage and in approach, we shall see that it

can be argued that Carter et al.'s approach does not take adequately into account

either what Lean in principle implies for work, especially for teamwork, or how Lean

in practice in HMRC was shaped by pre-existing work systems--in particular, the role

of performance measures such as target-setting.

We can note at this point that Carter et al.'s survey results are not entirely

consistent either with those of the Civil Service People Survey (2011). While the

latter survey is cited by Carter et al. (2013a: 96) to show that HMRC has the 'most

unhappy' workforce of any UK civil service department, a closer look at the results

reveals a more variegated picture. The HMRC's 'employee engagement index' is the

lowest of any department, but this seems to be related to dissatisfaction with reward

and organizational leadership, where positive response rates were only 24% and 17%

respectively.   In areas such as 'resources and workload', which includes items on

skills and workload, and 'my team', which relates to intra-team relations and the

opportunity to improve ways of working, the positive response rates were 62% and

74% respectively (although still below national benchmarks and averages for the civil

service). While these results are not directly comparable with those of Carter et al.'s

survey, they do at least imply that the situation is not so uniformly bleak as Carter et

al. suggest.

Research Site and Research Methods

Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and Pacesetter

Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) was established in 2005 as the unified

tax assessment and collection department of the UK government. It was formed by

the merger between the Inland Revenue, the government department previously

responsible for the administration of direct taxation, and HM Customs and Excise,

previously responsible for indirect tax. HMRC is also responsible for the collection

of National Insurance contributions and for the payment and administration of tax

credits, Child Benefit and Child Trust Fund.

At the time of the research in 2007, there were four types of business units in

HMRC: operational units, product and process groups, customer units and corporate

functions. The operational units employed over 70,000 staff and focused on

delivering services such as processing, local compliance and customer contact. This

research focused on HMRC Processing, which in April 2006 began rolling out the

change programme known as 'Pacesetter'. Led by the Director of Personal Tax, the

four main elements of Pacesetter were: Leadership Development, Operational

Management, Lean, and Workforce Strategy and Capacity Management.   The

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objectives of the programme were to improve efficiency and customer service by

delivering a 30% improvement in productivity, to reduce backlogs and

inconsistencies, and to ensure that HMRC Processing became the UK Government's

Processor of choice (Radnor, 2010a; Radnor and Bucci, 2007).

Within the Pacesetter programme, Lean was based on a three-pronged

approach (for a full description, see Radnor and Bucci, 2007):

- Redesigning service delivery processes so as to eliminate waste and variability,

  maximise flexibility, improve productivity and quality, and reduce lead-time.

- Changing current management processes to create appropriate management

  infrastructure to sustain improvements.

- Changing mind-sets and behaviours of leaders and front-line staff so as to support

  the new systems and deliver continuous improvement.

Lean was implemented in all HMRC Processing's strategic sites. These were

the larger sites which were scheduled to absorb the work of the smaller sites over a

period of time. In order to implement Lean, there were a number of 'Local Lean

Experts', based in local tax offices, and 'Central Lean Experts', who rotated over

three-month periods between sites. The internal staff had been supported by external

consultants since Lean was originally trialled in 2004.   Consultants involved in the

Lean implementation included McKinsey Consultants, PA Consulting and, since

2006, the Unipart Group (see Radnor, 2010a).

The creation of lean teams took place through the implementation of new

processes and structures.   The implementation of Lean within each of the case study

sites was carried out through a diagnostic process led by the central and local

Pacesetter team. The diagnostic stage consisted of considering the current state of the

processes, looking at the set-up of the teams, considering the demand at the site, and

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then designing the future-state process on the basis of the targets to be achieved.

Once the diagnostic stage had been completed, pilot teams were established to trial

the future-state process.

Research methods

In order to undertake the research, ten HMRC strategic sites were identified by the

Pacesetter Programme Office. The ten sites included five large processing offices

(LPO), two distributed processing offices (DPOs), and three national processing

centres. As Table 1 makes clear, the LPOs and DPOs each covered tax services at a

local level, while the national processing centres each operated on a nationwide basis

in respect of smaller and more specialist areas such as National Insurance.

Documentation collected from the sites and the Programme Offices included

Pacesetter Programme documents and the Lean Academy handbook.   Sites also

provided organisation charts, current and future-state maps for the processes

concerned, and information on performance collated over a period of time.

Table 1 around here

The main vehicle for data collection was a series of site visits undertaken

between January and May 2007. Each visit, with one exception, extended over a

two-day period.   Across the sites visited, semi-structured interviews or focus groups

were undertaken with a total of 296 personnel. The interview protocol was tailored to

the different grades of staff. The personnel interviewed at every site included Senior

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Managers (SMs), Senior Officers (SOs), Higher Officers (HOs), Officers (Os), and

team members consisting of Administrative Officers (AOs) and Administrative

Assistants (AAs). The actual numbers and profiles of those interviewed varied

according to the size and nature of the sites (see Table 1). In terms of relevance to

this paper, the focus of the data analysis was on the staff who were placed or had the

potential to be placed in lean teams. These were all the 'front-line staff' identified in

Table 1 and consisted of Os as team leaders and, AOs and AAs as team members.

They were interviewed in focus groups, primarily as groups of Os and then as mixed

groups of AOs and AAs.

In order to understand the implementation of Lean, the interviews and focus

groups were structured around a number of basic issues These included what staff

understood both by Pacesetter and by Lean; what staff saw as the qualitative and

quantitative impact of Lean implementation; what problems had arisen and also what

had worked well during implementation; and, most important for our purposes here,

what had changed as a result of the implementation in terms of individual roles, the

processes, the interaction with the customer and the working of individual teams.

Groups and individuals were asked how they had experienced Lean in terms of their

own job, their team's work and their understanding of the customer. They were asked

also to describe teamworking on their own site; whether there were differences

between the Lean and non-Lean processes; how the performance of teams was

measured; and whether, and with what effect, this had changed for the Lean

processes.

Notes were taken of all interviews, and the majority were recorded on a digital

recorder and then fully transcribed. At the end of each site visit, a site report was

prepared by the visiting researcher. The site report summarised the main responses to

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the questions asked during the interviews and focus groups, and highlighted the site-

specific reflective notes of the visiting researcher. These reports were amalgamated at

the end of the evaluation and common issues were drawn together and coded.   The

data was used to develop a final evaluation report which was validated by senior

HMRC personnel (Radnor and Bucci, 2007). This paper makes reference to this

report but draws primarily on the data collected through the course of the research.

Findings

Our attempt to understand the operation of lean teams in HMRC gave rise to an

analysis of the data structured around three key areas. The first of these is the nature

of the work experienced by employees as individual team members; the second, the

degree to which employees' experience of autonomy corresponded to that suggested

by the model of lean teams; and third, in partial explanation of the experience of

autonomy, the role played by the continuing emphasis on team targets. We look at

each of these areas in turn.

The nature of work in lean teams

Turning, then, to the nature of work in HMRC's lean teams, we can say first of all that

there was evidence of employees feeling that work had become fragmented and

degraded.   According to representatives of the main trade union, Lean had led to a

situation in which there was 'deskilling, little challenge, excess monitoring and where

poor performers could not hide.' One employee referred to feeling like being a 'cog

in a wheel'. In all the case study sites, employees reported that they were each

responsible for only part of a whole process, rather than seeing a case through from

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start to finish, as was the situation 'pre lean'. As one front-line employee, an AO,

expressed it:

> My job has changed. I did have a lot of variety to do, as in post and dealing
> with phone calls. Now I … get a return … and do only one particular part of
> that return. That might be inputting the information or coding the record
> correctly and then passing it on to the next person. Because I am now doing
> only one part, I've lost a lot of knowledge that I had gained before.

A number of front-line staff (both AOs and AAs) pointed to the negative

consequences of this. One said:

> Like everyone else I feel I've been deskilled. We used to do different work, a
> good variety of post, but on Lean we do only six different types and follow the
> instructions. If you don't follow the instructions you are marked as wrong. It
> gets monotonous and [the] more you get bored, the more you make mistakes.

But the picture was by no means a universally negative one. Even the

employee who referred to being a 'cog in a wheel' was prepared to qualify this

description. There was an acknowledgment on the part of front-line staff that they did

work in an environment in which some degree of interdependence was necessary and

even welcome. Some AOs and AAs felt that the new lean processes gave them a

greater understanding of how what they did fitted into the process as a whole. Across

both the taxation offices and the national processing centres, some AO and AA staff

welcomed the changes to the way in which work was organized, feeling that there was

more structure to their working day. Where there once had been different practices

across and within sites, there was now more of a structure to enable all sites to

undertake the work in the same way. As one expressed it:

> For me, it's simplified the work. I don't think about what cases I have to do.
> My day is mapped out for me and it's structured. I can concentrate on the
> process I am assigned to do at a set time.

Another officer said:

> [Lean has] given me a clearly defined structure and its enables me to go out
> and look at things that would otherwise have been hidden away because it's
> more visible.

In addition, there was some feeling that work organized in this way offered a

better service to the taxpayer. Thus while individual workers might be restricted to a

smaller range of tasks, the expertise each of them could develop could improve the

quality of the work of the team as a whole. Robust performance data proved difficult

to obtain at a team level, but there was a sense that the completion time and the

number of queries related to the taxpayer had both been reduced (Radnor, 2011). In

the words of one HO:

> From a customer point of view, the one thing that I've found from the start
> when we were doing self-assessment returns is that Lean has produced better
> quality work, which has got to be good for the man outside. It has a benefit to
> the customer because it is done, in this particular site more correctly than it
> was pre-Lean.

Thus while we can identify some reduction in the variety of work and in the

discretion that individual employees were able to exercise, Lean can also be seen to

be associated with a more structured approach to work, which provided a clarity and

focus to the work that some employees appreciated. and a heightened sense of

common purpose. As we highlighted in the introduction to the paper, Lean, in

principle at least, could also involve a greater degree of a particular kind of autonomy.

It is to issues of autonomy that we now turn.

Worker autonomy in lean teams

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Issues of autonomy in lean teams are centred around the organization's standard

operating processes or SOPs. In the case of HMRC, standard processes were

developed and managed by a senior manager and their team at one designated site.

In rolling these out to other sites, any major deviation from the standard process had

to be considered by this so-called 'process owner'. Involvement in Lean

implementation within each site was confined largely to senior management.   Their

role was to agree site performance targets (for such things as quality, productivity and

lead time), be involved in the on-site Pacesetter launch meetings, maintain contact

between the Pacesetter team, trade union representatives and staff, and reassure staff

about the impact of the introduction of new processes and operating procedures. Even

middle-level managers only became involved in implementation when Pacesetter was

being implemented in their own process areas.

There was thus considerable evidence that many front-line staff felt that they

had had no real input into how the new processes were implemented.   Staff

interviewed in the course of the research often stated that the procedures were not 'fit

for purpose', and that when they had tried to change them (even through the

designated 'process owners'), they had met with little success.   Staff in one LPO, for

example, came up with innovations around the layout of their performance board, the

introduction of SMART targets, and a productivity calculator.   None of these was

implemented, despite the acknowledgement from one manager on the site that

this 'may have softened the blow for staff or made Lean more acceptable to them'.

The lack of employee involvement in the introduction of the standard

operating procedures might have counted for less if employees had subsequently been

able to play a part in the procedures' ongoing development.   Within Pacesetter, the

formal position was that there were opportunities for greater staff involvement

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through structured approaches to improvement and problem-solving. These included

the '3Cs'--concern, cause, countermeasure—through which staff were encouraged to

highlight and to share with other teams the issues they had faced and the means they

had used to resolved them. There were also intended to be weekly problem-solving

meetings, in which teams of staff and managers got together to look at and resolve

problems using a process called the 'problem-solving O' (based around the plan-do-

check-act framework). The importance of all this was recognised by one AO:

> The managers have to actively seek and get staff involved in solving
> problems, since they are the ones actually doing the work; I think that is key
> with Lean. Staff have a say and can improve process themselves by working
> through problems.

Such activities were of clear appeal to many of the staff interviewed. Some

front-line staff were sceptical, regarding the new systems as 'overkill', and arguing

that the solutions to many of the problems were in any case well-known. The

balance, however, was very much on the positive side. When asked which elements

of Pacesetter they would most like to retain, many interviewees pointed to the focus

on structured problem-solving.

The major problem was that even where effort was put into working out and

proposing improvements, operating procedures remained the prerogative of senior

management or the process owner. Even some of those at Officer and Higher Officer

level--who in general took a positive attitude to the opportunities to address problems-

--expressed frustration at the fact that their proposals were not always put into effect.

There arose the feeling that there was no flexibility to make improvements and that

the new problem-solving procedures were a pointless exercise. This was particularly

apparent in the local or regional tax offices (LPOs and DPOs), where there was a real

concern that the standard work instructions might even start to be ignored if they did

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not become more user-friendly and if the process for making changes to them was not

improved:

> The standard work instructions could be lost if they are not sorted out. If
> people are told they are empowered to make changes, they will only feel
> empowered if the organisation responds to them.

Although the frustration this represented was typical of the situation in the

local or regional tax offices, a different picture emerged in the national processing

centres. As their name suggests, each of these centres was responsible at a national

level for a particular process or area of work. In contrast to the local or regional

offices, therefore, where basically the same work was being done in each one, each of

the national offices was unique in its responsibilities. This made it much easier for

the senior management in the office to themselves shape and develop the SOPs, rather

than having to conform to an externally-imposed nationwide blueprint.

These structural factors were thus reflected in some degree of autonomy for

the national offices in the development of their SOPs. During the implementation of

Lean, senior management in these centres had been very firm with the central

Pacesetter programme team with regard to timescales. They had also been very

determined to keep external consultants involved until there was no longer a need for

them. The argument advanced for this was that implementation should be based upon

perceived business needs and not just led by an end-date stipulated in a contract.

As a consequence of all this, the level of 'buy-in' and understanding amongst

the staff at the national sites was much more apparent and positive than it was at the

local ones.   At the central processing sites, staff were able to use the diagnostic

process to develop and implement their own standards and processes. Within these,

more flexibility was built in, with the process teams being able to dedicate time to

meetings and problem-solving activities. Although it was acknowledged that this was part of a continuous, long-term process, managers at the site saw a clear relationship between problem-solving and engagement in the process:

> Problem-solving is key to staff engagement. If staff are involved meaningfully in problem-solving and they can actually change what they are doing, then they feel they have some control over what they do. We need to do more on this, but we are doing a lot better than we were.

Thus while in principle we see an indirect form of autonomy as one of the main defining characteristics of a lean team, looking at things in these terms in the context of HMRC reveals a rather messier reality. Front-line staff in the local offices had little input into either the introduction or the development of their standard operating procedures. The national processing centres, on the other hand, were able to use their respective unique positions as a means of retaining some control over how they did their work, which in turn encouraged a greater degree of involvement on the part of front-line staff. To gain a fuller understanding of how lean teams operated in HMRC, we need to look at what else was shaping it. We turn now, therefore, to the issue of team targets.

Lean teams and team targets

In order to fully understand how lean teams operated, we need to consider them in the context of the target-based system in which they were developed. It must be conceded that for some in HMRC, the operations of the teams was not seen as an important issue. In this view, membership of a team was little more than nominal. One Officer said that in their view 'team' was simply 'a term to define a loosely related group of people'. The fact that individual taxpayer cases had now to be worked on by than one employee, however, promoted a greater focus on the team as

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the key work unit. One focus group of AAs and AOs discussed how teamworking

had been enhanced as a result of the changes, as simply more of it was now required.

At the very least a recognition that the reorganization of work meant that staff now

had a better idea of who their immediate colleagues were, and, as a result, would

discuss work with them much more than before. This feeling was encouraged by the

holding of daily team meetings and by the physical presence of team performance

boards.

The meetings and the boards, however, might better be seen as the physical

manifestation of the continued importance given to the achievement of performance

targets. The diagnostic process in the sites included the timings of the process and the

agreement of team work targets. The achievement of the targets was tracked hourly

by recording the progress of individual team members. Individual progress was

aggregated to the team level and noted on the team performance board. There was a

view widespread across many sites that the focus on target-hitting rather than

improving the service offered to the taxpayer.

This emphasis on meeting targets shaped the operation of teamworking in two

important ways. The first and most obvious of these is that pressures to meet the

targets simply reduced the time available to take part in problem-solving or

improvement activity.   As we have seen, interviewees were broadly supportive of this

kind of activity, and felt frustrated at the imposition of targets. As one interviewee

expressed it:

> We can't take time out to have an instant meeting about problems. We are
> encouraged to do this, but the stats targets don't change. There isn't time to do
> this.

There was thus a perception at some sites that the pressure of work was such that there was no real opportunity to be involved. 'Problem solving has been good,' said one front-line employee, 'but there has not been enough of it'. Looking at it the other way round, then if time was taken to focus on problem-solving, this could have a negative effect on performance. 'Some processes have more problem-solving sessions than others,' said one respondent, 'and people are being taken out of the teams to carry them out. This is impacting upon performance'. Another member of front-line of staff stated, '[the daily meetings] are a waste of time and resource when I could be getting on with some real work and meeting the targets'. The tension between solving problems and meeting targets was well-expressed by a third employee:

> If we solve the problems that are stopping us hitting the targets or stop us working more efficiently, then this is fine, but if we are constantly having meetings to solve problems and we are not hitting the targets and the problems aren't being resolved or aren't affecting the targets, then we are creating a problem rather than solving a problem.

The second way in which targets helped shape the nature of teamworking was through its effects on how members of a team related to each other and worked together. In some cases, particularly front-line staff, it was felt that the targets were being used to monitor individual performance. One said:

> The pressure to achieve comes from internally as well. We must accept that as soon as people start collecting statistics, people want to achieve; they may pretend they don't care, but they do. You therefore put pressure on yourself because you know that you have been counted.

Of more interest to us, however, is how individuals placed greater emphasis on how their own efforts contributed to the team as a whole. Part of this can be put down to more or less direct pressure from management. Front-line staff could feel under

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pressure from their front line managers, while the front-line managers were

themselves under pressure from further up the managerial hierarchy.

The pressure felt by team members can be understood in one of two ways. For

some, it was a negative development; it was seen simply as having to work harder in

order to compensate for those not working hard enough. This could be cause of

significant resentment. One team member said:

> Some people are having to compensate for those that don't work so well. You
> are not supposed to pinpoint people who are not working because it's a team
> effort, but when people slack off, it can really annoy other people in the team.

On the other hand, the same pressures could be seen as contributing a greater

sense of identification with the work of the team as whole. It was accepted that

differences in individual performance might exist—and also that there might be good

reason for this. Differences in performance against a numerical target could arise not

just from differences in effort levels, but also from differences in the degree of

difficulty of the cases being dealt with. A more structured approach to work might

involve some reduction in the degree of discretion that individuals were able to

exercise in deciding what cases to work on—but at the same time it could reduce

tensions arising from the temptation on the part of some individuals to take the more

straightforward cases in order to meet their own individual targets. This 'cherry-

picking' of cases had been a long-standing concern for management at a number of

sites.

In what were perceived as the better-functioning teams, therefore, a more

collective, team-based approach could be seen. Focus groups referred to improved

'team spirit', particularly when the team was achieving its targets. As a Higher

Officer on one site commented, 'On the two better performing teams, a good team

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spirit exists, they are very engaged, take accountability for things and actually want to

do a good job.' In such teams there was now more cooperation between individuals

within teams and between managers. According to one team member, there was a

heightened sense of common purpose:

> We work better as a team. This is a positive. Before [Lean] everyone had a set
> number of claims to process and people would sit at the desk and not speak to
> many people on your team…. Now there is more involvement as a team to
> solve problems and to work to reach the targets.

It was difficult to obtain the quantitative data at a team level that would have allowed

this relationship to be tested more formally. Nonetheless, the richer data obtained

from our qualitative interviews allowed us to identify the tensions between targets and

the operation of lean teams—and also the different ways in which these tensions

might play out.

Discussion and conclusions

Having presented the findings from a thorough and comprehensive investigation of

one of the most high-profile implementations of Lean in the UK's public services, we

can return explicitly to the research questions posed in our introduction. In answer to

the first of these, we saw in our review of existing work on Lean an idea of what we

might expect lean teams to look like. While on the basis of some autonomy-focussed

definitions it might be tempting to dismiss these as not being teams at all, we saw in

our review of the secondary literature a distinctive form of teamworking in which

employees have responsibility for the continuous improvement of standard operating

procedures or SOPs.

In looking at Lean in practice in HMRC, the subject of our second research

question, our findings represent a more nuanced alternative to the almost exclusively

negative interpretation offered by Carter et al. (2011a, 2011b, 2013a, 2013b). Our

findings can be seen to be more in line with the range of experience suggested by the

results of the Civil Service People Survey (2011). Thus while we can see that there is

some evidence to support Carter et al.'s portrayal of Lean as being associated with the

fragmentation of work and the loss of employee discretion, a closer analysis reveals

that this is only part of the picture. For one thing, some welcomed Lean on the basis

that it gave them greater structure and a better understanding of where their own work

fitted with the work of the organization as a whole. In this respect we can give some

support to Vidal's (2007) findings that predictability might be as welcome as

empowerment to some employees.

Moreover—and perhaps more importantly for our purposes—Carter et al.'s

analysis takes little account of how employees work together in teams under Lean.

There are two aspects to this. First, Carter et al. neglect how, in principle at least, lean

teams are able to exercise an indirect form of autonomy through their input into

improvement and problem-solving activities. As we have seen, it would be greatly

overstating the case to say that a high degree of this form of autonomy was

universally enjoyed in practice. What we see in HMRC is, again, a degree of

variation. In the local and district offices (the LPOs and DPOs), although the

mechanisms did exist by which employees could play a significant role in both the

creation and the development of operating procedures, little effective use was being

made of them. We can thus take heed of Schouteten and Benders' (2004) caution

that account should be taken of the extent to which employees are able to exercise a

heightened degree of autonomy. In the more specialist operations undertaken in the

national-level processing centres, on the other hand, the centres' managers retained a

greater degree of control over processes and were able to use this to encourage greater

involvement on the part of employees. The differences between the two types of

office appear to relate to the greater autonomy afforded to the national centres rather

than directly to differences in the nature of work. Thus while consistent with

Benders' (1995) emphasis on output characteristics, they can offer it only indirect

support.

A demonstration of the second aspect of Carter et al.'s neglect of teams

provides us also with an answer to our third research question: how can we explain

the form that teamworking takes in practice in HMRC? The Civil Service People

Survey (2011) shows working as a member of a team to be the most positive aspect of

work amongst those surveyed in HMRC. As we have seen, the key to understanding

the operation of teams here is the continued emphasis placed on the achievement of

work targets.   At one level, there was a simple inconsistency between targets and lean

teams: either improvement activity was squeezed out or, to the extent it was

undertaken, it was regarded as being to the detriment of the achievement of targets.

More than this, however, we can see how the targets helped shape how members of

the team related to each other. Yet again, this could work in different ways.   A

heightened concern for how individual efforts contributed to team performance could

have the effect of encouraging resentment amongst those who felt that they were

making a disproportionately large contribution. On the other hand, the targets could

be seen in a more positive light, as providing the framework and incentive for a more

collective effort. What we see might be regarded as an intensified form of the

'target-based' form of teamworking identified by Procter and Currie (2004).

This in fact takes into our fourth research question, the implications of this

analysis for our understanding of Lean and the way it is introduced and operated in

organizations.   It is clear from what we have presented here that it is not just a matter

of adopting the philosophy and principles of Lean. The way in which lean teams

worked—and didn't work--was shaped by the environment into which they were

introduced. Two aspects of this might be highlighted. The first is the organizational

environment. In HMRC, as we have just seen, this was manifest most clearly in the

emphasis on targets and the form of teamworking to which this gave rise. The second

aspect is what we might describe as the 'market' environment in which an

organization operates. Earlier sections of this paper showed that concepts of JIT are

premised essentially on demand-constrained environments: workers should produce

only in response to demand (Oliver, 1991). In HMRC, the pervasiveness of targets

suggests the opposite, a labour-constrained environment: workers should produce as

much as they can. The implications of looking at things in this way need to be more

fully worked-out. It is to be hoped, however, that it can be used to improve our

understanding of Lean and the way it is managed within organizations.

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Site	No. of Staff on site	Staff Interviewed	Lean Processes at time of Research	% Staff Involved in Lean
Chapel Wharf (LPO)	~970	• 5 Managers (2 SOs; 3 HOs) • Local Lean Expert • 20 Front-line Staff (4 Os in a Focus Group; 16 AOs and AAs across 2 Focus Groups)	Self-Assessment Employee Maintenance Open Cases Post	~75%
NOS Wolverhampton (National Processing)	~250	• 4 Managers (2 SOs; 2 HOs) • Local Lean Expert • 17 Front-line Staff (2 Os, 8 AOs and AAs in a Focus Group; 7 AOs and AAs in a Focus Group)	Deregistration Registration	~50%
Child Benefit Office (National Processing)	~1,200	• 7 Managers (4 SOs; 3 HOs) • 3 Local Lean Experts • 21 Front-line Staff (8 Os in a Focus Group; 13 AOs and AAs across 2 Focus Groups)	Claims Receipt Post	~10%
Ipswich (DPO)	~120	• 3 Managers (1 SO; 2 HOs) • 3 Local Lean Experts • 10 Front-line Staff (3 Os, 7 AOs and AAs in a Focus Group)	Self-Assessment	~50%
Birmingham (DPO)	~300	• 4 Managers (1 SO; 3 HOs) • 2 Local Lean Expert • 23 Front-line Staff (5 Os in a Focus Group; 18 AOs and AA's across 2 Focus Groups)	Self-Assessment Employee Maintenance Post	~80%
Lothians (LPO)	~800	• 5 Managers (2 SOs; 3 HOs) • Local Lean Expert • 28 Front-line Staff (9 Os in a Focus Group; 19 AOs and AA's across 2 Focus Groups)	Self-Assessment Post Open Cases Employee Maintenance	~60%
South Wales (LPO)	~900	• 5 Managers (2 SOs; 3 HOs) • 2 Local Lean Expert • 24 Front-line Staff (8 Os in a Focus Group; 16 AOs and AAs across 2 Focus Groups)	Self-Assessment Employee Maintenance Open Cases Post	~80%
East Hampshire and Wight (LPO)	~650	• 4 Managers (1 SO; 3 HOs) • Local Lean Expert • Trade Union Representative • 27 Front-line Staff (10 Os in a Focus Group; 17 AOs and AAs across 2 Focus Groups)	Self-Assessment Employee Maintenance Customer Reviews Customer Correspondence	~85%
West Yorkshire and Craven (LPO)	~400	• 5 Managers (2 SOs; 3 HOs) • Local Lean Expert • 32 Front-line Staff (10 Os in a Focus Group; 22 AOs and AAs across 2 Focus Groups)	Self-Assessment Employee Maintenance Open Cases Post	~60%
National Insurance Contributions Office (National Processing)	~3,500	• 4 Managers (2 SOs; 2 HOs) • 4 Lean Experts • 2 Local Lean Experts • 28 Front-line Staff (9 Os in a Focus Group; 19 AOs and AAs across 2 Focus Groups)	Refunds	~20%

Table 1: HMRC Processing Sites and Interviews

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