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Anti-Dualist Cosmopolitanism:

Theorising Cosmopolitan
through Education

by

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Declaration

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Abstract

This thesis argues, through a careful analysis of cosmopolitan theorising, that an educational stand can be identified which influences the theorist's theorising of cosmopolitanism. An engagement with their mostly unwritten educational norms can contribute to a new way to approach to concept of cosmopolitanism. Firstly examining the works of Thomas Pogge, Seyla Benhabib and James Ingram in the contemporary era, it identifies a struggle between universalism and particularism through the lens of struggle and conflict, and an overwhelming reliance on Kantian arguments. This thesis then engages directly with Kant's works, reconstructing his political and cosmopolitan scheme from the ground-up. It identifies a series of hierarchies, exclusions, and normative assumptions of human nature, and a foundation of *pure* practical reason, religion and, crucially, education which his political and cosmopolitan project is designed to develop and expand globally to establish a singular cosmopolitan morality. The exclusionary nature of Kant's interwoven project leads to an exploration of a contemporary theorist of his; Johann Herder, who's cosmopolitanism differs radically from Kant. Herder's cosmopolitanism, whilst still aimed towards the idea of freedom is, in contrast to Kant's hierarchical system, anti-dualist in nature, and based on the necessity of a holistic understanding of humanity's intellectual capabilities which treats reason and emotion as one, and establishes communication, language, culture, and history as core concepts. It also, crucially, rejects a Hobbesian premise of selfishness that must be incorporated and responded to, as well as relying on institutionalisation, and bureaucracies to organise human existence. Herder further emphases education and *bildung* as ongoing processes of progress and change by which his version of cosmopolitanism (*humanität*) could be achieved, not in an Enlightened Age, but as an ongoing Age of Enlightenment. This thesis then argues, through an exploration of contemporary cosmopolitan educators, that Herder's works align with their own. As a result, Kant's premises and logics on the meaning and purpose of education are shown to be at odds with contemporary understandings of cosmopolitanism. This thesis then concludes by arguing for a 'nonbinary Cosmopolitan' re-framing of cosmopolitan theorising.

Chapter 1: Introduction

" Liberal character traits and political virtues do not... ...come about "naturally" or by the deliverance of an "invisible hand."" (Macedo 1995, p.240)

Contents

1.1   Introduction

This thesis explores the idea and importance of education in the theorising of Cosmopolitanism, focusing on both the Enlightenment period and the contemporary era, to understand and critique how the concept has been interpreted in the past, how it is now utilised, and ways to engage with it in the future.

The key argument this thesis makes is that the role of education, both through a formal educational system *and* through one's situated experiences and interactions with others (as culturing, socialisation, tradition, or *Bildung*), was a fundamental component in the proposed future construction of a cosmopolitan world during the Enlightenment period. This holds true not just from the arguments of Kant in his writings on pedagogy, his overt support for the Philanthropinum Institute and his conception of an ethico-civil community, but also from other cosmopolitan theorists such as Johann Herder, Johann Fichte, Christof Weiland, Le Marquis de Condorcet and Georg Forster. Its relative absence from contemporary theorising has led to a skewed and overly objectivist perspective, firstly, within the academic field of politics, as a 'top-down' cosmopolitanism located within the International Relations discipline, and focussed on the global and institutional and political levels. Secondly, philosophically as a deeply personal and individualistic, 'bottom-bottom' dynamic[1], embedded with the idea of an individual as an agent free and the ability to act, in theory at least, without obvious and overt bias, able to recognise and reject the 'claims of culture', and which as a consequence serves to weaken cultural and communal ties. These perspectives downgrade the centrality of education in the creation, nurturing and cultivation of a very specific type of identity, whose purpose was to foster cosmopolitan attitudes of self-

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[1] By this I mean the active cultivation of individuality through the development of a particular spread of (both pre-existing and desired) quasi-universal norms (moral, cultural, linguistic, societal, capitalist, patriarchal, racial, ableist, endosexed, heterosexist, allistic etc.)

agency, morality, and human equality, *alongside* a sense of community[2] membership and global citizenship.

Principally, this thesis takes as its starting point the importance that Kant himself gives to education; that "Education is the greatest and most difficult problem that can be given to the human being" (Kant 1803, p.441). From this, it both explores and critiques the ramifications of education in his overall scheme for a cosmopolitan world, as well as its impact upon its contemporary usage. Because of the way he identifies education as the only route out of 'animality' to humanity, it as a result examines the system that he designs to facilitate this movement, as well as the normative assumptions that justify his approach. The consequence of this examination of Kant's works reveals, with regards to his position on religion, gender, culture, civil society, identity and human nature, the layered and hierarchical nature of his cosmopolitan vision (See Chapter 3). As a result, this thesis proposes another theorist's works, Johann Herder (Chapter 4) as an alternative way to understand cosmopolitanism, again focussed through education, by which humanity could be envisioned, and explored, in its future theorising.

This thesis provides a critique of current interpretations of Cosmopolitanism and of its history, and presents a loose 'Anti-dualist' framework for future theorising, re-incorporating its wider philosophical, social and aesthetic discourses back into the political arena through the lens of education. It does this by exploring and developing the following six main areas: 1) Presenting a brief historical analysis of the theorising of cosmopolitanism, and the multiples of meanings that have been assigned to the idea of cosmopolitanism. 2) Examining key contemporary cosmopolitan theorists' interpretations and uses of the concept of cosmopolitanism and the underlying norms of education that are implied in their works. 3) Exploring in depth the writings of Immanuel Kant and reconstructing his 'true' cosmopolitan vision from the 'bottom up', which identifies the underlying importance of education through pure reason. 4) Presenting the works and arguments of Johann Herder, and his understandings of humanity, culture, education and identity through his interpretation of the idea of *besonnheit* – the reflective capacity of the mind 5) Exploring existing contemporary approaches to a 'cosmopolitan education' within the discipline of education itself, and their impact on contemporary cosmopolitan theorising within the social sciences. The thesis then concludes with the development of 6) An Anti-dualist framework for future theorising.

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2   Whether that be incorporated in a Kantian ethico-civil community, or a Herderian *volk*.

As a part of the arguments of this thesis, I note and respond to the partial and selective use of Immanuel Kant's writings that contemporary cosmopolitan theorists have used, either to support their own advancements upon the theory of cosmopolitanism or to reject his works *in toto* in their own variant interpretations of cosmopolitanism. This selectivity, often argued as a simple and logical decision to focus attention on the most pertinent parts of his writings (e.g. his political or philosophical works) or to emphasise his lack of relevance, also serves to erase, downgrade or ignore certain aspects of his thoughts and arguments, for example on race, gender and religion. This erasure of the oft-considered unnecessary, problematic or irrelevant parts of his works prevents a more comprehensive understanding of the complexities of his works and how they inter-relate and interact with each other to create a fuller understanding of his vision of, and for, humanity. Into this also falls his writings on education, which this thesis argues is, and always was, a fundamental part of his cosmopolitan vision and impacts on every part of his philosophical and political theorising. When incorporated back into his works, I demonstrate in chapter three that his cosmopolitan vision presents a radically different and far more problematic plan for his proposed future cosmopolitan world than is typically recognised.

This thesis also responds to arguments as to the fractured nature and interpretation of the concept of cosmopolitanism itself. In response it provides a brief historical analysis of cosmopolitan theorising. It both situates the multiplicity of understandings of the concept into their historical setting, and identifies two key themes of theorising on 'how one becomes a cosmopolitan' and uncovers a methodological shift from traditionalism to criticality that parallels a move from a reliance on Kantian cosmopolitanism and the pre-eminence of universalism, to an avoidance of his works and an emphasis on situated and subjective experiences. This provides answers, in part at least, to the reasons for the unclear, diffuse, conflicting, and often contradictory uses of the term in the contemporary era, and clarification as to the reasons why the role of education faded from cosmopolitan discourses over time.

This thesis then explores the works of Immanuel Kant and Johan Herder. The former is explored in more detail than is customary firstly to present a wider and more comprehensive understanding of how his cosmopolitan vision connects to his less overtly political works, through the idea of education. This analysis identifies the ways in which his arguments on human nature, religion, community, society, gender and race

also played a crucial role in his cosmopolitan vision, and in turn contributed to his position on education and identity, or 'personality'. All of these are reliant upon his development of pure reason and his desire to downgrade, mitigate or remove the influence of emotions on the path and progress of humanity.

The latter, Johann Herder, is presented as an alternate cosmopolitan theorist whose works envisaged cosmopolitanism in a radically different way – arguably in a far more inclusive and situated way - than Kant's own rigorous and, as I suggest in this thesis, necessarily and deliberately elitist and exclusionary cosmopolitan vision. I do this by examining key areas of his argument; on the importance of the reflective mind (*besonnheit*), culture *(Kultur),* history, progress, humanity (*humanität*), and cultivation (*bildung*)[3] in Herderian theorising, and the influence they have over the importance and direction of his educational arguments. I further makes use of his understanding of his response to the philosophical conundrum of 'The One and the Many'. Part 2 also highlights the differing arguments on human nature, society, and identity etc. and their implications for contemporary cosmopolitan theorising. The perceived nature of humanity, the influences and purposes of societies, communities, cultures, and nations and their intra- and inter- dynamics, and the ways in which our identities could or should develop all play their part in determining not just what education could/should be, but the ways in which we are educated and the ways in humanity *should* as a result be educated into or towards cosmopolitanism.

Finally, this thesis re-situates the importance of education that both Kant and Herder placed on human progress and cosmopolitanism back into the centre of the contemporary educational discourses on cosmopolitanism, combining the arguments of the theorists explored in chapter two with the cosmopolitan texts of David Hansen and Hannah Spector from the perspective of education, as well as Mark Bracher (2013), who links Education and Cosmopolitanism to the 'cognitive sciences' and literature. This final exploration establishes the Herderian nature of contemporary cosmopolitan education, then leads to the presentation of an anti-dualist 'Herderian cosmopolitanism' framing by which to reconsider existing approaches to cosmopolitanism, and which suggests future directions for cosmopolitan theorising.

1.2   Cosmopolitan Meanings

This section explores the multiple meanings of cosmopolitanism. I initially follows an

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[3]   The precise meanings that Herder gives for these terms is explored in more detail in Chapter 4.

historical approach, touching on the periods most often referred to by traditional theorists, starting with the earliest uses of the term 'cosmopolitan'. This history, as Inglis (2014a) suggests, is at odds with understandings of cosmopolitanism outside of the political and philosophical disciplines, and touches on concerns that some theorists have raised as to both its history and trajectory. I then explore the use of the term to an ever widening number of historical theorists before examining the contemporary era's use of the word. It then concludes with a discussion of the tensions implied by these ongoing developments. Taken together, these three aspects of its story raise fundamental questions as to its historical meaning(s), its direction, and what education might mean to these variations of cosmopolitan, and its role in its conception.

When considering the historical meaning of cosmopolitanism, "Kosmo Polis" or Citizen of the World, Diogenes' quote serves to set the scene for the concept. He declares that "I am a citizen of the world"[4] and that phrase, used in such a way, provides us with the direction of his perspective. He *declares* this. He thrusts this statement out into the world, asserting his position and status within a non-governed global polity. Not only does he have the power to make this assertion (as a man and a philosopher), but it relies on him being heard, and that message being received, communicated, and responded to. He makes it personal and affirming. He claims the position himself rather that it being awarded to him or being born into it. The use of 'am' denotes here an integral aspect of his personhood, and his use of the concept of the citizen infers not only that he has power in this global polity, but that he possesses status in the form of citizenship, just as others do too, as his equal citizens, and he will treat them according to this perspective. Further, that as a citizen of a demos with no sovereign and no formal constitution, he allows himself to be bound by some form of self-adjudicated 'collective' agreement, but he owes allegiance to no one, and his duty to others is an expression of agency-decided duty, viewed through the lens of a global citizenship framework, and not determined by the local polity he was within. This simple statement positions the role of the citizen of the world in a very specific way – it gives agency to the individual yet also requires equality with others – at the same time that it erases communal identity. It encompasses all humans, yet is a singular assertion, not a collective one and for Diogenes it was "a rebellious reaction against every kind of coercion imposed by the community on the individual" (Hadas 1943, p.108).

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[4]   In chapter five I examine Hansen's uses of a variant translation. He uses the phrase "inhabitant of the world" (2011, p.45).

The position of Diogenes and the Greeks in general, in so many origin stories of cosmopolitanism, sets the scene for the direction that its theorising progresses from. A rejection of, not a movement towards, is the primary reason given for his statement. Borgman suggests that "I am a cosmopolitan... was part of his (Diogenes') effort to criticize if not subvert the conceits of local civilisation" (1992, p. 131) and Diogenes described himself as "cityless, homeless, without a country, poor, a wanderer, living life from day to day" (cited in Douzinas 2007, p.154). His voluntary self-positioning at the margins of society 'allowed' him to then see the culture he was encountering from a different and more authoritative perspective, and, because of his 'distance' (which echoes traditional approaches), he was able to reject their relativistic, and partial experiences of human living in favour of something that he believes is greater. In effect he is, firstly, deciding to turn away from the local to, secondly, move to the 'universal'. As such, the foundation of the term positions cosmopolitanism as a binary of opposition from the local and towards universalism - and it starts from a position of agency. What is though quite crucial to this chapter of the origins of cosmopolitanism is that Diogenes had the ability *and choice* to reject the security and dictates of local citizenship and identity. He was not 'an outcast' in the way that Hansen suggests (2011, pp.37-39) - he was not made an outcast by birth, nor assigned it because of his gender or nationality, rather he chose to *act* and was outcast as a result. His ability to make the choice of incorporation or distance from the local community implies then that he was approaching from a position of power[5] from where his choice could have a wider meaning to those around him. He was not powerless before this choice, and he was not living a powerless life because even whilst living as an outcast, he could have changed his mind and regained a local status.

The next step in the history of cosmopolitanism then moves to Roman additions such as Seneca and Marcus Aurelius[6] before it then leaps forward to Immanuel Kant and the Enlightenment (Inglis 2014a, p.103). From this point, cosmopolitanism is presented variously as "best found in the works of Immanuel Kant and his *ethical* and *political* writings" (Beardsworth 2011, p.19, my emphasis); or "The most important contribution to this body of thought can be found in Kant's writings" (Held 2010, p.41); or that "The modern idea of cosmopolitanism originated in a series of essays written by Kant" (Douzinas 2007, p.160) or "Immanuel Kant is the *de rigueur* point of reference for any

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[5] i.e. That he is recognised as male in a society where *only* men had political agency, he is educated to an elite level, which is recognised by his peers, and he possesses a local citizenship to reject.

[6] And their contributions to its institutional and legal aspects, as well as the idea of 'stepping into the experiences of another'.

discussion on cosmopolitanism" (Mendiata 2009, p.244). The language varies, but the meaning remains essentially the same: to provide the historical grounding for contemporary cosmopolitanism, Kant is the 'go to guy'.

This collective, narrow and partial approach is explored by McMurran in her historical analysis of contemporary cosmopolitanism, where she raises the issue of the prominence of Kant, specifying further that "Immanuel Kant's *political* writings are consistently singled out as the progenitor of theories of cosmopolitanism" (2013, p.xx; my emphasis). This selectivity of Kant's works is focussed on his "ethical and political works" and excludes his own thoughts on education, human nature, culture, religion, identity, race, and gender that he built his cosmopolitan vision from, which as a consequence provides a skewed interpretation of his position and arguments, and of the history of cosmopolitanism itself.

This is not to say that only Kant is mentioned though. Other enlightenment cosmopolitan theorists are occasionally commented on, by a small number of theorists, for example Daniele Archibugi's brief contemplation of Anacharsis Cloots (Archibugi 1992, pp.302-303). The typical approach though is to raise the 'cosmopolitan' angle of the alternate Enlightenment theorist and then to immediately move to dismiss it as unsuitable or not truly cosmopolitan after all (ibid, pp.302-303). At this point, the theorist returns to Kant, but for most instances, there is no mention of another theorist at all. This selectivity also expresses in a second way - to strip out a wider consideration of Kant's works, such as on education, geography or religion. This reliance on a partial understanding of Kant's is also something that those who critique contemporary cosmopolitanism often refer to, for example David Harvey's *Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom* (2009), Charles Mill's *Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism* (2017) and Mendiata's *From imperial to dialogical cosmopolitanism* (2009).

McMurran takes this critique further, arguing that the narrowing of its history extends more deeply than being merely restricted to a selective use of Kant's works. She sources Kant's current role and interpretation in much of contemporary cosmopolitan theorising, whether in the political and philosophical fields, or indeed more widely, as proceeding almost directly from Nussbaum's article *Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism* (1994). Nussbaum's impact on Cosmopolitanism is one widely recognised as bringing it into the

academic 'mainstream' although I disagree with McMurran in one minor aspect[7]; Nussbaum's article was not a bolt out of the blue, but rather was able to have the effect it did because it appeared after a slow but significant increase in articles in the years proceeding her own[8] on the topic of cosmopolitanism, aligning with the ending of the 'Cold War'. Between them, they helped to contribute towards this 'Nussbaum effect', but their intellectual heritage in turn drew from Charles R. Beitz's intervention into international relations – where he injected morality through Kant's Cosmopolitan focussed texts (1975; 1981; 1983) into the theorising of international politics arena that Thomas Pogge and Brian Barry each also contributed to long before Nussbaum's article.

That aside, McMurran's critique argues that Nussbaum's presentation of cosmopolitanism both misrepresents Kant's arguments on cosmopolitanism, as well as ignoring the wider body of literature from other cosmopolitan theorists during the Enlightenment period. Much of the latter theorising and exploration of cosmopolitanism takes Nussbaum's presentation of cosmopolitan and her later works relatively unproblematically, without an awareness of these structural (historical) issues. From this, they fail to acknowledge both its complex heritage and the many-stranded developments and advances that occurred during and after the Enlightenment period. There is effectively a triple filtering of cosmopolitan theorising that directs the theorist firstly to the Enlightenment, absent all save Kant, before it then filters away all those texts not directly pertinent to his political, philosophical and cosmopolitan texts. The final stage is the re-framing of this process through Martha Nussbaum's article.

The re-writing, or ignoring, of its historical heritage, and the concepts, scenarios, and experiences that the term cosmopolitanism is now applied to, and the multiple meanings implicit in its use, suggests a far wider and messier story than the narrow and simple sketch that is used by so many. Pollock et al. responds to this issue by pointing out that "We are not exactly certain what it is, and figuring out why this is so and what cosmopolitanism may be raises difficult conceptual issues" (2001, p.1), and it is these difficult conceptual issues that this thesis in part looks to explore. Figuring out what cosmopolitanism is requires questioning its past because, as Derrida asks us; "Where have we received this image of cosmopolitanism from? *And what is happening* to it? (1997, p.3, his emphasis). His questioning looks to the past to situate an understanding

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[7] This echoes my critique of Ingram's arguments on the impact of Nussbaum in section (2.4.1).
[8] See e.g. Waldron (1989 and 1992), Kaldor (1991), Archibugi (1992), Held (1992), Robbins (1992) and Pogge (1992a & 1992b)

in and of the present, and not just from a theoretical perspective. By asking 'where' he incorporates a sense of physicality and location. He particularises it and he gives it specificity before questioning the present because where the meanings of cosmopolitanism have come from determines, or at the very least influences, our understanding and the subsequent uses we attempt to put it to. Further, "Where have we received?" does not pre-determine or require a singular source but allows for a multiplicity of sources that combine and as such, of the possibility of a multi-faceted idea that strains beyond attempts to fit it into any simplistic thumbnail sketch. If, as Pollock et al., Derrida (and others) suggest, there are fundamental questions, confusions and uncertainties over its meaning, then the story of where it comes from has pertinence to any discussion of what it means, where it is going, and how it means to get there.

Within political theory and philosophy that Nussbaum, Appiah, Pogge, Benhabib, Douzinas and others explore, it is presented relatively consistently, as suggested by Inglis' 'thumbnail sketch', which it takes from Kant and follows the historical path detailed above. But when looked at more widely, it is *messy*, and as Herder would suggest of human nature and progress in general; *fragmentary, contradictory, and dialectical*[9].

This is, I believe, part of both the weakness and strength of contemporary approaches to cosmopolitanism, which raise necessary and fundamental challenges to its meaning, purpose and propagation. This vagueness and the multiples of meanings, often contradictory and conflicting, from theorist to theorist and discipline to discipline, with unexplained exclusions or inclusions of meaning, approach, interpretation and historical narrative, permit or perhaps even encourage what I suggest is a vagueness almost to the point of irrelevancy within a Kantian dualist framing. From a Herderian perspective though, focussed through his thin moral cosmopolitanism of individuality, freedom and agency, and taking into account Hansen's reinterpretation of cosmopolitan as "inhabitant of the world" rather than citizen, they can cohere in clusters, some of them by necessity contradictory and conflicting, connecting in multiple ways to each other.

Extending from this, the determination of who was or was not a cosmopolitan theorist is one that can continually, almost endlessly, widen. From a simplistic history of a single re-presenter (and developer) of the concept; Immanuel Kant, it allows for an almost

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9   See Chapter four.

endless array of variations on different and related themes[10].

1.3   Education and Cosmopolitanism

The previous section explored the multiple meanings of cosmopolitanism, and it is from this variable source that fundamental questions arise as to its connection to education. Not so much *that* it is linked to education historically, but rather that *what* cosmopolitanism is, or what it is conceived to be, determines what type of education could, should, or indeed already does, occur.

With such a wide and in many cases contradictory understanding of its many meanings, education's connection to it as a result varies from the Kantian conscious reconstruction (or revolution) of one's identity as an adult man (1803), and Beck's meta-forces of world risk inducing a cosmopolitanisation of humanity from above (1996), through to Nussbaum's liberal arts education at university developing sympathy and compassion through literature (1997), and Delanty's hybridization or creolisation, as cultures, communities and societies interact (2009), all the way to Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism (2006) and Ingram's radical cosmopolitics from below (2013).

The idea that education contributes to the formation of an individual's identity and their perception of the world is, I believe, an unproblematic assumption to make. We are taught, in specific ways, for specific purposes, and this directs and influences our interpretation of the world around us as we interact with it. We make use of the tools we are provided with, such as language, cultural norms, our abilities to use our bodies and

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[10]   A short (but in no way comprehensive) list of historical theorists and philosophers now or in the past assigned the label of 'cosmopolitan' includes:
Immanuel Kant of course; *Johann Herder*, who rejected Kantian's Cosmopolitanism as elitist, exclusionary and a danger to humanity (Scrivener 2007); *Jeremy Bentham* (Skrivener 2007); *Jean-Baptiste du Val-de-Grace, Baron de Cloots (Anarcharsis Cloots)* who argued for the expansion of (French) cosmopolitan ideals across the globe (Kleingeld 1999a; Archibugi 2005); *Le Marquis de Condorcet* (Rothschild 1996, Valdez 2012); *Auguste Comte* (Inglis 2014b); *Emile Durkheim* (Inglis 2014b, Pendenza 2017); *Franz Fannon* (Go 2013); *Johann Wolfgang von Goethe* who helped to develop the idea of Cosmopolitan Literature and was a student of Johann Herder) (Qing 2014); *Georg Forster* who critiqued Kant's arguments on both race and happiness) (Gray 2012; Kleingeld 1999a); *Dietrich Hermann Hegewisch* who developed a vision of capitalist cosmopolitanism, building on both Adam Smith and Kant's works (Kleineld 1999a); *Alexander von Humboldt* (Ette 2001); *David Hume* (Glowienka 2015); *Karl Marx* (Cheah 2006); *Michel de Montaigne* (Brown 2009, Hansen 2011); *Montesquieu* (Delanty 2009); *Friedrich Nietzsche* (Gagnier 2010); *Georg Philipp Friedrich Freiherr von Hardenberg (Novalis)* who explored romantic cosmopolitanism (Kleingeld 1999a); *Alain Locke* (Harris 1997); *John Locke* (Binney 2010); *John Stuart Mill* (Agathocleous 2010; Appiah 2001); *Thomas Paine* (Walker 2000); *The Abbe Saint Pierre* (Kant); *Friedrich Schiller* (Laursen 1993); *Adam Smith* (Ahmed 2014; Forman-Barzilai 2010; McMurran 2013; Preparata 1996); *Ferdinand Tonnies* (Delanty 2009, Inglis 2009); *Francisco de Vitoria* (Catta 2016, Mignolo 2000); *Christof Weiland* (who popularised the term cosmopolitan during the Enlightenment period, prior to Kant's own works) (Appiah 2006; Beck 2007; Kleingeld 1999a) and *Mary Wollstonecraft* (Scrivener 2007).

minds, and a variety of techniques which are imparted to us, to find a place within that society, communities and groupings, and through our often-subconscious interpretations of the meanings of these norms, we then produce or reproduce new variants of them, or indeed rejections of them. There is, further, considerable literature (see Callan 1997; McDonough & Feinberg 2003; Hansen 2011 etc.) on the deliberate creation of citizens of particular inclinations and perspectives, whether from a political, societal, community, economic, gendered or religious perspective, or indeed from the perspective of the educators themselves. This ranges across formal citizenship education, subtle gender and relationship norms underlying educational policies, all the way to the forcible displacement and re-education of indigenous populations by colonial powers or dominant groups within a state to a minority group. It also includes, for example, the seemingly ever-present fear by governments and peoples that 'the wrong kind of education' can change a person's sexuality or gender and break down the bonds of society itself[11], just as it underlies the belief in and use of conversion therapy to attempt to change a person's gender or sexuality.

To a great extent this is influenced by the ways in which bounded political ideologies are harnessed by political parties within the Westphalian state system, in direct competition with each other for political power. This in turn is expressed through decisions on the form, function and purpose of education, and on the preferred structure of a society's norms in terms of morality, identity, expression, and duty towards the nation state. Cosmopolitanism by contrast, lacks a specific national political presence because of its perceived focus on either the individual, which leads to a distancing of them from identifying with the nation-state or their local community, *or* on the global. Its use as a descriptor to denote something that happens to individuals or people as a result of some form of global influence also suggests that cosmopolitanism is something that just happens to an individual because of globalisation. This lack of direct usefulness to the state, and its lack of intra-national support influences the importance that the idea of cosmopolitanism has for specific national educational approaches directed for the benefit of the state - unless it can be linked to specific aspects of globalism that nation-states approve of, such as global capitalism, liberal universalism, or through moral concepts such as religious belief, universal human rights or ideas of 'equality'.

Cosmopolitan attitudes or identities are instead often presented in direct *opposition* to

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[11] The recent furore over the provision of LGBT education to children, currently receiving much attention in the UK media, is one such case in point.

the needs of a nation-state or a community. This is variously linked to different, and unwanted, religious or cultural identities, for example Jewish people in cold-war Soviet Union (Brooks 1992) or throughout much of Europe historically (Boehm 1935) or well educated, supposedly parasitic individuals in the US and elsewhere, who are perceived to possess little or no sense of local community identity[12]. Given the multiple ways in which cosmopolitanism is used to present undesirable attitudes or identities, to want to encourage the education of 'cosmopolitan individuals' makes little sense from a state's or a bounded moral perspective. These types of undesirable cosmopolitan identities are, given the multiples of negative connotations used to describe them over successive decades and generations, presented in direct opposition to a nation-state's survival or well-being on the global stage, and labelled as parasites, unpatriotic, feckless, footloose, and so on. The current, commonly understood configuration of cosmopolitanism within international relations such as those discussed by Beardsworth (2011) or Held (1995) place cosmopolitanism at odds with a sense of local and communal identity and cohesion. Its erasure, or the downplaying of approaches to cosmopolitanism that link with the incorporation of subjective experiences, positions cosmopolitanism as a rarefied and arguably unrealistic standpoint more akin to radical libertarian individualism, than contributing to a state's determination of what a moral or situated education would or should be designed to produce.

In contrast to this, the rarefied sense of a cosmopolitan moral education, carried primarily by Kant's philosophical writings, projects the idea of the genius and moral cosmopolitan as one who acts in some way as both the conscience of the state and the exemplar of universal morality itself. This can be seen to occur, in part at least, in the privileged educational systems and schools that provided (and continue to provide) states with individuals that served the purpose of the state as if it were the best representative of humanity. Alongside this, Kant explicitly argued that education for the commonality should be designed to provide a level and type of education specifically for the functioning and reproduction of the state, and to channel humanity's natural asocial sociability into economic but not military rivalry. This education would be designed around cosmopolitan norms, but would not incorporate an education in cosmopolitan virtue[13]. The former empowering national universalism and the latter both

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[12] This was an area of exploration in the field of sociology from the 1940's – 1990's in the US, where assumptions of a binary of opposition between cosmopolitan, and local, identities led to a series of empirical studies and a wide body of literature that expanded to the UK in the 1970's. See e.g. Merton (1968), Abrahamson (1965), Gouldner (1957), Hanh (1974), Harvard (1964), Lammers (1974).

[13] See chapter 3 on Kant for more detail on this.

liberal functionalism and global capitalism, all under the needs of the state - and each deliberately failing to either connect or encourage a situated cosmopolitan identity, experience or expression.

If organic imagery were used here, the idea of the state as a body, developed during the Enlightenment period proves adequate. Elite schooling was designed to contribute to the higher functioning of the state, the commonality were to act as the state's limbs. The cosmopolitan 'geniuses' that would appear regardless of environment, would then act as the conscience in the centre of the mind, ready to contribute to the development and refinement of the civil constitution that would be the precursor to a global cosmopolitan society, or its poorer cousin, the pacific federation. Crucially though, this also meant the rejection, chaining, or the deliberately enforced powerlessness of the sources of emotions (i.e. the heart).

The issue then, for cosmopolitanism, is what cosmopolitanism itself means, and what role education as a result should have. Cosmopolitanism is, after all, presented as a 'progressive' or utopian theory that, far from trying to simply accommodate 'what is', looks to 'what could be' and attempts to move towards it. For Kant and his inheritors such as David Held, Daniele Archibugi and Thomas Pogge, this requires the formalisation of humanity in a global-institutional way, continually moving closer and closer to the 'perfect system' and for the most part appearing to rely on existing systems of education, but the further removed from the institutional approach, the more removed the argument is on what education should be to promote cosmopolitanism.

Hansen suggests that we consider the encounter with difference under the idea of 'moving closer apart and further together' (2011), and a number of theorists emphasise the educational power of literature to teach empathy[14]. Ingram, by contrast, produces a cosmopolitan framing that 'teaches' cosmopolitan values as the product of the dialectic between universal oppression and marginalised resistance, as a 'bottom-up' response, whereas Beck's is about cosmopolitanisation from above and its imposition on those below. Appiah's rooted cosmopolitan sits somewhere in the middle as a curiously middle-class response to the power of meta-forces, globalisation and changing economic and political realities on third-world community living, in encounters with the other in a "global village" (2005, p.217).

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[14] For example Aboulifa (2009); Adorjan (2001); Alexander (1947); Bielsa (2014); Bracher (2013) etc.

If cosmopolitanism is a process, then education needs to be understood as a dynamic of that process which leads towards more cosmopolitization, whether it be from above in Beck's case, somewhere in the middle with Appiah and Nussbaum, or below with Ingram and Hansen. If it is practice then it requires a different response, just as it needs different techniques if it is a philosophy or way of life. If it is at odds with local affiliation then it needs to emphasise its global and universal aspects, whereas if it is understood to be an attitude that can only be created in the subjective then a very different and more delicate approach is required (Biestla 2013).

1.4   Kant and Herder

Both Immanuel Kant and Johann Herder understood the reality of a world where people live very different lives, grouped in different polities, with a spread of different perceptions on morality and identity, but their responses to reality was radically different. Kant sought a way to harness the intellect, to move beyond the chaotic impact of human experiences and interactions through constitutional measures and educational practices that direct the practice and expression of morality in a single very specific way. For Kant, ultimately the *problem* he is responding to is *difference* and *change*, and his solution to this was the development of *pure reason* that involves a need to believe in God, and which would lead to the deliberate construction of a single moral-religious-social identity. This required for him a civil constitution, asocial sociability, economic commerce, an international federation, and the refinement of education into a science. His pedagogy would produce individuals who would over time become more and more cosmopolitan as they grew older, and as the science of pedagogy was refined further. They would exert their social status onto the state and its citizens, influencing social norms, the practice of education, and the establishment of laws, from which collectively, a cosmopolitan identity could most easily be developed from. Only then could cosmopolitanism come into being as both a practice, process, and philosophy and approach his Kingdom of Ends.

Kant saw the need for overarching global systems (Cosmopolitan Right, a Pacific Federation and his nine Propositions). Alongside this was the active determination to erase moral difference, a cosmopolitan education for the intellectual elite, and the neutralisation of the masses through the development of a practical schooling system geared to the service of the state that would direct their asocial sociability through trade and enterprise. Behind it all would exist Kant's social, religious and educational

enterprises, in conjunction with Nature and Providence, slowly working on 'the masses' through the weariness of unending conflict that would lead men to create a civil constitution. Kant from here saw firstly the need to turn education into a science – and thus to improve, over succeeding generations, the way by which one could be turned from a flawed, emotionally driven individual into a cosmopolitan man with the same exact moral code as all other cosmopolitan men. His second angle consisted of his development of the ethico-civil society; the actions of these cosmopolitan men moralising the masses and themselves through public moral acts that others could emulate and learn from, even if they could not self-cultivate their morality through pure reason. Kant's justification for such an approach was, quite simply, that emotions were too dangerous and too powerful and, when joined with any use of reason, they would inevitably led to evil unless a pre-constructed moral-religious-cosmopolitan personality could be developed to short-circuit emotionally driven reason. Elite (moral) education, whilst not feasible for a variety of reasons[15] to give to all, and not strong and sure enough to give humanity as a whole the strength to resist, was a necessary aspect that would help to contribute to human progression, and which would give humanity the tools by which a civil constitution could be created.

Herder, by contrast, looked to accommodate a plurality of cultural and moral identities in a fragmentary way that was wary of constitutional, institutional, and bureaucratic routes because of their tendency to dominate and prolong their own existences. His approach rejected the idea of pure reason and universal moral constructs, arguing instead for a holistic understanding of human nature. He also saw, in common with many of the negative views towards cosmopolitanism today, that any universal system or project would become a way in which already dominant groups would reinforce their dominance and serve to solidify cultural difference in an artificial and damaging way. For Herder, *difference* and *change* is the *point* of humanity, not the problem.

This required a recognition of our situated existence, and *besonnheit* (reflection) was the process that humans already used, which could be developed further into a way that we could learn, through acceptance of our own flawed natures, and from differences and commonalities in ourselves and The Other. This reflection, in his approach, because it involved both emotions and reason as a single mental capability, could be reframed as a process of *humanität* that carried with it a moral imperative to act on injustice, inequality, and unfreedom. Education, as a result, in Herder's framing, was not just

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[15]   See chapter three for a more in-depth discussion on this.

about coming to terms with difference, but a project to facilitate the ability to reflect. Essentially being the best self-reflective 'process of becoming' that one could express, and how an individual, and the families and communities that they were a part of, would in turn contribute to a culture where this was both prized and normalised.

The cultivation of this holistic mentality through reflection was, for Herder, the cultivation of genius, which he believed all humans, no matter their gender or race, possessed (Herder 1778). Because of this, education for him needed to be focussed on humanity's cognate-sensate capabilities through formal education, with an emphasis on using happiness, joy and enthusiasm to embed, channel and drive forward positive attitudes throughout an individual's life, especially in their formative schooling years. On to this he added his arguments on the essential role and importance that families, communities, cultures and societies play in providing the linguistic, emotional, cultural and rational frameworks by which we understand and interact with and influence ourselves and the world around us, and the feedback mechanisms by which those frameworks, cultures and communities grew, developed, changed and faded over time[16]. He saw the importance of such communities as essential and unique sites of human experience – something that we as humans are 'already always' a part of. This meant that they needed protection from dangers such as capitalism and European expansion, or indeed any other hegemonic influences that would prevent culture and growing and changing through balanced interactions between cultures through intellectual and social commerce. He perceived any attempt at universalising humanity in a Kantian way as not just inherently flawed, but an attack on human diversity, the primary gateway to European domination of the world, and a fundamental hindrance to the development of a shared humanity.

1.5   Chapter Summations

In Chapter two I explore the normative assumptions on education and cosmopolitan identity which underlying the works of Thomas Pogge, Martha Nussbaum, Seyla Benhabib and James Ingram. Whilst this chapter highlights the relative absence of exploration on the role of the creation of a cosmopolitan identity (either through formal educational systems, or through cultural education – *Bildung*), I piece together underlying norms that they rely on in their works to construct an understanding of the principles and educational assumptions implicit in their writings. Thomas Pogge's

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[16]   *Bildung* and his interpretation of the concept of 'tradition'.

approach to, and interpretation of cosmopolitanism, presents a traditional, universalist approach that aligns closely with Kant's, secularised for the contemporary era. His approach emphasises the replaceability of each individual within his framework, under 'individualism', and behind Rawls' "Veil of Ignorance" (Rawls (1971) 1999, pp.118-122; Pogge 1983; 1992). For him, there is a necessity of a single moral standard and of the positioning of cultural or personal differences and experiences into the category of lifestyle choices that can be overcome or changed through formal education and the personal exertion of one's will.

Benhabib's approach identifies Pogge's position as an aspect of the 'generalised other' who's purpose is to achieve universalised justice, but which only has reversibility when personal experiences and moral encounters of the 'concrete other' are ignored or dismissed into the private realm. In addition, that Pogge's approach (and thus Rawl's) corresponds to the concept of the archetypal male figure. Her response to this is to emphasise the experiences of the concrete other and the role of the 'Good Life', which she proposes through an approach using discourse ethics to produce reversibility for both the generalised and concrete other.

James Ingram argues that cosmopolitanism can only manifest 'from below' – from the locality that Nussbaum argues cannot correspond to a cosmopolitan approach. He sees cosmopolitanism from below as a necessary corrective to the tendency of universalisms to dominate when driven from an ethical perspective that is then politicised, and locates cosmopolitanism as the site where conflicts occur "through which universals are articulated" (2013, p.5). From this, cosmopolitanism is the steps taken to resolve, rather than an end goal, and as such, cosmopolitanism is the interruptions to conceptions of universality, not the point of resolution. The political is where he sees these cosmopolitan moments occurring, and as such, they only manifest when there is resistance to universalising movements that interrupt and redefine the universal, before it in turn is interrupted. These series of dialectics contain echoes of Kant's own argument on 'antisocial sociability' as it relies on an imperfect universalism that changes through the negative experiences for whom the universalism does not fit and who's political responses are produced as a result. Essentially, it relies on the suffering of these groups, and in turn the ability of them to turn it into a political response that those for whom the universalism fits more closely can in turn combine with to produce a new universal that potentially fits both groups better.

The conclusions to chapter two reveals that the main 'problem' with cosmopolitanism is the nature and importance of human groups. Pogge sits firmly on the side of universalism. Benhabib attempts to introduce some form of balance between universalism and particularism through her use of the generalised and concrete other, but still has underlying issues with the idea of culture. Her rejection of cultural identity under the premise that talking about culture reifies it is a weakness to her attempted balance. When added to her democratic iterations that support the civil state over cultural experience, and her enthusiasm for Kant's Cosmopolitan Right[17] reveals a clear preference for universalism over particularism. For Ingram, he locates the *process* of cosmopolitanism in the resistance to universalism, in a dialectic that produces new 'false universalisms' awaiting challenge from below, but he fails to elaborate on what that means, instead retreating from the issue of replicated hierarchies within these groups, and failing to engage with the idea of culture in any meaningful way.

Chapter three re-examines Kant's writings in more depth than is customarily the case, incorporating the majority of his writings from 1764 onwards, and including his works on religion, aesthetics, morality, judgement, anthropology, race, and the state, adding structure, complexity, depth, and additional context to his Cosmopolitan world system. This chapter presents a new interpretation of his overall works, highlighting neglected aspects such as the role of religion and his arguments on community and human nature, into his final international politically themed writings. By doing so, building Kant's cosmopolitan world from its foundational philosophical, ethical and religious principles upwards, it highlights not just the crucial role of education, but also of religion, society and identity re-creation that contributes to his arguments on education, and emphasises the partial, elitist and exclusionary nature of his cosmopolitan vision. It also reveals that an underlying Hobbesian structure informs Kantian cosmopolitanism, principally through the emotions of fear and desire.

Whilst Kant does not assert that humans are selfish by nature, he does still argue that it is necessarily to assume that they are, and so his system requires a response to this factored into his scheme. This is expressed through the importance he places on trade and commerce as 'peaceful' expressions of the manifestation of asocial sociability, as well as in the use of Cosmopolitan Right as a one-side tool that justifies the right to

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[17] I examine cosmopolitan right in the section on Benhabib in section (2.2.4) as well as exploring it in the chapter on Kant in section (3.6.3).

access and intrude on 'natural societies' (but not societies recognised as possessing a civil constitution). Cosmopolitan Right's main purpose here is to expand the reach of cosmopolitan norms through commerce, either through the establishment of colonies and institutions, or through the normalisation of economic practices that contribute to the pragmatic education of the state that would in turn lead to its incorporation into a pacific federation. Education, for Kant, is the principle means by which all other moral and cultural expressions can be slowly erased from all civil societies, and his educational system, both formally and through *bildung*, is designed to normalise cosmopolitan norms into the fabric of all societies. The final point that this chapter reveals is that Kant's system elevates the moral philosopher to the position of the conscience of the state, and that all of his writings on moral education and deliberately directed towards the production of this rare individual through the conclusions reached from the development of pure reason, and not, as is commonly assumed, for the masses.

In chapter four, I engage with the works of Johann Herder, presenting his writings on Humanität not just for his significantly different interpretation of humanity, but also as a cosmopolitan theorist in his own right. This chapter explores his works and his combining of emotionality to rationality as a proto- critical theory academic, and comprises his ideas of global society, community and identity through language. It presents Herder's works are of a surprisingly contemporary nature, with a focus on empathy and the recognition and importance of shared experiences of vulnerability and suffering to facilitate interactions with the other. In so doing, these two chapters highlight the historical importance of education in their arguments.

Chapter five examines the writings of contemporary educators who have specialised in the theorising of cosmopolitan education. By exploring the works of David Hansen, it establishes the surprisingly Herderian nature of his arguments and approaches to cosmopolitanism, as well as the importance of re-framing of cosmopolitanism as 'inhabitant of the world'. I engage with Mark Bracher, whose use of cognitive theory and psychological approaches to cosmopolitanism through literature allows for a clarification both of the base moral expectation of cosmopolitanism, and the subsequent route by which cosmopolitan sentiments of compassion (which incorporates a moral imperative to act) can be instilled in a person, through a literature education. This approach requires the breaking down and reformulating a series of paired binaries by which humans are assigned into different mental categories of man vs animal, and man

vs woman. I then explored Hannah Spector's cosmopolitan approach to imagination, where she argues that economistic approaches to education, in conjunction with increasing bureaucratisation has both negatively impacted on the likelihood of the productive imagination, and skewed reproductive imagination in economistic ways. I then examine Ling's trialectical approach to world politics (2017) as a way of introducing nonbinary concepts into the idea of cosmopolitanism.

The chapter concludes by arguing that a nonbinary re-framing of cosmopolitanism, which breaches the implicit binaries inherent in Kant's cosmopolitanism and his inheritors, can serve to produce new ways of thinking about the meaning and purpose of cosmopolitanism itself.

Chapter 2: Re-presenting

Contemporary Cosmopolitanism

Contents:

2.1   Introduction

This chapter examines the works of three prominent cosmopolitan theorists: Thomas Pogge, Seyla Benhabib and James Ingram. I initially present the main thrust of their respective works before delving more deeply into some of the key arguments of each of the theorists. I explore how, whilst they do not explicitly explore the idea of education in any detail, their approaches still give us insight into the underlying norms on human nature, identity, culturing, and cosmopolitanism itself that they rely on. From this, I lay out and expand on how their arguments relate to education, and the kind of education implicit in their arguments.

Whilst education is the primary focus of this thesis, this claim, as one of my main assertions is that education is (mostly) absent from contemporary international relations and political understandings of cosmopolitanism, when historically it was considerably more important. As such, proving a negative through the relative absence of explicit discussions on education is not in and of itself sufficient to justify this, because their works and arguments contain within them implicit norms of how we as human beings are shaped through education, either of a formal type in a schooling setting (and of course not just what we learn but also how, where and why we are taught), or of an informal type through culturing and socialisation. Because of this, the expectations of how humans act, react, perceive themselves and others, develop, change, and connect to

other humans are critical. An assumption of humans as isolated units, or as always already a part of cultures and communities, or that humans are by nature selfish, deceitful, violent, or evil, or perhaps altruistic or innocent at birth, all bring with them different expectations on how identity is present in a new-born, and then shaped, and as a consequence what role the many types of education take in achieving this. What we are taught and what we learn, whilst obviously not the same things, are both heavily influenced by the assumptions on what is being shaped in the process, the methods taken to educate, the locations in which it happens and the social environment, and the many different desired outcome(s). Since education itself is rarely explored in any great detail within political discussions of cosmopolitanism, a wider analysis is needed that takes account of expectations of human nature, identity creation and development, because implicit within these are assumptions about what it means to be and grow as a human being, and on how, or even whether, education shapes our identities (and if so, to what degree).

There are a number of other theorists who have contributed to the development of political cosmopolitanism in the contemporary era[18], and in addition there are those not specifically writing within the field of politics, whose works have an impact on political cosmopolitanism[19], yet both Thomas Pogge and Seyla Benhabib frequently serve as key initiators to many of these theorists' own developments. According to Google Scholar, Thomas Pogge's article *Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty* (1992b), is one of the most cited articles that has appeared on cosmopolitanism[20], and Seyla Benhabib's book *Another Cosmopolitanism* (2006a)[21] has impacted in a similar way. Only Derrida's book *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness* (2001)[22] which was mentioned in the introduction, and Martha Nussbaum's *Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism* (1994)[23] have exceeded theirs. As such, their works and arguments are seminal to understanding the current status of cosmopolitan theorising. My selection of James Ingram, although his works are much more recent than Benhabib and Pogge, is due to his quite different and more unusual approach. Whilst other theorists outside of politics typically explore the idea of bottom-up cosmopolitanism, very few of them have explored it from an

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[18] e.g. Daniele Archibugi, Charles R. Beitz, Gillian Brock, Garrett Wallace Brown, Steven Caney, Fred R. Dallmyr, Costas Douzinas, David Held, Mary Kaldor, Martha Nussbaum, Onara O'Neill, Samuel Scheffler, Jeremy Waldron, Thomas C. Walker, and others.
[19] e.g. Anthony Appiah, Ulrick Beck, Gerard Delanty, Pheng Cheah, Robert Fine, David Inglis, Nikos Papastergiadis, Florian Pitchler, Bruce Robbins, Lee Trepanier etc.
[20] 1274 citations; Google Scholar, 04-07-18.
[21] 1260 citations; ibid.
[22] 2364 citations; ibid.
[23] 1917 citations; ibid.

explicitly *political* and *theoretical* perspective. His inclusion allows me to cast a wider net and present a broader spectrum of meaning through their works.

2.2   Thomas Pogge

Thomas Pogge's works have been directed towards global ethical issues, with a focus on poverty and global injustice, best characterised as an analytical and political philosophical approach. His earliest works were for the main part either responses to the writings of John Rawls, or redevelopments of his ideas[24]. He argues largely from within a Rawlsian framework, but with an emphasis on the global, a significant aspect of which focusses on global health and socio-political issues (Lake 1992, p.474). For this reason, Pogge's approach could be categorised as a universalisation and modification of Rawls arguments rather than a distinctly new approach (although some of his 'tweaks' are not inconsiderable in their own right and produce significantly differences in their conclusions). From the early 2000's, Pogge moved more explicitly towards focussing on global injustice, health and poverty[25]. As a part of this, he re-characterises the idea of a positive moral response to alleviate suffering worldwide (through charity and philanthropy etc.) into a *negative* duty, arguing that we (as in western developed nations and the people therein) are *actively* complicit in the suffering of others through maintaining and supporting an institutionally biased economic system (1989 & 2008b).

This section commences with a brief overview of his works, before focusing on three key areas of Pogge's research. Firstly his much quoted 'three aspects of Cosmopolitanism' (2.2.1) where I highlight the difference between individualism and individuality. Secondly, I explore his approach to human groupings and his arguments on essential and additional rights (2.2.2). Finally, in section (2.2.3) I examine the underlying Rawlsian norms that Pogge makes use of, and Susan Okin's critique of Rawls, alongside Pogge's own writings on education, to explore the unspoken educational grounds of Pogge's cosmopolitanism. I then conclude by arguing that Pogge's scheme is designed to reject the particular whenever it comes into conflict with the universal, and contains normative assumptions of justice as fairness, which naturalises the dominant culture within the state, and rejects the political nature of the domestic sphere. Whilst there is cultivation to cosmopolitan particularity (i.e. socialisation) within the family, primarily from the female carer, all other levels,

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[24]   See Pogge (1983, 1988, 1992a, 1992b, 1994, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2000a, 2001d, 2001e, 2002a, 2002b and 2004a), but see especially *Realising Rawls* (1989).
[25]   Pogge (2005, 2008a, 2008b, 2010 and 2011).

whether socialisation, formal education or institutional requires and prioritises universality, as does his presentation of group identity as a voluntary association that can be dismissed or rejected at will.

2.2.1   Three Aspects of Cosmopolitanism

The first area that I explore is featured within Thomas Pogge's *Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty* (1992b). In this, he presents his much referenced and repeated 'three aspects of cosmopolitanism' which a number of other theorists have made use of in their own arguments, and it forms a core element of contemporary cosmopolitan theorising (e.g. Cavallar 2011, p.7)[26]. Pogge commences the section that this quote is taken from by simply by stating that "Three Elements are shared by all Cosmopolitans", and in so doing implicitly rejects the cosmopolitanism of cosmopolitan theorists who do not agree with him. He then continues:

> "First, *individualism*: The ultimate units of concern are human beings, or persons - rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, nations, or states. The latter may be units of concern only indirectly, in virtue of their individual members or citizens. Second, g*enerality*: This special status has special force. Persons are ultimate units of concern for everyone – not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists and such like. Third: *universality*: The status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human being equally not merely to some subset, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, whites, or Muslims." (Pogge 1992, pp. 48-49, his emphasis).

There are three main aspects to this formation to be considered: firstly, two of the points he lists, *Individualism* and *Generality*, could as easily refer to a bordered liberal ideology such as Rawls presents. The addition of *Universality* effectively establishes it as a borderless liberal ideology. This suggests that Cosmopolitanism for Pogge[27], is, broadly speaking, the universalisation of liberalism rather than a specifically different set of ideas, ideals and meanings[28].

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[26]   David Held describes it as a part of the 'third conception of cosmopolitanism', which he suggests comes from Beitz, Pogge and Barry (Held 2010, pp.39-44). He also refers specifically to this text (ibid. pp.44-46) when doing so. He locates the Stoics as the first, and the second occurring during the Enlightenment period (solely with reference to Immanuel Kant), which suggests a kind of 'parity of importance' to these three conceptions and also aligns with Inglis' thumbnail historical sketch. Daniele Archibugi follows a similar although somewhat less elevated path; in his case "...build[ing] upon the definitions introduced by Charles Beitz... Thomas Pogge... and David Held" (Archibugi 2004b, p.20) and Stan Van Hooft quotes verbatim the whole section of Pogge's text (Van Hooft 2009, pp.4-5) from which he then develops his own arguments.

[27]   As it is for Brian Barry (see Bacon 2003) and others.

[28]   See also Beardsworth (2011) who follows on from Pogge and links liberalism and cosmopolitanism together in a similar way.

Secondly, whilst Pogge emphasizes the fundamental importance *of* the individual over that of the groupings that humans form in this formula, he fails to explain (either here or elsewhere) the importance of the individual *as* an individual or what it means *to be an individual*. I am referring here to a distinction between the meanings of individualism and individuality. The latter I take to be suggestive of that which makes an individual a unique and irreplaceable person, and the former indicative of the *idea* of an individual - the concept of the interchangeable individual, irrespective of geographical location or social environment (see also Simmel 1917/2007). Pogge's arguments align specifically with this understanding of individualism rather than that of individuality. Because he is projecting from the global downwards, as "...The ultimate *units* of concern are human *beings*..." in the plural (1992b; my emphases) as a collectivity of human beings, who can only be incorporated into his theorising of humanity *in general* in this way and his positioning of an individual's particularity to *indirect concerns* emphasises the generality aspect further[29].

Individualism also aligns closely to Kant's arguments, where he emphasises the absolute necessity of a single underlying moral system, which *requires* this level of interchangeability. As a 'successor' and 'progressor' of sorts, of Kantian arguments on cosmopolitanism, this also corresponds to Pogge's own position on morality and ties in to his support for Rawls' *Veil of Ignorance.* Pogge's approach, to explore humans only in their conceptual collectivity as humanity *in toto* (but tellingly not in the collectives that humans create and gain political, legal, and social recognition from, such as communities, cultures and societies) skirts around but does not directly engage with the arguments of other theorists such as Benhabib, where importance is placed on the recognition that each human is both a unique individual, and an inextricably connected to one's ongoing group ties (familial, social, cultural, societal etc.). Instead, Pogge downgrades the factors that contribute to our uniqueness as optional aspects that we can chose or discard at will *other than what is gained through formal education*[30]. As such, these optional extras, for Pogge, do not contribute to who we *truly* are – the core of one's identity - as they are aspects that *anyone* could possess at will[31].

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[29] See also section (2.3.1) for a more in-depth exploration of the generalised other.
[30] This is the main topic for section (2.2.3).
[31] I examine this area in section (2.3) where I explore Benhabib's works. I widen and distinguish the differences between these two terms further, through her interpretation of the generalised and concrete other (1992, pp.148-177). I situate Pogge's approach in the generalised other position, with Benhabib's focus on the concrete other as the site in which one's individuality is expressed through subjectivity. In addition, I explore Benhabib's attempt to develop concrete 'reversibility' and respond to this with Young's idea of reciprocity.

The third main aspect to this is in response to *the way* that he presents humans through individualism whilst simultaneously diminishing the social and cultural aspects of human existence. He refers to them as *indirect* concerns, and as such, the subjective environment, experiences and potentiality of different 'natures' is placed outside of the individual. The first point mentions familial, ethnic, religious and political structures – those most commonly explored in sociological and cultural explorations, but in the third point, he uses a mixture of physical traits (men, white), class status (aristocrats), pseudo-scientific racial groupings (Aryans) and once again religion (Muslims). This array of groupings with organisation into types, or recognition of their differences is one that at first glance appears curious but of no great significance, as humans are often identified in such ways through appearance, mannerisms and dress. What it does, however, do is place this mixed selection of different ways in which humans are grouped into the same conceptual 'bag' – and as a result gives them the same conceptual significance. Given the significant differences between these groups, it suggests that *any* aspect of difference that humans collectivize around would also be interpreted in much the same way by Pogge. As such, any group is, or should be considered, 'the same' as any other, whether it be a group formed through similarities of gender, sex, sexuality, life experience, geographic environment, or physical or mental differences.

Whilst he suggests that his three points are shared by all Cosmopolitans, his individualism makes no allowance for the types of choice-less individuality I have mentioned. His individualism instead approaches and corresponds to the idea that humans are essentially interchangeable, within a collective of all other individuals, subsumed behind a generality of human nature, sourced from the Kantian moral subject, with no distinction between lifestyle choices, cultural experiences or even biological realities. Further, his approach assumes, along with Kant, that humans are progressing ethically and that religious, racial and cultural ties and differences will be resolved simply through greater levels of respect being expressed between different groups.

2.2.2 Human Groupings

In the previous section I discussed Pogge's three aspects of Cosmopolitanism, which raised a number of concerns with his structuring of cosmopolitanism, and the terminology he uses. It examined, as it related to these aspects, his approach to the distinction between individualism and individuality, and Pogge's clear favouring of the

concept of individualism, over the existence and experience of individuality, and the different needs that arise as a result. I then started to explore the approach that Pogge takes to the idea of human groupings, where he groups a wide variety of different characteristics, experiences, and life histories into the same conceptual bundle.

This section develops this angle further, raising additional issues with his approach to human groups, and as a direct consequence, how Pogge interprets difference itself - as an optional extra that we can chose to possess or discard at will. Pogge explores his understanding of human grouping further, when he approaches the idea of group rights and ethnicity, which Gillian Brock (2002) engages with, where she notes that "Pogge argues that whatever we demand from a just and fair political process for ethnic minorities, we should also demand for any other minorities: If enough citizens share a certain identification and are willing to form a coalition for the sake of securing representation for themselves in a legislature, irrespective of the type of their identification... In this case, it may be plausible to go well beyond our standard group types (ethnic, religious, linguistic, lifestyle) to include also dentists, dog-lovers, stamp collectors, war widows, socialists and Porsche drivers" (Pogge 1997b, p.180 & Pogge 2010, p.201, paraphrased in Brock 2002, p.289).

As was noted in the previous section, his grouping together of widely different human interests, possessions, experiences and alignments creates a direct equivalence between lifestyle choices, professional associations, emotional tragedies and the ownership of property, to those of family, ethnicity, race, and even gender. But Pogge takes this still further, asserting that "deciding what group rights we, as society, may or should grant to various groups, we ought not favour groups of one type, as such, over groups of another" (p.187). It is here that he places a moral, political, and social equivalence between groups that ignores the numerous conceptual and empirical differences between these different types of groups. He clearly refuses to accommodate or account for a fundamental difference between any of these types of groups – those we chose as an act of expression of our personality (stamp collecting, owning vehicles), groups that are chosen for us (ethnicity, race, religion, linguistic), those for which we have no choice (gender, sexuality, physical and mental divergences or typicalities) and of course those which blur the boundaries between the ideas of nature, nurture, and agency.

Instead, he allows for the possibility of stamp collectors being placed on the same value

level as family ties or gender and he appears to conceive of human beings as having both the capacity and the opportunity to take up or discard all of these affiliations and connections through conscious choice alone – as autonomous units who can chose freely and objectively, and can perhaps even exist without any sense of or need for social community. Pogge's decision to place racial, cultural, familial, and other choice-less groupings in the same conceptual position as stamp collectors, Porsche drivers or dog-lovers – and perceiving that their self-declared requests *could* be viewed with the same level of importance becomes, in his view of cosmopolitanism, a matter of how effectively those groups of people connect politically and then acts on their desires for special consideration. From this, he places their wants as a factor of *additional* rights (but not *essential* ones, which would be based on need, not want); but only in so far as those rights and wants would be equal or equivalent to those of any other group that decide to also organise and act.

Pogge's approach neglects the rare, and unusual individual whose *needs, perceptions and experiences* are markedly different and cannot help but be so, and is, I believe, a key attribute that is too often overlooked in political cosmopolitan theorising because its theorising tends to gravitate to either the global level, or on how cultural and ethnic groupings specifically are impacted by global dynamics in 'cosmopolitan' ways. There is a vast differential between the political connections, social status and economic advantages of Porsche owners desiring cheaper fuel, faster driving lanes, or lower taxes on vehicle insurance, and that of, for example a disabled, transgender, bisexual, working-class woman who needs access to essential healthcare[32]; or perhaps of an intersex person who requiring uniquely specific protections at birth (or perhaps even an entirely different legal category of gender and/or sex being recorded and recognised by the state) as *essential* rights for them, which are not required by others.

Natural inequalities, for example in the case of disabilities, are only relevant to Pogge's conception of justice if they impact on the *institutional* structure of a 'just' society (Oosterlaken 2013, p.205). Because of this, rights for Pogge become essential only when it is possible to determine through a causal chain of logic (ibid. p.211) that *institutional* injustice exists and contributes to injustice. Yet curiously, in his example of disabled people and traffic lights (2002a)[33], whilst he acknowledges it as an institutional

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[32] For her this would be an *essential* right, incorporating social norms like marriage, as well as less overt social, political and religious stigmatising and persecution, the opportunity to access life-saving medical care, as well as fundamental changes to the institutional systems that regulate her life.

[33] Pogge considers traffic lights to be a part of the institutional order and thus an 'essential right'.

injustice - blind people cannot see the lights and thus are unsafe when attempting to navigate crossing roads - his response is to suggest guide dogs be given to them. This implies that compensation for injustice (providing a 'tool' to navigate traffic lights) appears to be a more appropriate response for Pogge than a change to the institutionally unjust system (modifying traffic lights so that blind people can navigate them without tools). Pogge seems reluctant to respond to the obvious institutional injustice with a revision to the institutional system, whereas elsewhere he has a much more positive response to inequality (e.g. health care and global poverty) when they are *not* framed through specific and localised human groupings, but rather seen as amorphous global issues that require an institutional change.

Even more surprisingly, when he contemplates the existence and needs of disabled people he concludes that "Nearly all persons with special mental or physical needs or disabilities today would be perfectly capable of leading happy and healthy lives if they were not suffering the effects of severe past (and present) *resource deprivation*" (1992b, p.186, my emphasis). His response to disability is a response to a perceived historical, cultural, and social inequality, but *not* an institutional inequality, or to accommodate a factor of human variation. He presents, effectively, disabled people as *the problem to be fixed* and not the institution. As a consequence, with the 'right' institutional system these problems can be resolved, and one must assume as a consequence that for Pogge, once this is in place, 'nearly all' disabled persons would no longer (need to) be disabled – that disability would essentially 'be resolved' - and should disabled people still exist after this resolution, they would fall outside of his framework of institutional justice and into other areas (p.190) – which would be framed as *additional* rights, to responded to through compensation as a kind of bargain that all groupings of humans can and have an equal right to engage in.

Pogge does suggest that different ethical and moral positions could be a factor in resolving these inequalities, but his analysis of these different groups as political equivalents, and his assessment of them as requiring the same essential rights, suggests that the aim of his works is not just not aimed at the existence or removal of structural (cultural) inequalities, but that it is also not aimed at accommodating human difference at all at the level of essential rights. He instead sees difference itself as either an 'optional extra', and thus not within the scope of his idea of justice at all (Ward & Wasserman 2015), or he sides with the institutional system when it comes into conflict

with cultural and group rights (Pogge 2002a). As a result, Pogge position appears to clearly support this hierarchy of needs, established from his philosophical base that he takes from Kant, through Rawls, and is resistant to the idea of local-group led variances influencing his overall global rights system.

On top of this, and linked to the political capabilities of different groups to achieve additional rights through activism and economic power, is that the struggle to achieve them in his hierarchical system does not start from a level playing field. It instead privileges those further up the hierarchy – and crucially, those who's essential needs already fit within the borders of Pogge's hierarchical needs system. As a result, his conclusions seem both overly simplistic and structurally incapable of achieving the equality he argues for. It suggests rather that his desire to protect and support his theoretical structure for the rights of individuals is made at the cost of many of the things that contribute to our individuality and give our lives specific and personal meaning, and also of those which make us different, through no choice of our own, and influence the development of our identity and experiences).

2.2.3   Education

The previous section explored Pogge's approach to human groupings, and his positioning of their needs or wants as justifying *additional* rights granted based on their ability to act politically and successfully argue for their rights in such a context. I also commented on his shift of what I argued should be considered *essential* rights to the *additional* rights bracket, based on the appeals from a (local) group approach (such as disabled people) rather than when perceived on the global level. This section now explores the few times that Pogge directly engages with the idea of education. To build this understanding further, I explore the underlying philosophical and normative premises that both he and Rawls share, through Okin's critique of Rawls. I then consider how the previous sections on the three aspects of cosmopolitanism and his views on human groupings contribute to a wider understanding of his position on education.

Given Pogge's assumptions of the conceptual similarity between the different types of groups explored in the previous section, and his stance that membership can be taken up or cast aside at will, his perspective on education continues in this vein, which he places on both a formal and 'elevated' footing. Whilst the various particulars of our experiences are secondary to the individual, and considered optional extras, Pogge's view of

education by contrast is that "their educational background is a permanent trait" (1983, p.156). His approach takes identity as something we are formally educated into (and as such, a prerequisite to his cosmopolitanism) and from there, that this education is (both simply and profoundly) the process by which the tools to (re)create oneself are provided, and the method by which one is shaped into a specific type of person. He approaches this from the position of 'educational equality' (pp.67-68) because he recognises that "Education (as *health*) is a vital good in its own right, access to which has a fundamental impact even on the kind of person we are to become" (pp.75-76, his emphasis) and that once acquired "their educational background is a permanent trait" (p.157). His analysis of the impact of education establishes it as a permanent enhancement or alteration to a person, which changes the direction of the rest of their life and he places it as an equitable, rather than equal need, which recognises those with less capability requiring more than those with 'natural endowments' (pp.154-155), and his 'Opportunity Principle' requires that disadvantages be minimised.

The mode of education that I identified in Pogge's works is public and general in nature, and corresponds to his use of individualism. The point I made at the beginning of this section, about the interchangeability of individuals underlying his assumptions on human nature, must also be so for the subject and purpose of the educational experience itself. Pogge implicitly positions education at the core of his approach to cosmopolitanism, but other than determining that it is critical to a person's identity, and that some form of global equity in education is necessary (pp.156-157) he takes this angle no further. Socialisation through community, culture, ethnicity, by contrast, and choice-less variances by implication, are assumed by him to be aspects that can be taken up, discarded, or 'traded' in similar ways to one hobby being swapped for another, and the acquisition of possessions producing similar aspects of a person's interest.

Frustratingly, Pogge goes no further in explaining what this 'permanent trait' means - whether there are better or worse 'traits', whether this trait is something that can be attached at any time in a person's life, or whether it is a requirement for a cosmopolitan identity. Nor does he explore why other forms of education and learning from a cultural or even familial perspective are not granted this elevated status. But given that Pogge's emphasis is on individualism rather than individuality, that he considers humans in their generality, and that these should be universal, what comes across is firstly that a universal standard of education appears to be the type he would be most in favour of,

and secondly, that there is an absence of awareness of the profoundly *particular* influence that 'education' and socialisation before and outside of formal schooling has during one's childhood.

Pogge only gives hints to the underlying educational norms contained in his works, but when he does, he makes similar assumptions to John Rawls. In *World Poverty and Human Rights* (2008b) for example, he intimates that humans are by nature selfish because when they are in a position of strength they attempt to avoid moral norms "designed to protect the livelihood and dignity of the vulnerable" (p.5). This aligns closely with Rawls' own first assumptions when considering the reason for his Veil of Ignorance because "Somehow we must nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men *at odds* and tempt them to *exploit* social and natural circumstances *to their own advantage*" (Rawls 1991, p.118, my emphases). Both simply assume this and take as a norm a base level of understanding of human nature embedded within Kant's works, which he in turn builds in response to the possibility of a Hobbesian nature.

Because of this, I turn to John Rawls' approach to human nature (in the absence of a specific examination by Pogge himself), which situates and gives the home environment a profound position in the development of an individual's intellectual and emotional capabilities, and as a result Pogge's own works. Whilst conclusions drawn from Rawls' arguments are not necessarily identical to Pogge's, there is a significant level of similarity to their normative grounds on human nature, which is of importance here and indicates that a Rawlsian understanding of human nature and a child's environment can be interpreted and transposed under Pogge's position. Other theorists, such as Henry Richardson suggest that Pogge "approaches Rawls's texts with a philosophical frame of reference not that distant from Rawls's own" (2011, p.230), and Valentin Stoian notes that Pogge accepts Rawls' "normative premises" but disagrees with his empirical premises (2012, p.139). Further, Thomas Pogge himself asserts at numerous times that he approaches Rawls from a Rawlsian framework (1987; 1989; and 1994[34]). Whilst he may and indeed frequently does disagree with the theoretical and empirical *developments* of Rawls' arguments, the underlying framework, the pure philosophy and theoretical construction, as it were, of what, how and why the human 'is', even if the direction the human 'goes' is seen differently, stays approximately the same. They both, in addition, take a great deal of their arguments and developments from Kant's own works, which adds another layer of similarity to their normative assumptions.

[34] Pogge states here "In my own extension of Rawls's framework" (p.195).

Essentially, the argument here is that Rawls (and consequentially Pogge) prioritises the male archetype figure's characteristics in their works, and their focus on (or dismissal of) particular types of justice and morality follows this framing, which are woven into their decisions on what resides in the public and private domains of life. Susan Okin, Seyla Benhabib and Iris Young each critique Rawls on this from different perspectives, but I will restrict myself to Okin's critique here, as I explore other aspects of Benhabib's Rawlsian/Poggesian critique (and Young's response to Benhabib) in the next section. Susan Okin's three articles where she critiques Rawl's approach to the family[35] from a gender perspective[36] serve as the basis for this part of the section. Okin's approach, it should also be noted, while focussed more on gender, also has implications on the privileging of a particular type of human with his arguments.

Briefly, Okin's main objection is to Rawls' use of the idea of a 'head of a household' (the man) as one of the institutional foundations for his works, and both the implicit and explicit assumptions about the private domain within the household that this entails. This has a "fundamental effect upon their accounts of moral subjects and the development of moral thinking" which, due to the strong Kantian influence on Rawls, forces him to make "unacceptably egoist assumptions about human nature". Rawls presents his works in such a way that it is "sometimes viewed as excessively rationalistic, individualistic, and abstracted from real human beings" and one of Okin's main thrusts in her articles is to argue that even though Rawls presents his argument in this way, he relies on "a voice of responsibility, care, and concern for others" (1989, p.230) but is unable to present it as such because of his reliance on Kantian language, which rigidly separates reason from feeling. His assertion that the Veil of Ignorance is implicit in Kant's works (p.231) further strengthens this stance and gives it more of a cosmopolitan aspect.

For Okin, Rawls is "unwilling to call explicitly on the human qualities of empathy and benevolence in the working out of his principles of justice and in his lengthy description of the process of deliberation that leads to them." (p.234). From this, Okin suggests that Rawls' account of moral development is clearly unable to be founded on a Kantian account of rationality with the splitting off of reason and feeling (p.235). This is because

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[35] He asserts; "given that family institutions are just" (Rawls 1991, p.429).
[36] *Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice* (1989), *Political liberalism, Justice and Gender* (1994) and *Justice and Gender: An Unfinished Debate* (2004).

although he situates moral development in the family unit, which he suggests is the western nuclear family (i.e. heteronormative, and with a male head) he makes this foundational by asserting "that a just, well-ordered society will be stable only if its members continue to *develop* a sense of justice" (ibid. my emphasis). He then goes on to present the argument that both justice and right are founded on *loving* a child, which in turn drives a child's admiration of the parent – and a desire to be the kind of person their parents are. Moral development, for Rawls, *requires* "love, trust, affection, example, and guidance (TOJ, p.467)" (Okin 1989, p.236; Rawls 1991, pp.406-7), and from this foundation of love, trust and affection the child grows and takes on new roles, more responsibilities, and has new experiences "as we assume a succession of more demanding roles with their more complex schemes of rights and duties" (Rawls 1991, p.411). It is this which allows the individual to cast a wider net into which they can "put ourselves into another's place and find out what we would do in his position" (Okin 1989, ibid.; Rawls 1991, p.410).

Okin goes on to suggest that "This whole account of moral development is strikingly unlike that of Kant" (ibid.) but I would disagree with her here. Rawls' account of moral development is *founded* on love – primarily driven by the "loving ministrations of those who raise small children from the earliest stages" (p.237) which develops through multiples of revisions of experiencing different roles and responsibilities, as a person with agency. Kant's approach[37] also starts with a parent's love, because he recognises the underlying power and influence of emotionality unless it serves the purpose of reason - but Kant's approach to formal education - primarily from a male tutor figure in a male only environment - is designed to help *supplant* it with a *revolution of thought* that occurs later in life. The person's subsequent experiences serve to strengthen and fortify this through the exercise of their will in the service of their duty. The difference here is not love as the base of a child's experience, but rather that Rawls sees this as an ongoing and continuous development, as reason contributes to a foundation of love, essentially layering morality on top of, rather than reconstructing it through a Kantian moral revolution of thought, where reason *replaces* love. The crucial difference here is that Kant is frightened of the power of emotionality[38], and so wants to side-track and divert its influence as much as possible whereas Rawls' system firstly relies on it within the home environment, develops reason from this foundation, and then wants to ignore it

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[37] See Section (3.6.1).
[38] I explore this aspect further in chapters 3&4 (See Sections (3.3) and (4.2.3.2)) as well as touching on it again in chapter five.

when considering the public realm.

The points I take from Okin's re-reading of Rawls here is that it is not just because of love and emotional closeness that we are able to position ourselves into the place of the other (which is her main point), but that we firstly put ourselves into the location of those emotionally closest to us, through a positive emotional connection with them. Each succeeding repositioning of ourselves through taking different familial, cultural, economic, societal, authority or group etc. roles, as we develop, allows us to put ourselves further into the place of the other who is more and more distant in some way from us. This suggests that closeness to ourselves (whether conceptually, geographically, or through other frames of reference, but starting within the family) and experiencing many different roles (as we grow develop and change), is rooted in, and extends from, an echoing of love for the other that starts in the family, primarily linked the main care-giver. This is Rawls' essential, and under-explored, deduction of a child's moral development which he relies upon.

The hierarchical nature of the home environment and of wider society then, in a Rawlsian/Poggesian framing, with lines of commonality and difference, depends on their cultural, familial, and societal framing of what is or is not the same or different, and critically, *how different we are told that they are* by those in positions of authority above us and who have influence over us in some way, and how this is reinforced over time. Each angle presents different ways in which humans align to these three factors. Closeness, then, could be towards 'an Other', and make use of the historical emotional closeness we have had to a person through the conceptual positioning of them in our minds as 'mother', 'brother', 'sister' etc. This is then transposed onto someone who reminds us in some way of our mother, brother or sister. They become 'like mother', 'like brother' or 'like sister' and this allows us to form bonds between us and them. The different roles we take, and the experiences we have then serve as templates which we subconsciously or consciously test or place against other roles and experiences. My experience *in* the role of daughter to others, or my role as 'Asian woman' that I can align conceptually to your experience as a 'black woman' etc. Different types of experiences and identities that we (can) unconsciously associate with each other.

The implications of this is that Rawls's approach to the universal, as I suggest is also the case for Pogge's, is framed as a *particular* experience which is then reframed through

such devices as Rawl's 'Original Position' and his 'Veil of Ignorance', as a *universal* norm of experience, built on the idea of the family unit being just, as well as binary, heterosexual and monogamous, situated in a western liberal (or perhaps social) democracy, and regulated in a gendered and hierarchical way that is already inherently unequal and, according to Okin (and indeed Young and Benhabib) institutionally unjust. Okin's critique and suggested progression of Rawls' stance is one that he explicitly rejects, through his later publication *Political Liberalism* (1993), where he strips the issue of injustice within the family from his institutional structure of the family unit that he relies on - Okin's primary angle for her critique of his works. He instead doubles down on the family unit needing to be considered an ideal type and moves on.

The family unit, especially the head of the family, for Rawls, is considered a basic institutional unit, and as such should be considered both public and political in nature, yet at the same time he also argues that "The political is distinct... from the personal and familial" (Rawls 1993, p.137; cited in Okin 1994, p.26). From this, Okin concludes that Rawls' clarification between "the political and the nonpolitical coincides with his distinction between the public and the nonpublic" (Okin 1994, p.27). When he discusses slavery via race as constituting "social death", but does not see the virtual slavery of women raised in religious communities in a similar way, he actively reinforces the split between these two poles. This is compounded still further with what Okin sees as Rawls' move to an even more Kantian account of the development of one's virtues, focussing further on autonomy and intellectualism, which is even less relational, or concerned with moral feelings (p.34). Whereas in *A Theory of Justice* Rawls situates the development of virtue in the home, in *Political Liberalism* he simply suggests that people acquire political virtues by living under "basic institutions" (Rawls 1993).

When I bring forward Okin's understanding of Rawl's assumptions and norms, and then connect them to Pogge's, there seems to be little to suggest that Pogge sees this all that differently. The differences between Pogge and Rawls' arguments is not so much about a different starting point (a Kantian approach to human nature and Rawls' assumptions of familial dynamics), as where they go from there, in relation to the international realm. This is something that Schwarzenbach also infers in her critique of both Pogge and Rawls' understanding of fraternity and friendship (2011, pp.40-41), and Rawls and Pogge have been critiqued in similar ways by a number of theorists for the way in which their universalisms "neglect(s) other hierarchical social relations of power,

including those of gender and race" (Robinson 2006, p.7)[39]. From this, it seems clear that Pogge avoids context and particularity in his approach, and as a result his arguments are entirely 'generalised' in nature.

Pogge's arguments are characteristic of a top-down dynamic based on the universal taking priority over the particular whenever they might disagree on institutional matters – including the household - and his favouring of institutional responses to global issues (like health, poverty) as *essential*, over issues that particular communities or groupings of people experience globally (like the rights of disabled people, the gendered nature of health, the racial dynamics of poverty etc. within a specific state) as *additional*, demonstrates clearly where his focus, priority, and normative assumptions are situated. This of course plays back into the educational dynamic, because whilst Pogge relies on a Rawlsian understanding of family dynamics rooted in emotional bonds, he favours the institution of formal education to provide the rational, objective, moral grounds of a person's approach to life.

In conclusion, this section has argued that the Poggesian cosmopolitan system is designed to always favour the universal institutional system over the particular experiences of groups – and the appeals that groups make to issues of justice should be considered an appeal to additional rights rather than essential rights. Pogge implicitly relies on the Rawlsian use of the western liberal democratic ideal family unit as an institutional norm, and as a consequence supports its removal from the right to make a claim to institutional injustice based on the gendered nature of the familial dynamic that Rawls relies on which favours the male archetype figure – and as a consequence the other characteristics that are implicit in it – that the male archetype figure be heterosexual, cisgender, able-bodied, and neurotypical. In addition to which, it is suggestive of a level and type of education consistent with a middle-class environment that both relies upon, but also discounts and genders, emotional education, and which corresponds to that of a 'dominant culture of the state' experience within the polity. These layered attributes and experiences are then 'foundationalised' as the 'normal' attributes and experiences which essential rights are developed to respond to and cater for, with all those falling outside interpreted as requests for additional rights.

2.3   *Seyla Benhabib*

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[39]   See also Gould (2007) who makes a similar point about gender, and Mills, who responds to Rawls' hierarchical blindness towards race (2017).

This section explores the works and arguments of Seyla Benhabib. Benhabib rarely engages directly with the idea of education in her writings, and this lack of exploration of the subject necessitates a closer examination of the related aspects of identity, culturing, and cosmopolitanism which she explores most prominently in *Situating the Self* (1992), the *Claims of Culture* (2002), and their interplay with her move to cosmopolitan theorising in *Another Cosmopolitanism* (2006). I first explore her writings on the idea of the generalised and concrete other (2.3.1), followed by her critique of culture and cultural identity (2.3.2). The third section (2.3.3) examines her stance to Cosmopolitan Right, and the final section (2.3.4) explores those times when she directly presents her views on education, seeking to find some coherence to them, in combination with the underlying norms that are contained within them, which were revealed in the previous three sections.

Seyla Benhabib's works, as with Pogge's, commenced long before the contemporary expansion of the examination of cosmopolitanism. In her case, she pursued a path that features both sides of the critical and traditional divide through Critical Theory, with her movement into cosmopolitan theorising passing through a wide range of philosophers, starting with Hegel, and including Kant, Habermas and Arendt. Her works come in three main stages (Aramburu 2015, p.519); firstly, the philosophical and theoretical exploration of the universal and the particular, which starts with Hegel and natural right, and is a response to Hobbes, Locke and Kant's presumption that "the individual is <u>prior</u> to the community logically, temporally and psychologically" (1977, her emphasis[40]) which she refers to as "practical egotism", and of Hegel's rejection of their position that "the self is one of logical and practical egotism"[41]. In essence, this issue is between the origins of natural rights, which eventually develop into universal human rights, and Hegel's response that "the "original" rights of the individual, can only be given when the individual is treated as a member of a human community" (p.2).

In the second stage of her works she engages with empirical exploration, incorporating the dynamic and conflicts between a number of different liberal democracies, and cultural identity (with a focus on immigrant communities, the experiences of women, and polity residence) before moving to global dynamics in the 2000's and onwards. The main theme of her 2004 Berkley Tanner lectures, which was subsequently published under the title *Another Cosmopolitanism* (2006) is her attempts to grapple with and

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[40]   This text does not have a page number for the quote. It is on the 4th page of the microfilm document.
[41]   This response is similar to Herder's, which I explore in Chapter four.

resolve some of the core contradictions between cosmopolitanism and democracy[42] as they relate to Kant's *Cosmopolitan Right*. As she points out in an interview not long after the lecture "...we are caught within this puzzle... democracies require our borders, they require boundaries... It is possible to have an empire without borders... [but] I don't think it's possible to have a democracy without borders and so this creates... the sort of philosophical and moral dilemma that I have been trying to address in these lectures. Can you reconcile cosmopolitanism and democratic... self-governance?" (2004). To a great extent this exemplifies the direction of her works from this point onwards.

2.3.1 The Generalised and Concrete Other

Turning now more directly to her development of the concepts of the 'Generalised Other' and 'Concrete Other' (1992, pp.148-177), Benhabib presents the pair as a critical development from a single universalist standpoint (i.e. the generalised other) focussed on ethical orientations of right and justice. Pogge, as we saw in the previous section dismissed social, cultural and familial factors as simply optional extras or lifestyle choices, and elsewhere shows less awareness of the nuances of structural inequalities and marginalised experiences. Benhabib's works though explore this area in far more detail, through the idea of the concrete other, at the same time incorporating aspects of the universalised angle of cosmopolitanism within her reformulation of the generalised other, with its own focus on ethical orientations of care and responsibility (p.152).

The distinctions between these two positions are ones that Benhabib defines as the differences between substitutionalist and interactive universalisms[43], with the former focusing on 'justice' as representative of the experiences and perspectives of the male archetype figure, and the latter on 'the good life' as representative of the woman's. Benhabib interprets them as exhibiting the dynamic of the 'gender-sex system' – in that "While the bourgeoisie male celebrates his transition from conventional to post-conventional morality, from socially accepted rules of justice to their generation in light of the principles of the social contract, the domestic sphere remains at the conventional level" (p.155) with the domestic realm – the location of the woman "relegated to the realm of nature" (ibid). Her development of the generalised and concrete other is her attempt to establish a sense of parity between these two areas, and thus to allow the principles of *reversibility and universability* (p.152). This would then extend beyond the interactions of only the generalised other, where Pogge, Rawls, and Kant's arguments

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[42]   This is also a key aspect of Ingram's works. See especially section (2.4.2).
[43]   See especially (Benhabib 1992, pp.164-5 & 227-8).

are situated, and into that of the concrete other (1999b, pp.353-4), just as concrete actions extend into the general.

Benhabib's concept of the *generalised other* and *concrete other* (1992, pp.148-177) is, as she puts it "two conceptions of self-other relations that delineate both moral perspectives and interactional structures" (p.158), with the moral perspective relating to the generalised other, and the latter to interactional structures. The generalised other's standpoint (both for the self and for the other) is the basis for universalisation and the assumption of objectivity, just as the concrete other's standpoint (both for the self and for the other) is for the unique individual (p.159) and therefore of subjectivity. This approach, developed from Carol Gilligan's research into cognitive and developmental moral psychology (1980)[44], provides a powerful insight into the dynamic between traditional and critical conceptions of cosmopolitanism such that it explains, as I will develop further, the difference between traditional cosmopolitanism as the location of the generalised other, and critical cosmopolitanism as the conceptual realm of the concrete other. Whilst Benhabib explores this idea mainly from the perspectives of feminism and immigrant status, this dynamic can also be applied to a multitude of different experiences by other marginalised groups. Essentially, it is not just that the concrete other manifests in the personal interaction in the private realm, but that this point of interaction appears to be the essence of her 'concrete cosmopolitanism'.

Extending Benhabib's position further, the concrete other is then encountered through personal and subjective interactions, initially and primarily, inside the domestic environment, through 'webs of interlocution', and surrounded by wider cultures, communities, societies, and states where universalising and 'universalised' norms of justice already exist and are given impetus through a variety of formalised and institutional means. This creates a dynamic between the generalised and concrete other, where one promotes the idea of 'the Universal equating to individualism', which as a consequence closes around and polices the boundary between the private and the public. This then restricts the fundamentality and importance of the concrete other - the self-defined-self - and a person's individuality, to the private realm. As a consequence, principles designed for the encounter with the generalised other, in the public domain, do not require a critical evaluation of the other's individuality to establish the mode of encounter (and thus does not require the re-evaluation of the self since these are

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[44] Gilligan's arguments should be considered a critique of, *and* a second strand of moral theorising that runs alongside the first, rather than just a critique of Kohlberg's earlier work (Jorgensen 2006).

subsumed within 'universal norms' such that they can be assumed, but do not need to be critically engaged with). This is because the mode is already determined through the prioritisation of a form of justice which excludes, downgrades or dismisses the moral validity of the concrete other's experiences. What I mean by this is not that the concrete other – the person whose concreteness is being considered - is not a moral person, but rather that the source of morality is positioned and prioritised within the attributes given to the generalised other. The difference between these two perspectives can be then thought of as *justice as fairness*, following on from Rawls, and *justice as care* from Gilligan.

In essence then, in the generalised other's world, I do not need to know *who* you are because I can safely assume that I know enough about *what* you are, based on the prevailing norms of the public environment: liberalism, democracy, tolerance etc. The generalised other that I encounter must therefore be one who accepts, abides by or tolerates these principles as the norm - and that this other possesses or expresses these norms in common with myself. It is the similarities between us; the norms, not the differences, which determine our interaction. Once that is established, what you do in the public sphere as a generalised other is established and takes precedence over who you are in the private as a concrete other, since the public interaction requires the 'what' and the material expression of one's identity, not the 'who' and the encounter with the other's internal sense of self. Whoever you are or whatever else you might be outside of a generalised other is not important to the functional level of interactions that relies on these norms, and as a consequence for society at large. Within an economic, political and societal environment which promotes, for example, atomisation under these kinds of meta-narratives, as well as where established hierarchies of power (gender, sex, sexuality, class, ethnicity etc.) already exist, this reinforces the normative nature of these meta-narratives.

I do not as a result need to know the 'who' of you – your uniqueness - and so too do I not need to know or perceive myself as unique either. Firstly because the binary of self and other collapses into a functional 'self that is as other' and secondly, because the generalised self is universalised as the location of these norms - which are both 'neutral' and 'natural'. This then leads (through these hierarchies) to a conflation with, for example, the other (male) person being perceived as the norm, and thus 'like the self'. As the same kind of 'natural' (or perhaps rather that it is *necessary* to perceive the other as

the same as the self) because the publicly recognised and enforced sense of justice, right, morality etc., come from that public sphere.

Essentially, the issue that Benhabib is trying to resolve here, through her desire to incorporate the concrete other's experiences and perspective into cosmopolitanism, is one that Rawls' Veil of Ignorance deliberately and explicitly rejects. The generalised other interaction is the public (male) interaction, which is normalised and as a consequence the concrete other interaction as the private, female interaction, is othered. Whilst this othered concrete position, in its interaction, is the source of justice as care – which is necessary in the family - it is also as a consequence the source of particularity and thus overt bias, as well. Rawls' system requires the denial of these 'normalised' aspects of the unique concrete others and their interactions (in general) at that level, as a valid and potentially alternative source of morality, justice and right.

Whilst Benhabib then goes on to argue that the woman is positioned in the realm of 'nature' (1992, p.161), which I agree is the case, where I disagree with her is that the male archetype figure is *also* positioned into the realm of nature – as both the natural possessor, *and* the natural source of the determination of *all* justice, right, morality etc. They are an essential aspect of their intellectual and reasoning capabilities, which is established through formal education and reinforced in the social environment, and privatised in the family environment. The woman, whilst also positioned in the realm of nature is the source of, and possessor of caring as an aspect of her biological otherness, which is kept privatised by Rawls. The woman is, essentially, privatised and discounted *because* her 'nature' is to care - because her nature in Rawls' system *is* emotional.

Whilst the 'generalised-self-as-other' reduces (or perhaps even negates) the requirement for criticality because it is 'backgrounded' and naturalised into the fabric of social existence, the concrete other relies upon the different to be seen to exist, to be recognised, *and* for it to be both perceived and responded to in some way as an equivalent expression of human diversity. If the other is seen as the self though, there is no substantive difference between the two, and thus the opportunity to widen the boundaries by which the generalised other is understood is denied, because these come about from an encounter with *the different*. This is highlighted perhaps best in Benhabib's positioning and arguments on the reversibility aspect of her cosmopolitan formulation. She suggests that we should 'put ourselves into the shoes of the other' and

through doing so, we can ensure a sense of reversibility, but, as Young then points out, "The ideas of symmetry and reversibility that Benhabib relies upon evoke images of mirror sameness... but such images of reflection and substitution, I suggest, support a conceptual projection of sameness among people and perspectives at the expense of difference" (Young 1994, pp.167-8).

To understand another, my own experiences, knowledges and logics which provide the framing and lens through which I understand the world cannot help but be carried through in my interpretation of the other that I am trying to position myself into the shoes of. As a consequence, I do not see *them*, rather, I see *my* interpretation of them through the lens of myself, with all its particularity and normative assumptions[45], and which cannot be anything other than an educated guess – and inevitably inaccurate to some greater or lesser degree. The importance of the idea of positioning into that of the other refers to both the desire *and* the ability to be able to reverse standpoints, yet from Young's perspective, it carries with it the impossibility of true reversibility. This means that, according to Young, both myself and the other not only cannot be perfectly understood, but cannot *ever* be perfectly understood from a concrete perspective. Whilst it might be possible to have this level of reversibility between generalised others[46], this is not the case for the concrete other that Benhabib describes. Any level of reversibility is and can only ever be an approximation, and one in which pre-existing hierarchies of structural privilege and oppression would inevitably tend to favour one side more than the other (p.171).

The encounter between concrete others is one where less is assumed and so more must be discovered, in a historical way, before concrete interactions can have relational meaning. Under the principles of reversibility, this means that, in Benhabib's approach, the more I know about you, the greater the possibility that I can deduce more closely who the 'true' you is, and to see more closely how this other differs from the self (myself), until the point comes about where I can attempt to put myself into your shoes. But this is still only, and can only ever be, an approximation. In this respect, concrete engagements which provide information and insight on the formative elements of an individual's identity fall outside of universalised or generalised norms *only* if they are *not* reversible. When my rational mind fails to provide a self-derived accurate

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[45] This is essentially one half of Johann Herder's *besonnheit* - the capacity of the reflexive mind. See section (4.1.3).

[46] Kant's works are directed specifically towards this through his Categorical Imperative, just as Rawls' is through the Original Position.

comprehension of the other, it falls outside of its universalisation because it falls into the realm of my capacity to imagine, which is entirely subjective. This suggests, logically and somewhat self-evidently, that for Benhabib, the closer the comparability of the other to the self is *before* discourse (i.e. the closer the generalised *and* concrete normatives are), the greater the possibility of a more accurate understanding of the other there is, and the further removed, the harder it is. This also then suggests, since not all normatives will be encountered in a single discourse, that the longer the interaction(s) occur for, the more capable one might be to mirror the other. This then applies regardless of whether it is an encounter of generalised others or concrete others, and it implies a historical nature to the process of mirroring and reversibility.

In section (2.2.3) I explored the familial dynamic that Rawls relies upon for his ideal family unit, and the way in which a child learns to carry out this process of identifying with the other, starting with a foundation of emotional connection to those closest to us, and then expanding further outwards through distinct lines of identification that pre-given to us and follow gendered, and cultural routes. What is perhaps most interesting with Benhabib's approach is that she also chooses the same environment - the family - where one would from a 'common sense' perspective, expect to see the greatest understanding of the other occurring. The length of time and nature of the discourse, starting at one's birth all the way to adulthood and beyond, provides both the opportunity, and in theory the almost inevitability of a deep and ongoing level of interaction from which to base one's understanding of the other – yet even at this level the widespread failures of children and parents to understand each other does raise concerns over her approach (just as it does for Rawls's use of the 'just family' as the basis for his arguments).

If we then include any number of the choice-less individualities mentioned previously[47] the reversibility level would likely drop - almost precipitously if multiple choice-less differences are involved, and especially if one or more of these aspects is culturally perceived to be 'disordered', 'broken', or aberrant – as being neither a generalised other, nor a concrete other, but an utterly other[48]. This is essentially[49] *because* normative ideas of both the right and the good combine with the dominant hierarchy of male power that is culturally normalised within a family dynamic. What is both right and good are

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[47]   For example sexuality, gender, sex, mental or physical ability, race, class, culture, ethnicity etc.
[48]   Whilst this veers sharply from the topic of this thesis, this suggests a third category to the generalised and concrete other, and from this, how mirroring, reversibility, and reciprocity might function.
[49]   There is a second aspect to this – through language. See chapter four.

experiences that are perceived to be 'ordered, 'whole' and 'normal'. The further removed one is from *that* normative experience, and therefore the orientation of the quintessential generalised other, the more deviations are produced from even seeing the other as a concrete individual, something which I think Young's suggestion of reciprocity rather than Benhabib's reversibility is able to more deftly respond to.

Returning to Benhabib, whilst an 'enlarged mentality' may well be of use in greater levels of interpretative and narrative skill to more accurately understand the other (Benhabib 1992, p.54), it also positions the dynamic of power to the one *doing* the interpreting, rather than the one *being* interpreted. This is itself derivative of a Kantian approach (through Arendt) that privileges the normalised standpoint - and the idea of enlarging works on the expansion of the generalised category, rather than through a dynamic of some kind between the generalised and concrete.

Benhabib's system relies on both reversibility and universality for both the generalised and concrete concepts to function - and is I think a powerful response to the primacy of the existing (gendered) generalised other standard. What concerns me is that the weight of numbers will, inevitably, fall on the side of universality under the generalised other's perspective, not least because, politically and socially, those in a position of structural dominance (which favours the existing generalised system) will tend to maintain their dominance if given the choice, and even if this is not overtly desired. As was discussed in the section on Rawls/Pogge, they assume a 'just' male archetype figure led household – where the concrete other initially develops primarily under the care of the female archetype figure – whilst at the same time denying the relevance of justice as fairness from the institution to the household. This socially reinforces the structural dominance of the male figure through its societal wide normalisation.

It is because of Benhabib's drive towards symmetry rather than reciprocity that this issue still arises and complicates her schema for Young (1994, p.170). If our positions are reversible, then there must be at its core an interchangeableness to our identities, perspectives, and experiences, which implies that no matter the context, I, or you, could mirror ourselves *to any other person*, and any other person could mirror themselves to me, *regardless* of experience or difference. If this is the case, then my concern is that Benhabib's approach is widening the category of the generalised other, rather than putting forward the concrete other as an equally important but substantively different

category - what also needs to happen to maintain balance is to show how the concrete category is widened. The underlying principle of the generalised other is that it is universal, so if the concrete other is also universal (because of its reversibility) then how are, could or even should they be considered different to each other? Benhabib quotes Hilary Putnam when discussing a related point (a critique of Jean François Leotard's radical untranslatability which has parallels here) in *The Claims of Culture.* Putnam suggests that:

> It is a constitutive fact about human experience in a world of different cultures interacting in history while individually undergoing slower or more rapid change that we are, as a matter of universal human experience, able to do this; able to interpret one another's beliefs, desires, and utterances so that it all makes some kind of *sense*" (Putnam 1981, p.117, cited in Benhabib 2002, p.31)

But whilst Putnam emphasises *sense* in her text, from my perspective the emphasis should also be on *some kind of* as well. This is an approximation, an estimation, which does not allow the kind of reversibility that Benhabib argues is not only possible, but essential for her formula to work.

Benhabib's approach, whilst attempting to walk the line between traditional and critical approaches through the Frankfurt School, perhaps inevitably fails to achieve this because the introduction of a new universal system, no matter how widened, is still ultimately a universal system that tries to accommodate everything into it. Essentially, it cannot *accept* concrete human choice-less individualities, nor can it incorporate radically different experiences because it is ultimately seeking to fold those individualities into an admittedly much widened, but still generalised, individualism. At the same time, the enlargement of the generalised other as the location of the male archetype figure is I think necessary because it incorporates aspects of justice as caring which are typically excluded from the 'nature' and identity of the archetype male figure. What concerns me here is that whilst the category of the generalised (male) other is widened, the category of the concrete (female) other is effectively transported into the widened male category rather than continuing to exist and be recognised as different, or that the male category transported into a widened female category. Since Benhabib's purpose in using these concepts is to justify the need for a balance between the two perspectives, this appears to be a problem, because the widening of one through the subsumption of the essential characteristics of the other manifestly does not achieve this goal.

What this means, in practical terms, is that she uses the universal, general, *male*, position to justify a response to a hierarchy that already privileges these same connected norms, albeit in a different configuration. The leaning to the universal that is appealed to is, because of the dynamics and links between reason, justice as fairness, universal, generalised other and public, are all connected to the male archetype figure. These concepts mutually reinforce each other, and as a result, the problem she sees with the sexist nature of, for example, the generalised other dynamic of the First Nations (2002, pp.53-54), with all its normative aspects, requires recourse to a larger and more powerful, 'more universal' generalised other, with its own normative aspects - but which also connects them to the male archetype figure. The male 'figure' is different, without doubt, and all the normative elements would vary both in context and content, but it is *still* the male, generalised 'perspective' that is privileged over the concrete other female 'perspective'. Essentially, by privileging the universal, this has a knock-on effect that supports the general over the concrete, fairness over caring, the public over the private etc. as well. The sexism *has* changed, and is quite possibly less - and would most likely express differently - but it is still the male archetype that decides, because that is where justice and power resides.

2.3.2   The Claims of Culture

The previous section examined Benhabib's approach to two different framings of the self and other – as generalised and concrete - and how they correspond closely to gendered norms. The former aligning with the dominant male archetype figure and a 'natural' possessor of the concept of justice, and the latter with caring. I further suggested that her principle of reversibility opens up her arguments to the critique that if they are reversible, then it is unclear how the generalised other and concrete other can be both distinct from each other, and yet serve to balance each other. Rather, I argued that her approach both serves to widen the category of the generalised other as it widens the category of the universal, in an attempt to accommodate aspects of what she has framed the concrete other, rather than creating a balance between the two. In addition to which, recourse to the universal to resolve particular inequalities also brings with it an implicit recourse to the different configurations of those interconnected norms within the larger 'universal' that instigated the recourse.

This section now explores her approach to the idea of culture, in relation to her support

for liberal democracy. I do this firstly by identifying how she approaches the idea of culture in the polity as an 'always problematic' concept that *could* be accommodated, but must ultimately always be subordinate to "constitutional and legal universalism" (Benhabib 2002, p.ix). Her purpose here is for the creation of a "deliberative democratic model that permits maximum cultural contestation within the public sphere" and the combative nature of this interaction is further emphasised by her analysis that the idea of culture and identity as identity politics which "draws the state into culture wars" (2002, p.1), and that we are "we are daily confronted with culture "skirmishes," if not wars" (ibid.). Her framing of identity politics is based primarily on a gendered critique of immigrant cultures and communities that, relies on culture being the problem 'from the beginning' – that culture, cultures, the concept of culture etc. - they are always problematic. Her solutions, and the examples she uses in response to these are invariably turns to the universal. This leads to her turning to society, democracy, and cosmopolitanism, are her attempts to resolve this problem, which always occur in favour of an iteration of the dominant universal, which as I argued in the previous section, raises its own problems.

The first point that I need to touch on, although only briefly at this point as I examine these areas in more detail in chapter four, is in the beginning of her book *The Claims of Culture* (2002). Benhabib refers to Johann Herder on a number of occasions[50], firstly in clarifying distinctions between *Kultur,* civilisation and *Bildung* (pp.2-4) as well as a brief discussion on the idea of 'genius'. The conclusion she reaches from this is to argue that:

> "much contemporary cultural politics today is an odd mixture of the anthropological view of the democratic equality of all cultural forms of expression and the Romantic, Herderian emphasis on each form's irreducible uniqueness... one assumes that each human group "has" some kind of "culture" *and that the boundaries between these groups and the contours of their cultures are specifiable and relatively easy to depict*" (p.4, my emphasis).

Whilst she is correct, in some ways, on the first part – that Herder does indeed hold the view that each expression of culture is unique, the conclusion she links this to – that culture is bounded and easy to depict – is far from Herder's position. Herder's arguments on culture are far more intricate and interwoven than the quote Benhabib uses. He presents cultures as multiple, multi-layered, with porosity to their boundaries that are themselves diffuse and constantly shifting over time. Herder was a social constructivist

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[50] Primarily through Joshua Parens (see p.2-4), as well as Charles Taylor (see p.55-57).

and an inter-culturalist, and he also believed that people did not so much possess culture as that they are in a relationship with multiple cultures which they are co-creators of. At the same time Herder does think that it is possible, on careful consideration and reflection of a person, people, community or group, to be able to point and say 'that is a snapshot of their culture, and that is not their culture'. This I think is a reasonable determination to make, and is something that, for all the diffuseness and complexity of a concept like culture, is a common occurrence. What he would not say though is that 'this is their only culture', just as he would not say 'these things *define* their culture'.

In addition, her interpretation of Herder's arguments on the nature of genius fundamentally misunderstands his position that genius is a holistic and balanced expression of an individual, rather than the contemporary, far more Kantian perception of a single exceptional aspect of a person's personality or capabilities. Her analysis of Herder's position on the meaning of these two terms is much closer to the position Immanuel Kant takes than Herder. I set out their (Kant and Herder's) respective arguments in chapters three[51] and four[52], and in chapter five I briefly return to Benhabib.

The 'claims to culture' which Benhabib refers to in her book arise within modern democracies and come about as a result of cultural elites, and the groups they represent, making claims to dominant political groups which have the power to bestow or deny legal recognition. This move to be recognised by a dominant power's legal, social, and institutional systems formalises, reinforces, and hardens aspects of their cultural experiences and identity, as well as the interactions between the dominant and supplicant cultures. This both 'distorts' and further reifies recognition and experiences of the weaker culture closer to the desires of the cultural elites of that group. Benhabib refers these types of groups, and their formalisation through their desire for recognition as corporate identities, and is primarily concerned with the interplay between:

> "group identities based on their individual members' experience of language, gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and culture, on the one hand, and forms of group identity recognized by the state and its institutions as legal or quasi-legal collective entities, by virtue of which their members are the granted certain rights and privileges, on the other." (Benhabib 2002, p.72)

Her concern with this formalising, and their claims, is that "Many traditional cultures, for example, still consider women's and children's rights as an aspect of their ethical

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[51] See especially Sections (3.4.2), (3.5.2) & (3.5.3).
[52] See section (4.2), but especially (4.2.3).

life-world" (p.40) which she clearly sees as problematic in nature and a result at least in part of this fixing of cultural identity. Her response both here and elsewhere is to lay out how response to this issues make use of "universalist moral language", and each example she brings up generally proceeds in a similar way[53].

Her turn to discourse ethics, democratic iterations, and cosmopolitanism, are her attempts to resolve this problem, which she defines when she argues that political and legal philosophy "share faulty epistemic premises: (1) that cultures are clearly delineable wholes; (2) that cultures are congruent with population groups and that a non-controversial description of the culture of a human group is possible; and (3) that even if cultures and groups do not stand in one-to-one correspondence, even if there is more than one culture within a human group and more than one group that may possess the same cultural traits, this poses no important problems for politics or policy." (p.4) which she calls the "reductionist sociology of culture" (ibid.).

The issue that comes across most strongly to me though, with Benhabib's approach to culture and group identity, is not the overall development of her argument and the method she takes to reach there. I am broadly in agreement with the logic of the argument she develops on *that* level, and find it mostly convincing. Where it fails for me, and the concern I have with the overall argument she makes here is that she relies on her development of the generalised and concrete other that she constructed in *Situating the Self* (1992) to then locate her philosophical and political position on culture somewhere between the universal and the particular. The arguments I made in the previous section as a result also apply to her arguments on culture here, in that there is *always* a leaning to the universal *over* the particular, and which by implication leans towards the male over female, public over private etc. Her identification of cultural inequalities as struggles and potential 'wars', in conjunction with her democratic iterations system also reinforces this leaning. As a brief comparison, when considering the claims of a marginal(ised) group, the smaller, weaker culture is situated in particularity (and thus 'femininity' etc.) in relation to the larger, more dominant, in a similar way that post-colonial writers argue occurred during the colonial period. They are powerless, or at least have less power, and thus are 'feminised' in and through the processes of the interaction. The 'fixing' that occurs from this claim not only allows for

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[53] See for example when she discusses "the Scarf Affair" (Benhabib 2004, pp.52-61) as well as her consideration of First Nation rights of self-determination vs women's rights for equality (Benhabib 2002, pp.53-54).

recognition of their particularity and culture, but also institutes a 're-masculinisation' of the group because it gives institutional support to the generalised other dynamic within the 'culture'. Their particularity is, roughly speaking, (locally) universalised.

There are two key comments she makes which epitomises her position on culture, which she expands later to incorporate more generally 'corporate group identities'. Firstly that "movement for maintaining the purity or distinctiveness of cultures seems to me irreconcilable with both democratic and more basic epistemological consideration" and secondly that "Struggles for recognition that expand democratic dialogue by denouncing the exclusivity and hierarchy of existing cultural arrangements deserve our support" (Benhabib 2002, p.ix). The use of the words like 'purity', "exclusivity" and 'hierarchy' each serve here to position the issue of cultures as essentially and always problematic, and this is due to the way in which cultural identity is, according to Benhabib, fixed primarily through the appeals to recognition, and the process that they are forced to undergo to maintain their distinctiveness. This appeal, of course, makes use of the power of the larger universal (i.e. the state, which is of course in reality still particular, but a *de facto* universal within the state) over the particular, which makes it doubly problematic in that the claim for particularity, granted by the larger allows it to become its own smaller quasi-universal.

It is this fixing process that Benhabib has a problem with, and which I agree with her *is* a problem - for the types of examples she uses - but the situation is one where Benhabib has, essentially, a problem with the way in which *states* require the fixing of cultural identity in some way to justify and codify their recognition and incorporation because of inequality within the culture. But this fixing is also often desired by the marginalised cultures and communities *themselves* at a wider level, in the face of overt and covert levels of discrimination etc. against them by the host state, antagonistic groups, or hostile individuals within it. Whether during second-wave feminism, "consciousness raising" and the deliberate construction of communities and safe spaces that would "consist only of women"[54,] or in the US for black people, the situation was that "Before a group can enter the open society, it must first close ranks. By this is meant that group solidarity is necessary before a group can operate effectively from a bargaining position of strength in a pluralistic society." (Carmichael & Hamilton 1967, p.42). As well as it being a common feature of non-white immigration and black and Asian communities in the UK. Resistance to group-targeted inequality (often) forces group cohesion.

[54] The Women's Action Alliance (WAA), *Consciousness-Raising Guidelines* (1975, p.10).

Benhabib's arguments respond primarily to the gendered hierarchy that exists in this solidarity and formation, at the same time she requires democratic dialogue to allow for the partial accommodation of cultural difference. I agree with her that "recognition of the radical hybridity and polyvocality of all cultures; cultures themselves, as well as societies, are not holistic but polyvocal, multilayered, decentered, and *fractured* systems of action and signification." (Benhabib 2002, pp.26-7, my emphasis), yet her assessment that these systems may well be *fractured* is a clear indication that principles of logic, reversibility and universality cannot accommodate them – logic breaks down if it is 'fractured' - yet on the individual level, extending to the limits of her webs of interlocution, her mirroring and reversibility suggest otherwise. She continues that "Politically, the right to cultural self-expression needs to be grounded upon, rather than considered an alternative to, universally recognized citizenship rights" (ibid.) which is again a clear affirmation for the universal *instead of* the particular. I say instead here rather than incorporation, because this cultural self-expression *must* fit into the universal to allow for its 'particularity'.

What I want to do here now is link Benhabib's views on culture to the categories of the generalised and concrete others, through language and identity, to what I have referred to previously as 'choice-less' individualities, groups, identities, attributes etc.[55]. Her preferred cluster of understanding of cultures is that; a) they have no clearly delineable wholes, b) they are incongruent to population groups, c) all descriptions of culture are controversial, and d) they pose important problems for politics or policy. Given this understanding, it significantly widens the possibility of recognition for cultures that vary markedly from simply a determination by ethnicity, religion, class or working practices that the word is typically used in relation to.

If we consider for example variant sexualities such as homosexuality and/or bisexuality; those who perceive themselves to be homosexual/bisexual do not form clear and distinctly discrete cultures merely through their existence, at the same time there are multiples of cultural dynamics based around different norms related to homosexuality that vary over time. They are geographically spread across a population, although there are also clusters based on prevailing dominant norms that influence their movement,

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[55] There is a considerable body of research which identifies acceptance of choice-less individualities to be higher when the aspect or attribute is perceived to be predominantly essential and biological, rather than when it is believed to be more socially constructed and impacted. See for example Belsky & Diamond (2015). The more choice-less it is, the more accepted it is likely to be.

and the number and proportions of people who identify as homosexual and/or bisexual varies across populations as well as nation-states. Both homosexuality and bisexuality are also not easy to define – not least because there are multiple ways in which they are conceived, as well as different ways they are both internalised and externalised. In some cultures, for example, being 'the top' or 'bottom' in a relationship impacts on how that person's sexuality and gender is perceived (the top is 'more male' and 'more heterosexual', the bottom more 'female' (Herek, 2000)). In addition, the classification of what is heterosexual/bisexual is gendered, as well as influenced by other norms. A bisexual man is, for example, more likely to be seen as homosexual if they engage in *any* same sex relationship or interaction, whereas a woman is more likely to be seen as heterosexual but merely 'fooling around'. Finally, they are a 'problem' to politics and policy because they interact in different ways with politics and polity, and the polity is not set up for their accommodation or incorporation, not least because they might not even be recognised by the polity. The polity might, for example, have a mandated policy of their murder, should they be identified as such - just as they might be considered politically, socially and culturally divergent or aberrant in multiples of different ways.

The clustering I referred to is also affected by the level of hostility to the possession, expression, or perception, of that identity – and the geographic clustering of people with similar attributes does have a tendency to produce and influence the expressions, experiences and understandings of homosexuality and bisexuality. Language is involved in and comes from this dynamic, because one of the most common (and profound) experiences of homosexual and bisexual people is when they find, for the first time, language, terms and definitions that attempt to 'explain' to them what about them is different to those around them. This discovery of language and meaning carries with it the possibility of fellowship and relations with others, based on the 'possession' of the attribute, as well as alienation and othering. Firstly, because the dominant polity/group has typically created language that in some way pathologises the attribute, characteristic or expression - and allows, facilitates, or is tolerant of a social environment where their attribute is presented in a mostly or wholly negative fashion. Secondly those who possess this attribute and learn they are not alone in this possession are able to engage in a process of co-creation of the language that is used to define them, which in turn requires the pre-existence of others who possess that attribute and have been able to enter into discourse with each other. Terminology changes, additional meaning become connected to them and change over time, and social practices, originally 'from' the

dominant social group, or imported from outside, or created within then establish a diffuse, poly-vocal, fractured cluster of elements that allow for their use, which then allows us to and say, even if not entirely accurately, and reliant on contradictory and confusing elements, that that is 'gay culture' or a 'gay community'.

Language and discourse contributes to, even if it does not determine, their choices and self-other perception. The result of a dominant polity view of a choice-less characteristic or attribute dominates, even if in a rough and incomplete way, the linguistic structure and boundaries for generalised other as well as concrete other interaction. Pathological language determines the possessor of this choice-less characteristic, attribute or being in public discourse not as generalised or concrete, but as *utterly other*. This generalised pathologisation and attribution of language, meaning and social context - and the particularised (re-)claiming of language and insistence on community can be seen not just for homosexuality, but also for other choice-less aspects like intersex, transgender and neuro-diversity.

This utter othering effectively situates choice-less individualities, to one degree or another, outside Enlightenment binaries of logic which universalised humanity in the absence of their acknowledged or incorporated existence. Crucially though, the relationship between the utterly other and the concrete other is less distanced than that between the utterly other and the generalised other, because the generalised other is the already dominant setting whereas the concrete other is seen to be particular, emotional, biased, caring etc. as well as marginal. What is also particularly interesting in this is that the possibility of acceptance of the utterly other, which may lead over time to a slow accommodation of them into the universal, comes firstly from the particular (i.e. women, in this context (Herek, 1988)). Utterly others (or choice-less individualities) are invariably accepted in concrete circumstances before they are accommodated in generalised ways[56]. This then suggests that the polity and the generalised other public discourse acts, initially at least, as a limiter to acceptance, *not* a facilitator. This then raises the question of how the importance of the interactions between concrete others – the uniquely expressing individuals - can come about and be placed at the centre of the purpose of interactions between individuals because Benhabib situates mirroring and reversibility arising from this interaction, and expressly wants to balance this with the universalising generalised interaction.

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[56] See e.g. Herek (1988, 2000 & 2009) r.e. Lesbian and gay people; also Norton & Herek (2013) r.e. Transgender people. In each case, acceptance is higher from women than men.

Benhabib's wider support for democratic systems (specifically self-ascription in consociationalist or federative societies (2002, p.19)) suggests that cultures are fine so long as they are voluntary in nature and change through discourse with the member of other cultural groups and the wider politic that is moral, ethical, and political-pragmatic in nature (p.12). Essentially, that the source of a person's characteristics is flexible/plastic/variable, and can as a result change over time. Whilst this might be feasible for cultures centred on religion, ethnicity or nationality, the inverse is true for choice-less attributes that are perceived to be essential. The perception of their essentiality counter-intuitively increases their acceptance and accommodation, and the less they are constructivised and questioned, or 'engaged in discourse' - the more it is accepted and accommodated within generalised interactions[57].

The movement for non-essentialised cultural identity/affiliation comes across far more tellingly as a requirement for the group to change to fit the polity, rather than the polity itself adapting its own 'nature' to accept (rather than accommodate or incorporate) the group. It is where she raises issues with the question "Is Universalism ethnocentric" that her concerns with the idea of culture in general extends further. She suggests here the idea that "universalism is ethnocentric often also presupposes a homogenizing view of other cultures and civilizations" (p.24) and uses this angle to justify universalism. Her argument does have a certain validity to it, but at the same time it is an artificial construct because cultures can only be carefully examined *if* they are considered in some way homogeneous entities. This is a similar issue that also touches on issues of race, gender and sexuality. They are assumed to be more homogeneous and 'essentialised' than they are, especially when engaging with them in a theoretical manner, because more accurate representations of them that acknowledge their complexity and historicism introduce ever-increasing variables into them and weaken an often deliberately 'strategic alliance' between different elements within the culture for the purpose of resisting oppression or achieving recognition.

When it comes to the process of discourse within the polity, there is again an issue which arises as the process of discourse is one that is influenced by one's membership of a group – and how influential one's perspective and positionality is translated to other

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[57] Slogans like Stonewall's "Some people are gay. Get over it!" tap into this dynamic, with an implicit essentialising of their sexuality, at the same time attempting to end discussion by simply suggesting you 'get over it'.

groups and the polity at large. Whilst Benhabib has an issue with the polity fixing group identity, what strikes me is that the discourse approach *also* fixes group identity, as different ways of framing them in relation to the structurally dominant groups inevitably produces different responses. From this, dominant internal elements of these marginal groups would still produce 'elites', defined by their interplay and public contestation.

Benhabib's deliberative system has two aspects to it, the first of which is critical to, and mandated by, the state. This is that "it accepts both legal regulation and intervention through direct and indirect state means". This imposes requirements and restrictions on the group that, whilst perhaps not as strong as the 'fixing' of cultural identity discussed earlier suggests, still essentially requires appeals both to the state, and through public discourse to the structurally dominant groups. As a result, again, the force and direction of that discourse will proceed along already existing preferential paths that will privilege certain sub-groups and individuals who more closely correspond to the dominant society.

2.3.3   Cosmopolitan Right

This section now explores Benhabib's critique of Kant's Doctrine of Cosmopolitan Right (2006). In this, I engage with her use of Kant's formula, and her progression, and then suggest the idea of a 'Zeroth law' - a cosmopolitan identity, perspective and/or orientation - which corresponds to her idea of the concrete other, and an environment that support it in some way, is a pre-requisite to a doctrine of cosmopolitan right. As such, how this identity comes about and is cultivated is of critical importance.

Benhabib summarises Kant's doctrine of Cosmopolitan Right as follows: 1) Posited relations of right: The interaction of individual with state (domestic law) 2) Rightful relations between states: The interactions between states (*Voelkerrecht*) 3) Cosmopolitan Rights a) Interactions between individuals (*Weltbuergerrecht*) b) Interactions between the individual and Global Civil Society (Benhabib 2006, p.21).

As originally presented by Kant, and developed further by Benhabib, it is not so much a question of how to create a cosmopolitan world, or how a cosmopolitan world would interact once created; rather it is how cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan people, and institutions, can interact together in the already existing non-cosmopolitan world that leans towards a traditional conception of human nature and of the international system.

Benhabib's interpretation of Kant's Right of Hospitality is functionally a question concerning the right of hospitality between individual and state where both may or may not *be* cosmopolitan, but it makes the assumption that they should be, and it also makes no distinction between critical and traditional versions of cosmopolitanism (although the implication is that this refers to traditional framings). Yet if both state and individual proceeding from the generalised understanding of cosmopolitanism (or some more contemporary approximation such as Pogge presents), then there would be no, or considerably less issue with, problems of refusal of access or domicile etc. from either the traditional or critical side, since following the principles of cosmopolitanism would counteract the negative connotations of the many concerns typically raised.

Benhabib's support and exploration of Cosmopolitan Right here is, paradoxically, in direct tension with her argument for the concrete other, since it relies on the pre-eminence of the *Rawlsian* concept of both human nature and the state, and a *Poggesian* international state dynamic having power over and determining the what of the individual (i.e. the generalised other) who wishes to visit and remain, in contrast to Benhabib's suggestion of the inclusion of the concrete other, and some form of balance being maintained between the generalised and concrete other. The tension implicit in Kant's Cosmopolitan Right, which she explores, is one that relies on disproportionate power relations in addition to disproportionate relations of justice and right[58], located at the examination of an individual's generalised identity[59], with *neither* side necessarily projecting from the position of any form of cosmopolitanism in the first place. It relies, in effect, on a scenario of at best the generalised other that the host state expects the visitor to conform to over the concrete other that the individual might or might not be (and which might well be in direct tension to the generalised other). The concrete other's unique individuality is passed over or ignored in favour of the generalised other's individualism. Kant's Cosmopolitan Right reinforces this dynamic instead of placing the interaction of the concrete cosmopolitan at the forefront of (or perhaps parallel to), the critical question of who is granted hospitality and why, because as Benhabib puts it "*hospitality* is not to be understood as a virtue of sociability, as the kindness and generosity one may show to strangers who come to one's land or who become dependent on one's act of kindness through circumstances of nature or history; hospitality is a right that belongs to all human beings insofar as we view them as potential participants in a world republic" (2006, p.22, her emphasis). This makes clear

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[58] i.e. fairness instead of caring.
[59] i.e. the 'what' of the person.

that care, neither to a generalised other, nor a concrete other, are contained within this. It is purely a question of justice as fairness.

Bonnie Honig's critique of Benhabib's stance on the idea of Cosmopolitan Right of Hospitality (which occurs in the same book) raises, from a different direction (primarily through Derrida), a similar response; although in her case she names Benhabib's understanding of hospitality a product of "Enlightenment universalism" (Honig 2006, p.106). She further points out, tellingly, that "what those rights point to in Benhabib's account is not an open futurity dotted by new or emergent rights but a normative validity that launches us into a subsumptive logic in which new claims are assessed not in terms of the new worlds they may bring into being but rather in terms of their appositeness to molds and models already in place: incomplete, but definitive in their contours". (p.110). Benhabib emphasises this position still further when she asserts that "all future struggles... will be fought *within the framework* created by the universalistic principles of Europe's commitments to human rights, on the one hand... and the exigencies of democratic self-determination on the other" (Benhabib 2006, p.61, my emphasis). Far from trying to tie in the concrete and general as distinctly different but necessary to each other, she relies upon the already existing universal principles to determine what is acceptable, and rejects the characteristics of the concrete other.

By itself, the indication that Benhabib always favours the universal seems unmistakable, but there *are* levels and more complexity to Benhabib's universal, which she elaborates on through her use of the idea of "Democratic Iterations". In brief, this idea posits that each new claim to rights by new political actors draw upon "experiences that could not have guided those rights in their initial formulation, they open up new worlds and create new meanings" (Benhabib 2006, p.159). Each new iteration transforms and enriches the meaning of the universal in "ever-so-subtle ways", but my earlier critique of the universal always winning out due to the already existing universal being inevitability prioritised by those with the power to decide, applies here too. Honig suggests that Benhabib's approach subsumes the particular into the universal, and Benhabib argues that the universal subtly changes – and both are possibly right, on occasion, but the probability is on the side of subsumption rather than hybridity, which Benhabib herself implicitly acknowledges through her use of the word subtle. Change, of course, is always occurring, such that any encounter with the different will produce something new – but what it produces and how that propagates forward is telling. States are

essentially designed to resist change, and as a result are far more likely to subsume the different than to be changed by the encounter with the different into something new.

Further, whilst things may change, whether subtly or not, in certain locations at the institutional level - rights may be granted in new ways to new groups of people, or existing rights may be changed to accommodate the different – they can always be reversed or be denied because the members of the state are still 'culturally' virtually the same[60], with all the norms that it carries with it. In this case the prioritisation of the generalised other over the concrete other still applies. Correspondence or conformity to the identity of the generalised, state-sanctioned other's moral, ethical, historical and societal codings may contribute to the possibility of retaining rights, but correspondence to the choice-less identities we are either raised into, perceived to possess, or bring with us in some way, whether they be cultural, historical, gendered, sexual or biological generalised other, *also* matter. This can be seen in the US – where the election of a black president was touted by many as radical change simply *because* he was black, with all the cultural history of slavery and racial discrimination that that implied, yet the underlying meta-norms never really shifted. At the same time that Obama's administration was granting new rights to new peoples in new ways (e.g. gay people, transgender people, illegal immigrants, women etc.), he was also a supporter of the widening of neoliberal economic policies, and the ongoing military stance of the US, albeit expressed in drone warfare form. With the election of Trump, the rights of those same gay, transgender, immigrants and women are in the process of, or already have been, reversed, with even more radical regressions still possible. This is precisely because the subtle changes through 'iteration' that Benhabib relies upon do little to change the existence of the boundaries, or the underlying norms of the 'universals' that they rely upon.

Benhabib's democratic iterations don't appear to be profound enough in their effect on the populace, even if they affect the state apparatus, to produce *new* iterations. What seems to be lacking here, with regards to Benhabib's notion of Cosmopolitan Right, is a fourth right – a 'zeroth' law – which would come before and bind the three points together. This could be summed up as 'the Right and opportunity for the individual to develop as a concrete cosmopolitan individual rather than a strictly generalised liberal individual (whether bounded or boundless)'. From this, each of the three Cosmopolitan

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[60] 'Cultures' do, of course, always change and are always changing, but not generally fast at the structural level, even if on the surface more visible aspects like popular culture might alter more rapidly.

Rights she takes from Kant must ground in an underlying fourth, or zeroth law: 1) If there is no emphasis on the creation of concrete cosmopolitan individuals, then there cannot be a cosmopolitan state because that state will not develop along cosmopolitan lines; 2) If there is no state populated with these cosmopolitan individuals, then the interactions between states cannot follow cosmopolitan principles of self-limitation and human equality, regardless of laws passed or institutions created that might appear cosmopolitan in nature. 3) If there are no cosmopolitan individuals, then the interactions between the individuals themselves and between the individual and global society cannot be enacted in a cosmopolitan way, driven by cosmopolitan principles.

Benhabib positions part of the idea of cosmopolitanism in the location of the concrete others (it is unclear in her arguments where the weighting would fall between the generalised and concrete other), which she positions in the domicile and the location of the construction of the female archetype identity. The environments in which one becomes, and is engaged with as a concrete other through communication and discourse are key aspects of the construction of her cosmopolitan world yet she requires their specific exclusion from Cosmopolitan Right. This cuts to the heart of what are effectively three different aspects of cosmopolitanism in Benhabib's arguments – cosmopolitan institutional systems and structures at the top filtering through a democratic state system, through a cosmopolitan social environment, to individual orientations.

This section has explored Benhabib's engagement and use of Kant's Doctrine of Cosmopolitan Right, and of the contradiction between her earlier emphasis on a balance between the concrete and generalised other, and hospitality, which emphasises only the generalised other. The next section examines those areas where Benhabib directly explores the idea of education, and widens this with the findings from the previous sections so far explored.

2.3.4   Education

When Benhabib's engages directly with education she reveals her perspective to be one in direct contrast to her support for Kant's cosmopolitanism elsewhere. She rejects the Kantian logic of "a self-transparent and self-grounding reason, the illusion of a dis-embedded subject, and the illusion of having found an Archimedean moral standpoint situated beyond historical and cultural contingency" (1994b, p.174) on which Kant's vision was built. Her stance is rather for the interweaving of formal and 'cultural'

education which together contribute to the constitution of the self "*in a human community*" (ibid, my emphasis). Her stated purpose though, rather than specifically education, is to examine the *dialectic of universalism and discrimination* that is unique to the post-Enlightenment era, through discourse ethics, where, critically, "the two principles of moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity are *always* already implied... and hence cannot... be established only as their result" (p.176).

But the capability to engage with this process is not one that she sees for all, rather, that the ability to do so requires a "certain level of cognitive and psychological development" (p.177) and as such, this suggests that the *determination* of 'the moral', as well as its expression, is of necessity restricted to those with this level of development. In this, whilst she rejects one part of Kant's arguments, she falls in line with Kant's justification for his own hierarchical system of education and morality that I examine in chapter three[61]. As a result, the grounds by which one determines what a 'certain level' means – and by implication *who* determines what this standard is or should be becomes crucial. Does it, or should it, come from the discriminated, or the universal? Or from the dialectic? If it is from the concrete, then care is primary, whereas if it is from the general, then fairness has priority. The social and public space of discourse, if it is in the location of the dialectic, is the place were society essentially decides what is reasonable, and can be cared for, but the care is less at this point than in the concrete interaction and at the concrete level.

Within discourse ethics itself it also creates a circular argument - effectively that selective exclusion is a prerequisite to the response to selective exclusion - which Benhabib's modifications were supposed to resolve (p.176). There *are* similarities here between those who can be excluded from behind the Rawlsian *Veil of Ignorance*, although of a different contextual level, since Benhabib's desire to incorporate the attributes and experiences of the concrete other into the category of the generalised other does significantly widen the boundaries of who and what is included, and her discourse ethics approach allows much more information, and a far wider level of argument to be included, as well as shifting the site of their inclusion into the public domain rather than behind a veil. On the other hand though, those who are deemed by the state (which manages the public discourse in Benhabib's system) to be disordered, mentally ill etc., and those who cannot be involved in the discourse because they cannot or do not meet the criteria to be considered worthy to be an agent are excluded –

[61]   See especially Sections (3.5) and (3.6).

whereas the personal experiences of those who meet the criteria have a stronger voice. Benhabib both widens the knowledge permitted in the discourse, and expands the groups of people permitted to be involved in the discourse, but still retains an intellectual standard that must be passed before inclusion and involvement.

When we consider her desire to develop a dual strand of justice from both the concrete and generalised other, her clear favouring of the generalised other in border issues of hospitality and immigration, as well as internally cultural and societal matters, suggests a fundamental contradiction to the purpose and usefulness of the concrete other in her system. The conclusion I draw from this is that Benhabib is in reality widening the nature of the generalised other position at the expense of the concrete other. She gives more depth and complexity to the male archetype figure that it is the essence of the generalised other but fails to do so from the concrete other's perspective. The universal (generalised interaction) extends further downward into the particular (concrete interaction), but the particular does not expand upwards. As a consequence, the implicit priority in Benhabib's arguments is for the generalised other, not the concrete other, and even though she makes clear that she rejects the Kantian perspective when it comes to education, she relies on it when it comes to international, institutional, state, and societal matters.

Benhabib sees the nation-state playing a key role not just in the production of the generalised other through state driven educational systems, but also of *enforcing* group difference[62] through the legal recognition of their existence. Acknowledgement and codification of specific differences for their accommodation and needs is required for their equal inclusion as a function of some form of a modern welfare system. Implicitly interwoven into her argument, then, is the drive by these cultural groups receive (official) recognition, which through these very drives (which are themselves in responses to perceived inequalities, lack of opportunities or rights), solidify and cement cultural signifiers and experiences into aspects of one's self-identification. Essentially that the very struggle for identification as a project becomes a process in which one's cultural identification is clarified, made more distinct, and formalised. Because this struggle is multiple - it involves multiple people in the struggle, and it impacts multiple people after its conclusion - this shifts the direction and self-perception of the people who are a part of that struggle.

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[62] She uses the phrase "Corporate Group Identities" (1999c, p.4&16).

Whilst formalised schooling is one of the locations of homogenisation within a state, one's familial nurturing and home environment, with all of its cultural signifiers, is where "Intimacy and domesticity together contribute to the nourishment and unfolding of individuality". This suggests to her that "the primary moral and cultural purpose of the household under conditions of modernity is the development and flourishing of autonomous individualities." (1993, p.108). Personal morality is produced, driven, cultivated, or nurtured primarily in the home environment, where these unique elements combine, because this is where we are most often recognised and, paradoxically, given that children are generally understood to hold little structural power in such situations, they also have the strongest sense of personal agency. As Taylor puts it "My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose?... to know who I am... is a species of knowing where I stand" (Taylor 1989, p.27).

Key to these arguments then is the idea of historicity. From the Kantian/Poggesian model, identity is 'emphasised' in an ahistorical sense through its universalisation and the primacy of the generalised other, primarily through formal schooling and the justice system, but its moral tone comes far more from the content of that schooling. This produces the interchangeable generalised other's moral stance in Pogge's framework. From Benhabib's perspective though, the stronger sense of morality is through these intimate webs of 'interlocution' (2002, p.15), or narrative threads, which combine through conversation to produce an ongoing and historically nuanced sense of self-in-relation-to-other, and where morality that is focused through context-dependent experiences in sites of "love, care, sympathy and solidarity", corresponding to the moral categories of "responsibility, bonding and caring" (Benhabib 1992, p.159).

This then implies that any change to the dynamics of either the home or school environment must impact on the future path of morality itself, regardless of the type of morality being taught. Take for example a shift in earnings from parents necessitating working longer, later, or antisocial shifts, or a forced need to work further from home. This would naturally lead to a reduction in the amount of interaction possible with a child – impacting on these webs of interlocution and the times in which these narrative threads can be developed and as a consequence, the embeddedness of a family driven moral code is altered, as is the opportunity to *know* the other as a concrete other.

In conclusion, the problems that Benhabib struggles with is the impact that uniqueness and difference has on a universal system, any universal system, no matter how widened it becomes. Her critique of culture and her favouring of the generalised other position on immigration, as well as the need for reversibility are the causes of this contradiction. Her use of democratic iterations, whilst useful in some ways to increase the accommodations of a state, complicate the institutions but do not change them.

2.4   James Ingram

I now move on to James Ingram's works, which are of a much more recent nature and as such, build on and respond to many of the arguments so far discussed. The course that Ingram's works have followed so far involves the exploration of liberalism, democracy, and cosmopolitanism, in, as he puts it, a 'radical' sense. His stated aim of approach is to position cosmopolitanism more directly into the realm of practice first, with theory following, rather than the typical way of developing the theory and then applying it to practice[63]. Whilst both Pogge and Benhabib to a great extent accept Cosmopolitanism from its Kantian source very much as is (with some tweaking or re-framing from other theorists to make it pertinent to the modern era), Ingram starts with a genealogical analysis that identifies underlying norms of cosmopolitan explorations *throughout* history, which he then responds to in this analysis. His approach both recognises and responds to the arguments that "any serious attempt to realise cosmopolitan aims could proceed only by means of enormous violence" (2016, p.71) as well as accusations of unrealistic utopianism (2013, pp.263-272).

Ingram's most significant contribution to date is his monograph *Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democratic Universalism* (2013), In combination with his previous publications, he builds upon a close and ongoing engagement with the ideas of radicalism as expressed through universalism, democracy; and of course cosmopolitanism[64]. Between them all, there is a clear path of exploration of political agency within a democratic setting, expanded to the global level. He makes the case for an approach to cosmopolitics 'from the Bottom Up' and from the 'edge to the centre' (2018, p.21). He clarifies this through the use of the term cosmopolitics in the title of his latter works rather than cosmopolitanism because he locates cosmopolitanism as "an

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[63]   Both Pogge and Benhabib would fall into this category, as would Kant himself.

[64]   *Radical Cosmopolitics and the Tradition of Insurgent Universality* (2018); *Can Universalism Still be Radical?* (2005); *Between Liberalism and Radical Democracy* (2006).

ideal and a project" i.e. the theory. Cosmopolitics for Ingram, by contrast, is the critique expressed through action, as "a critical politics of universalisation, a practice that asserts universal values against what denies them here and now" (p.8). In this he locates it in the practice of politics and democracy during the moment (or process) of change, as particular experiences respond to and influence the universal through the struggle of the marginalised, discriminated against, and excluded.

This section explores three main areas in its analysis of Ingram's arguments. Firstly, I examine and critique Ingram's rejection of top-down cosmopolitanism in favour of a bottom-up approach. Ingram uses the arguments of a number of different theorists to clarify, distinguish and support his position[65], many of whom would likely object strenuously to the label of cosmopolitan[66] being applied to them (even if they might appreciate his own particular interpretation of it) to reach his conclusion. Secondly, I examine his idea of contestatory cosmopolitics, and consider the ramifications of this from the perspective of the groups that he identifies this cosmopolitics occurring through. From this I conclude that there is a fundamental lack of consideration of the social elements of intra-group dynamic that complicate his relatively under-considered use of 'groups' at the core of his schema. In addition, that his arguments rely on both Hobbesian and Kantian premises; his formulation rests on the necessity of suffering of the marginalised, excluded and discriminated against, through change, in the latter; and he is unable to escape the dynamic of the state's exercise of power *over* people (2013, p.249) in the former, even though his re-framing explicitly tries to avoid this. The final section gathers together the arguments of the previous sections, and develops the strands of thought he presents that are connected to education. I then conclude and suggest that his exclusion of "Arendt['s]... philosophy as activism" (p.224) from his analysis of cosmopolitanism to date is the absent angle from which firstly education could provide a core element to his cosmopolitics, through the practice of radical democracy, and secondly where his critical engagement with the cultural elements of his scheme would benefit from. This would allow him a route where the suffering of the marginalised, excluded and discriminated against, even if it could not pragmatically be avoided, might perhaps be mitigated.

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[65] Principally Immanuel Kant, pp.67-76, 106-143; Judith Butler, pp.56-59, 151-176; Pierre Bourdieu, pp.170-182; Claude Lefort, pp. 190-202, 252-253; Hannah Arendt, pp.190-209, 239-259; Etienne Balibar, pp.130-131, 207-219; Jacques Ranciere, pp.213-224, 254-257; Jurgen Habermas, pp.93-99, 133-142; and Seyla Benhabib, pp.159-172, 241-249.

[66] Judith Butler, Pierre Bourdieu, Hannah Arendt, Etienne Balibar and Jacques Rancier, although a number of theorists position Arendt in the general area of cosmopolitanism (see Benhabib 2008).

2.4.1 Top Down and Bottom Up

This section examines Ingram's approach to cosmopolitanism, and his justification for a bottom-up approach. It initially presents his assessment of previous historical expressions of cosmopolitanism to date as top-down expressions of universal arguments, inevitably turned to tools for dominion and imperialism. I then explore his development of a bottom-up approach as a response to this tendency, before considering some of the ramifications that are suggested from its framing.

Ingram identifies eleven specific locations, expressions and developments of top-down cosmopolitanism which starts with its Cynic origins and positions, as I argued in the introduction[67] as a negative action – a rejection of social life in totality (2013, p.27) – which the Stoics later re-interpreted as compatible with political life and its expression in the particular (p.29). Christian universalism sees its next major expression with "Constantine's union of faith and empire" (p.31) and the Holy Roman Empire. The next stages, firstly of the development of international law through such luminaries as Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel (p.32-34), and its subsequent expansion and theoretical redevelopment during the Enlightenment period (pp.34-35), was followed by Economic Cosmopolitanism which expanded "laissez fair cosmopolitan[ism]" (p.36) more widely. In conjunction with these last three physical expressions of cosmopolitanism can also be traced the continuing development of the *ideas* of, firstly, *Perpetual Peace* perhaps best exemplified in the works of Kant, but which saw featured a far greater number of other theorists like "Sully, the Abbe Saint-Pierre, Penn, Wieland, Bentham, and many others" (p.37). Secondly, "Revolutionary Cosmopolitanism" (p.38) via Anarchasis Cloots, Thomas Paine and Antonio Gramsci[68], all acting as counterpoints to hegemonic or imperial cosmopolitan tendencies.

Ingram's "High Imperial Cosmopolitanism" era (p.39) is a period frequently ignored in the historical presentation of cosmopolitanism, but this is where he locates numbers of western nation's attempts to universalise their own particularities "to infinity" (p.40), which acted against the high aspirations of cosmopolitanism, but which also served to universalise "the field of theory as well as practice" (ibid.) and saw a significant move towards globalisation and historical progressivism. The final two 'moments' each occur at the endings of periods of global war. The first of these is the "Postwar Revival" (p.41)[69] with the founding of the United Nations (UN), universal human rights and

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[67] See Section (1.3).
[68] To which could be added Le Marquis de Condorcet and Franz Fanon.
[69] One could also perhaps argue that there is a half-moment before this, post WW1, with the

more, and the second at the end of the Cold War, with the intervention of Nussbaum's 1994 essay[70]. He sums up this analysis with reference to Timothy Brennan's assessment that cosmopolitanism "is a discourse of the universal that is inherently local—a locality that's always surreptitiously imperial." (Brennan 2001, cited in Ingram 2013, p.7).

The inevitability of repeated movements towards the idea of global equality and freedom turning to inequality and unfreedom, through its tendency to imperialism, arises because each expression of the universal and cosmopolitan occurs "in the particular" (2013, p.42) and displays a number of "tensions - between exclusion and inclusion, elitism and egalitarianism, the actual and the ideal... they are part of the logic of universalism" (p.44). The eleven historical expressions of cosmopolitanism that he sets out each contain within them their own exclusions in their attempts to universalise, whether it be slaves, women, the un-propertied, the immigrant, the foreigner, the transient, the disabled, the neuro-divergent, the child, the homosexual, the intersexed, the transgender, the left-handed, the black, the brown, the oriental, the primitive, the irrational, the emotional, the uneducated, the heathen, the atheist, the pagan, the Jew, the Muslim, and so on. The situation he presents is of the continual determination of individuals and groups in their particularity to universalise their perspectives in their attempts to conceptualise a singular project of humanity. In conjunction with the ongoing globalisation of the earth also occurs a re-framing of history towards progressivism. From this, Ingram takes the existence of universals in a practical way, as simply 'always already there', and then reframes them as *false* universals, through Judith Butler arguments (p.26), awaiting their necessary challenges from below *because* of their falseness.

Ingram's approach to cosmopolitanism, based on this assessment, is clearly and understandably cautious in nature, because whilst he sees "Cosmopolitanism... [as] an attempt to realise the imperative of universalism" (p.23), it inevitably becomes *an attempt to realise the imperialism of universalism* when its progression is taken on by political elites. Cosmopolitanism is, from his assessment *always* repurposed for imperial, colonial and/or hegemonic reasons, or as ideologies of domination, which throughout history "tend to go astray, typically by serving as cover for projects that do not share their noble aims or motives" (2016, p.67). Essentially, then, cosmopolitanism in this framing is its own destructive dialectic. Firstly, between the theorising of its

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development of the League of Nations etc.

[70] This was touched on in section (1.3) but Ingram spends a good deal of time examining her contribution (2013, pp.45-60).

universal values, which are of a necessity normative in nature as it must be able to discriminate to be effective, needs to be framed from somewhere, against something (p.148). Secondly, through the inevitable positioning of a particular social and cultural environment, favoured by the privileged in their locale which the universal values are framed from, is identified by them as both the best example for the location of these values, and the most valid expression of those universal values. This in turn produces the seeds of its own downfall, as it betrays its own values of equality and freedom with the imposition of its particularity, through the utopian idea of the universal, typically by force and some form of violence (p.14) to achieve its aims.

Ingram responds to this through the ideas of difference and equality, and it forms a major aspect of his arguments. This drives his desire to centre cosmopolitics in the struggle for equality and liberty, incorporating Badiou's argument that the acceptability and accommodation of 'otherness' is conditional, relational, and ultimately ineffectual as "the self-declared apostles of... the 'right to difference'... are clearly *horrified by any vigorously sustained difference*" (Badiou 1999, cited in Ingram 205, p.564, his emphasis)[71]. Otherness can be *tolerated* to a certain extent, but never truly accommodated or accepted, rather, it inevitably ends up as "Become like me and I will respect your difference" (ibid.). This response has echoes of Pogge's inclination to shift fundamental or significant difference into the category of additional rights that may or may not be recognised and incorporated, as well as Benhabib's discourse dynamic moderated by the sovereign state, and reinforces the power dynamic between the two positions[72]. Ingram's use of Badiou's approach reframes the dynamic as one of *in*equality, which he uses to centre his idea of cosmopolitics as occurring when the other (who is inevitably the marginalised, excluded or discriminated against) uses political and moral means not to be accommodated within existing false universals, but rather to transcend them, and in so doing to constitute larger, wider, but still "false universal[s] in the name of the values that they betray" (Ingram 2013, p.iv). This movement always occurs from lower down, as the universalism at the top inevitably already closely represents the views of those at the top politically.

Cosmopolitanism is, then, always theoretically framed from the experience in the particular to the ideal of the universal, and claims against it are always made politically through the ideal of the universal from experiences in the particular. This implies

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[71] See also section (2.3.2) where I connect to this with the idea of the 'utterly other'.
[72] See Sections (2.2.2) & (2.3.4).

another type of dialectical interaction between two opposed aspects of the broader idea of cosmopolitanism, with their synthesis indicating a 'truer' cosmopolitanism, but understood as a 'false' cosmopolitan synthesis awaiting further claims against it from below. It is based on an assumption of the socially constructive nature of humanity, and therefore its endlessly shifting and changing expressions. Ingram's pragmatic suggestion is of a bottom-up approach as a corrective to the already existing norms of universal language, a globalised world, and equality, expressed through top-down universal ethical systems which produce their own failures through their underlying particularity, their tendency to imperialism, and their normative need to discriminate. He justifies this argument through the language of equality and the right to difference for those discriminated against and excluded.

2.4.2 *Contestatory Cosmopolitanism and Group resistance*

The previous section explored Ingram's justification for a bottom-up approach to cosmopolitanism. This section examines his idea of contestatory cosmopolitanism, and the role of marginalised groups, in producing movements towards 'better' false universals.

The second stage to Ingram's response to his concerns with cosmopolitanism, beyond its need for a bottom-up approach, is that "cosmopolitanism *must* be contestatory" (ibid. p.68, his emphasis). His solution to this is to frame "cosmopolitanism as a way of relating to a given set of circumstances" (2013, p.25). Crucially though, whilst cosmopolitanism is often seen this way already (when driven from the theoretical to the practical) it is typically interpreted as a *personal* and *private* (i.e. internal) orientation towards the world, generally identified with the educated, well-travelled, and in many senses already privileged part of humanity. Ingram instead turns this about, expands it, and redirects it as "a discursive practice or political move, a specific kind of *interruption* in a given discursive field" (p.44, my emphasis). He situates cosmopolitanism as both an attitude that should be shared across humanity, and an action of the marginalised in contest against their marginalisation, rather than simply an expression of the privileged towards global equality.

He initially uses the example of Nussbaum's (1994) intervention into the theorising of cosmopolitanism as such an interruption (pp.45-60), and devotes considerable attention to the complexities that arose from her intervention, but in his consideration of its

contestatory nature and its "political move", he looks far more towards the marginalised, excluded, and discriminated against instead. This aspect is raised partly through the somewhat concerning interaction that occurs between Nussbaum and Butler[73] (pp. 56-59) but more crucially from Wallerstein's argument that "those who are weak, or at least weaker, will only overcome disadvantage (even partially) if they *insist* on the principles of group equality. To do this effectively, they may have to stimulate group consciousness – nationalism, ethnic assertiveness etc." (Wallerstein 1996, cited in Ingram 2013, p.58). It is the *necessary* hardening of group identity to coordinated resistance against so-called universal norms that forms the core of his decision to site cosmopolitanism in the way that he does, not just from the bottom-up, but in political action from political *groups* at the bottom.

As was explored in section (2.3.1), Benhabib attempts to engage with this dynamic through her development of the generalised and concrete other primarily on the individual and familial level to develop her scheme of cosmopolitanism of democratic iterations through discourse ethics. This approach is designed to allow her to mitigate the level of recognition and fundamentality of group identity, formation, formalisation, and politicisation that Ingram relies upon. Benhabib's approach is to articulate, justify, and refine the already existing imposed universal through discourse. Ingram's approach, by contrast, (through Butler) is to view the struggle of the group, in a similar though not identical way, reframed in a dialectical fashion – as a way to expose limits and exclusions (p.159) – to use the group struggle as a justification to *reject* the existing imposed universal in favour of a new (but still flawed) universal which those groups have had a hand in the creation of. Re-framing in this way also allows Ingram to link Butler's arguments to Bourdieu's "question of universalism [which is] not... a matter of interpretation, but of power" (p.171) and with his paired ideas of capital "as a form of accumulated relational advantage" and symbolic violence, to view civil society as a place of inequality and domination that can be examined in egalitarian terms. Essentially, to centre on what is not universal, i.e. negative universalism (p.178).

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[73] The example he uses raises questions about its suitability to support the argument he makes here – not least because the structural position of a prominent academic able to initiate this kind of shift *by themself*, as he suggests occurred, hardly fits the profile of someone or some group at 'the bottom' or of his perception of the fundamentality of *groups* contesting universal norms.
As I discussed in Section (1.2), it was not the intervention of a single individual, but rather the arguments of a number of academics that Nussbaum's essay built upon, which aligned with the ending of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Considering the interruption to be the fall of the Berlin Wall would more easily support Ingram's arguments, rather than focussing on the privileged who (re)directed our understanding of the impact of the interruption in a certain direction, after the fact.

Ingram's use of Butler also raises two further points in their collective argument that "languages of liberation might be implicated in the very service of oppression, that the enfranchisement of 'women'... might require and institute a different set of hierarchies … turned against other marginal groups" (Butler 1991, cited in Ingram 2013, p.153) and secondly that "the identity categories often presumed foundational to feminist politics... simultaneously work to limit and constrain in advance the very cultural possibilities that feminism is supposed to open up" (ibid.). Whilst Butler's arguments was directed at feminism (as was Benhabib's), this same nature of argument holds for any move to enfranchisement from a disaffected group at 'the bottom'.

From this, the very act of resistance, of contest, in the way Ingram suggests, requires the stimulation of group consciousness and its formalisation, out of which coordinated responses can arise, as dictated to by the dominant power that the claim(s) of inequality are made against. This then necessitates on the one hand a certain level of external-facing fixing of dominant elements (from activist groups, social groups, charities, groups based around particular experiences, specific communities etc.) within the oppressed group, as the dominant power influences the power of these groups to affect it, and influences their formally recognised actions through prescribing acceptable ways of interaction. On the other hand, internally, those within the group(s) experience a self-defining, 'claiming' or 'reclaiming' of the language and concepts used to refer to and talk about them, often rejecting outright or partially accepting for pragmatic reasons, the will of the dominant power that has excluded, marginalised, discriminated against, or misrepresented them (Carmichael & Hamilton 1967, p.42).

This process occurs at the same time that strategic alliances form between other marginalised (and likely similarly but not identically disadvantaged) groups, and the involvement of non-affected elite advocates representing their views. In addition to which hierarchies *outside* the group are replicated *inside* the group, such that, for example, lighter-skinned and/or 'westernised' black and Asians people, middle-class gay men and women, trans people who 'appear' cisgender', gender-binary presenting intersex and non(-)binary people, disabled 'super' athletes, neuro-diverse social affluents and 'high functioning' autistic people etc. are funnelled towards the top of their respective groups through both internal and external pressure and opportunities, to become the more acceptable faces of these groups. The various groups, through these ongoing processes, becomes at least in part defined by the struggles that they undertake, and the

compromises in language they are forced to accept from external pressure (or because internally one group has more social capital and is able to exert more control over the process), and the suffering that they continue to endure. The struggle, in effect, becomes a core aspect of the cultural identity of the group(s) because the struggle itself gives a common and dominant theme to the lives of the people in the group (and those they represent) around which their language and practices are forced to accommodate, accept, or privilege.

Intra-Cultural norms and dynamics are inevitably reshaped by these contestatory processes (something which Benhabib repeatedly expresses concern with in relation to gendered ethnic dynamics, but with Ingram does not examine). They are also hardened through the requirement of the dominant power to produce a normative response to the claims against a failed universal, whether that be legal recognition of different ethnic or cultural groups or changes to legal systems and social practices to accommodate different ways of living and interacting with others. This effectively manifests as the need for homogenisation of the group. Further, the 'problems of culture' are frequently given in cosmopolitan discourse as issues that cosmopolitanism is supposed to overcome[74]. This produces a contradictory setting where, in effect, the dominant powers *require* internal cultural/group hardening to justify shifts in political/legal/societal systems and norms based on universal values – to prove that their claim is valid - yet at the same time those same universal values are a means used to dismiss or discount group identity.

Ingram's lack of specificity, or engagement, with the intra- and inter-dynamics of the groups he bases his cosmopolitical scheme on is surprising, and this is compounded in two further ways. Firstly because he explicitly steps away from identifying such groups, and refuses to provide guidance or insight into what claims could or should be considered valid. Whilst he does indicate that "exclusion of women" is an aspect of the political realm where these cosmopolitical moments can occur (p.214), as well as inequality and discrimination, there is no exploration of the potentiality of competing or divergent claims from these groups. This is an inevitable function of his (false) universalism because, as was noted previously from Butler, the claims that succeed will inevitably be exclusive in some way and produce their own hierarchies and exclusions. But more significantly, he asserts that "we cannot simply align ourselves with the underdog in every one of the world's disputes... movements of underdogs are not always

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[74]   See especially Nussbaum (Ingram 2013).

reliable vehicles for promoting freedom and equality... also... it may not be clear who the underdog is" (p.222).

The question then arises as to how can this be determined, if cosmopolitics is, as he suggests, contestation *from* below? If the contestation has to come from below, but the judgement of the 'cosmopoliticality' of the contest comes from elsewhere, then this suggests that it is *not* contestation from below itself, but rather the determination of the rightness of the contest that determines whether it is cosmopolitical. Secondly, and just as significantly, Ingram presents a very particular political system that, leading on from Arendt, requires a significant degree of *activity* in which the contest arises and can be acted upon. As with the problems for Benhabib's discourse ethics entering a domain where it is moderated by the state and will favour the least different, similar issues arise here.

Ingram's next step is to engage with the political aspects of the idea of cosmopolitanism, conjoined with democracy, and "to rethink democratic politics... as a domain and activity". As was the case earlier in this section, he again makes use of a number of theorists to define, clarify, and distinguish his position. Firstly, from Hannah Arendt, he takes her view of democratic politics "to show how political action can be understood as a vehicle of democratic transformation". To this he adds Claude Lefort's "idea that democratic politics is necessarily unfinished and conflictual and realises itself through contestation over democratic ideals". From Sheldon Wolin and Miguel Abensour he thirdly argues that "politics can arise outside and against institutions in the form of a demand that they become more democratic" and finally from Etienne Balibar and Jacque Ranciere he shows how "a politics of transformation... emerges through challenges to particular obstacles to the expansion of the universal principle of equal freedom" (p.223-224). Between these critical theorists, and in response to Kant's cosmopolitanism and its neo-Kantian variants, Ingram, rather than simply repositioning cosmopolitanism as a purely contestatory theory as his arguments suggests, also recasts the ethics of cosmopolitanism as a necessary cycling between two broad theoretical strains.

Just as with Benhabib, who focused on and explored the idea of the concrete other in response to the predominance of universalising arguments that privilege the already powerful, Ingram's combination of a range of critical theoretical approaches into the

framing and re-conceptualization of cosmopolitanism allows him to give much needed attention to this 'bottom-up' angle to the idea of cosmopolitanism, in relation to the wider and better known normative varieties. His focus on a bottom-up cosmopolitan approach though *requires* the theoretical developments of the universal to react against, (which he himself admirably demonstrates in his book) and this must *always* follow hegemonic, universalising systems. In addition to which, through this cyclical system, it both normalises and essentialises this mode of (false) universal creation. Suffering, as the experience of these groups from which this contest occurs through, is *necessary* for his construct to work. This makes the struggle for survival, and then on and upwards towards the possibility of equa-liberty, the primary trigger for the possibility of cosmopolitan progress towards moral/political advancement. This also replicates, in modern form, Kant's own assessment of social-unsociability and the suffering that is necessary to drive forward human progress.

I will leave this angle under-developed for now, as responding to it requires the arguments I develop in chapter three, where I explore the underlying norms of Kant's works and arguments, and which is expanded still further with Herder's intra- and inter-culturalism arguments in chapter four. I then return to and answer this in chapter five, but one underlying norm that I identify in chapter three which needs to be noted at this point is the prominence of *fear* and *desire* that drives Kant's own cosmopolitan vision.

Essentially, Kant's political system and the philosophy that both stands behind it and drives it forward are based on the emotional states of fear and desire, and it is these elements that combine to produce his antisocial sociability – which is the fertile ground from which oppression and inequality grow. Ingram's schema of cosmopolitanism developing through contestation relies on this same premise because it is exists in the normative angle of cosmopolitanism that his contestatory response is built and designed to respond to. The primary, and not insignificant difference between the Kantian approach and Ingram's is that Kant's 'struggle' is between an intellectual-moral elite and the political-economic pragmatic elite, presented in a genteel and effusive manner. Ingram's system concerns the struggle of the disenfranchised, dispossessed and discriminated against as the moral, against the political-economic (and perhaps even the intellectual elite) as the pragmatic response to inequality.

2.4.3   Education

This final section on Ingram engages directly with education, something which, as is

typical for the majority of cosmopolitan theorists, he touches only briefly on. When he does, it is in response to approaches to education by other theorists, principally Martha Nussbaum (Ingram 2013, p.55 & 81) and Immanuel Wallerstein (ibid. p.58)[75]. From these it is possible to establish from his critique of their perspectives a somewhat rough understanding of what a cosmopolitan education would or would not consist of.

With regards to Nussbaum, he responds to her view of a cosmopolitan education and the 'cultivation of humanity', which she argues is to educate people "to recognise humanity wherever they encounter it, undeterred by traits that are strange to them, and be eager to understand humanity in all its strange guises. They must learn enough about the different to recognise common aims, aspirations, and values, and enough about the common ends to see how variously they are instantiated in the many cultures and their histories" (Nussbaum 1994, cited in Ingram 2013, pp.55-56[76]). The issue that he has with Nussbaum's approach is that it relies upon an already pre-existing idea of what humanity 'is' - the 'common' - rather than expressing a concern with assigning a universal concept of humanity from her own particular perspective that corresponds to her own privileged experiences and position.

Ingram also responds to Nussbaum's assertion in *Cultivating Humanity* (1997) that "only a human identity that transcends... divisions shows us why we should look at one another with respect across them" (p.67) which links to her arguments of the three main aspects of humanities education that are needed: self-criticism, identification with different others; and the cultivation of a "narrative imagination" (Nussbaum 1997, cited in Ingram 2013, p.81). This time, Ingram expresses support for them - the ideas of self-criticism, identification with distant others, and the cultivation of a narrative imagination - but he also argues that the three imperatives are in direct opposition to her 'Capabilities' (1997) and her framing present a paternalistic, western, top-down approach, where the west acts upon the rest (Ingram 2013, p.80). For Nussbaum those within the west need to be taught these three imperatives, in a certain manner, and when combined with her 'capabilities' approach, education, development and 'freedom', similar patterns are forced onto non-western people, which, he argues, simply serves to

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[75] He also discusses education in relation to Pierre Bourdieu (p.175 & 177) but this does not contribute to understanding Ingram's overall position.

[76] This is a rephrased quote from Nussbaum's 1994 article *Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism*. In the original, she uses female pronouns: "to recognize humanity wherever *she* encounters it, undeterred by traits that are strange to *her*, and be eager to understand humanity in its "strange" guises. *She* must learn enough about the different to recognize common aims, aspirations, and values, and enough about these common ends to see how variously they are instantiated in the many cultures and many histories". In the edited book by Cohen that Ingram refers to, it uses gender-neutral "they" pronouns.

make them 'more like us'. Nussbaum's main concerns are 'culture and tradition', specifically *their* cultures and *their* traditions, which situates the problem '*over there*' i.e. in the non-west, or the non-western[77], rather than "say, the international distribution of labour, commercialisation, the state or development" etc. (p.81). From this, it is possible to identify that Ingram supports the main principles of the three imperatives, but not the pre-existing assumption of humanity, nor the normative arguments of which capabilities are the correct ones to be cultivated. It is the western-imperialistic project, and the asymmetry between the west and the rest - and the actions which follow - that is the problem.

When Ingram explores Wallerstein's arguments, we encounter a quite different and on the whole more positive tenor. Here, Wallerstein argues that "What is needed educationally is not to learn that we are citizens of the world, but that we occupy particular niches in an unequal world, and that being disinterested and global on one hand and defending one's narrow interests on the other are not opposites but positions combined in complicated ways. Some combinations are desirable, others are not[78]" (Wallerstein 2006, cited in Ingram 2013, p.58) and this is directed not towards one's cultures or traditions, but towards one's social and geographic situation. This contributes to movements towards group identity and solidarity in the face of inequality, contributing in turn to developing nationalism and ethnic assertiveness. Ingram's support for Wallerstein's argument, in light of his earlier position towards Nussbaum, suggests that to consider oneself a 'citizen of the world' is not actually necessary or even relevant to his cosmopolitan moment through contestation. Group identity and being on weaker side of power dynamics, on the other hand, are.

The process of cosmopolitanism as contestation therefore relies on the opportunities and capabilities *of the oppressed* – which produces a number of aspects through education. Firstly, that education[79] when linked to a project of recognising similarity and commonality is, for Ingram, a gateway to *erasing* difference when projected from a position of power, but only for the other and not the self. Secondly, centring the ability to respond to false universals on the ability of the dispossessed inevitably privileges

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[77] Benhabib's concern are similar but distinct – it is still *their* cultures and traditions, but *over here* rather than *there*. In immigrant and indigenous communities in the west.

[78] This quote from Wallerstein continues "Some are desirable here but not there, now but not then". This 'time and location' factor resonates closely with Herder's own ideas, and connects to his understanding of the life-cycle of a *volk* (4.2.4) as well as history more generally (4.2.5).

[79] This has considerable impact on the educational elements of 'International Development', although its exploration falls outside the remit of this thesis.

those within the dispossessed groups that are less dispossessed. The elite of the marginalised are the ones who lead the charge, and they are also the furthest from the negative implications of their own dispossession. Further, that in combination with his critique of Nussbaum, education for the possessed as opposed to the dispossessed, for Ingram, must require a recognition of one's own hierarchical position, as well as those of others, reminiscent of an intersectional approach, but with a (necessary for Ingram) empirical evaluation so that genuine claims can be recognised by the possessed, and relative inequalities can be assessed to determine the order and magnitude of response.

The consequence of these points is that education for the possessed *must* come with a political project of recognising *and responding to* inequality-difference by weakening one's own position in the dominant systems meta-norms. But to get to the point where the understanding – even the imperative of - democracy should be seen as the struggle of the dispossessed for equal-liberty rather than a civilised process of power distribution and use is another matter. Ingram's arguments require a wide-spread belief that a primary purpose of the state is in the regulation of itself *against* the regulation of the marginalised. It relies on a radical reformulation of how we as subjects, citizens and humans understand the concept of democracy, and of that understanding wending its way through the political institution, requiring fundamental shifts in the practice of politics at all levels. More than that though, it empowers instability against a pre-existing requirement for stability, but is unclear of the means by which these contests can be judged valid (and who does the judging). Without this embedding throughout society all the way to global society, as a new norm of politics, it would inevitably be a path for the privileged (even if also dispossessed in certain ways) to contest for *their* equa-liberty. The need for embedding is an underlying requirement – which education slots in to. It also makes the assumption that the only way is through contest – which is its own Hobbesian norm. Further, it requires suffering, just as Kant bases his own project upon. I would even go so far as to argue that it elevates suffering as the core principle of Ingram's radical cosmopolitics.

2.5   Conclusions

The previous sections of this chapter have explored the arguments of Thomas Pogge, Seyla Benhabib and James Ingram. For Pogge it identified, firstly, his location in the traditional approach to cosmopolitanism, presenting a universalisation of a historically state-bounded, generalised conception of humanity focused on individualism. He

develops this primarily from an enlargement of Rawls' works, and is an approach which both Benhabib and I attribute to the locus of the concept of the generalised other. This serves not so much to erase the importance of particularity, but to present a level playing field between *all* particular experiences and perspectives, regardless of their essentiality, importance or impact, and regardless of whether they are experiences that can be escaped from, taken up and cast aside. As a result, he dismisses structural issues of privilege, opportunity and agency that the possession of choice-less individualities (like race, sexuality, gender, class, physical or mental ability etc.) impose on already marginalised groups which he repositions against voluntary group affiliations. Education, for him, whilst fundamental to the development of cosmopolitanism, is situated primarily in the formal schooling of individuals to develop rationality and aligns closely with Kant's own arguments.

Benhabib's approach, in contrast, through her development of both Gilligan's generalised and concrete other and extending from Habermas' discourse ethics, attempts to weave a path *between* the generalised other and the concrete other by incorporating the idea of reversibility, in the hope of levelling the historical privileging of the generalised other (the publicised middle-class male) against the concrete other (the privatised middle-class woman), although the final balance between the two remains unclear. This positions her somewhere near the middle of the traditional/critical spectrum. She approaches from a self-avowed critical feminist perspective and her first main aim is to explore the dynamics and interactions of the concrete others, not just as a key source of human expression, interaction and development, but also as a way to justify its positioning at the same level as the generalised other through the principles of *reversibility* and *universality.*

Her goal is, in effect, the location of the dialectic that is produced between universalising (generalised) and particularising (concrete) approaches. It demonstrates a wariness of both approaches when considered on their own, in addition to concerns over the 'middle' location of cultural/group experiences, and the institutionalising effect that struggles for group recognitions have over their culture's growth, development and change. In her case, she acknowledges that her version of morality as communicative ethics automatically excludes an undefined number of humanity who are unable to engage with the commitments that her system demands, but which appears to constitute an educational and capability barrier to inclusion. Further, that her method is *only* valid

for those who can engage in the process. Benhabib's desire is to establish balance between the universal and the particular, explored through state-moderated discourse. This is expected to produce newer democratic iterations, although I argue that he emphasis on reversibility fails to establish this, as does her clear favouring of the universal over the particular in areas like hospitality.

My exploration of James Ingram established the importance for him of a counter-narrative, rather than simply balance between the universal and the particular, and a recognition of the inherently imperialistic nature of cosmopolitanism. This imperialism can only be checked through the privileging of the struggles of the marginalised against its universalising, and generalising, tendencies and requires the reification of group identity and their struggles against their erasure and/or oppression. What was also revealed though was that, because Ingram's is a *response to*, it has to incorporate the underlying norms of fear and desire that are a core characteristic of the Kantian vision of cosmopolitanism.

The analyses carried out in this chapter reveals three key, chained aspects that serve to direct the theorising and analysis of cosmopolitanism in a very specific way. Firstly, that Pogge's traditional conception of cosmopolitanism relies on the development of generalised and homogenised individualism through education. Individual difference could be accommodated, but it cannot be incorporated. Secondly, Benhabib's approach focusses on the development of individuality through familial, domestic and cultural education, but in the disagreement between the universal and the particular on the plane of culture, it prioritises the enlargement of the characteristics of generalised individualism over concrete individuality or cultural identity. Finally, Ingram's arguments suggest that cosmopolitanism, rather than focussing on either individualism or individuality, is interested primarily in *group* identity, specifically when it responds against marginalisation, discrimination or dispossession.

The current approach to cosmopolitanism, as represented by Pogge, Benhabib and Ingram, can be classified in specific ways, identifying similarities of approach that highlight a critical and traditional divide within the social sciences. The traditional cosmopolitan approach embeds the fundamental equivalence and legal equality of the individual at the heart of its approach through its promotion of collective individualism, and it automatically aligns, through a lack of examination and focus on the political

side, to the creation of the individual with a pre-set liberal democratic education that privileges the generalised other. As a result, the underlying nature of the state, or indeed of the western-dominated world, is not one of the importance of the concrete other[80], but rather of the differently-identified generalised other being granted *temporary and restricted* equality. This continues until either the institutionally accepted generalised self is threatened by external factors unless or the differently-identified generalised other surrenders, sacrifices or allows to fade (if possible) its differences and presents itself as the generalised other. Pogge sees their accommodation as expressed through *additional rights*, and Benhabib needs these concrete aspects to be reversible and therefore ultimately incorporateable into the generalised other's standpoint through public discourses and democratic iterations. Ingram, by contrast, elevates the different and the marginalised as the key element of contestatory democracy and cosmopolitics.

In essence, then, this chapter looked at the point of the '*who*' over the '*what*'. The self-creation of the '*who*' as an expression of difference, but linked to some aspect of group affiliation, over the other-determination of the '*what*' as an expression of universal commonality. The approach that the traditional side presents is in effect of the philosopher-king determining the '*what*' that defines the individual as human and worthy of rights because of its focus on individualism and universality. This '*what'* is universally equal and grafted with specific rights that define that humanity, but it also encloses and limits it. The development and promotion of universal laws and rights, by theorists and specialists places their creation and alteration outside the authority or influence of the individual, or even the group, without some kind of public complaint, discourse or contest being undertaken.

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[80] Which Benhabib elaborates upon but then removes from consideration when examining hospitality and Cosmopolitan Right.

Chapter 3: Kant and Cosmopolitanism

"Education is the greatest and most difficult problem that can
be given to a human being" (Kant 1803, p.441)

Contents

3.1 Introduction

This chapter explores Immanuel Kant's works in detail, expanding on the narrow and partial approaches typically taken and which were discussed in the previous chapters. This examination re-presents his arguments on Cosmopolitanism as resting on five main overt themes that run through much of his writings; the importance of religion, human nature, reason, and education, and the danger of emotions, as well as a further two implicit themes: elitism and exclusion. These all combine together to form the structure that his cosmopolitan system relies upon. I approach this chapter with an under-examined aspect of his work, religion (3.2), before moving on to his understanding of human nature (3.3) and the groupings that humans form (3.4). The final two sections explore his arguments on education, firstly of a formal kind (3.5), which has seen much

exploration and critique (from the philosophical side at least), before examining the informal ways education works in Kant's political system.

3.1.1   Situating Kant

In this account of Kant's cosmopolitanism, I firstly demonstrate how his arguments interconnect and work as a relatively cohesive whole. Secondly, by sourcing his arguments directly from his texts, and referencing according to their original publication date, I highlight how these seven themes extend throughout his post 1770 texts, suggesting that Kant's approach to, for example, international politics, emotions, gender and race, can only be understand as part of a relatively comprehensive system that incorporates not just his empirical analysis of humanity as it was, or would progress, but also his critical development of how he believed that it *should* exist and progress, from pure reason. This both includes *and relies upon* his arguments on religion and Providence, as well as his anthropological works, geography, elements of both Hobbes' and Rousseau's analyses of humans (atomisation and human animality/nature), inherent hierarchies of power, and notably for the purpose of this thesis, education[81].

His arguments on the construction of a civil society and the state, gender and human nature are embedded into his writings on perpetual peace, as are his arguments on God and religion, and just as his republican state relies on gendered exclusions, elitism and suffering to function. His moral person has to be the philosopher/cosmopolitan – a re-representation of Kant himself, stripped of historicity; just as a moral personality in his system can only be acquired by a white, educated, man. So too is education interconnected with, and embedded within Cosmopolitan Right, Perpetual Peace, the construction of a republican state, the development of an ethico-civil society and his writings on reason and religion. By treating Kant's works as separate elements that can be cut and pasted elsewhere, such as both Rawls and Pogge do (Molloy 2016, pp.10-

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My approach is a variant of what Jay Rosenberg, in his introduction to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, refers to as an Appolonian approach and consists of "an especially close reading of the text, philological attention to nuances of interpretation, a careful tracing of intellectual influences, and a continuous awareness of the broader historical, cultural, and socio-political setting within which the work developed and emerged" (Rosenberg 2005, p.2). I turn this approach inward towards Kant, expanding the texts to be considered, and establish his arguments within their *own* broader context.

12), I argue that it not only fails to present the comprehensive nature of his works but also, I believe does a profound injustice to the purpose and direction of his works.

An important aspect of this approach involves his 'critical turn', and the period in his life from 1770-1780 which is often referred to as his "silent years" (Kuehn 2001, p.188). Contributing to this is that Kant makes clear in 1797, in discussions with his editor that 1770 should be the cut-off point for consideration of the republication of any earlier 'minor' texts (p.190). This typically means that any writings prior to this date are not considered relevant to his own critical period's arguments, but instead are a feature of 'The Magister' years – and usually as a result ignored.

There are though a number of texts which breach this 'before and after' dynamic, and make a simple split between these two points less simple and definitive than is often considered. For example, his writings, and even more importantly his teachings, of anthropology, geography, and aesthetics, started well before – and extend through these silent years into the 1790's when he stopped teaching. Although there are some changes to the texts he uses over these years, "the roots of his anthropology course lie… as early as 1757" (Louden 2007, p.2). A similar situation occurs with *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime* (1764), the *Programme of his Lectures* (1765) and his lectures on *Physical Geography* (1802). Elements from *Observations* also feature in *Anthropology* and his *Critique of Judgement*, and whilst this makes it easier to incorporate these into my analysis of Kant's arguments, *Observations* was never republished. Guyer (2007, p.19) notes that, whilst it contains little in the way of aesthetic theory, it does still form a wider part of Kant's anthropological exploration; it contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of his developing moral theory, and it provides considerable detail of his views on "gender, nationality, and race" (ibid.). In addition, Goldthwait draws attention to Kant's handwritten comment in his own copy of *Observations* where he writes that "Everything goes past me like a river and the changing tastes and the various shapes of men make the whole game uncertain and delusive. Where do I find a fixed point in nature, which cannot be moved by man, and were I can indicate the markers by the shore to which he ought to adhere?" (1960, p.8). Johann Herder, whilst they were still friends, also observed in relation to Kant that "No cabal, no sect, no advantage to himself, no ambition, had the least influence over him compared with the development and illustration of the truth" (p.7).

My approach to these texts, his own note, and the various theorists who have explored this area, is that whilst they contribute only marginally to his critical turn[82] and the history of the development of his moral philosophy, they are far more crucial to the empirical exploration that contributed to his need to develop the critical turn. Many of the observations he makes in *Observations* extend throughout his later works, and as I demonstrate in this chapter, are crucial to a comprehensive understanding of his overall cosmopolitan vision. These empirical explorations were Kant's early attempts to find a 'fixed point in nature' which he then abandons for a fixed moral point that he believes can link the noumenal with the phenomenal; his 'transcendental deduction' and synthetic *a priori*. Because of this, I have made the decision to include his anthropological texts as empirical evidence that is used to justify his need for the critical turn, as well as the source of underlying norms by which he 'judges' human nature. His cosmopolitan political system, and his educational arguments, as a result, have to respond to the empirical 'evidence' that justifies the need for the universal.

This then leads into the second aspect that is crucial for situating Kant in this chapter. Whilst it is not possible to go into great depths on the particularities of Kant's philosophical arguments on reason – this has occupied philosophers ever since they were published and there are ongoing differences of interpretation of how to engage with his works – I take the approach here that there are three 'basic' aspects to reason that are of importance. Firstly, pure theoretical reason; which is related only to the noumenal, and secondly, empirical reason; which relates only to the phenomenal. The third, crucial use is pure[83] practical reason, which is Kant's bridging between these two perspectives, through morality. This third use is, I believe, the main purpose of Kant's philosophy – morality – which extends through his second *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* (1785), and of course *The Metaphysic of Morals* (1797) itself.

My engagement with reason in this chapter, as a result, makes use of two distinct aspects. Firstly, that which has a 'pure' component and thus relates to morality – it has an aspect to it that is *a priori*. Secondly reason as the idea of reasoning – aesthetic judgment, which is *a posteriori*. I refer to them respectively as pure reason, and empirical reason(ing). This is of course a simplification – not least because it conflates

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[82] David Harvey and Michael Foucault both suggest that, with regards to Kant's *Anthropology* and *Geography*, the impact is far greater, and that these text should be considered central to his critical turn (Foucault 2008; Harvey 2009, pp.21-23).

[83] Kant frequently but not always drops 'pure' when he discusses reason.

pure theoretical reason and pure practical reason into one, and in addition Kant does not usually refer to empirical reasoning in this way. When he refers to reason, it is generally a shortening of pure reason - as is the case for the title of his second critique (Reath 2010, p.3). In relation to the areas explored in this chapter, it is sufficient to clearly distinguish between the universality of Kant's moral arguments, and the particularity in his non-philosophical works. Pure reason contains a (universal) moral component, whilst empirical reason, although it may contain a moral component, is sourced from empirical sources - and thus is not related to universal morality.

3.1.2 Chapter Summations

Section (3.2), starts by examining Kant's writings on religion and theology, for a very specific reason – because Kant repeatedly asserts that "Human reason *has need of* an idea of highest perfection" (1783, p.341, my emphasis). This *need* is foundational to his works through the idea of *belief*, and 'highest perfection' refers to the Christian interpretation of a singular God-figure. His philosophical, political, and educational arguments rely on a very particular conception of this God, of religion, the natures of good and evil, and the meanings of Nature and Providence, which he builds upon and are mentioned throughout his works, not least Perpetual Peace where he states outright that it is "guaranteed by no less authority than the great artist Nature!" (1795b, pp.108-9). It situates his arguments on the strength and danger of emotionality (as the catalyst to evil thoughts and actions) and the necessity for the development of a specific form of education designed to counteract this influence through the cultivation of a cosmopolitan attitude reliant on the development of pure reason; so that education can serve its primary purpose for the good of humanity.

The next section (3.3) expands upon this through an exploration of human nature. It initially looks at his idea of the natural human and its relation to the idea of the 'noble savage' before moving on to the ways he sees humans becoming civilised, before I then move on to how man[84] should be moralised to cosmopolitanism. The final part of this section looks into more detail on Kant's particular approach to essentialising men and women into a permanent binary of opposition, that connects back to the first section; his fears of emotionality and why emotions must be contained, and as a consequence why *women must be contained* and forever denied the right to a moral personality. This final part to this section features the first major exclusionary move that Kant makes, not just

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[84] This refers specifically to men, not women or any other genders of humanity, and, as I develop further in the chapter, of a particular subset of men.

because he deems women to be less than men and unable to be moral, but because he makes this exclusion permanent. His framework requires women to fulfil a role determined by Nature, for the good of humanity, and so must exist outside of the possibility of human agency and be permanently denied the opportunity for moral development.

Section (3.4) takes the findings from the previous sections and explores the different types of societies that Kant identifies. The first correlates with his understanding of 'natural human animals', and the location of 'morality through innocence' prior to the development of reason i.e. the romanticised concept of the 'noble savage' that he takes from Rousseau. The existence of social communities, through culturing and empirical reasoning alone is one that he sees as inherently untrustworthy, resting, as he perceived it, upon emotions (most prominently fear and desire) rather than being developed from pure reason. The progression from there to a civil society brings with it the *reasoned* construction of a civil constitution. This serves to give a legal (ethico-judicial) means to counteract animality and promote justice, and is, according to Kant, the necessary response to humanity's asocial sociability, and the endless wars and strife across the globe that drives human societies to construct international institutions to regulate commerce and facilitate peace. This occurs primarily because of the actions of Providence (through the structure of Nature) but also through the manifestations of his 'geniuses' and the ongoing development of the art of education to the science of pedagogy, to produce elite individuals with the capability and opportunity to develop their moral personality. These moral elite then go on to form the 'invisible church', made up initially of individual ethico-civil societies but eventually, in the fullness of time, are expected to become a single ethico-civil community connecting all of humanity together.

Essentially, Kant's system indicates that whilst it is possible for there to be movement from a natural community to a social community, it can only become a *civil* society through a) the influence of Providence, b) the development of pure reason and c) the contributions of his moral-cosmopolitan-religious men to the development of this constitution. This development occurs through 1) public discourse, 2) moral examples that are recorded for posterity to influence the already existing and future elite 3) formal education to prepare a new generation of cosmopolitan individuals 4) the development of a civil constitution 5) the creation of a single-state world, or failing that, a pacific

federation. Civil society serves as the location of the struggle between humanity's animal nature and cosmopolitan man's moral development, and Kant's conception of the religious ethico-civil society contributes to this battle through public examples of moral acts by his geniuses, moral men, and those who copy their examples. Their contribution in turn relies on an elite level of education that Kant sees as feasible for only a select few, which also requires the opportunity to practice their reason and morality until they are able to revolutionise their thoughts and actions to pure morality for humanity. The right to vote, which he restricts to men of independent wealth is one such avenue for this to occur. The existence and actions of his ethico-civil society serves as the main avenue through which the exercising and propagation of cosmopolitan (moral) values was expected to spread from his cosmopolitan beings to the wider public who are able to perceive good and evil actions, even if they cannot yet act as good beings. This process occurs through a curiously un-Kantian 'fake it till you make it' approach using self-deceit, that he suggests is acceptable for non-cosmopolitan citizens, and of the educational requirements needed to create the individuals that would be a part of this society. Kant's cosmopolitan world is the culmination of these layers, helping to secure a perpetual peace through the development of a world government, or if that is not possible, a pacific federation.

This section also sees a second set of major exclusions of Kant's. The first is, surprisingly, his 'pragmatic' response to the expense of the kind of education needed to give the grounding from which to develop pure reason (and as a consequence moral men). Since he sees it as too expensive to be provided to all male children, he instead directs the majority to be distracted through commerce, and to receiving a lesser level of education for skill and prudence, but not morality[85]. The second is through Kant's wholesale removal of native Americans, Africans and other races that he groups with them, from the ability to develop skill and experience culturing – the necessary first steps and route to moralization. The third is through his distinction between citizens and subjects. A citizen is one who has the right to vote and as a consequence, because they are not economically beholden to others, are able to act freely and morally.

The final two sections (3.5 & 3.6) directly explore his writings on education, and how they fit into the sections explored previously. The first (3.5) looks at the role and system of formal education he develops, with the second part exploring the elements of indirect

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[85] Although it should be noted that this moral standard is implied, and the groundwork is laid, in the way that they are disciplined and cultivated (See section 3.5)

and cultural education that he weaves into his arguments. There are four elements to this first part, which starts with a) the disciplining of the child away from animality. The child is then b) cultivated by his teacher to skilfulness at the same time that they are c) culturing into civility, before d) the elite men are educated in virtue before educating themselves to morality through its practice.

The second section (3.6) explores Kant's idea of *bildung* and culturing, and the other informal measures he sees as necessary to cultivate mankind to humanity. This section initially examines the function of the family environment (3.6.1) before detailing how religion and the ethico-civil society are implicated in the cultural and moral development of those who are denied an advanced level of education, just as they are used to support the internal struggle that is a function of a man's unceasing striving to morality (3.6.2). This final part of this section (3.6.3) sets out the way in which Kant relied upon his idea of Cosmopolitan Right and commerce to facilitate cultural and moral development across borders into other states (through an Enlightenment understanding of the meaning of commerce).

This chapter then concludes (3.7) by arguing that Kant's cosmopolitan system is deliberately designed to promote a single moral code that would be cultivated in a select few thorough a Socratic-style cosmopolitan education system. They are expected to act as the conscience of the society they were a part of; as its 'moral centre'. His original 'Kingdom of Ends' was also the truer expression of his works, rather than his latter support for a pacific federation which he settles on for pragmatic reasons, and whilst his shift acknowledged the practical impossibility of achieving his final utopian future, it still rested upon his foundational understanding of human nature, and the inherent danger of emotionality that justified its exclusionary nature.

The analysis presented here makes the case not just of the essential role that education and religious belief plays in his project of a *'Kingdom of Ends'*, but also to highlight that his more problematic elements are *also* intrinsic to his Kingdom of Ends. His Cosmopolitan world relies on, and is premised upon, structural inequalities and embedded norms that permanently and necessarily exclude large parts of humanity entirely from the opportunities, political agency and equality that are the assumed conclusions of his works. Consequently, the Perpetual Peace that his cosmopolitanism is designed for is a peace provided and enforced by inherent and necessary power

differentials; not his overarching concept of Freedom and Duty. Further, that Kant's Cosmopolitanism is by necessity an aloof, Deist, Christian Cosmopolitanism world, rather than the secular versions that are most commonly presented.

Part 1: The Human

3.2   Kant's Religious Theology

The first part of this section examines Kant's writings on God and Religion and identifies the role that education plays in Kant's concept of pure rational theology. The second part of this section explores Kant's use of the concepts of Nature and Providence, and their relation to both God and education. The final section explores in more detail Kant's concept of Religion through his understanding of good and evil, highlighting the role of education in the creation of a moral identity, which he typically refers to in his works as either personality or character.

3.2.1   God and Religion

This section highlights the path that Kant argues must be taken to worship God, which he suggests must come at a later stage in a person's educational development than is the usual; *after* the individual has already developed their ability to use reason and judgement. He suggests instead that:

> "[children]... should witness no acts of veneration... never even hear the name of God, it might be the proper order of things to guide them first to ends and to that which benefits the human being, to sharpen their power of judgement... then to add a wider knowledge of the structure of the universe, and only then to reveal the concept of a higher power... at first everything must be attributed to nature, but later nature must be attributed to God" (1803, p.480).

Picking this passage apart, this quote first imposes an embargo on the influence of the ecclesiastical system of religion, which Kant perceives to be of an emotional, or sensate, influence which precedes, but should not be confused with, the necessary development of pure religious faith (1793b, pp.139). Secondly, that the individual's education initially focuses on humanity's ends, indicating a focus on philosophy as the "science of the human being... as he is and as he should be... in terms both of his natural function and of his relations of morality and freedom" (1798c, p.288). This is then enhanced by 'knowledge of the structure of the universe' although what Kant means by this is

questionable as he makes no mention of 'the universe' elsewhere in his writings. He does though suggest that *anthropology* should be "considered as knowledge of the world, which must come after schooling" (1798a, p.231) which appears to be the closest approximation to his 'the universe' in this context. Finally, that whilst the revealing of the overt concept of God, in Kant's ideal situation, would occur much later in life, occurring *after* his moral and practical education (1803, p.464), the existence of God is already implicit in all of the education that has gone before, which is initially ascribed to 'nature'. The child's education prior to this point assumes and incorporates, but merely does not emphasise, God.

Kant's purpose for approaching in this way is due to his move towards a 'Pure Rational Belief[86] (1793b, p.151). He firstly recognises the historical necessity for the use of ecclesiastical props designed to generate an emotional dependence or connection to God, and the role of priests in determining for others what morality should be, before rejecting its role in the future development of religious belief (1784a, p.3). Instead, Kant argues that determining the existence of God is never possible, due to his super-sensible nature, and so can only deduced by "a synthetic *a priori* proposition" (1793b, p.59).

Whilst Kant does suggest that "the moral concept of God reason gives us is so simple and obvious to the ordinary human understanding that not much cultivation is required" (1783, p.448), there are two issues with this. Firstly, whilst the *concept* is indeed, in and of itself, quite simple to grasp, this does not touch on the determination through pure reason of *the need to believe* in God. It relies, rather, on learning of the moral concept of God from others and for that to 'make sense' in some way – i.e. for it to follow some form of logic from its first presentation, *or* for it to be normalised culturally, societally, and/or in the education system, and then *a posteriori* reasoned. Secondly, the ability to make use of – to *apply* that faith - according to the precepts of morality and reason, requires the individual to have an intellectual background in the first place. This is especially so since Kant places the discovery of nature as attributable to God well after the end of schooling. It also then requires faith to make that connection, as driven by the belief that humanity has an End, which determines the existence of God. As Kant puts it "he [man] needs a moral Intelligence, because he exists for an end, and this end demands a Being as the cause both of himself and the world with that end in view" (1790, p.274). Further, he talks of the essential, incentivised nature of morality that

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[86] This is a part of his wider works on the distinction between pure theoretical, and pure practical reason, contained within his Critiques.

requires this belief (1783, p.345) because otherwise there is no reason to assume that humans can even achieve true happiness. As he puts it "why should I make myself worthy of happiness through morality if there is no being who can give me this happiness" (1783, p.407). From this, the contentment he equates with happiness, which he describes as the emotional state achieved by a person performing their duty for duty's sake, comes from God, and would not occur in the absence of belief as there would be no incentive to follow their Duty and no God willing to grant this contentment.

What stands out here is not just the issue of a belief in God, but also the belief in a grand destiny of humanity – the reason for and purpose of our existence - which is situated as the underlying precept that determines the need and requirement for a belief in God because "without assuming an intelligent author we cannot give an intelligible ground of it [existence] without falling in to plain absurdities" (1786c, p.11). For Kant, the existence of humanity is meaningless without a purpose, and so a purpose must be presumed. In essence, this introduces a circular argument to his works: if an End of humanity is assumed, then this requires a Moral Intelligence, and if a Moral Intelligence is assumed, then humanity has an End; but neither can be determined from empirical means, according to his arguments, because God is outside the practical world and so can only be deduced as necessary and needed through *pure* reason, i.e. it is a moral argument. If God can only be deduced as *needed* from pure reason, then this idea of man's destiny *also* requires that same level of deduction – as a moral argument, but Kant fails to justify this. Instead, he surprisingly states that "I must thus be permitted to assume that, since the human race is constantly progressing in cultural matters... it is engaged in progressive improvement in relation to the moral end of its existence... *I do not need to prove this assumption*" (1793a, p.88, my emphasis). Kant's arguments here rests on two key assumptions to support his deduction from pure reason that God needs to exist. Firstly, humanity has a destiny, and secondly, humanity is constantly progressing in cultural matters. But since the first is a circular argument involving only pure reason, and the second is an assumption that can only be deduced from empirical means, the latter (according to his own arguments on the separation between pure reason and empiricism) should have no influence over the former.

This juxtaposition of the empirical and moral are instead blurred into each other, through the education of the child, and excused as the one necessary exception to their divide (1790, p.194). Rather than resolving this conflict, he instead uses *discipline* and

cultivation[87] to force them together and shrouds this behind the idea that the world and its workings should be attributed to nature, and thus are *natural*, which is only much later attributed to God, who therefore must exist since the whole basis of education predicates and normalises God's existence. The circle is closed off in the early formative years of the child because "discipline prevents the human being from deviating by means of his animal impulses from his destiny: humanity" (1803, p.438).

Kant makes use of the same principles of reason to determine his arguments on religion. Firstly, God's super-sensible nature cannot be deduced from empirical means, but rather must be assumed from "a felt need of reason" (1786c, p.12), i.e. a remnant of humanity's original good-innocence through intuition that is God-given via Nature. Secondly, because "pure rational faith can never be transformed into knowledge by any natural data of reason or experience" (1786c, p.14). By this, he argues that the trappings of ecclesiastical faiths, whether led by a shaman of the Tungues or the European Prelate (1793b, p.195), would neither lead us to a true worship of God, nor allow for the freedom he prized so much. It would rather be little more than a stop-gap, and in the end "religion will gradually be freed of all empirical grounds of determination... the lead-sting of holy tradition... becomes bit by bit dispensable" (1793b, p.151)[88].

More fundamentally, the sequence of Kant's arguments goes accordingly: theology is the "System of Cognition of the highest being" (1783, p.344), which is derived from pure reason (and faith), and "religion is nothing but the application of theology to morality" (p.342), where morality is *also* derived from pure reason (1790, pp.275-77). Religion is thus sourced from two aspects of pure reason, and is therefore *pure* rational belief, which by its nature does not, *and cannot ever*, have an empirical component to determine its necessity. It is therefore internal and theoretical in nature, and understood as "purely moral laws [which] each individual can recognise, by himself, through his own reason, the Will of God... …which lies as the basis of *his own religion*" (1793b, p.137, my emphasis). The possessive and personal nature of this phrase is crucial to his arguments because firstly it is produced from the individual's own pure reason and not determined from any empirical knowledge, whether that be teaching, experience, rituals, prayers, visions, a formal religious system, or the writings contained within a holy book. This argument rejects the importance of a visible church and the role of, as he calls it,

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87   See Sections (3.5.1) and (3.5.2).
88   He presents this argument in the same tone, and implies a conceptual link between them, when he also suggests that humans become adults when they give up "*childish* things" (1783, p.448, my emphasis).

"guardians of the common mass" (1784a, p.55). It instead suggests an *invisible* church where each both worships and expresses their belief according to their own determination of their duty (1793b, p.176). Secondly, this development of one's own *religion* (as a formal system of religious attitudes, beliefs, and practices) requires considerably more than the "not much cultivation" (1783, p.448) Kant asserts is the case to know God.

For Kant, the duty of the cosmopolitan, determined through pure reason, the moral law, derived from the same source, and pure religion belief – again from pure reason - are all a part of the same interwoven system, rather than detachable elements that can be reassembled independently. They are interlocking (or complementary) structures (Kant 1781, cited in Kleingeld 2001, p.201)[89] - with each reliant on the crucial role of education to give the intellectual tools from which to reach and develop these duties and laws. The processes that these moral individuals establish within themselves are derived from the same processes and must lead to the same conclusions. For Kant, the moral person, the cosmopolitan person, and the religious person are the same individual.

3.2.2   Nature and Providence

The previous section explored Kant's views on God and religion, and their interplay with his ideas of education and reason. This section examines an area that has seen little attention to date[90] – Kant's use of Nature and Providence and the importance he places on them, because of his assessment that men are unable by themselves to achieve a pacific federation.

Part of this issue is concerned with why Kant sometimes favoured one word over the other – and the connection to Kant's wider views on religion. More widely it emphasises the importance Kant gives God in the progress of humanity to his kingdom of ends because "a *justification* of nature - or better, of *providence* - is no unimportant motive for choosing a particular viewpoint for considering the world" (1784b, p.53, his emphasis). These terms appear not just in his religious works, but also more widely[91] and as Pauline Kleingeld points out, for Kant, progress comes from "*Providence* alone"

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[89]   The translated quote Kleingeld uses is "Under the government of reason, our cognitions are not permitted to form a rhapsody; instead, they should form a system".
      This is interpreted elsewhere as "Under the sway of reason our knowledge must not remain a rhapsody, but must become a system" (1781, p.386).
[90]   Although see also Kleingeld (2001, p.203) and Molloy (2017, p.ix & 14).
[91]   E.g. *Perpetual Peace* (1795b), *Ideas for a Universal History (with a Cosmopolitan Purpose)* (1784b), and in *On the Common Saying: This may be True in Theory but it does not Apply in Practice* (1793a).

(Kant 1793, cited in Kleingeld 2001, p.203). The other part of this issue is the importance that Kant gives to the actions of Nature or Providence in his works to such an extent that "he asserts without further discussion that if the full development of the human rational predispositions were impossible, this would make these predispositions appear purposeless and in vain, "which would abolish all practical principles"(19)." (ibid, p.210). Whilst their presence in his texts are usually glossed over, their inclusion raises interesting issues with his works because: "what means... of maintaining and accelerating this constant progress... depends not so much upon what *we* do (e.g. the education we impart to the younger generation)... it will depend upon what human *nature* may do in and through us, to compel us to follow a course which we would not readily adopt by choice (1793a, p.90). Kant even goes so far as to assert that the movement towards a "perfect constitution" (which comes *after* the formation of a pacific federation (p.47)) is "the realisation of a hidden plan of nature" (p.50). As with the previous section and the importance of God and religion to Kant's works, Nature, as "the *order* in nature" and Providence as "the *cause* of this order" (Kleingeld 2001, p.214) are the components of Kant's arguments that he relies upon to such an extent that he asserts that his arguments are *meaningless* without them.

Nature is determined by God, and the dispositions that humanity has been imparted with, both compassion (1798a, p.355) and the seeds of discord (p. 417), are sensate dispositions of humanity's nature. In the former, compassion, it is "planted in us... to handle the reigns provisionally until reason has achieved the necessary strength" (p.355) and in the latter it is the source of Kant's asocial sociability which, post-fall, drives humanity to seek refuge within a civil constitution. Nature's role is the use of the positive, emotional, attributes that Providence imbued humanity with, until the predisposition of reason (which is of man) is developed enough to *supplant* it. It makes use of the negative attributes to drive the cultivation of reason to create an environment where humanity is both able, through the development of pure reason, and forced, by endless strife and war, to construct a system where it can restrict itself to achieve Perpetual Peace.

As with the need for a belief in God, so too does Kant argue that duty demands him to make the assertion that humanity is driven to progress by Providence through Nature, so that he can influence the succeeding generations who will in turn make this same argument (Kleingeld 2001, p.215)[92] – and because of the need for this argument, *it must*

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[92] "I base my argument on my innate duty to influence posterity, in every member of the series of

be so. Far from a reliance on logic, rationalism, or the primacy of pure reason, Kant is relying on the *need for belief*, and the responsibilities that it places to ensure that this need will propagate through time. Again, this appears to be another instance where Kant relies on a circular argument as the means by which progress can occur: because it is possible to assert this, it *must* be asserted, and if it can be asserted, it can be made true through its assertion, which justifies the need to make the assertion.

The conclusion that I reach here is that education can never be enough *by itself* to achieve Kant's Kingdom of Ends, and so humanity must rely on the force of Nature to achieve its progression. Education *is* implicated in the process though, firstly because the propagation into posterity of the need for a belief in Nature, Providence and God that serves to teach those who come afterwards, can only come about when man realises *through pure reason* of its need[93]. Secondly, the course that humanity is forced to follow is one for which pure reason (as was explored in the previous section), and thus man's moralization through self-education, requires the construction of a civil constitution which is a prelude either to the reality of cosmopolitan world, or a pacific federation[94]. This suggests that both are bound together and necessary, since without the conclusions that pure reason reaches this cannot be delivered through history, and a civil constitution cannot be reached *regardless* of the will of nature. Without pure reason, humanity would endlessly endure wars and destruction, and be unable to move beyond it.

3.2.3 Good and Evil

The previous section examined Kant's use of Providence and Nature, and the fundamental role that they play in the development of his works. In addition, it highlighted how important the *need* to believe is within his works, and as a result, the development of pure reason. It finally presented the realisation of the need to record to posterity to teach those who come after.

This section explores his perspective on good and evil, and how his reconstruction of religion involves the creation and enforcement of a binary between pure reason (as the beginning of the path to good through evil) and emotions (as the original location of

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generations, in such a way that it continually improves (the possibility of which must hence also be assumed), and that this duty can be rightfully passed on from one generation to the next." (Kant 1793a).

[93] And of course to be able to reach the point of determining through *pure reason* requires an intense level of education in virtue (3.5), which also needs to be exercised (3.6).

[94] Although Kant does argue that "a law-governed external relationship with other states" is both more important and comes before a perfect constitution, an imperfect constitution must come before this because otherwise a state cannot reach an agreement with another state (1784b, p.47).

good, turned to evil by empirical reasoning), because "The first development of reason toward the good is the origin of evil... God wills the elimination of evil through the all-powerful development of the germ [good] towards perfection... the means to good is placed in reason" (1783, p.412).

The reason Kant deduces that humanity is forced to endure warfare and violence is due to his analysis of the nature of evil. Reason, for Kant, is harnessed for two key purposes: in the first instance, it is developed to counteract the perceived, or assumed, animal (*bestial*) nature of man through discipline and training, and secondly to identify the nature of this intertwined approach in constant *opposition* to the sensate nature of the person:

> ...we cannot start out in the ethical training of our conatural moral disposition to the good with an innocence which is natural to us but must rather begin from *the supposition of a depravity of our power of choice*... and, since the propensity to this [depravity] is inextirpable, with unremitting counteraction against it. Since this only leads to a progression from bad to better extending to infinity, it follows that the transformation of the disposition of an evil human being into the disposition of a good human being is to be posited in the change of the supreme inner ground of the adoption of all the human being's maxims in accordance with the ethical law (Kant 1793b, p.92, my emphasis)

Although Kant does not explicitly align with a Hobbesian view of human nature here, he deduces that we must assume that it is *possible* Hobbes was right, and so a system needs to be designed that takes this into account. Since he sees good and evil as two distinct and opposing ideas, rather than existing on a scale, a profound change is needed to establish good, rather than just being *better*[95]. This depravity comes from humanity's sensuous nature, principally the two main emotional drivers of fear and desire[96].

Reason is therefore cultivated in a specific way to counteract the misuses that it can be put to, since just doing better isn't 'good enough'. Humans always already make use of a natural disposition to reason, and because of their instinct to good through innocence often attempt to or even succeed in doing better, but until they are able to develop their own moral deductions through pure reason, they are unable to direct it towards *good*. Kant makes a distinction here between the "sensuous nature of the human being" (1793,

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[95] Roughly speaking, this means that emotionally influenced (i.e. empirical) reasoning provides a scale of worse => better, but only *pure* reason can be *good* and only its deliberate reversal is evil.

[96] I expand on this aspect in sections (3.3.1) and (3.3.2). See also Ingram, section (2.4.3).

p.81) which, if it gains prominence, gives the human a bestial character, and evil, which requires active *will*, where "the human being... is evil only because he *reverses the moral order* of his incentives in incorporating them into his maxims... together with the law of self-love" (p.83, my emphasis) and thus is defined as a *deliberate* act and the establishment of a new category of *good*[97] rather than just a movement away from evil.

Evil for Kant can *only* manifest from a warped moral reason, but that warping can only occur if the sensuous nature of the human is left unbridled. Since for Kant reason of a pure type is the only path to morality, religion, and cosmopolitanism, and pure reason is the only method away from evil, emotions are consequentially not, and can never be, the path to good, and therefore progress. They must instead be identified, interpreted, questioned and critiqued to allow for the creation of intellectual processes that can replace the emotional response (i.e. through discipline, cultivation and nurturing - education). Thus any aspect that incorporates the empirical world can be avoided and/or contained. For Kant, good can only come from pure reason. Emotionally driven sympathy, because its source is from man's animal nature is an inherently less trustworthy driver since it is inevitably influenced by reason. Whilst it originates from a 'purer' form of good, in a fallen world it is "nevertheless weak and blind" (1764a, p.30) and bound into the misplaced use of reason; self-love.

This suggests that, far from sympathy being about extending to others, it is for Kant another form of egoism; "sympathy [and complaisance] are grounds for beautiful action that would perhaps all be suffocated by the preponderance of a cruder self-interest" (p.31). In effect, I care for others and give to others because it makes *me* feel good. The implication being that if it does not make me feel good, then I would not do it, and so duty would be determined from one's own happiness, and thus be self-duty. Since children have not had the opportunity to develop their cognitive abilities to the level where they can chose their actions from pure reason[98], and they do not yet have the agency to make decisions for themselves, they must instead "be prevented from any yearning, languishing, sympathising. Sympathising is... an evil which consists of merely bemoaning a thing" (1803, p.474)[99].

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[97] In this respect, good in the Kantian system, from pure reason is *pure good.* Better is therefore *practical* good, from empirical reasoning.

[98] This is of course a short-hand as for Kant pure reason establishes the universal moral maxim, not the empirical action in the particular.

[99] This also suggests that acting on sympathy, *at all*, is not a moral good, because it always comes from emotions, although it may well make things better. Just as acts of philanthropy from empirical reason are not *good*, but might make things better than the existing situation. This also suggests more widely that *any* actions by non-cosmopolitan individuals would fall into this category

Kant's presentation of his understanding of the nature of evil closely follows that of the bible. Evil comes to humanity only after it tastes the forbidden fruit – which represented the knowledge of good and evil. Prior to this, humans were in a state of innocence, led only by the God-given animal instinct of humanity, which by itself had no access to the ability to miss-use reason until after they had fallen because, crucially, the knowledge of evil is required *before* the ability to determine whether one is good or evil since ""the human being is evil" cannot mean anything other than he is conscious of the moral law and yet has incorporated into his maxim (occasional) deviation from it" (1793b, p.79). Prior to the fall, Nature maintained humanity in a state of innocence that was 'good'. After this fall, Nature continues to makes use of humanity's emotional, animal nature to try to progress humanity to a place of good-innocence that is no longer possible. Nature's drive to use humanity's intuition (which is the route by which God delivers its message to humanity) to good, instead of following this original sensate-pure route, connects to humanity's emotionality combined with empirical reasoning – which manifests as 'inherent' antisocial sociability – and which presents through endless wars and conflict. The development of pure reason is the only means by which humanity can move beyond this point, and the endless wars and strife force empirically reasoning humanity to construct constitutions to reign in human tendencies, and to redirect this antisocial sociability through trade and commerce.

As a result, the situation is such that the "human being must be educated to the good... but he is educated by a human being who still lies in the crudity of nature" (1798a, p.420). And it is from here that we see the reason for Kant's assumption that humanity can only progress by infinitesimal steps, as education to the good is carried out by those who are themselves flawed in a fundamental sense. Kant's solution to this is through the experimentation of education techniques until the art of education is *transformed* into the science of pedagogy (1803, p.442). When Kant states that "Good education is exactly that from which all the good in the world arises", he means this in a *literal* sense. Good is not a progression or movement from worse to better, it is a leap to a completely different position; just as good education does not mean better education, but a profoundly different means of educating people. This establishes a profound problem with the current level of education during his time. If better does not lead to good, then better education can also not lead to good education if it is based on the emotional – i.e. education as an art. It requires development from pure reason and for

the art of education to be entirely set aside and replaced with the science of pedagogy.

Nature forces humanity through asocial sociability to the point of needing a civil constitution, but it is only through a pure-reason driven education where man is first taught of virtue, and then practices this until he is able to develop his morality in a purse sense, that he can counteract the desire to self-love with the duty imposed by pure reason (p.443). This allows him to develop the capacity for good that is required both for the Kingdom of Ends, and so that he can reach happiness as contentment in the fulfilling of his duty for the betterment of humanity, by contributing to the construction of a civil constitution (1783a, pp.411-412).

3.3   Kant's Nature of the Human Being

This section explores in more detail the 'nature of the human' that has already been alluded to in section two. It examines the attributes ascribed to the human, as a part of his animal and human natures, and their implications. This section is split into four parts, the first exploring humanity's predisposition to animality, the second looks at those which are a part of his necessary human development in an empirical (sensate) world to becoming civilised, and the third examines his conception of the moral person. The final section explores Kant's analysis of women and men as gendered beings, and the reasons he gives for their essential and necessary differences. These different natures are crucial to the Kantian political project and the educational system needed to achieve his goal of humanity's progress, because human nature determines what method is needed to reach this goal. Also, as was established in the previous section, how a person can move from merely doing better to doing good is crucial to this process, and nature also determines, in the Kantian system *whether* there is any reason to attempt to develop pure reason for some people.

Kant distinguishes between humanity's predispositions to animality, humanity, and personality (1793b, p.75), which correspond to the process of development for the human being "to cultivate himself, to civilise himself and to moralise himself" (1798a, p.420)[100]. The first two of these, 'Natural Animal' and 'Civilised Human' are sensate and empirical understandings and interpretations, whilst the final concept is the artificial reconstruction of one's identity via the deductions of pure reason where "we... find in man two quite different elements... sensibility and understanding on the one hand... and on the other hand reason and free will" (1798b, p.289). He presents these three aspects

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[100] See especially *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (1793b) where he examines human nature and our predispositions to good and evil.

as in a process of development, not just in terms of formal education, but also when he discusses the communities that humans form and where culturing occurs.

In addition, Kant provides two distinct timelines for the process by which an individual progresses from animality, to civilisation, and then to moralization. Firstly, in the footnotes of his *Conjectural Beginning of Human History (*1786a, pp.169-170) he suggests that a youth in 'nature' reaches their adulthood at approximately 16, but within the civilised condition it takes an additional ten or so years. The final step – the revolution of oneself to morality (and here he uses the developments of skill, prudence and wisdom), he places at the ages of 20, 40 and 60 (1798a, p.330). Whilst these two timelines do not quite correspond, as the former is through culturing and the latter through education, the process of progression and development are key aspects of his understanding. To become civilised and to then achieve wisdom are not quick processes, but rather long, slow processes of culturing by others to reach the civilised and prudent positions, and by self-education to achieve wisdom (p.307).

3.3.1 Natural Human Animals

As was touched on in section (3.2.2), Nature, as an empirical representation of a super-sensible God, determined the composition of the emotional, sensate self of humanity. It is a part of our natural dispositions, which are physical in nature and impacted upon by the sensate world. Sensibility and understanding have their role only within the physical realm and thus are entirely removed from pure reason. In essence, these two different elements are the original attributes of humanity, which is then followed by the 'acquired' knowledge of good and evil. As a consequence "the human being must be destined for two entirely different worlds" (p.289) with the first world consisting of the empirical and 'of God'; which is our animal nature; and the second world of the theoretical and 'of man', which is towards the development of morality and the progression of humanity. This analysis, as has been discussed earlier, places humanity into a precarious position of only functioning 'correctly' either in a pre-acquired-knowledge state where our predisposition to good is led by instinct as the Voice of God (1786a, p.165), or in a post-development state through pure reason.

Humans are by their nature good, but only in their innocence and in the absolute absence of the use of reason. Any application of reason, which is needed to produce understanding and to interact with the world, must connect with these nature-derived

characteristics of humanity. But the first developments of reason are empirical, prior to the deductions made through pure reason and their consequential 'truths' of the moral law, which means that the course of each human will typically only range from bad to better. This is why Kant states that "the history of nature begins from good, for that is the work of God" because he is alluding to this pre-historical state of being. He immediately follows this through by asserting that "the history of freedom [is] from evil, for it is the history of the human being" (1786a, p.169), specifying that man has both fallen from the good of innocence, and he has been both in a state of progression from bad to better through empirical reason, and from evil to good, through pure reason.

When this is linked to the essential characteristics of our animal nature he identifies: self-preservation, the sexual instinct and culture (1793b, p.76), as residing within the totality of these original attributes, the ability to develop pure reason and free will seems precarious. Yet when he applies this to the underlying *purpose* of humanity, Kant deduces that it is necessary (because it is our destiny), and therefore it *must* be possible (1793b, p.105) to discipline a child[101] from animality to civilisation, and then to direct him towards humanity/morality. These three original elements, self-preservation, propagation of the human species and community with other beings, serve as the most powerful, lowest, drives of human nature, which he groups collectively under the title of '*mechanical* self-love' (1793b, p.76). They exist regardless of rationality, and when turned to vices, express as gluttony, lust, and wild lawlessness - in effect *desire* in the absence of pure reason.

Kant's arguments here have a significant degree of similarity to the historical and romantic idea of the 'noble savage' (1775, p.86) which he takes from Rousseau – untouched by civilisation and reason, acting from instinct (i.e. the Voice of God) to survive and somehow 'pure' of nature because of this. As he puts it "the human being in the state of nature can only be subject to a few follies and hardly any foolishness" (1764a, p.75). There is no evil within their actions – indeed, he also elsewhere ascribes the label of genius to them – as they are original creators of their own means of survival (1798a, p.331). Yet in his ongoing discussions with Georg Forster[102] he also makes clear that such people are 'children' (1803, p.448), their happiness has no value, and their very existence serves no purpose for humanity (1785a, p.142).

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[101] Even if not an adult (1803, p.452).

[102] Pauline Kleingeld goes into this in some detail in her article *Kant's Second Thoughts on Race* (2007).

Part of the difficulty of this concept and his presentation in this way is that it has no relation to any period of the existence of humanity, as to exist in this state is to *not* be a part of humanity. It is essentially a theoretical concept that he creates to develop his arguments, which requires this initial construct, with each animal-human in isolation to each other, so that he can parse out different aspects to his three stages of human development. The problem with Kant's conception of this is the idea of the isolated human that he builds because it both disregards the impossibility of its occurrence, and situates his approach from a Rousseau-ian foundation that requires the base position to be that of the atomised individual, absent community. But to propagate the species and the social drive requires the pre-existence of a community of some kind, and interaction with others – all of which positions the human as a social creature and triggers the second predisposition – to humanity. As such, natural man as a social creature is always in the second stage because reasoning is always a part of his mental processes.[103]

3.3.2 Civilised Man

In his *Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion* (1783) Kant argues that "the means to good is placed in *reason*" (p.412, his emphasis) but more crucially that "he [man] first uses reason in the service of instinct, finally he develops it *for its own sake*... he finds evil first when his reason has developed far enough that he recognises his obligations" (ibid, his emphasis). Thus, "whilst the distinction between good and evil... can be known by the human heart, through sentiment" (1765, p. 297), the ability to see evil *in himself* can only be determined in conjunction with the recognition of one's duty. In this way Kant firmly separates the *determination* of good and evil by pure reason, from the *identification* of good and evil by emotionality. This introduces a subjectivity to the determination of good and evil of a person's actions, as it requires the knowledge of one's duty and the deliberate choice not to do good, before evil can exist. The same action, from this approach, could be either good or evil, depending on the knowledge and awareness of the individual, and *not* on the act itself, which links to his distinction between having good morals and being morally good, yet Kant problematizes this further by listing some vices of humanity (before the development of morality) as *diabolical* vices - which implies that they are still, in some sense, evil. The only way to square these two arguments, it seems, is to assume that Kant perceived a route to the expression of evil (but not good), regardless of the type of reason used. Evil can be identified from the extreme expression of the vices of culture "where they are simply

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[103] This links to section (3.4.1), where I connect the idea of the natural human animal to Kant's arguments on race.

the idea of a maximum of evil that surpasses humanity" (1793b, p.76) specifically as they relate to envy, ingratitude and joy at another's misfortune. Good, in contrast, can *only* occur, in the expression of one's duty through pure reason (with all other actions being in some sense evil) but it can be *felt* prior to the development of pure reason.

Evil comes about from the use of reason for one's own happiness, rather than for the happiness of others and the perfection of one's self (1797, p.190) and further that humans are driven by the fear that one might not be worth enough, or worthy of respect (1793b, p.76). Kant uses the idea of 'comparison' to explain this – to gain worth in the opinion of others, which again requires reason, from judgement, and from this, inevitably, without a moral personality cultivated from pure reason, emotionality is involved which leads to the desire to gain superiority over others. Humans are cultured through social interaction, but without a pure moral position the main driving forces are most prominently from a fear of inadequacy through comparison to one's peers (the driving force for civilised man) and desire for survival and sexual satisfaction (the driving force of animal-man). Further, this use of reason is driven only by the empirical world - which should not be universalised, and cannot ever be pure. This combination of fear and desire moderated only by empirical reason, according to Kant, inevitably leads humans in the singular to vie with each other for greater status, wealth or pleasure, and in the collective to make war upon each other, which Nature then uses to drive humans to seek shelter under a civil constitution.

Yet to be driven to seek this shelter suggests that whether humans exist under a civil constitution or not does not require morality, only pragmatism. To be civil, after all, does not require morality to exist, merely for the acceptable and expected *illusion* of respect and civility. As Kant puts it "the more civilised human beings are, the more they are actors. They adopt the illusion of affection, of respect for others" yet he identifies this as in some sense 'good' because "when human beings play these roles... [they] will gradually be aroused and merge into the disposition [of virtue]". These illusions are assumed by him to be known as illusions by all, and so it is not a lie, but rather a "permissible moral illusion" (1798a, p.263) which contributes, in a small way to an eventual movement from bad to better, even if it is not in itself good. Kant is basically (and somewhat crudely) arguing that our cultivation into civilisation relies on a 'fake it till you make it' approach through empirical reasoning, implying that we can be cultured towards good through allowing us "to deceive the deceiver in ourselves" (ibid). This

point is a critical one to make as Kant makes clear that the only route to morality is *through* culture and *not* beginning with morality (1798a, p.423). This suggests that the culturing of humanity must start *before* the development of morality for men, and since morality comes through our culturing[104] it cannot exist in its absence. Civilisation is therefore necessary, but *only* as a stepping stone to morality, through culturing[105].

But it is also from this state of being that Kant decides that the destiny of humanity can be deduced in a universal sense; that "there is only one case in which experience leads our judgement to the concept of an objective and material purposiveness – the concept of an end of nature" (1790, p.194). In Section (3.2.1) I discussed how the existence of God and man's destiny are circular arguments that are assumed rather than being deduced from pure reason, as these initial routes to a belief in God and a final purpose of nature are *determined* from empirical groundings – from natural or practical reason - but the destiny of mankind cannot be *achieved* using empirical knowledge. It is only from pure reason that our end can be achieved, just as an acceptance in the need for God must come from pure reason, and it is only from pure reason that a universal morality can be constructed which allows us to achieve our destiny. Of course, as was discussed earlier, humans possessing a final destiny requires the belief in the existence of a Supreme Being, and so this position is required from empirical, sensate experiences. Essentially, humanity's initial belief in God comes from life experiences, not from pure reason, which in turn comes from the culturing we receive from the society and communities (and family unit) we are a part of.

On the face of it then, a civilised person without morality would seem to be perceived as a negative, as a producer of only evil, but Kant here argues that in fact the opposite occurs through two different functions. I explore this area in more detail in section (3.4.2), but briefly, these are that firstly he suggests that people living together in a civil condition cancel out each other's evil. Secondly, that whilst those who act from self-interest from one side contribute to creating evil, he also argues that they are necessary and indeed contribute to 'the common good'... in that "Those of self-interest are the most common... those are the most industrious, orderly, and prudent people; they give demeanour and solidity to the whole for even without aiming at it they serve the common good" (1764a, p.39). Kant positions Nature as a system for the furthering of

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[104] Which we initially receive from our parents (1786a, p.169).

[105] Culture in this respect means "The production in a rational being of an aptitude for any ends whatever their choosing" (1790, p.260). Culture for Kant is a form of education, not a social existence.

humanity, making use of their 'evil' in this case by providing a foundation on which "finer souls can spread beauty and harmony" (ibid.).

3.3.3 Moral-Religious-Cosmopolitan Man

In the previous sections I discussed the two initial concepts of human-animal and civilised man. In the first, I highlighted how the natural animal category is a theoretical concept that Kant uses, but has no relation to reality, because human beings are always already social and using some form of reason. The second section suggested that culturing and civilising are essential elements to humanity's progression, and that Nature neutralises the evil of their uses of empirical reasoning, turning it to good. In this section, I examine the final level of development to a man's personality, or moral character, "as a rational and at the same time a responsible being" (1793b, p.76) whilst also noting that for Kant, "Morality, not understanding, is what first makes us human beings" (1798c, p.291). Empirical reasoning is not and can never be a path to humanity.

This stage of development moves beyond the natural drives of animal-man and the culturing of civilised man that we experience as a part of a community or society, and involves the self-education of a man to the status of 'human' through the *revolutionizing*[106] of his approach to the world via the development of pure reason. Morality, as has been discussed previously, is determined through pure means and so is outside of the empirical world. It requires the cultivation of pure reason to reach a position where it becomes a man's moral duty. In this way, morality and its maxims can only be determined through a cosmopolitan-religious-moral education because "it is only as a moral being that man can be the final end of creation" (1790, p.272).

The development of morality requires an intense education, initially directed towards man as a part of his education to virtue, but then even more importantly practised by man in his self-education to wisdom until it becomes internalised. The first part of this final step is, it should be noted, addressed by Kant in his contemplations on education where he reaches the conclusion that it is better for education to occur in a public capacity, and for that education to include a moral education (1803, p.407). One of the problems he notes - but does not resolve - is the significant cost implication to this level of teaching (he suggests the use of the Socratic Method). This would prevent most people from accessing education and cultivation to a position where they have been

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[106] Kant uses the word revolution in a positive way only rarely, reserving it for a man's self-recreation by pure reason, and when referring to a revolution in education.

both civilised, and taught a doctrine of virtue (1797, p.266) which serves as the beginning point for the development of a moral personality. Instead of exploring this issue further[107], he accepts this problem is insurmountable and moves on, determining that schools in general should be used to cultivate children to an inclination to work (1803, p.461). Through this approach he also removes culturing to *civility* from the schooling system itself, along with knowledge of the world "which should come after schooling" (1798a, p.231) in addition to a knowledge of "higher things" (1765, p.291)[108]. Significantly, those educated only to pragmatism are removed from the possibility of a (supported) development of a civil and moral personality, which, as was discussed earlier, also requires the freedom to practice it. In conjunction with this aspect, and something that I will explore in section (3.4.2), are the roles and opportunities to practice virtue that he recognised as impossible for those of lower societal ranks, where one who works for another is denied the right to express their own virtue - and thus to develop their own morality - in deference to their employer's desires. In addition to which, Kant states that those who work for others, and do not live on the fruits of their own labour are also denied a civil personality (1797, p.125 & 126)[109].

Since one's cultivation to the determination of pure reason requires a level of education denied to most men (and all women), and the ability to develop one's virtue to wisdom is prevented through a lack of ability and opportunity to practice it - fundamental to his conception of the development of virtue to wisdom - it seems clear that moral men are far rarer creatures in Kant's understanding of civil society than is generally assumed. This is further compounded with his interpretation of the role and importance of philosophers in civil societies, not just as rational consciences to the state (1795, p.115) and the only ones incorruptible to outside influences (ibid.), but as the key individuals who dedicate themselves to developing their own reason for duty's sake (1786d, p.185). This privileges the position of the philosopher so far that he uses the 'teacher' of virtue[110] as *the* "good example" (1797b, p.267) to be adduced from (1793b, p.93) and as a *proof* of virtue itself (1797b, p.268).

A fundamental aspect of this moral person is that he is in an endless struggle against

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[107] I explore this area further in sections (3.4) and (3.5).

[108] The direct translation of his words here is 'higher insights', suggesting that the teaching of virtue, morality and pure reason should also occur after this 'schooling for work', and indeed after knowledge of the world. This aspect comes from the design of his own *Program of Lectures*, highlighting not just that he theorised it, but that he practised it, as a part of his own teaching.

[109] There is some ambiguity here though, as Kant also suggests that women and priest's "civil status is weak" indicating that they could, or do, possess some form of civil personality (1798a, p.281).

[110] Which is, of course, the role of the philosopher.

evil (1793b, p.92). Rather than a simplistic move towards an easily identified good (and a similarly easily identifiable evil) that can be easily maintained, Kant perceives it to be a battle that needs to be reinforced through external measures, as well as a never-ending internal checking process. To be good, in Kant's view, is *difficult* – indeed virtually impossible - and can only occur after a *revolution* of thought that must be followed by "an ever consuming striving for the better" (ibid.). This battle, which Kant talks about in moral/religious terms requires one ongoing internal process; establishing the good firmly within us, and then three key empirical actions; propagating it externally, transmitting it to posterity, and maintaining a fellowship of the invisible kingdom of God through repeated public formalities (1794, p.228, paraphrased).

Good must be established within these men, expressed publicly, noted as such and recorded to posterity, and repeated, both as a part of an ethical community of others like himself, and for those outside of this ethical community (but within the same juridicio-civil society). It is also only if this process is carried out and repeated that it allows the practising of virtue which leads to the development of wisdom. In effect, Kant acknowledges that a social system of positive reinforcement from those around us, both for his moral beings and those who are not but could be, is required to continue the path of humanity's progression towards his Kingdom of Ends. This is insufficient though, because of the far larger number of civil, but not moral, individuals, as well as the population at large who have neither a civil not moral personality. Education, from this perspective, is not sufficient because there are simply not enough people who have access to education of the level needed, or the opportunity to practice their virtues (through which to develop their own moral maxims) to achieve it without the hand of Providence forcing the issue. Kant clearly places the burden and responsibility of trying to move humanity forward on these elite individuals, both through this public action, and then relies on God through Providence to complete the task.

Kant's moral men are, as a result, a select group of highly educated men, educated specifically in virtue, with a socio-economic and political status that allows them to practice their virtue until it develops into a moral personality. Since he situated morality only in them, they are also effectively the moral conscience of the state they are members of, and their duty requires them to contribute to the ongoing progress of humanity *through* the state.

3.3.4   Animal-Woman and Human-Man

The previous section presents the essential difference between his ideas of the human animal, civilised human, and cosmopolitan man. This section examines the dynamic that Kant explores and establishes between men and women.

From his earliest works, Kant ascribes women with beautiful characteristics that inspire love and have their source within the sexual drive (1764a, p.46 & 50) whereas men are sublime and inspire esteem. Yet Kant's conclusions are underwritten by his arguments on God, nature, and reason. Man's duty is developed from pure reason, in competition with his lower powers whilst striving to become good rather than simply better, whereas women are assigned a different duty, and given different essential characteristics. Most stark amongst these is that women do not have the right to determine their own end. Whilst men have the obligation to develop their free will in connection with the moral law, for woman "one can only come to characterisation of this sex if one uses as one's own principles *not what we make* our end, but *what nature's end was* in establishing womankind" (1798a, p.401, his emphasis). Women have an end which is determined *solely* by nature and their abilities are also driven by nature's sensate attributes, to such an extent that Kant believes firstly that "it is difficult... to believe that the fair sex is capable of principles" (1764a, p.43) and secondly, "true virtue can only be grafted on principles" (p.31). He makes clear that women are not destined for pure reason, and thus are unable to develop a moral personality or moral maxims. From this, for Kant, there is both the unlikelihood of the capacity, and the lack of necessity, for the development of their ability to reason.

He supports this argument further by deciding women possess "a stronger innate feeling for everything" (p.40) which positions women closer to nature before the fall, and negatively impacts on their location in the category of humanity in the present. Whilst they have just as much 'understanding' as men, it is *beautiful* whereas man's is *deeper* (p.41). In section (3.3.1) I discussed how man is of two worlds, and this is also true for women, but in Kant's system they should only be allowed to be a part of the sensate world and so simultaneously a) probably cannot b) have no need of and c) *should not be allowed to* possess free will and reason in the pure sense because to educate them in virtue towards pure reason is a "malicious cunning" and a "perverted taste" (p.42). The use of the words malicious and perverted implies evil, deceit, unnaturalness and has an aesthetic nature to it, suggesting that Kant's position here is as much an emotional response as it is a necessary step for his system to work. He positions women as

members of the human race (but not possessing humanity) only when acting from her sensate nature – essentially little different from that of an animal, and because of this, a woman's education must be to emphasise and reinforce these qualities rather than to work against nature's will. When we then apply this understanding to the previous section (3.3), it becomes clear that of the three types of human that Kant identifies: natural, civilised, and cosmopolitan, women are perceived by him to exist and express as a mixture of only the first two aspects. Women can become civilised through culturing, but cannot (should not, and *must not*) become moralised through education. Education's goal here, rather, must be to refine and further develop the capabilities of woman and man *in line with Nature* – for woman as a 'beautiful being', based on her greater natural inclinations to good from an innocence perspective[111], and for man as a 'noble being', sourced from his cultivation to good, from a just and reasoning approach.

Whilst a woman could be both good[112], and evil[113], it is clear that from Kant's perspective, a woman also cannot either be or do good because of her predisposition to reason. She can be and do *better*, but she must be denied the possibility to be or do good because her purpose is decided by nature, not her. Women have simultaneously a 'higher', and baser purpose. She should therefore have little to no civil status within a society so that her capacity to do evil is contained. The only way in which a woman can therefore be the cause of evil is through active attempts to allow her (or for her to attempt to) develop for herself pure reason whilst still of child bearing age (1764a, p.49) as to do so, given Kant's determination of the purpose that women must serve, is to pervert the dictates of Nature and subvert the course of humanity.

Between men and women, it is only in a marriage that they become a single whole, where the woman acquires (synthetically) the moral stature of her husband (1764a, p.51) yet even within this situation Kant perceives men and woman as a binary of opposition, both in their capabilities and mentality. Rather than perceiving them as complementary to each other; as a holy union, or in some form of positive dynamic, he perceived their interaction through power dynamics, and the idea of antagonism is embedded into both his interpretation and conclusions. Men *force* women to *esteem* them – to see and value their moral worth. Women *force* men to *love* them (p.51) – to

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[111] It is questionable whether the education of women, in a Kantian sense, should here be termed education at all.

[112] In her absolute innocence and through her natural instinct, which it is of course not possible for her to achieve, although she is believed to be closer to this state than man.

[113] From her culturing and as a result of her civil status, when expressed to an extreme level as *diabolical*.

see and value their aesthetic worth, as well as attempting to force them to descend to the empirical and sensate realm where "woman shall dominate and man shall govern for inclination dominates, and understanding governs". The justification that Kant gives for this dynamic is that the end of man requires him to have dominance over the woman, because of the end he is able achieve, and as a consequence duty *requires* him to work towards (1797b, p.98). Once again Kant presents a circular argument, this time justifying the position he takes to exclude women from possessing a moral personality.

His interpretation of courtship and the purpose of marriage an aspect of a civil society continues in the same vein, relying on the sensate nature of man, where "the woman does not give herself up to the man's *desire* without marriage" (1798a, p.401, my emphasis). This dynamic can also be interpreted through the dispositions discussed in section (3.3) when he talks about the *Character of the* Sexes (1790, p.400). The aspects that Kant uses to identify the ways in which men and women attempt to achieve superiority over each other are that women make use of animal-man's mechanical self-love (to propagate the species) to master him, and man makes use of his physical superiority and *courage*, which is a virtue (1798a, p.358), and so is an expression of cosmopolitan-religious-moral man. In this way, the man's superiority is inherent in that it comes from his mastery over himself (to develop virtue), whilst hers is over *his* harmful animal nature, which as Kant puts it, is a "*sickness...* [which is] incurable: except through marriage" (1798a, pp.290, my emphasis).

Kant clearly believes women exhibit the worst characteristics of both a natural personality through fear - of her 'inherent' physical and mental weakness - and a weak civil personality through desire - the misdirection of empirical reason discussed in section (3.3.2) in that "Inclination to dominate is woman's *real* desire" (1798a, p.401, his emphasis). She makes use of man's 'sick' desire for her to 'master' him, something that is apparently only curable by marriage (1798a, p.290), and hence the reason why he also remarks that the philosopher, with all the moral elitism, purpose and duty that he sees them as possessing (or requiring) should avoid if at all possible the trappings of marriage so that he can focus instead on his duty.

This suggests that the more men who are educated to virtue, the more they will be able to resist the 'influence' of women, and ensure the moral development both of themselves and humanity. The home environment where men and women interact as a

'natural hierarchy' also therefore serves as a place where a man can constantly practice his virtue, and where woman, as a consequence, serves his and humanity's end *as her own end*.

Part 2: Humanity

3.4   Human Groupings

In the first part of this chapter, on human nature, my analysis highlighted the essential role that education to pure reason takes in Kant's arguments on both religion and human nature. Humans start from a base of 'animality', which they are disciplined away from, then cultured to civility, cultivated to skilfulness, educated to prudence, and finally a select few are educated to virtue and self-educate to morality. It is only at this last stage that the *need to believe* in God, Providence, progress, and recording acts to posterity is produced. This part also made clear how Kant's scheme permanently excludes women from the possibility of a moral personality, instead situating their nature into the realms of either an impossible to return to innocence in nature, or evil through empirical reasoning. This exploration then showed how he believed that the elements he examined combined in his own time, and how he felt they *should* combine together in future to progress humanity to his Kingdom of Ends, but ultimately his assessment was that the production of men with moral personalities would not be enough to achieve his cosmopolitan world by themselves and so humanity must rely on Providence to carry them the rest of the way – but *only* if humanity does all that it can to progress itself.

The first section of Part 2 focusses on the communities that humans form. It sets out how Kant identified three distinct types of human groupings; social (natural) communities, civil (juridicio-civil) societies, and moral (ethico-civil) societies[114]. Social (natural) communities, are an expression of humanity's animal nature which "manifests itself earlier... more powerfully than pure humanity" (1798a, p.423) but because man is always already using reason, and man's animal nature features the social drive, this type of community features as a theoretical construct because what immediately arises is a movement *from* natural communities to social communities.

This occurs from two main directions. Firstly negatively; from war, strife and competition, that forces them to seek refuge under a civil constitution, which tellingly can be constructed, but cannot be *perfected* until either a global system, or a pacific federation, is established (1784b, pp.47-49). In combination with this is the impact that cultural progress itself has. It "hatches punsters and subtle reasoners" (1764b, p.65) as an aspect of humanity's animal nature in combination with empirical reasoning that

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[114]   As well as a theoretical singular ethico-civil community in the future Kingdom of Ends.

civilisation represents. The prominence of empirical reasoning increases the frequency of wars (1793a, p.90) through the twin negative emotions of fear and desire[115] that are the main drivers of human nature prior to the development of pure reason and morality.

Secondly positively: principally from education. This initially arises from 'geniuses' who drive forward their understandings and spread their ideas and perspectives through formal education in the cultivation of elite men towards morality, as well as through a revolution of the art of education to the science of pedagogy. The actions of his moral-religious-cosmopolitan men also contribute to the culturing of humanity, in the social and civil setting, as a part of an ethico-civil community, through their public moral actions (1784a, p.55). This public culturing towards virtue supports the actions of other moral men, those who are un(der)-educated and therefore not moral, and an intermediary group - those who emulate the actions of moral men and "adopt the illusion of affection, of respect for others, of modesty, and of unselfishness" (1798a, p.263). By adopting this role, his emulators can slowly be "roused and merge into the disposition" (ibid.) that they copy, and contribute to the level of virtue of the state, as a prelude to its moral progression. For both the cosmopolitans and the emulators, they contribute to the development of the constitution of the state under principles of right, into a commonwealth under law. It is the development of these laws that are, according to Kant, the true mark of humanity's moral progress to his kingdom of ends. Facing outwards, they also give support to the development of "a lawful federation under a commonly accepted international right" (1793a, p.90) and support this through the medium of global commerce.

The third type of human groupings, the ethico-civil community, is his idea of an invisible proto-community or *invisible church*, within *all* natural and civil societies (1793b, p.131). It consists of his religious-moral-cosmopolitan men, in self-construction through their individual moves to pure reason, and the need to believe. This singular community is initially only an idea, expressed at the beginning as separate ethical societies, which can only become a single ethical community when the totality of "all finite *rational*[116] beings" (ibid. my emphasis) are voluntary members of it. These cosmopolitans spread their teachings – to culture both quasi-civil and civil societies through the public expression of their morality, and the recording of their acts to posterity for future generations. Those who take the role of teachers experiment with

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[115] See Sections (3.3.1) & (3.3.2).

[116] i.e. specifically and only those who could, or should, develop pure practical reason.

teaching techniques and develop the art of education into the science of pedagogy, which serves as the means to create cosmopolitans in a systematic way, inculcated with a specific moral drive through their discipline, care and cultivation. Over time, as this 'revolution in teaching' spreads, it impacts on more and more people, eventually spreading across the world via Cosmopolitan Right and the medium of commerce. These new pupils are turned from prizing cultural norms, their animal attributes and their own happiness, towards the happiness of others and the perfection of themselves.

3.4.1   Social (Natural) Communities

This section examines Kant's perspective of the attributes of natural communities. I firstly argue that there are two distinct types of social communities in evidence in Kant's arguments. The first applies to 'primitive' communities, and is distinguished by his racial arguments. The second are natural communities where the potential to develop into some form of civil state is in evidence. The former are identified by Kant as those where the black and Native American races are situated. These communities in his view have no ability to develop a civil constitution, due to 'racial deformation' that has biologically fixed their nature, permanently denying them the ability to develop pure practical reason (1775, p.96). Social communities, which he applies to all the other races, can make use of empirical reasoning, even if they cannot develop it to a pure form. For Kant only the white race is able to develop pure reason, and from this, morality and the ability to do good become the exclusive capability of white people and their descendants.

Kant identifies three key attributes to "the animality of the human being, as a living being" which he locates under the label of "Mechanical self-love"; self-preservation, propagation of the species and community with other beings, and their associated vices of gluttony, lust, and wild lawlessness (1793b, pp.74-75). This leads into his argument that "The highest division of natural Right cannot be the division into *natural* and *social* right, instead it must be the division into *natural* and *civil* Right (1797b, p.67). Culturing leads to the development of civil right, which is expressed through the construction of a civil constitution, *not* society, because society is a natural aspect of humans, but men must taught civility *through* culturing. Further, culturing is also the means by which humanity progresses to moralization, because men must be taught virtue.

In section (3.3.1) I suggested that the idea of the 'Natural Human Animal' is a theoretical

construct that has no empirical basis, but which Kant uses to facilitate the construction of his system of human development to morality. This argument holds if Kant's approaches to equality and capability are taken on their own, but this conclusion can only be reached in the absence of a discussion of his views on race. The main issue here is that the same holds true for natural (social) communities because of the use of reason, which immediately moves a community to culturing towards civilisation. Natural social communities act as a theoretical idea to allow for the structuring of Kant's anthropological and sociological analysis of humanity, but when race is included into the mix, the situation changes radically. Kant's views on race, and his various works where he approaches the idea of race and humanity have seen considerable examination and critique as to whether, how much, or what type of racial arguments Kant held to.

Some, such as Pauline Kleingeld (2007 & 2014) and Sakar Muthu (2003, 2012) suggest that his views on the different races changed and lessened in the latter part of his works, whereas others like Mendieta (2011), Harvey (2009) and Mills (2017), argue that Kant's position on racial hierarchies and essential racial nature never really changed[117]. The view that I take here is that whilst Kant's views on race did not significantly change, the framing of them did. Whilst he initially held to a racial biological hierarchy with white people at the top, his long-running conversation principally with Georg Forster (Kant 1788; Kleingeld 2007 & 2014), forced him to develop and present a social hierarchy, and it is into this hierarchy that he directs his un-recanted racial elitism through.

In effect, his view of black and north American people, whilst in theory a part of humanity but also 'utterly other'[118], was developed from a racial (biological) hierarchy into a formalised structural racism of human group development, which situated black and Native American people at the bottom as 'primitive'. The white race was placed at the top with the potential to achieve humanity, with the other non-white races spread between these two poles, limited to the civilised level. Black and North American people, and people of colour more generally, are still below white people in his global social ordering, but whereas he previously presented this as a permanent location based only on their essential characteristics[119], his last words on the subject (which Kleingeld builds her argument[120] from) suggests that it is their cultures and communities, *in*

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[117] There is of course another group, that of the many cosmopolitan theorists who skirt around or entirely avoid the subject and focus on Kant's theoretical-political developments to the exclusion of his racial views, such as Thomas Pogge, Seyla Benhabib and Kwame Anthony Appiah.

[118] This could be interpreted as possessing 'choiceless individualities' (See chapter two).

[119] i.e. that the other races were inherently (biologically and cognitively) inferior and would always be so.

[120] See *Kant's Second Thoughts on Race* (Kleingeld 2007) and *Kant's second thoughts on colonialism*

addition to his un-redacted position on their essential differences, which now places them at the bottom of the global order.

This shift to biological nature *and* social existence, positions primitive cultures as natural communities, absent the capability for either civil development or the potential for moral geniuses to arise, but does still allows for the existence of 'natural geniuses' before reason, which links to the 'noble savage' idea that he took from Rousseau. Kant permanently excludes the lowest races from the ability to move from their animal nature state to the possession of skill (Mendiata 2011, p.312 & Mill 2017, p.32[121]), which is the first necessary step towards the development of a moral personality. As a result, the education of non-white elites to cosmopolitanism is irrelevant to any discussions of race because for Kant these people could never be educated to morality anyway.

The dismissal of Kant's racial texts under the argument that transposing contemporary views of race onto Enlightenment views, or suggestions that he was 'as racist as the general population at the time' is also not a convincing argument. As a cosmopolitan theorist, with claims towards the ideal of global citizenship and human equality, his position falls far below that of his academic peers. Georg Forster, as was mentioned earlier, strongly criticised Kant's position on race, as did Johann Herder, who lambasted Europe's actions towards those of other races and even went so far as to call for reparations to be paid to the injured peoples[122]. Le Marquis de Condorcet and Thomas Paine also both argued publicly, vocally and repeatedly, as Abolitionists, against slavery and the lesser treatment of other races. Kant's reticence to publicly critique the slave trade from the perspective of those enslaved, in contrast to his peers, in conjunction with his oft-stated arguments on the inherent flaws that non-white (but most especially North

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(Kleingeld 2015).

[121] Mill provides a number of quotes from Kant's works in his book. The most pertinent are:
"Whites: contain all the impulses of nature in affects and passions, all talents, all dispositions to culture and civilization and can as readily obey as govern. They are the only ones who always advance to perfection.7
Asians: [The Hindus] do have motivating forces but they have a strong degree of passivity and all look like philosophers. Nevertheless they incline greatly towards anger and love. They thus can be educated to the highest degree but only in the arts and not in the sciences. (p.96) They can never achieve the level of abstract concepts. A great Hindustani man is one who has gone far in the art of deception and has much money. The Hindus always stay the way they are, they can never advance, although they began their education much earlier.8 (2017, p.7)
Blacks: They can be educated but only as servants (slaves), that is they allow themselves to be trained.... The Negro can be disciplined and cultivated, but is never genuinely civilized. He falls of his own accord into savagery.11
Native Americans: The race of the American cannot be educated... Americans and Blacks cannot govern themselves. They thus serve only for slaves.14
The Future of the Planet: All races will be extinguished… only not that of the Whites.17" (2017, p.8)

[122] This is touched on again, more directly, in chapter four.

American and African) people possessed, makes clear that his cosmopolitan scheme excludes their contributory involvement in his cosmopolitan world. In addition, his continued teaching of anthropology and geography, where his more problematic ideas and arguments on race were propagated, continued relatively unabated until he stopped teaching in the mid-1790's. As such, all of the non-white races are the third excluded group of people, after women and the less-well educated, from the possible acquisition of the title 'Cosmopolitan' and the possession of a moral personality, with the consequential ability to do good.

Whilst Kant does criticise the actions of slavers, and he comments on the deaths that occur at their hands, his critique of slavery and of the slave trade are also less about the people enslaved, rather, they are principally directed at the impact of slavery *on the slavers*, i.e. the Europeans and other western nations complicit in the slave trade. This focus on the white slavers is to do with *their* moral development, and aimed at their decisions to commit acts of genocide because his aim is a *pacific* federation. This would be constituted, at least initially, and perhaps only ever, by western states, which the ongoing murders of peoples goes against – but from the standpoint of the people doing the killing because they are the only people he perceives to have the potential to act in moral ways. As Mendiata notes, "where Kant attacks the slave trade in Africans as an institution, he appeals to the cosmopolitan law of hospitality to condemn slavery and not to the categorical imperative." (2011, p.304). Just as for Pogge's response to blind people[123] where he positions their rights as a bolt-on to his overall system rather than adjusting it, and Rawls' doubling down when he refuses to deal with gendered justice inequalities[124] by excluding justice in the family from justice as reasonableness, rather than reworking his system, so too does Kant refuse to modify his universal system that is built from the categorical imperative, but instead relies on a lesser, adjunct system to accommodate it[125].

From this, the ability to moralise oneself is a capability that *only* white people possess (this is the point at which he excludes all other non-white races). Thus natural communities *only* exist in far off places, on different continents. In contrast to this, those primitive areas in Europe, like Greenland, populated by white people, have the capability, but not yet the opportunity, to develop morality. As such, and in line with my

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[123] Section (2.2.2).
[124] Section (2.2.3).
[125] This suggests a wider issue with the approaches of at least some universal theorists, but further exploration of this falls outside the remit of this thesis.

arguments as to the concept of the 'human animal' in section (3.3.1), the idea of the natural community is one that his cosmopolitan scheme entirely excludes. Since for Kant black people and Native Americans cannot develop at all, and other non-white races cannot develop as far as morality, they cannot ever be a part of his *ethico*-civil community – his Kingdom of Ends permanently excludes them.

This of course introduces a fundamental contradiction between his philosophical universalism and his exclusionary politics, which Kant could have resolved by turning against his racial hierarchy. Instead, he reaffirms these exclusions both in the courses he taught and by republishing the works where he made these arguments in the latter part of his life[126]. The simplest and I believe most accurate explanation is to simply accept that Kant meant what he said, wrote, taught, and repeatedly published in his works after his critical turn. As a result, his works should be considered applicable specifically to *western* societies, and his universal arguments of equality viewed instead as arguments for a universal hierarchy of racial inequality.

From this, the points where he mentions ideas like social discourse, cultivation, culturing or education are not *and were never meant to* apply to non-white races. Whilst they can be subjects of a juridicio-civil society, they do not, according to Kant, have the capability to be a part of his ethico-civil community. Instead, they are directed solely at the different levels of European and Western social and political development. They (the non-white races) are permanently excluded from the possibility of being a part of the ethico-civil community, or of creating their own ethico-civil societies. His natural communities, and indeed his view on human animals, are arguments founded on his assessment of the lower races, which he supports with arguments such as the fixing of racial germs, the inability of races to develop if they are supplanted to different regions, and his multiples of comments on the undesirability of mixed-race people. His conclusion is that the dominance of the white germ would erase their mixed-ness through successive generations (1775, p.86; 1802, pp.572-580). Far from his cosmopolitan principles spreading to all of humanity, his arguments are in instead concerned with the spreading of white, western, cosmopolitan men across the globe.

3.4.2   Civil Society and the State

The previous section argued that Kant's idea of natural social communities is where he

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[126] Primarily in his response to Georg Forster; in *On the use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy* (1788); his lectures, and students', notes on *Physical Geography* (1802); and the republication of *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798).

firstly positions the black and Native American peoples into primitive communities but which has no relation to the experiences of the white race because of their predisposition to use reason in a way that is not possible for the 'more primitive' races. Secondly, the social communities of the Asian race can be cultured and civilised, but through his racial hierarchy construction, are unable to moralise. As such, the 'lowest' non-white races are excluded at that point from Kant's cosmopolitan world because of his argument that they are unable to be taught or cultivated, rather they can only be disciplined, and the Asian race cannot follow a path to the eventual development of morality through pure means and so are permanently excluded from the ethico-civil community, although they *can* still be a part of a juridicio-civil state.

This section now examines his idea of a civil society, and the role that the state should play in ensuring a move towards a pacific federation and global cosmopolitan society. It considers how societies were expected to develop, from a (quasi-)natural position via empirical reasoning, to a society with a civil constitution, driven by Nature and influenced by pure reason. It then looks at the essential qualities of the state, the impact education has on the development of the state and of the state's role on education. It finally explores the importance of culture in directing this development towards the ends of humanity, and the perfecting of the civil constitution. This section also sees another group of people excluded, through Kant's distinction between citizens and subjects, which corresponds closely to, but is not the same as, his exclusion through access to education, but aligns instead with the opportunity to develop one's morality through agency because of the increase of suffering through inequality that Kant sees as necessary for the human progression.

The movement from a 'natural society' to a civil constitution has multiple, contributory elements, the first and most important being from the threat of war and strife. This continual fear forces a natural community to develop into a judicial society[127] through its negative interactions with groups of people that are considered 'not us'. This dialectic between us and them, based on Kant's assessment of humanity's nature - asocial sociability – forces both groups to reform themselves into military states (1795b, p.112). From this, the construction of the rule of law for the internal workings of the state, from empirical reasoning, is founded on the perception of external threat, i.e. fear, and develops further from both external threat and internal dissent. Due to its founding on empirical reasoning, wars and strife cannot end. Man is instead continually forced into

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[127] i.e. a society founded on law.

moving towards a civil constitution through the ever present external threat (or reality) of war and strife, and internally through a number of activities and processes, which by themselves are not enough to prevent war, but for which progress cannot occur without. The movement to a society though provides the essential framework for the move to a civil status, which cannot occur without a society of some kind already existing.

Secondly, the ongoing developments of culture, which produces the arts and sciences, helps to "make him [man] civilised and so prepare man for a sovereignty in which reason alone shall have sway (1790, p.262). This also contributes to the development of the arts of pedagogy, philosophy, and empirical psychology into sciences (1765, p.291-295; 1797, p.267; 1798b, p.288; 1803, p.442), which are the main locations for man's development of pure reason (outside of the spontaneous appearance of 'geniuses'), and of a cosmopolitan morality through the need to believe in God and human moral progress. The discoveries and the actions that these moral men make as a result of the route they take to morality[128] are promoted publicly through the right to free speech that is granted to 'the press'[129] by the sovereign for the purpose of "mak[ing] his [the citizen's] opinion publicly known regarding what appears to him to be a wrong committed against the commonwealth by the en-treatments and administration of the sovereign" (1791b, p.11; 1794, p.228). In addition to this is a drive to Enlightenment by philosophers through "the public instruction of the people in its duties and rights vis a vis the state to which they belong" (1798c, p.305), and through their public actions as a display of "their pure disposition... as an example to imitate" (1793b, p.182), which are also recorded for posterity (1794, p.228).

Their words and arguments also serve as secret advice to the sovereign on war (1795b, p.115)[130]. As a consequence of their actions and words, they influence the veiling of practical reasoning man's civil personality with "the illusion of affection, of respect for others, of modesty, and of unselfishness" (1798a, pp.263). Of itself, these illusions mean little, but they contribute to the normalisation of a pseudo-moral civil character which

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[128] There are only two routes to morality for Kant. The first is the self-manifestation of 'geniuses' (1784a), the second are those who are educated through a Socratic system of taught ethics, which is then practised over a long period of time. This eventually leads to the self-development of morality.

[129] In this case, the press refers not to the contemporary idea of 'the news', blogs or journalists, but rather to the publication of books and essays by philosophers and scholars.

[130] Kant gives only two reasons for secrecy. First to preserve the dignity of a sovereign, the second is the shrouding of one's nature behind a public front of civility. In contrast, the comments on human beings as actors also notes that this occurs "without deceiving anyone at all, because it is understood by everyone that nothing is seriously meant by it" (1798a, p.263), and the injunction "To deceive the deceiver in ourselves... is a return to obedience under the law of virtue" (ibid.) which also emphasises that it serves to "save virtue" - itself 'small change', with potential to contribute to morality (p.264)

makes it easier for them to, in theory, eventually move towards morality through pure reason. If we exclude subjects who are not citizens from the mix, as Kant does, this means the state is populated by two main types of citizens; empirically-reasoning men (for their own pleasure or as emulators of the virtue of moral men), and his moral men.

Secondly, the growing importance of commerce and the construction of a legal constitution to protect property counteracts and redirects man's selfish tendencies towards the state's prosperity (through their own emotional drives to prosperity) which makes the need for peace within a state more urgent, regardless of the existence of pure reason (p.113). Wars are seen as a greater and greater threat to the prosperity and stability of the state. The power of the sovereign to declare war (which he does not personally suffer from but which the people of the state do) is eventually restricted. This surrendering, of course, can only happen in some kind of republican state which requires the existence of a civil constitution, based on the rights of all independent men such that they have the authority to make this decision.

Kant sees the establishment of a civil constitution as "one of the most important facts in human history" (1791b, p.3) which becomes almost a 'synthetic person' because it is "as an end in itself" (ibid.). He also places this *above* the needs of the individual people of the state, arguing that the end of humanity requires the existence of a civil constitution – and it is the primary duty of humanity to contribute to its construction. He therefore allows for humans to be both a means and an end for this specific purpose, in contrast to the commonly accepted view that his 'means and ends' relate to *all* humans at all times. But he goes further, repeatedly using religious language in relation to the construction of a civil constitution, suggesting that "The idea of a civil constitution as such... is *sacred* and irresistible" as well as "of an *exceptional* nature" (1797, p.176 & 1793a, p.73, my emphases), and that even the "mere idea of a civil constitution among men carries with it the concept of punitive justice belonging to the supreme authority (1797, p.168), the preservation of which "is the highest law of a civil society (1798a, pp.425-6), and that "A law is so holy that it is already a crime even to call it into doubt in a practical way... is thought as... from some distant flawless lawgiver... "all authority is from God"" (1797, p.130). Far from a secular system, Kant imbues the civil state with religious connotations, and uses religion to justify the reasons for its necessity.

With regards to the internal workings of the people of the state, there is a pre-existing level of inequality which contributes to the further development of 'skill', with the

majority labouring for the benefit of the elite, who in turn contribute to the people's cultural development by exploring the "less necessary branches of culture in science and the arts" (1790, p.261). Their explorations contribute to the civilising of the state, and prepares them for "a sovereignty in which reason alone shall have sway" (p.262). Each of these paths educate the people in different ways, with the elites developing their ability to use logic through science (towards pure reason), and the building up of virtue through the arts and the illusions that are assumed by his emulators. As a result, the culturing of the people of the state is slow, but one which still progresses quicker than the development of morality (1794, p.225). As a consequence, and in conjunction with the influence of Nature, they are both driven to conflict by empirical reasoning and the desire to dominate others[131], educated further to skill and prudence (1798a, p.231), and driven away from war and strife because of its negative impact on commerce.

The people of the state are themselves divided into three main categories based on "the following rational principles": 1) The liberty of every member of society as a Man, 2) The equality of every member of Society with each other as a subject, 3) The self-dependency of every member of the Commonwealth as a citizen (1791b, p.3-4). As such, step one excludes women and children; the former permanently, and the latter until they reach their majority (p.7). Step two defines the rest as subjects, and step three identifies a portion of them, determined by their economic 'self-dependency', as citizens, with this group alone bearing the right to "give or *enact* laws", whilst those who carry only the title of 'subject' are viewed as "protected fellow subjects" (p.6, his emphasis). Their exclusion is a critical part of the state's make-up for Kant firstly because he believed that the fewer active members of a society there are, the more likely agreement can be reached (p.7) but also secondly because he sees inequality as not just unavoidable, but *unavoidably necessary*. It contributes to increasing levels of internal and external strife (through Nature), which forces the state, and men in general, to continue to move towards the perfection of their respective civil constitutions. Their suffering is not just necessarily, their right to be both means and ends is also denied to them because their lives are primarily for the civil state's development, not their own. Whilst this may seem a controversial claim, Kant does argue in *The Metaphysic of Morals* (1797) that the right to emigrate is something that should be possessed by a subject *who is also a citizen.* Underlying this argument is the belief that a person who is a citizen is *not* property and so their movement should not be restricted, but his

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[131] Desire is a key aspect of Kant's logic, which was discussed in Section (3.3.4), when I examined his views on women, and it provides the underlying emotional drive of 'natural human animals' in (3.3.1).

distinction also makes the case that the subject who is *not* a citizen *is* in some way the property of the state (p.147).

For Kant, the cultivation of freedom occurs *under threat*[132], and is fundamental to the eventual development of morality and human progression. This occurs in a number of ways; humans and humanity can only develop from a childlike state either as natural beings or social creatures through external pressure (i.e. through practical experience) - either from a foreign military power (1795b, p.112), from the domination of adults over children (1803, p.448), from dissent within a state between the upper and lower classes (1790, p.261), through a struggle for dominance within a family between husband and wife (1798a, p.400), in the discovery of good (1783, p.412), a people's moral development (1784a, p.59), censorship of the press (1798c, p.305), from restrictions on civil freedom stimulating intellectual freedom (1784a, p.59) and more comprehensively against the state itself (1784b, p.49). It is from these threats and limitations that progress comes, from the "natural heralds... philosophers". This progress can be measure by "an increase in products of legality" which are not disputed, alongside an increase in good deeds; "more charity, and less strife in lawsuits" (1798c, p.305 & p.307).

With regards to education and the state, two key aspects are the state's involvement in educating its existing or potential citizens and subjects, and the means by which this education can be achieved. For the former, Kant is clear that public education is "more advantageous" than private (1803, p.447), and that this should in theory be determined 'from above'[133], but there are two main issues here. Whilst he sees this to be desirable, he also perceives that it is unlikely to have the effect that it should – that the people in the state would act from morality – rather, they will need to be forced from above by Providence through strife and conflict (1798a, p.423). What he does though allow for is that education from above[134] will eventually lead to a reduction in wars (1798c, p.307). *That* reduction in conflict will facilitate additional funds being directed towards education (p.308). This then allows, in theory at least, for more men's education to be 'complete', incorporating both instruction to skill and prudence *and* moral education (1803, p.446)[135], thus accelerating the development of morality within the state.

The other aspect to this is that if "the prince" (i.e. the sovereign of the state) pays for

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[132] i.e. the dominant emotion drive towards civilisation is fear, through comparison.
[133] In this case it refers to the sovereign (head of the state), not the Sovereign (God).
[134] Again, the state, not God.
[135] This education is, since it comes at the end, also "fortified by religious doctrine" (ibid.).

education, then it will be developed in line with his desires "not so much the best for the world in mind but rather the well-being of their state, so that they may reach their own goals" (p.443). This issue leads Kant to determine that "enlightened experts" should instead be responsible for education, hence his reason for deducing that education, whilst it *should* be for the masses, *cannot* be so because then their education would be for the purposes of the princes, and not for humanity (and therefore not in a "cosmopolitan manner") (p.442). Since Kant sees war as the greatest drain on the sovereign's finances, the sovereign no longer having the authority to go to war and the consequential civil constitution being instituted would in theory allow these finances to be directed towards education *and peace* but this in turn depends on the ongoing reduction of the occurrences of war. The conclusion he reaches here leads him to his arguments on, and support for, independently run experimental schools such as the Basedow Institute, to develop the art of education to the science of pedagogy. This avoids the state driven goal of an education for the purposes of the state, and instead leaves it in the hands of his "enlightened experts" who correspond once again to his moral/cosmopolitan/religious philosopher men.

3.4.3   The Ethico-Civil Society

The previous section examined three key aspects of a civil society; the construction of the state and its development towards a civil constitution, the role of the state on education, and the actions of three different types of men (practical reasoners, emulators, and moralisers) within the state. This section now explores Kant's ethico-civil society, and explains how religion moves from an ecclesiastic position to a pure state, and the meaning and purpose of his *invisible* church. I then argue that his views on religion in society, from section (3.4.1), run parallel to his arguments on the construction of a civil constitution, and are directed at the same moral people in section (3.4.2). The identity of the Cosmopolitan man, the man of faith, and a moral man are one and the same – and exactly the qualities expected of a philosopher.

Kant's ethico-civil community is "an association of human beings merely under the laws of virtue... can be called... an ethico-civil... society, or an ethical community. It can exist in the midst of a political community and even be made up by all the members of the latter. It has a special unifying principle of its own (virtue) and hence a form and constitution essentially distinct from those of the latter" (1793b, p.130). This makes it distinct both from that of a juridicio-civil society, which is concerned with justice, the

law, the regulation of the state, and the coercion of the individuals within it, and a natural society where there is no justice, only power (rather than a state of injustice which can only exist in some form of juridicio state). A juridicio-civil society is "a state of war of every human being against each other" in an external sense, whereas an ethico-civil community is primarily directed at an internal struggle between the principles of virtue and inner morality where "the good principle... is essentially attacked by the evil which is found in him and in every other as well" (p.132).

In section (3.3.3) I argued that Kant's moral man is the same as his cosmopolitan man and his religious man. These people form their own moral community both within the juridicio-civil society and in theory extending beyond and outside. It revolves around the moral law, which is an internal determination through the individual's move to pure reason, and its consequential external expression. In this it has a level of commonality with his idea of a natural community as "In both each individual is his own judge and there is no effective *public* authority with power to determine... what... is the duty of each individual." (1793b, p.132). Whilst one's duty can and often is indicated by a juridicio-civil society, this is generally negative in nature - what should *not* be done. For the ethico-civil these are positive, with some wide and others narrow in scope and expression. Whilst a natural community exists in a situation of "force without freedom and law - barbarism", the ethico-civil society can only exist within a republic - a juridicio-civil society that incorporates law *with* freedom *and* force (1798a, p.425).

Kant's ethico-civil community exists as a kind of invisible proto-community or *invisible church* within *all* natural and civil societies (1793b, p.131) that contains white people, and consists of his rational men, simultaneously religious, moral and cosmopolitan in construction, through their individual and internal moves to pure reason. This singular community exists initially only as an idea, expressed at the beginning as separate ethical societies. It becomes an ethical community when the totality of "all finite rational[136] beings" (ibid.) are voluntary members of it. These cosmopolitans spread their teachings – to culture both natural and civil societies through educating the public in formal settings, the public expression of their morality, and the recording of their acts to posterity for future generations to learn from. Those who take on the formal role of teachers experiment with teaching to develop the art of teaching into the science of pedagogy, which serves as the means to create cosmopolitans in a systematic way,

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[136] i.e., as I have argued previously, only white men; either 'geniuses', or those educated in virtue, and with the economic independence to express their agency and morality.

inculcated with a specific set of moral norms through their discipline, care and formation. Over time this 'revolution in teaching' spreads, eventually reaching across the world via Cosmopolitan Right and the medium of commerce. These new pupils are turned from prizing cultural norms and their own happiness towards the happiness of others and the perfection of themselves.

The movement from ecclesiastical faith to pure religion is one that Kant sees as a movement from childhood to adulthood (1793b, 151) in much the same manner as his earlier arguments in *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment* (1784a, p.54). He criticises humanity for its "self-incurred immaturity" and levels this accusation at the feet of the clergy (1798a, p.315) and further argues that the ecclesiastical system is designed in such as a way that the idea of morality is one that the church claims as their own (1803, p.445). In contrast to this, his *invisible* church is one where "the pure religion of reason will have all the right thinking human beings as its servants (without being officials)" (1793b, p.176). Kant's rather more radical turn though is where he argues that the different Judaeo-Christian religions should instead be considered different *faiths* – branches in effect – of the "one (true) religion" (p.140). This involves a second shift beyond the move to pure religion, extending belief in God across different belief systems and reasserting its universality in a different way as a "single church" (ibid.). His arguments on this move are essentially an argument against sectarianism, which can only occur in the empirical realm and relies on partiality. By stripping religion of its physical trappings and combining them into a single 'need to believe' determined by pure reason, Kant's arguments reinforce the internal dimension of belief in contrast to the external authority over the way to express belief, and reinforces the need for a single, universal, (religious) moral standard which is established in the discipline and cultivation stages of a boy's education.

Worship takes on a markedly different form now. Rather than attending church, praying, or following religious doctrine, Kant makes the case that "steadfast zeal in the conduct of a morally good life is *all* that God requires of them" (1793b, p.137) because "only the pure moral disposition of the heart can make a human being well-pleasing to God" (1793b, p.181). To do one's duty for duty's sake, then, means not just following pure reason, but it means obeying "the precepts of holiness". This involves not just the acts themselves, but their recording to posterity, and both the creation and reinforcement of the circular arguments that are needed to continue justifying them.

Part 3: Education

"The design for a plan of education must be made in a
cosmopolitan manner" (Kant 1803, p.442)

3.5   Introduction

The previous sections of this chapter have built up and constructed, from the philosophical, theological, and political arguments contained in Kant's works, the underlying elements of his cosmopolitan vision. Part 1 (3.1) examined its religious core and identified how a need to belief in God (3.2.1), and a particular form and meaning of good and evil, as well as the meaning and relationship between Providence and Nature (3.2.2) resides at the core of his works. These in turn tie in human nature as individuals, and humanity's nature as a species, into a progressive vision for humanity. As a result, religion[137] determines the expected and necessary end goal for humanity and the role that religion and belief, and Providence and Nature play, and the meanings of good and evil, by which to get there.

The next section of Part 1 (3.3) builds on this from two sides, the pure, and the empirical. Between the two they determine his understandings of human nature and its historical expressions, primarily concerning the interplay of emotions and reason - and their corresponding expressions as natural animal, civilised man, and cosmopolitan man. This understanding requires men to be disciplined from animality to humanity as children, civilised to empirical reasoning for the purpose of commerce, the good of the state, and human society. Then, for a select few, to cosmopolitanize themselves to pure reason, to act as the conscience and moral centre of each society that they are a part of, in the service of humanity's moral progress, as a species. This section saw the first of a series of systemic exclusions - race - as Kant's empirical works reject the possibility that black and Native American people possess the capability to develop *any* form of reason, and the inability of the non-white races in general to develop their thinking to pure reason (3.3.1)[138]. For women (3.3.4), Kant's assessment of them[139] is determined by his religious arguments, *and* justified in his empirical works[140.] They are doubly excluded from both the right and the need to development pure reason (from which, crucially, the self-determined need to believe in God is developed). They are instead designated a permanent tool for the end of humanity – as broodmares, decorations and nurturers –

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[137] Kant's *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (1793b).
[138] See also section (3.4) where I explore this in more detail.
[139] Kant follows Rousseau's arguments on gender here.
[140] Most prominently, but not exclusively, in his *Observations of the Beautiful and the Sublime* (1764a) and his *Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798).

and placed in permanent opposition and antagonism to their husbands, and as a way for men to continually test and practice their virtue against[141].

Part 2 of this chapter focussed on the communities that humans form. It set out the key features of the three distinct types of human groupings that Kant identified. Firstly, social (natural) communities (3.4.1) driven by emotionality, where he uses it as a theoretical concept to explore white humanity's progress, as natural communities, but where he also situates black people in reality and permanently, which I refer to in the section as primitive communities, to distinguish between them. Secondly, civil (juridicio-civil) societies (3.4.2) driven by a mixture of emotionality and reason where he locates both the white and Asian races, but where he situates the Asian races in perpetuity due to their supposed inability to develop pure reason. This section also examined how these types of collectives form and develop – to the eventual construction of a civil constitution driven by increasing inequality, war and strife, the actions of Providence, human nature, and education. This section also entailed the reasons for the exclusion of another group of humans – those identified as subjects but not citizens – from political agency[142], ostensibly due to their lack of financial independence. The final society is Kant's moral (ethico-civil) societies (3.4.3) that dwell within each white state, where pure reason is developed, expressed, and recorded into posterity. This section looked at the purpose, construction, and reason for the ethico-civil community, and how his moral/religious/cosmopolitan men correspond to his ideal of the philosopher.

Part three of this chapter now directly explores Kant's arguments and ideas on education, and how they fit into the sections explored previously. There are two main sources for Kant's arguments on education (in addition, to the numerous times he explores specific aspects throughout much of his texts). The better known is his lecturers on Pedagogy[143] and the lesser is a compilation of his writings on pedagogy and education which was edited in 1904 by Charles Brumbaugh[144]. The first main section of

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[141] See section (3.3.4). This is somewhat speculative, but as Kant describes the antagonistic relationship between husband and wife, it appears to conform to the pattern he believes men need to continually 'practice their virtue' - to develop their moral personalities under threat from the base lure of women.

[142] This section provides yet another layer of exclusion for women, as they are already excluded for being women. They are excluded here, as are what would now roughly be considered the working classes, as they are not economically independent and therefore cannot be politically or morally independent.

[143] Part of the problem with this text is that the last and most up to date version of them, which Kant gave to Friedrich Rink, has been lost to us (Louden 2007, p.435). Because of this, the version that I made use of is a compilation from a number of sources, gathered together, reorganised, and published by Cambridge University Press.

[144] This book is, according to Brumbaugh, "an endeavour to bring together all of the material Kant has to

this looks at the role and system of formal education that he develops (or sees as necessary), specifically for boys, for mankind's progress (3.5), with the second main section exploring the elements of indirect and cultural education that he weaves into his arguments (3.6). For the first section, there is a three-fold process which starts with the disciplining of boys away from animality (3.5.1). The boys are then cultivated by their teachers to skilfulness so that they have the capability to serve the economic needs of humanity (3.5.2). The final stage is 'higher' education that is reserved for his elite white men. They are educated in the principles of virtue, and can then develop this through practice (3.5.3).

Section (3.6) examines Kant's ideas on informal education – starting with the influence and impact of the family on the development of the child (3.6.1) through the provision of "maintenance and support" (1803, p.437). The family environment is also where the education for girls is expected to occur, ideally from their mothers. The next section (3.6.2) explores the education of boys into civility to serve the social needs of the state, and is the main site for the roles and actions of the emulators and cosmopolitans that I discussed in sections (3.4.2) and (3.4.3), but this time focussed more explicitly on the learning and educational aspects of their dynamic and development. The final section (3.6.3) takes up the thread of education as it is expected to extend across borders, primarily as a function of the intellectual aspects of commerce, and explores how this makes use of, and provides, if not an alternate reason, at the very least an additional aspect to Kant's development of Cosmopolitan Right.

3.5.0   *Formal Education (Schooling)*

This introduction to Kant's scheme of formal education provides background to, and situates his main arguments on schooling. There are three key elements to this. Firstly, the importance Kant places on education and why. Secondly, on what kind of education is needed to produce his cosmopolitan system, and finally, the vehicle he identifies that should carry out this change – something that he suggests needs to expand as quickly as possible, as a *revolution* rather than an evolution, in education.

Kant's views on human nature and education are that "humans must be educated to the good" (1798a, p.420), and further, not only that "good education is exactly that from

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offer on the general theme of education" (1904, p.vi) and contains comments and notes from the multiple versions of the lectures on pedagogy, which have not been published elsewhere, as well as many of his other texts that have not yet been translated into English. In addition, a large number of the 'selections' in this book are taken from the Hartenstein's *Immanuel Kant's Sammtliche Werke* (1867-1868) (not referenced) that Brumbaugh translated for his book.

which all the good in the world arises" (1803, p.443), but also "the human being can only become human through education" (p.439). Kant sees education as seminal to his Kingdom of Ends and perpetual peace, and he locates both the possibility of doing good, and of only becoming human *through* education. Without education, humanity as a collective - even though Kant does qualify its impact and importance significantly when he argues that it can *only* realistically prevent war - cannot progress to a position where they could be considered 'humanity', let alone bring about peace.

The education of a boy must progress through the four stages of discipline, cultivation, civilisation and moralization – with the latter, as with religious belief[145], already embedded in the structure and design of the educational system, even if it is not developed further through the formalised teaching of virtue. Kant envisioned that this would occur through a careful process by which the child is first disciplined away from animality, cultivated (and civilised) for the needs of the state and humanity's progression, and to give the individual the adaptability to choose from a variety of different (social) ends. These ends, it should be noted, still conform to the cosmopolitan moral principle, but they fall outside of their direct determination by these principles. They are wide, imperfect, empirically determined, and correspond to social and civil choices that Kant argues are illusions that all[146] can see through. The latter roles of formation and tutoring ensure that the child is made fit to be a functioning member of society, and finally, the Socratic Method is used to test out and develop, through the use of reason, his cosmopolitan approach. This final stage is in essence an education to be able to 'philosophise as an approach to life', built upon the foundations of discipline, cultivation, civilisation, and self-developed habituated virtue (1797b, p.268). But before this can occur, education must first be developed into the science of pedagogy (1797, p.267; 1803, pp.441-442). Only then can individuals be educated in such a way that they will achieve a level of moral similarity that will allow them to act "according to the same principles" which would become "second nature" to them (p.440). Kant's aim here is nothing less that the social re-engineering of the way in which humans understand themselves, interact with each other, and perceive the world. This path of humanity must proceed according to a singular principle under education - in a cosmopolitan manner (p.442) - which will ensure conformity and uniformity of moral principles.

Kant identifies the ideal vehicle for starting this process as Bernhard Basedow's school,

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[145] See Section (3.2).
[146] This would more accurately note that all rational, and thus Kantian moral beings, can see through it.

which he lends his support to in a variety of ways over the course of a number of years - as a fund-raiser, a writer of letters, and through his essays about the institute. He refers to it variously as "the first to have come about according to a perfect plan of education" (1776, p.98), and a "genuine educational institute that is fitting to nature as well as civil purposes". Even more surprisingly though is that he suggests that the Basedowan school is "the greatest phenomenon which has appeared in this century for the improvement of the perfection of humanity" (ibid.). For Kant, the example of the Basedow school is *the* route that "*if spread quickly enough*, must bring about such a great and such a fore-sighted reform in private as well as in civil affairs" (pp.100-104, my emphasis). Education, and Basedow's approach at the Daseu Institute is, for Kant, the base from which not just society, but the family itself will be reshaped. Thus it has to happen quickly – as a "swift revolution" (ibid. p.102) everywhere for it to take effect.

Alongside this change within the family and the state[147] is that he also sees this type of institute – and experimental schools in general – as 'a seed' which could spread across and beyond borders "to all countries and to the most remote descendants" (ibid.). As experimental schools, they develop the art of teaching through the education of both pupil and teacher into the science of pedagogy, and through their rapid expansion, they bring about social change and moral development. The comment concerning 'remote descendants' also links to my previous section (3.4.3) where I discuss 'recording to posterity'. Kant's project is both expansionist *and* historical in nature, even if the philosophical and political arguments are ahistorically presented, and he links both to its international propagation, through Cosmopolitan Right and commerce. Whilst Kant on the whole argues against undue economic influence on foreign and less developed states, this does *not* apply to the exchange of ideas and knowledge – the other side of commerce to its economic factor - which can be transmitted through "Universal Hospitality". This provides the main route through which his cosmopolitan norms could expand beyond the borders of the nation-state.

3.5.1   Discipline

This section examines the first element of Kant's system of education; Discipline, and examines its negative dynamic that is designed to turn a boy from animality to humanity, and the foundation that it provides to the development of a cosmopolitan-religious-moral personality.

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[147] See also section (3.6.3).

The primary purpose for discipline, according to Kant, is to "prevent[s] the human being from deviating by means of his natural animal impulse from his destiny – humanity" (1803, p.438), but this reference to his 'natural animal impulse' suggests two things that both tie in to earlier arguments that I have made, and which direct the course of his educational arguments and their formulation. Firstly that a human has an inclination to freedom 'at any cost' which hardens over time[148], and secondly, that a human's base nature is "not moral at all"[149] (p.479). Discipline's main task is to prevent this freedom being sought or expressed - at *any* cost (p.438) - whilst at the same time maintaining this lack of morality by eliminating or restricting the "impulses" (ibid.).

Discipline for Kant is as a result initially negative[150] and designed to 'take away' an individual's savagery (ibid p.437) and wildness. It must therefore occur early in a boy's life because if it occurs too late it can never be "made good" (ibid. p.439), even if severe attempts are made to break the person's 'will' at a later date (p.452). If it develops too far, there is no possibility of correction[151]. It is here that children are turned away from the path to evil in the first instance and the possibility of becoming individuals with a moral-religious-cosmopolitan personality is retained. If expressions from animality and the development of habits are prevented, then the expression and development of evil is curtailed, and so the individual can still potentially develop their thinking to pure reason without having to battle this 'natural' drive to freedom. This occurs initially through the reduction of a boy's experience of gratification from a very young age - through the avoidance of strong sensations – as a result of which 'nature is brought under rules' (ibid. p.443). Not only does this serve to prevent the child's inclination to freedom, but it also has the added benefit, according to Kant, of allowing the individual to enrich their later enjoyment of life (1798a, p.275) when controlled in such a way. This aspect steers the boy away from fulfilling sensate desires towards placing reason before emotions.

The first stage of the child's life is when he must display "obsequiousness and passive obedience" (Kant 1803, p.446). The child must follow passively, and discipline must as

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[148] See also section (3.3.1).
[149] See also section (3.2.3).
[150] But this is not a function of his Negative Principle as that occurs during the cultivation stage of education (Kant 1798a, pp.331-333).
[151] There are also structural similarities here to Kant's justification for permanently excluding other races from the capability of pure reason when he argues that their attributes become 'hardened over time' and cannot be developed further, even if they originally had the possibility to develop pure reason. This hardening of the individual through his desire for 'freedom at all costs', and which results in a fundamental inability to be turned toward pure reason, is similar to that which he ascribes to non-white races in general, but most specifically to the native American and African peoples.

a result "leave nature undisturbed" (p.451)[152]. This system is designed to avoid the development of habits – not necessarily of a physical kind, but primarily to avoid mental, internal, and moral, habits, which would, due to the lack of development of pure reason, be constructed from empirical reasoning - and so would manifest already fundamentally flawed from its inception. Kant argued in *Anthropology* (1798a) that humanity's nature tries to move humans from culture to morality, but that reason requires it to *start* with morality (1798a, p.423). Discipline here serves the purpose of starting with morality because, by restricting his animality, morality deduced from empirical reasoning is prevented and the boy is then, in theory at least, kept morally 'innocent', thus allowing his practical[153] education to start with the precepts of pure morality rather than having to counteract pre-existing empirically directed culturing.

What should be noted at this point is that Kant makes clear that it would be better if a boy's discipline (and education) occurred in a public setting, designed by enlightened experts, and as a result provided by men (1803, p.443). A girl's discipline should occur in private, and be managed by her own mother (1798a. p.227). I will examine this aspect of education for women in section (3.6.1), but as it pertains to men, Kant reinforces this binary of opposition by emphasising the need for discipline to be conducted by each gender on its own gender (ibid.). Kant is obviously reinforcing a gender binary through education principally in what one is taught, but also in the educational environment and the social rules that are developed, enforced, rejected and encouraged in single-gender environments, and so affects the formation of identity, interest and experience.

But on top of this, and perhaps the most critical reason for Kant's approach to the idea of discipline, is that the process of education also requires the child to be disciplined in a way that serves the purpose of the future of humanity. The child is treated as a means to an end – the future of humanity - rather than (or in some cases as well as) possessing an end in themselves, through the normative implications underlying this avoidance of moral development and the forced denial of experience. This suggests that a specific type of moral framework is being created for the child, since the child is being conditioned through the embedding of a particular moral purpose that the child will in turn contribute to. This service to humanity involves both humanity in the present, and is aimed towards humanity's future (1803, p.442) and is the principle reason that Kant

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[152] In this respect nature refers to moral innocence.
[153] i.e. "his education towards personality" (1803, p.448).

favours a public education over a private one, even given the issues that would arise if the sovereign of the state develops public education for his own purpose. Discipline's purpose is not just, or even primarily, for the individual. It is a social process that instils in boys norms of behaviour that are designed to propagate specific ways of interacting and thinking – regardless of whether the individual is destined for or has the opportunity to receive education in virtue. Discipline establishes not just what can or cannot be done, it also enforces how and why something can or cannot be done – and directs the boy down specific paths of social, intellectual, and emotional development.

3.5.2 Cultivation

Cultivation and Moralization are in some respects more closely linked to each other than the previous section on discipline because they are both aspects of Kant's *practical education* (1803, p.448). The main distinguishing points between them is that, firstly, cultivation to skill involves instruction and teaching, whereas the second stage, moralization, requires tutoring in a Socratic manner[154]. Secondly, cultivation is directed towards developing in all boys the capability to choose any end from a socially influenced perspective, whilst moralization is directed towards the development of reason and judgement, and then from these, the ability to choose consistently a specifically cosmopolitan end. Alongside this runs a boy's civilisation which situates and determines the specific social context, and they are both involved in the preparation of a boy to the service of himself, whereas moralization is implicated more prominently with his service to his society, and to humanity.

Cultivation is also specifically a part of the moral development of a "rational being"[155] (1790, p.260) in their mental and physical capabilities, primarily in service to himself, and aimed towards the "technical disposition to manipulate things" (1798a, p.417). This cultivation is layered on top of discipline, and in addition to the structure of the instruction and teaching and the method by which the boys are taught, it is already directed towards a specific type of future for humanity, since moral-religious-cosmopolitan norms are already implicit, even if not explicit, in design and direction of his education[156]. Thus the cultivation of the individual is for humanity, and as a result the individual is developed to find any skilled end *within that framework*. Kant's

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[154] The second stage of moral education is self-developed through the active practice of morality.

[155] Rationality is the final point of a man's moral development which leads to the education, preservation and systemic governance of humanity (1798a, p.417). Women are excluded from the process of cultivation because they are denied either the opportunity or capability to develop rationality.

[156] See section (3.2.1).

assertion that a boy cultivated in this way "determines no end at all" (1803, p.444) whilst making sense *within* this framework, contradicts both the implicit and explicit aspects of his educational system that is structured and designed for a particular moral purpose. Further, that "The moral concept of God reason gives us is so simple and obvious to the ordinary human understanding that not much cultivation is required for faith in a supreme governor of the world" (1783, p.448) only makes sense from within this framework because it is already normalised, and the system of education has been designed such that "at first everything must be attributed to nature, but later nature must be attributed to God" (1803, p.480).

The boy is further educated to perceive and interact with the idea of Kant's "principles of freedom" (1798a, p.417), who's expression has been denied up to this point, and is intrinsically linked to freedom for the self only in relation to the freedom of others. Every boy's education is as a consequence specifically designed so that he cannot achieve any of his goals if others cannot achieve theirs as well. Social dynamics are, reconstructed and naturalised within the schooling environment, and the individual is trained through the course of their schooling so that this dynamic is internalised. This allows Kant's educational system to produce the cultural and social uniformity he sees as necessary to ensure that they "act according to the same principles, and these principles would... become their second nature" (1803, p.440)

One area that Kant discusses for the development of underlying cosmopolitan norms is lying and telling the truth. Telling the truth is made essential to a child's upbringing and way of life, and serves an explicitly moral purpose. Lying must be responded to with *contempt* (p.468) - and treated as "*literally* vicious" (Kant, cited in Brumbaugh 1904, p.232, his emphasis). The strength of the language that Kant uses, and the type of response needed by the one who is lied to, is clearly designed to provoke an internal process of a very particular kind - "the shamefulness of vice" (Kant 1797, p.271). This makes clear that lying must never be discouraged through positive encouragement – because the incentive should be moral and so *self*-determined. Lying should never be punished because then he would be *trained* to tell the truth - something which takes away his agency. What is needed is for the boy to *understand* it is a fundamental wrong in and of itself and then *chose* to never lie because it is the right thing to do. This preference of understanding over training shifts education from discipline to cultivation, and is an aspect of Kant's Negative Principle (1798a, pp.331-333), expressed variously

as "to think for oneself" (p.333) or "*What do I want?* (asks understanding)" (p.332).

Whereas training is to have the thinking carried out or determined by another and impacts on the process that each boy is expected to follow on the path to determining for themselves their freedom and duty through pure reason. This leads to the need to "think for oneself" as the grounding for 'Enlightenment' (1786c, p.18). Whilst discipline is wholly negative, and relies on obedience, this control is reduced through the cultivation process as Kant argues for the normalisation of both interlinked freedoms where it can only be achieved if others also achieve theirs[157], and the development of skilled independence – to be able to *do* without needing others.

Cultivation, whilst the first stage of positive education, is there to develop the skills and capabilities that are essential for a male person who is firstly a political *subject* – and is the base from which the characteristics of a political *citizen* with the right to vote develops (Kant, 1791b). No personality in the Kantian sense is developed through the development of skill, or possessing the status of subject, because it is directed only towards his "value in relation to himself as an individual" (p.448). Pragmatism and moralization on the other hand are involved in the development of a civil and moral personality and so come later on in the individual's education (if at all).

With regards to the specifics of education that occur during the cultivation period, Kant makes clear that its primary purpose is to prepare the individual to be a productive member of society. This development of skill is also deemed by Kant to be fully developed by about the age of twenty (1798a, p.308) which not only covers the formal educational period for most boys, but extends further, flowing into the apprenticeship system. Essentially then, cultivation covers the whole of the schooling system *before* a university education, where knowledge of the world and virtue would be taught in his educational system. Moral education by contrast, is "one of life's adornments" (1765a, p.291) that is developed during a higher (university) education, and "knowledge of the world... must come after schooling" (1798a, p.231). This creates the curious situation where "All cultural progress... has the goal of applying this acquired knowledge and skill for the world's use" (ibid.) but knowing of the world for oneself is denied from the people who can contribute to humanity only through skill to this cultural progress. The creation and development of knowledge is, accordingly, kept in the hands of the educational elite. Those cultivated in its use are therefore beholden to the expertise of

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[157] This idea of freedom is a moral, or practical, education in nature.

others because their education, or lack thereof, and the moral system established during education, strengthens the authority that the educational elite have over the possession and development of knowledge.

3.5.3 Moralization

This section covers the second stage of practical education and is explicitly directed towards the explicit creation of the ethical grounds to develop morality. Whilst the previous two sections have this as implicit aspects, it becomes the main feature of the next stage of education in the discipline of philosophy[158] and as a consequence the teaching of a doctrine of ethics (1797, p.266). This system of education facilitates the pupil's creation of their own principles of virtue that can formulated and memorised, and which will serve him to develop his moral personality. At this point he reaches the conclusion that there is a need to believe in God. This provides a final, formal, linking of religion to pure reason at the end of a man's intellectual development, but crucially not of his moral development, which is continually tested and threatened. This occurs both internally with an ongoing struggle against "the inner enemy within men" (ibid.), and externally because "Human beings morally corrupt one another's moral predisposition... as though they were instruments of evil" (1793b, p.132) through man's asocial sociability. The teaching of virtue is required because humans are by nature not virtuous beings – they are innocent (or potentially Hobbesian), although they have the disposition to good – and because Kant links cosmopolitanism to progressivism and human moral capability in his religious arguments[159]. He assumes that "This idea... resides in our morally legislative reason. We *ought* to conform to it, and therefore we must be able to" (p.105) becomes a moral imperative for those who have come before and established pure reason and a moral personality. It is this act of self-creation of a doctrine of virtue *and* its continual practice that defines the individual as a moral being worthy of humanity. Without it he would be considered a child or animal - no better than the inhabitants of Tahiti (1803, p.448) – and of no worth to humanity.

The principle of this education[160] is based on Kant's three aspects of the power of the

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[158] Kant establishes philosophy in his educational system as the pre-eminent discipline at University that all other knowledges must be subject to. Philosophy for him is the location of the exploration of truth and morality, which requires philosophy to control the developments of *all* other subjects, according to its rules. This ensures conformity to a singular moral standard and allows for his moral foundations to be a part of all aspects of a man's education (1798c, pp.255-256).

[159] See section (3.2).

[160] Kant goes into the underlying reasons in *The Metaphysic of Morals* (1797) but also lays out the practical teaching of them decades before, in the *Program of His Lectures* (1765). Whilst there are over thirty years separating these publications, they are also supported in *Religion within the*

mind and the chaining of the 'lower powers'[161] to the service of them[162]. Understanding refers to knowledge of the universal, judgement to the application of the universal to the particular, and reason being the connection of the universal with the particular (1803, p.461). They are developed in a Socratic dialogue with a tutor (1797b, p.267), starting with understanding, to develop "rules... to cultivate the understanding" (1803, p.464), using "moral catechisms" to facilitate the student's intellectual development. These rules are then arranged into "formula" so that they can be memorised, and because the student is their creator, he would 'love' these rules. The pupil is then "drawn without noticing it to an interest in morality" (1797b, p.267) and he learns how to think and philosophize (instead of just learning the right thoughts to think) (p.292). These examples are then used as proofs that the formula works, rather than as models to base the formula itself upon (since the examples are empirically based and the pupil is looking for the universal rule, not the particular expression). This allows the universality of the formula to remain 'pure' as it is not influenced by the empirical.

The interplay of learning virtue with the one who teaches him contributes to the prominence and importance of philosophers in Kant's schema, as it situates virtue solely within the study of philosophy, and he quite specifically uses scenarios with philosophers as his only suitable examples of his "good people" (1793b, p.93 & 1797, p.268). The injunction of *sapere aude*[163] that Kant gives takes on a radically different meaning in this context as, according to his educational system and his formulation of the structure and nature of Understanding, it can only occur in an appropriate manner *after* the teaching of virtue has occurred – and then only within the context where a man is continually struggling internally with his animality, and constantly challenged externally. Daring to think is a right and a duty that *only* philosophers are entitled to.

Kant's system also makes clear that reason must follow *after* understanding, and then judgement, are developed. If reason is developed before the understanding of these moral catechisms, the rules to guide them, and the testing and practice of them through experience, then "science is borrowed rather than grown within... it has been corrupted by the delusion of reason" (1765, pp.291-2). The consequence of this is that

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Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793b) where he uses the same structure.

[161] These are the cognitive faculty, senses, imagination, memory, attention and wit (1803, p.464).

[162] "The main rule here is that no power of mind is to be cultivated separately but each in relation to the other; for example, the power of imagination is to be cultivated *only* for the advantage of understanding" (1803, p.461, my emphasis).

[163] Dare to Think, or "have courage to use your own understanding" in his *An Answer to the Question "What is Enlightenment"* (1784a, p.1).

understanding would be linked to the ongoing development of empirical reasoning which has grown through cultural interaction and empirical knowledge, rather than being an internally developed through understanding and then judgement. Further, the development of judgement and reason do not feature in his formal educational system as they are techniques that cannot be taught, but which come in to play in social dynamics.

Strictly speaking then, this section on moralization is more concerned with the establishment of the doctrine of virtue that is required for both judgement and moralization, which develops outside the schooling system, and later on in life. Other than Kant's geniuses who are able to cultivate and moralise themselves, and therefore fall outside the schooling system entirely. This educational system is the only path that Kant develops to provide the intellectual grounding for moralising to occur. It enables the pupil to establish rules to guide them, and the social settings where the underlying norms of his cosmopolitan morality acts within and influences. The consequences of this system not only exclude the vast majority of men and all women from the opportunity to develop their own systems of virtue, but it also privileges the already political and economic elite with the social standing of the philosopher. These philosophers take on the role of the conscience of the state they are a part of, and are, Kant hopes but cannot rely upon, responsible for the broader social moral development of the rest of society. The result of this is that education provides one of the essential grounds to peace – and thus his pacific federation.

3.6   Informal Education (Bildung)

The previous section presented Kant's approach to, and the importance of, a particular type of formal schooling in the development of a cosmopolitan approach and moral stance to life. It examined the reasons for the structure of learning and the importance of discipline in curtailing a boy's inclination to animality and unrestricted freedom. It then explored the technique of cultivation that Kant proposed, which would engineer a mutual-gains dynamic into the schooling environment, and the establishment of underlying cosmopolitan-moral norms. The final section (3.5.3) examined in detail the final stage of schooling; the elite level restricted to a few privileged men, educated in the principles of virtue which would then be practised as self-culturing to morality.

This section (3.6), explores Kant's idea of *bildung* – focussing on education's social as opposed to formal side - and the other informal measures he sees as necessary to

cultivate mankind to humanity. It shows firstly how the family plays a key role in the formation of a girl's social and 'philosophical' character (3.6.1). Secondly it examines the ways in which the university acts as the principle site for the moral development of men, educated in the principles of virtue, to practice and develop their judgement and morality, and how religion and the ethico-civil society are implicated in the cultural and moral development of his emulators, who are educated, but not in the principles of virtue. These emulators copy the examples of moral action, rather than establishing the formula for themselves, but by faking a cosmopolitan morality over a "considerable length of time" they are "gradually aroused and merge into the disposition" (1798a p.263). Because of their social standing they contribute to the moral and, more critically, the legal development of their society. The final section (3.6.3) examines the way in which Kant's Cosmopolitan Right and global commerce facilitates the expansion of western political, legal, social, and moral norms across borders into other states.

3.6.1   Family life

The family plays a curious role in Kant's writings. Section (3.3.4) identified the dynamic between a husband and wife as both necessarily and intrinsically antagonistic – as asocial sociability is an empirical feature that runs through the entirety of Kant's works and is something that he argues comes from the fundamental conflict between our instincts from Nature, and the development of reason from Man. In the home there is already a clearly established and permanent hierarchy in place that privileges men over women and places them into a binary of opposition and in a struggle for dominance[164]. It is also, of course, the place where children are raised. If they are educated by their parents, Kant suggests that the families own faults are not only continued, but deliberately fostered – something he clearly takes issue with – and this is one of the reason that he argues for a public education system. At the same time he sees the dangers of a sovereign-created and determined national education. As a result he supports independent schools run privately by educational moral-elites. This allows education to be developed to a science that will be in the hands of, and for the progress of, humanity[165].

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[164] See section (3.3.4).

[165] Kant does also refer to the sovereign power creating a national educational system, according to a "well-weighed plan... steadily maintained" (1798b, p.308). An educational system run by an educational elite is the second-choice scenario. This is similar to Kant's decision to pragmatise his idealism and settle for his second-choice of a pacific federation instead of a single global power - due to the danger of tyranny in the wrong hands, and its consequential formation and development for the wrong reasons. When Kant argues that "Behind education lies the great secret of the perfection of human nature" (1803, p.439), it is clear that the power he sees education possessing means that in the wrong hands it can not only deny the development of this perfection, but be deliberately directed in

The home and family is also the place where the responsibility for educating girls, in service to the needs of humanity's progress, occurs. Overall though, Kant gives little attention to the details and social dynamics expected of a family life, the education of girls, or indeed of the potential education of boys at home as well (Brumbaugh 1904, p.23). Whilst he mentions a few times that "care (maintenance and support)" (e.g. 1803, p.437) are essential for the education of a child, and that this is the purview of the family, he rarely discusses this further. He is far more interested in the education boys receive, and what their education should be like, in a schooling environment. When he does discuss this environment, it is mostly implicit, and in relation to the characteristics expected of a girl.

There are a number of expectations that Kant believes are necessary to develop, or should be encouraged in girls. Firstly, "girls, must be early accustomed to frank, unforced smiling; for the cheerfulness of the features is gradually imprinted internally, and begets a disposition to joyousness, friendliness, and sociability which this approach to the virtue of good-will early prepares." (cited in Brumbaugh 1904, p.196). This expression of congeniality and the impact of its continual practice is similar to Kant's argument concerning the discipline of boys away from animality that I discussed in section (3.5.1), as well as for his moral emulators that I touched on in section (3.4.2) and which I explore further in section (3.6.2). Kant clearly sees that repeated actions, in general, serve to habituate actions into the disposition of the individual.

Secondly, girls are expected to "know men rather than books" (p.226), and yet at the same time somehow possess virtue, which suggests that virtue for girls and women can only be developed from either practical reason, or that the principles of virtue are 'given' to her[166] since practical reason is not sufficient for the self-determination of one's duty and a cosmopolitan morality. This also relates to the requirement that they have an understanding and appreciation of honour[167] and the capability to develop "good modes of thought", but their nature *needs* to be directed down a different route, as her education "is not instruction, but guidance... honor is her greatest virtue, domesticity her merit." (ibid.). The 'science of man' which she is expected to learn is based on man's

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the opposite direction.

[166] This means that her mother passes virtue to her daughter, as her father passes virtue to his wife. Her education is in the hands of her mother, and the closest example of virtue would be the father.

[167] "Man's honor consists in his own estimation of himself; woman's honor in the judgment of others" (Brumbaugh 1904, p.230).

animal nature, and her "philosophical reasoning is not reasoning but sentiment" (1764a, p.42). Because of this, her understanding of 'men' *cannot* be an understanding of his moral personality – that which defines his humanity - which he develops through the practice of virtue, but rather must be the base level of man's animal nature, as her "philosophical reasoning is not reasoning but sentiment" (ibid.). Her philosophising as a result cannot accommodate pure reason's development from the construction and testing of a formula of virtue. If she could do this, it would mean that sentiment can not only reach the same conclusions as pure reason, which Kant acknowledges is possible when *recognising* right and wrong[168].

More importantly, she would intuitively understand *why* (because philosophy requires not just knowing a thing, but understanding why and using judgement - otherwise it would not be philosophical) - which is clearly *not* the point of Kant's marriage dynamic. A woman is not supposed to be able to grasp a man's *reason* because not only would she then have the capacity to engage him on that level, but she could do this *without any level of education to virtue at all* - and she would *still* have influence over his animality because of his physical desire for her. Instead he sees women attacking and seeking to dominate *only* their animality. Further, Kant's view is that girls cannot (be allowed to) develop their reason to a pure level under any circumstance. For whilst women *can* develop reason, it can be useful if they do, and they could even "go far in it" (ibid.), this can only be permitted to any significant level once their primary purpose as breeders and nurturers is ended (1764a, p.49). This also suggests that the service girls and women provide for humanity's progression never really changes, and perhaps more importantly never needs to change - because for Kant, man's animal nature never changes - even if his civil or moral personality can and must.

Given that a girl's education is lacking any kind of formal education, that books are not considered all that important to their education, and that she is taught to emphasise a natural innocence and compliant nature, this strongly suggests that reasoning of some kind, whilst useful, is not nearly as necessary for the girls' development as a boy's. Whilst a boy must be denied strong experiences from an early ages to prevent the development of animality at the same time that he is directed to reason as an underlying moral norm, for the girl, Kant's scheme suggests that her animality/sentimentality needs to be nurtured, at the same time that her (lesser) drive to freedom must be prevented. Her education would therefore, if given to a boy, be dangerous, as it would nurture

[168] See section (3.2.3).

emotionality and instinct. For a girl, Kant argues instead that "her bent"[169] (ibid.) is of a more yielding and compliant nature than the boy and that she can use reason in support of the rightness of complying with this tendency to compliance. As a result, this suggests that a girl would receive comfort and emotional experiences to a degree that a boy was not. This means that a woman is cultured into society from an earlier age, and this type of culturing takes a far more prominent place than for men.

3.6.2   Civilisation

For Kant, education has a limited, although still essential and influential, impact on the progress of humanity. They must also rely on providence (1793a, p.90) through asocial sociability, which drives humans to strife and war and forces them against their will to develop a civil constitution. Yet at the same time, Kant does also argue that, for all its inability to drive moral progress on its own, education *can* bring about peace. Firstly, because "as culture grows and men gradually move toward greater agreement... they lead to mutual understanding and peace... this peace is created and guaranteed by an equilibrium of forces and a most vigorous rivalry" (1795b, p.114). Formal education, as the main driver of the culturing of men - and something which must of course be developed into a science that standardises their education - shifts all men's moral norms closer and closer together, making it easier to reach "mutual understanding" as people would no longer live and interact in (morally) different ways - because of their cultured similarities. Their education to skill, which all men receive, further contributes to "a most vigorous rivalry" - essentially their asocial sociability - into economic commerce and as a result 'peaceful' conflict. The laws, rules and regulations developed both within the state and between states across borders through a pacific federation channel, reinforces the importance of trade, and creates a legal framework that is a 'physical' representation of humanity's moral progress. Pragmatism and reason (even if not pure) in such a system still ensures that there will be military peace, and also serves to satisfy humanity's inherent asocial sociability that cannot be avoided and so must be directed to 'economic war' and commercial rivalry instead. Crucial to this is that it relies on an economic system where Kant believes *everyone* will lose if the system - which relies on military peace to be maintained - is itself broken. As a consequence the economic system *must* be vulnerable to war[170], and must be protected by all, regardless of whether it is driven or developed by pragmatism or pure reason.

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[169] I take "bent" to mean inclination and/or nature.

[170] Essentially, to alter the economic system to avoid the danger of its destruction from war goes against the importance of its vulnerability to Kant's cosmopolitan scheme.

The social environment is one where men who are subjects have been cultured to trade, and habituated into economic pragmatism. Just as boys were initially habituated into humanity through discipline, and the foundations for a later potential moralization into cosmopolitanism was established; and just as girls were habituated into passivity and a pleasant disposition to serve and please men. From this, habitation to economic pragmatism appears far more day-to-day influential on these men than the habituation of their moral foundations laid during childhood, but this is where Kant's additional factors come in. Universities, public instruction, free speech, and his moral actors and their emulators, each of which contribute to the moral development of the inhabitants of the state, whether subjects or citizens.

The university is not just the location where virtue is taught, its teachings consists of two main branches. Firstly, the three 'higher' faculties of religion, law, and medicine. They "exist[s] among the incentives that the government can use to achieve its end (of influencing the people)". This occurs through their "eternal well-being"; religion, their "civil sell-being as a member of a society"; the law, and their "physical well-being"; medicine, which are given to them through "public teachings" (1798c, p.250). These teachings in turn come from "*writings... statutes... symbolic books*" (p.251, his emphasis) that are a part of the empirical world, and can not only "be changed to suit the times" (ibid.), but which the government has *the right to sanction* should it disagree with them. The higher faculties exists in direct service to the state.

The 'lower' faculty of philosophy[171], by contrast, which is the only location of the formal teaching and study of virtue that leads to the ability development of pure reason, must instead be "independent of the government's command with regard to his teaching" (1798c, p.249). This is because it is supposed to exist in service to *humanity* and *truth*, whereas the higher faculties are in the service of *utility* and the *government*. As a result, the faculty of philosophy should, according to Kant, be in control of the higher faculties and be itself subject only to "the laws given by reason" (p.255). The faculty of philosophy, and therefore the philosophers who are a part of the faculty, have a duty to test the higher faculty's teachings[172], in service to the truth, and "to deny the magic

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[171] "This faculty consists of *historical cognition* (including history, geography, philology and the humanities)... and a department of *pure rational cognition* (pure mathematics and pure philosophy, the metaphysics of nature and of morals)" (1798b, p.256). This faculty would also, according to Kant's arguments, be the location of the teaching of the social and political sciences, in the department of historical cognition.

[172] The lower faculty has a duty to test the higher on anything that has a rational basis, and the higher to

power the public superstitiously attributes to these teachings and the rites connected to them" (p.258). Crucially, this testing is expected to occur 'in public', and is the principle reason for the need for principles of free speech and public instruction, but it is still heavily restricted as it is intended as a means to educate the "*learned* community devoted to the sciences" (p.248, his emphasis). By this Kant means that it is primarily the theorists who are to teach the empiricists *within the lower faculty itself.* It is the duty of these theorists to stay in conflict with the higher faculty, and to do this in according with the precepts of reason, but access to their public instruction extends to all those who are educated and a part of "the intelligentsia" (ibid.).

Another aspect of this public discourse is that firstly, far from an accommodation or compromise being the resolution to their disagreement, Kant stipulates that it be determined by "the decision of a judge (reason) which has the force of law" (p.260). This 'law' is not law as would be created by a government – but rather a decision that the university and its teachers are expected to follows as if it were law, i.e. as if it were a moral duty (as truth is, for Kant). Secondly, that this process is an unending one and it is "the philosophy faculty that must always be prepared to keep it going" (ibid.). Between the two of these, the elevated moral position the philosopher possesses is enforced by the educational system, as his faculty serves the truth, whereas the others serve the people (or the government) in their partiality. Contributing to this elevation, of course, is that men were educated at school whilst boys to always tell the truth and to see lies as "vicious things" that should be treated with contempt.

The interplay of the faculties in a university, and the implications it has for the "public use of reason" paints Kant's *An Answer to the Question, what is Enlightenment* (1784a) in a very different light to that which it is normally presented as. Far from an injunction for all member of a polity to "dare to think", it is rather an expectation, firstly that the intelligentsia who serve the government as "*businesspeople*" will dare to think *in a private capacity* as citizens. That thinking is directed back towards the educated men of the state, but also beyond the state to other of a similar social standing. Secondly, the "natural heralds... are free[173] professors of law, that is *philosophers*" (1798c, p.305, my emphasis) and it is their self-defined duty, under the requirements of pure reason, to be "objectionable to the state" (ibid.). In addition, as members of the lower faculty their

test the lower on anything that has an empirical basis. (1798c, p.259).

[173] Not free as in unemployed, but with authority over their own earnings – and thus *citizens* of the state, rather than subjects who are employed and/or dependent on others.

duty is to direct this towards the teaching of the lower faculty who are not theorists. The publicity that Kant refers to, not just here but elsewhere, is not members of the state as subjects, but citizens who are also typically the intelligentsia, and the most important of these are the philosophers who are members of the lower faculty, directly engaged with the struggle for the truth, in service to humanity. The university system provides education to the political, economic and religious elite of the state, a large number of whom then go on to serve the government, the church, or become business people. They are the target of the philosopher's arguments, not the public as a whole.

When it is recognised who the moral people are in Kant's system; the philosophers, and whom this public discourse involves and is directed towards; the state and more widely the intelligentsia, it strongly suggests that the people I called emulators in section (3.4.2) are the already educated people who are not philosophers. Further, this leads to and reinforces the exclusion of the less educated from Kant's cosmopolitan vision[174]. Whilst the intelligentsia might not have received education in virtue specifically, they have been disciplined away from animality, and they have the same moral grounds, as well as having received an education to skill. In addition, each one will have been educated to prudence and are "well suited for society, popular *and influential*" (1803, p.444, my emphasis). The inclusion of influence into his civilisation suggests still further, as I have indicated previously, that education to prudence is not one that all pupils at school would receive, but rather is a practice reserved for the elite. This is especially so, given that the men who receive this education receive it through Socratic instruction, which has a considerable financial cost. The opportunity to influence comes about primarily from the social status, or civil personality, that one possesses - which is a characteristic of the intelligentsia but far less for the less educated (or uneducated, or women, or other marginal groups). The ability to "use other people skilfully" (1803, p.448) only makes sense when coupled with social influence.

Both philosophers specifically, and the intelligentsia more generally that they are a part of, are educated to prudence and pragmatism via the second half of the positive aspect of education – guidance (p.446). This education consists of developing the ability to "think oneself into the place of every other" and comes from the exercise of the power of judgement (1798a, pp.332-3). These are a continuation and furthering of the initial culturing that all men receive at school, guided now by a tutor, as an aspect of their practical education (i.e. of the mind), and aimed at the skilful use of others. But whereas

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[174] Women, non-white people, subjects who work for others, and the less (or un-) educated.

the philosophers are expected to be men who "despises all the attractions and desires of the senses" (1786b, p.185), the intelligentsia are more connected to the physical world. They act within and influence it, as members of their respective societies. It is this which places them in the position of influencing not just the workers of their state, but also the workings of the universities, and the government itself. They are as a result important to the creation of, the writing of, the application of, the enforcement of, and the teaching of, the law; which serves for Kant as the physical representation of their society's, and humanity in general's, moral development[175].

It is for this group of people that public instruction, and the moral development that Kant refers to, is aimed at. They have the opportunity, if they develop their sense of judgement, to contribute to the future progression of humanity, once some form of international peace is established, and not just for themselves or their state. But this internal development of theirs, and its expression, does not occur quickly. Kant suggests that it is an ongoing progression that is established by about the age of forty. It is the forerunner to the development of *wisdom* where a person's moral personality starts to develop[176] and which will be established at about sixty years of age. It is here that Kant establishes a further layer of exclusion, as his cosmopolitan moral system is also an oligarchical one – reserved to old(er) men who have had the necessary education, possess the requisite social status to develop their judgement, and then wisdom, as elite citizens of their society – but these moral men are, as I have argued earlier, most often situated in the university setting, as teachers of philosophy.

3.6.3   International Propagation

This section explores a somewhat neglected aspect of Kant's cosmopolitan vision – how his concept of morality through pure reason is spread beyond borders. In essence, how cosmopolitanism as a moral duty is able to propagate across the world and in so doing, contribute to the development of humanity.

So far, sections (3.6.1) and (3.6.2) have emphasised the importance of education in the moral development of a state, and highlighted that the physical manifestation of this

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[175] Whilst Kant does not have any great hope or expectation that either his moral cosmopolitans or their emulators will have any great impact on the development of these laws (1795b, p.113), they will nevertheless allow for the prioritisation of "the *spirit of commerce*" to take hold, and promote the cause of peace (p.115), that allows resources to be directed to the education of the citizens of the state. As a consequence, their education contributes to the ongoing development of moral norms that rely on the spirit of commerce.

[176] If he has the opportunity, has already had the requisite level of education, and has enjoyed a long period to practice his judgement to do so.

development is the creation of a civil constitution, the increase in laws, and acts of charity or philanthropy. It has also established that the concept of humanity is one charged with moral connotation in Kant's system and is located in his moral-religious-cosmopolitan men, not simply a catch-all for 'all human beings', just as the idea of the citizen is different to and an extension from the base level of the subject of the state rather than them being considered interchangeable. In addition to which, the exchange of ideas between the intelligentsia is the primary purpose for the 'freedom of the press' that allows for the propagation of his cosmopolitan morality and the establishment of 'truth'. Finally, that the ideal vehicle for the spreading and establishment of cosmopolitan moral norms are the experimental schools that Kant argues need to spread and be established as quickly as possible to trigger a revolution in the methods of teaching the elite boys of a state. This would then allow for the embedding of a common moral grounding in them (even if they do not acquire an education in the principles of virtue) that would facilitate the spread of his preferred moral norms into the heart of the educational, political, theological, and economic systems of the states where they are established. As a result, the development of laws suited for a civil constitution would increase, whether for pragmatic or pure reasons, and the reasons for disagreement would decrease because they would no longer live such (morally) different lives. This would trigger a (slow) systemic change in the desire for war, and the increasing establishment of its replacement, 'a vigorous rivalry' through trade. This in turn embeds and normalises the spread of his cosmopolitan moral foundations still further, eventually allowing for additional funding to be channelled to the education of its citizens.

It is for these reasons Kant argues that "The problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is subordinate to the problem of a law-governed external relationship with other states, and cannot be solved until the latter is also solved" (1784b, p.47). This is why he devotes the final part of the seventh proposition of his *Ideas for a universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose* to the problem of the *cultivation* of the *citizens' minds* of each commonwealth (p.49) – this is the essential point of establishing peace, and diverting funds to education instead of war. It is to facilitate and widen the moral education of the elite members of the state – because this type of education is something which occurs *after* the base level of education to skilfulness that all of the subjects of the state are provided with. The ongoing intellectual interactions within the intelligentsia of a state, and crucially, between different states, alongside the establishment of experimental schools - as 'a seed' - could spread across and beyond

borders "to all countries and to the most remote descendants" (ibid.). This allows for the development of elite level education that contributes to the slow expansion and refining of their education to cosmopolitan norms.

This in turn contributes to the growth of Kant's ethico-civil societies that facilitate the moral development of the state through acts of charity, the refining of the state's civil laws, public discourse that allows for the propagation of truth, and the ongoing development of the education of its citizens. The limits to this that he sees existing between states – principally religious and linguistic differences, are barriers that he clearly believes will weaken over time because of the promotion and propagation of pure reason and education by his moral-religious-cosmopolitan men. His "federation of free states" (1795, p.102), whilst a second best choice to a "cosmopolitan commonwealth" (1793a, p.90) is one that the actions of the members of his ethico-civil societies are clearly expected to respond to, as they work towards the eventual establishment of a single ethico-civil community of all - "a *single* church" (1793b, p.136 my emphasis).

With regards to Kant's idea of Cosmopolitan Right and "Conditions of universal Hospitality"[177] (1795b, p.105), whilst much discourse has been produced since its publication, typically around the idea of immigration and refugees, what stands out most in the text itself is the absence of words like immigration, emigration, asylum and so on. Rather, the focus of Kant's test is always focused on visitation *to* non-European states. He mentions the Barbary Coast, Arab Bedouins, America, African countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape, China, Japan and so on, as places where this type of engagement could occur, but nowhere in the article is there mention of a right of visitation *to* a European state. Alongside this outward-looking view of the right of hospitality, from a European perspective, is his argument that "this natural right of hospitality... make it possible for them to *attempt* to enter into relation with the native inhabitants". Again, the direction implicit in this is *from* Europe to elsewhere, as he never refers to the population of developed European states as 'natives'. This language is only ever reserved for those outside of the developed world and because of this set up, it is also *not* a mutual dynamic or exchange. Finally, Kant continues that "continents distant from us can enter into mutual relations which may eventually be regulated by public laws, thus bringing the human race nearer and nearer to a cosmopolitan constitution." (p.106). From this, and given the arguments I have made so far in this

[177] Also see section (2.3.4)

chapter, what seems clear is that Kant is not, and never was, referring to the right to emigrate as such, although this could be considered an aspect of it. Rather, the principle reason for Cosmopolitan Right is that it may lead to the development of public laws – which would emanate *from* European states that have developed some form a civil constitution. These public laws produced would incorporate the underlying moral norms that are a part of the reason for, and which would in turn contribute to, shifts closer to his cosmopolitan moral vision.

The result of this final feature is that, even though Kant is clear that some races cannot ever develop pure reason – can never be moral - his argument that empirical reasoning is enough to ensure the development of a civil constitution allows for the transmission of cosmopolitan norms to be established in these non-European states, and as a result, the distraction of the masses into the 'Spirit of Commerce' (p.114). By implication then, this allows for the 'Asian race' to be incorporated into Kant's cosmopolitan world because even though he believes that they cannot develop pure reason, their ability to develop practical reason could *emulate* the pure reason developed in the western states. Asia would follow Europe's pure reason because European moral examples, which travel through commerce and lead the way on the establishment of trade agreements and laws, would contribute to the establishment of the Asian race as a race of moral emulators, similar to the educated, but never moral individuals themselves.

3.7   Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has shown the carefully interwoven nature of Kant's many works, which all come together to respond to the issues that he believed prevented the progress of humanity. Far from the normal interpretation of a cosmopolitan state or world filled with cosmopolitan individuals, Kant's cosmopolitanism was designed to be populated by a majority who are not cosmopolitan, have no access to the educational techniques, and opportunities, that are required to cultivate cosmopolitan attitudes, and are for the most part deliberately and permanently excluded from it. Further, this cosmopolitan world, situated as it is from a deliberately western perspective would inevitably become a western dominated cosmopolitan world. Slowly, over time, this would erase the other races from existence, and promote the superiority of the white male moral philosopher. It requires the complete and eternal subjugation of women, as well as the removal of the less educated from any political or indeed moral agency. His cosmopolitan right, as a vehicle where immigration can occur, also becomes a means by

which the white, western developed nations could ensure their continual domination of the rest of the world, and global commerce was the vehicle to achieve it.

Whilst the arguments made in the chapter make the case that education is a vital component of his cosmopolitan world, his works also highlight the prime role of Nature in driving progress, rather than education alone. From the context of the Enlightenment period itself this is unsurprising. If the idea of a solely secular version of Cosmopolitan is approached, as is the case in the contemporary era - if we strip the role of God from his works, then education becomes the sole driver of Kant's cosmopolitanism.

The process of Kant's system of education therefore goes as follows:
1. A boy is disciplined to avoid animality and the development of evil, with an implicit universalised moral foundation established from the earliest moments
2. He is cultivated as a subject, to be skilled for the needs of the state, alongside the continuation and expansion of the implicit foundations of the moral system.
3. A select few elite youths are then educated in virtue so that, through their practice, he is able to develop his own formula and rules that he can be habituate himself into, which he will prize as he has developed them himself, and is the master of his own 'science'.
4. Judgement allows him to use others in a pragmatic way, according to the society's norms (underwritten with a cosmopolitan moral structure of interlinked freedom, truth and duty).
5. He practices virtue through the use of reason towards – through the principle of consistency – in the establishment of a moral personality (doing good things and recording them to posterity for future generations to learn from).
6. He reaches in the establishment of his moral personality of the need to believe in a God – who is already implicit in the norms already established in stages 1-3
7. The ongoing development of an educational system is designed to find and establish and refine the rules for this educational system.

Those cultivated in its use are, surprisingly, beholden to the expertise of others because their education, or lack thereof, strengthens the hold that the educational elite have over the possession and development of knowledge. Whilst the common understanding of Kant's position, taking only a selective understanding of his arguments, is that s*apere aude* is a principle for all, my reading of Kant, and building on the systemic exclusions

that have been identified so far in this chapter, indicates that the guardians of the truth have merely changed from religious people to the philosophical elite. They have not been removed at all. Overt empirical religious doctrine is replaced with philosophical doctrine that is *also* pure religious doctrine and the ownership of truth and right are possessed by a specifically disciplined, cultivated, civilised and moralised cosmopolitan group of mature men. Kant's political project was designed, quite simply, to promote a single moral code which would be cultivated in a select few thorough a Socratic-style cosmopolitan education system.

Chapter 4: Johann Gottfried Herder

"If Herder is the leader of the Counter-Enlightenment... then his inconvenient cosmopolitanism cannot be ignored; indeed, Herder is often a better cosmopolitan than Kant, especially in the issue of sympathetically understanding non-European cultures" (Scrivener, 2007, p.30)

Contents

4.1   Introduction

Due to a relative lack of knowledge of the main arguments and developments of Johann Herder, in contrast to the far better known Immanuel Kant, this chapter firstly notes the influence that Herder's works have had over a range of different theorists and academic disciplines (4.1.1), most predominantly in the cultural, philosophical, anthropological and critical theoretical areas. I then move on to explore in more detail the process of interacting with Herder's works (4.1.2). Because of the importance he places on language, culture, and emotions, this section identifies *Besonnheit*[178] - the *reflective*

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[178] This is often translated as simply reflectivity, or reflection, but it has a more precise meaning.
Barnard notes that Herder means "reflective mind", and then goes on to indicate that it is a "state of development... in which he can mirror himself within himself' and thus discover the nature and scope of his self-realisation" (1969, p.19). As he also later notes, *Besonnheit* is distinct from both " "The Moral Sense School"... and with Locke's dualism." 2003, p.115).
Spencer also notes that "*Besonnheit* refers to the general *disposition* and character of the human being, that is the totality of human powers" (Spencer 2012, pp.35-37, my emphasis).
Sonia Sikka, by contrast, suggests that it indicates "both self- reflection, and self- restraint" (2011, p.58) and clarifies this further by referencing a section from *The Origin of Language*: "Man reveals

capacity – as a process that it is necessary to engage with in, and is a crucial part of, his works. Reflectivity, as a process, is for Herder the single most significant aspect of human existence, and the ability to carry out this process establishes one as human. It is through reflectivity that firstly internal communication, and then external language arises, and it processes our engagement of the physical, sensate word, through reason. Using reflection, and in the case of Herder, the process of examining his writings, is the most significant way we learn both about ourselves and the other. When *besonnheit* is enacted for the purpose of *humanität*[179], this is education in the deepest sense.

Section (4.1.3) examines two main issues with Herder's works. I firstly bring up a common complaint that Herder's works have no overall system, where I suggest instead that the reason for this is because of ongoing attempts to force Herder's works into an antagonistic binary system. Essentially, he is considered confusing and contradictory from an Enlightenment-Kantian perspective which is then directed at the fragmentary and expansive nature of Herder's writings to provide additional justification for this stance. Herder's express purpose in producing works like this was because he viewed his arguments as merely a single set of works that needed to be built on, developed, and then finally discarded as understandings of human nature and humanity grew, changed, and moved on from his own perspective. I finally briefly elaborate on his frequent use of imagery. Although he most often uses an 'arboreal' metaphor system, relating his arguments to seeds, flowers, leaves, trees, groves, gardens and forests, his metaphorical approach deliberately changes, often in the same texts, with him using multiple types in his dialectical arguments. There were three main reasons for this. Firstly, as he noted in the preface to his *Ideas* the metaphor of stages of human life to that of a nation development was not supposed to suggest a direct equivalence[180]. Secondly, Herder's perspective was that it makes sense to use metaphor, because it allows for a closer *situated* understanding of the author and their arguments. Finally, for Herder metaphor is a fundamental source, component, and function of language itself. All language originated as a type of metaphor, as it was first developed in relation to the natural

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reflection when the power of his mind acts so spontaneously that, in the vast ocean of sensations rushing in on it by way of the senses, it can isolate and retain one single wave, so to speak, fix its attention on it, and be wholly conscious of doing so. H reveals reflection when... he can rouse himself to a moment of alertness, concentrate deliberately on one image, observe it quietly and clearly, isolate some characteristics of it, and identify it as this object and no other... This first act of apperception renders a clear concept: it is the first judgement of the mind... … the first indication of the conscious mind was a *word*" (Herder 1772a, p.135)

[179] See Section (4.1.4) for Herder's interpretation of *humanität.*

[180] "It had never entered into my mind, by employing the few figurative expressions, the *childhood*, *infancy*, *manhood*, and *old age* of our species... to a few nations, to point out a highway, on which the history of cultivation, to say nothing of the philosophy of history at large, could be traced with certainty" (Herder 1784-91d, p.vi).

world. Using organic imagery allows for a more 'natural' engagement between the reader and writer that helps to facilitate and direct understanding.

The final section of part one (4.1.4) examines the meanings he provides to humanity from his introduction of a new word *humanität*, which allows him to impart it with an old/new meaning that he draws from Roman history. This old/new meaning is further differentiated by approaching *humanität* as both *bildung:* self-formation as a process of being and living, and education: a project to establish the means by which *bildung* can be cultivated. I conclude part one by exploring in more detail Herder's use of the ideas of *Bildung* and tradition (4.1.5) noting his historical repurposing of both, which he develops as two linked processes of becoming and change, rather than states of being. This corresponds to *humanität* as process at both the individual and group levels.

Part two explores Herder's *humanität* as process through two main themes: language and history. Section (4.2.1) starts with language as a route to explore his arguments on the topic. This reveals firstly that Herder sees two types of language existing, the first of which is base, emotional and instinct based expression of feeling, and the second a production of the process of reflection (*Besonnheit*). The capacity to reflect is, for Herder, the essence of human nature, which produces language through our unique ability to construct images of ourselves (and others) in our minds, which we engage in communication with. This communication is the origin of language through reflection, as it requires language to function, and this process is driven by emotions and sensation that are an intrinsic part of the constitution of language, and which our capacity to reason orders for us through reflection. Humans then develop *spoken* language through interaction with others. Language for Herder *is* thought, and acts as both the medium of our thought, and the border beyond which we cannot think. Our responsibility to ourselves and others is to develop and expand our capacity for communication and language, and to cultivate our ability to reflection through its practice. As a result reflection is, for Herder, the process of endlessly becoming oneself through *being.*

The next section (4.2.2) examines Herder's argument on the family, and its importance as our first place of learning. The process of language through reflection, our relationship to others, and our involvement in our first community of the family, makes us co-creators of language, and culture is the process of passing back and forth our knowledge and understanding to those around us, and those who follow us. Section

(4.2.3) extends these linkages further into the idea of culture, noting the multiple nature of culture through communities linked by degrees of commonality and difference but ultimately from a common source of humanity as a single race. Culture and language are also pre-requisites for each other because humanity cannot live outside of community, and community requires communication, which requires spoken language – which is created through reflection. Our perception of the world, and our interaction with it, as well as our understanding of ourselves and the world, are as a result heavily influenced by language, culture, community, and the geographical area we reside in. Although we are all still unique in Herder's view, we all also have a tendency to similarity because of these common aspects of our histories and experiences.

Section (4.2.4) expands this dynamic still further, emphasising not just that we are born into families and communities, and are involved in creating and shaping culture, but that we are a part of a *volk* because we identify ourselves as such, and we are defined by our self-identification and our active involvement in culture through tradition that continually redefines the *volk*.

This projection through time leads to the second theme (4.2.5); the 'idea' of history[181]. Rather than the typical Enlightenment progressivism to a utopian future, Herder's historical argument is more akin to the tacking of a boat against the wind. There is forwards, backs and sideways movement, and the direction is crucially *never* fixed because there is no final destination to progress to, no utopian perpetual peace; only progress, movement and change through time. Not only is progress not guaranteed without the active involvement of *all* human beings[182], but Herder argues that it is impossible for humanity to progress smoothly forward because each evolution of human experience in its 'always already existing' collectivities (families, communities, societies, *volk* etc.), is an essential function of the expression of its own version of the good life and of morality. Each expression incorporates both progression and regression because of the unique, flawed nature of humans, and of one's situated perspective. As a result each expression can only contain certain formulations of the good life and morality within them, which Herder explains as a path which crosses a series of valley and mountains rather than a path leading only or primarily upwards – and the valleys and dips are just as important as the mountains (Morton 1989, p.60).

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[181] Primarily in: *Yet Another History for the Education of Mankind* (Herder 1774a & b) and *Ideas on the Philosophy of History of Mankind* (Herder 1784 & 1784-91a, b, c & d)

[182] Herder make clear in a number of places that *all* humans are included in this. Men *and* women, humans of *all* the different communities, *volker*, and cultures

Part 1: Situating Herder

4.1.1   Why Johann Herder?

Johann Herder, such as he is generally presented within the field of politics, is that of a straw-man figure; "a dreamer, an irrationalist, a person permanently in the past, and finally a pathological case" (Adler 1994, p.56). He is most often mentioned only in passing to facilitate a greater understanding of Immanuel Kant's political works, where Kant dismisses and derides – savagely so[183] – Herders writings on the history of mankind, and his works more generally, in the frequently republished *Kant: Political Writings* (1784/2010, pp.193-220). Herder here is presented as little more than a teaching point on the path of Kant's intellectual greatness[184] yet Herder's works have had a profound impact on the arts, humanities, and social sciences (Zammito et al. 2010, p.662; Bahr et al. 2008, p.504). Whilst his name is often not recalled, or assigned to only a few of his developments such as the idea of the *volk*, nationalism, empathy, populism, or his aesthetic philosophy, poetry, folk tales and anthropology, his arguments and developments can be seen, in many cases virtually as they were when he first wrote on them, across these disciplines.

Hegel draws from and develops Herder's writing on "God, the mind, and history[185]" (Forster 2002, p.*vii*), as well as his dialectical approach, just as Theodor Adorno, perhaps unknowingly, makes use of Herder's "negative dialectics" (Morton 1989, p.39). Karl Marx builds on his critical approach to cultural identity and social development, in addition to re-presenting Herder's "dregs of society" - those who have no sense of civil consciousness or affiliation - as his *lumpenproletariat*[186] (Barnard 2003, pp.30-33). Friedrich Nietzsche also pays tribute to Herder arguments, and incorporates his developments on language and morality (although he sharply disagrees with his conclusions), and they both share a critique of rationalism that is "at times strikingly similar" (Zusi 2006, p.509). In addition, Church (2015, pp.13-29) suggests that Herder

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[183]   Kant goes so far as to state that "intentional deception [was] Herder's trademark" (Kant 1800, cited in Anders 1994, p.56). Lying, for Kant, is an evil act.
This interaction in some ways resembles the attack that Martha Nussbaum launched at Judith Butler (and her works), where she states, among a number of other extreme criticisms, that "Judith Butler's hip quietism is a comprehensible response to the difficulty of realizing justice in America. But it is a bad response. *It collaborates with evil.*" (Nussbaum 1999, p.13, my emphasis). See also Ingram (2013, p.158).

[184]   Ironically, Herder is used only as a means to an end, and not also an end in its own right.

[185]   Gjesdal also notes Herder's impact on Hegel through his development of a "genetic method of comprehending history by tracing the cultural genesis of its events" (2006, p.114)

[186]   It should be noted that Herder does not reduce this 'rabble' to a single social class, whereas Marx does. Rather, he allows for it to be a feature of people from *any* social class, and he considers their existence a failure of their society's culture and education, not something intrinsic to the rabble themselves.

heavily influenced Nietzsche's theory of *Kultur* (culture), and Sikka notes that he anticipates Nietzsche's account of 'concept construction' (2007a, p.41). Herder is also recognised as a principle figure in the development of the philosophy of language (Forster 2002), which can be seen reproduced, and developed further, in the works of Wittgenstein, as well as in Heidegger's comments on language (2007, p.40). He is also located at the foundations of social theory and sociology more generally (Sikka 2011), in addition to the birth of Anthropology alongside Immanuel Kant and Ernst Platner (Zammito 1992). Finally, Herder is identified as the progenitor of the words and concepts; *Einfuhlungsvermogen* – most commonly translated as empathy, *Kultur* as well as *populism*, *expressionism*, and *pluralism* (Berlin 1976, p.153)[187].

Herder's works, as a result of his mostly under-appreciated influence on these disciplines and theorists, have a relevance to contemporary politics as well as social and cultural theorising. In relation to the works of the contemporary cosmopolitan theorists that I explored in chapter two, Herder's works engage directly with the struggle of how difference and diversity can or could be incorporated, embraced, acknowledged and responded to, in their cosmopolitan framings. Scrivener's quote at the beginning of this chapter, whilst in some way a contested argument[188], points to two central issues of cosmopolitanism identified in chapter two. Firstly, the encounter with the different, which Herder handles far more adroitly than Kant (whose approach to difference is simply that difference is the problem that needs to be 'solved') and secondly, the importance of asymmetrical power dynamics, which inevitably manifest from universalising systems and approaches.

4.1.2 Interacting with Herder's Works

When approaching Herder's works, there are a number of key elements that feature prominently. Firstly, Herder's critical arguments and the stances he takes were often produced and developed *in critique of* the works of other theorists, primarily (but not solely) Immanuel Kant[189]. As a former student of, and one-time friend of Kant, he experienced a series of very public critiques and vilifications, which started with Kant's reviews of a number of his works (Reiss 2010, pp.192-200; Kant 1784, pp.201-220).

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[187] See also Andress (1916, p.1); Barnard (1969, p.4); Berlin (1976, p.145); Gillies (1945); Schick (1971, p.11); Morton (1989, p.1); Forster (2002, p.vii); Seigel (2005, p.334); Sikka (2011).

[188] The idea of a counter-Enlightenment is a contested concept, as is his supposed leadership, as well as the binary that is created by conceiving of the Enlightenment in such a way (or indeed in thinking about the Enlightenment as a singular Enlightenment).

[189] Morton refers to this as "a kind of variation of the medieval scholastic *via negativa*" where errors of another are used to develop one's own arguments (1989, p.66).

The impact of Kant's ongoing and negative critique influenced much of Herder's process and writings, which are bound into his frustration with this situation - from his perspective the betrayal by, and fundamental misunderstandings - of his writings and arguments by one of his intellectual 'fathers'[190], compounded by the triumph of Kant's perspective alongside his own fading into obscurity. His texts are frequently attempts to correct misunderstandings of his own works, and responses to what he perceived to be both fundamental mistakes of Kant's philosophical framework[191] as well as the dangerous consequences of his political developments (particularly Kant's version of cosmopolitanism[192]), as much as they are presentations of his own arguments.

Secondly, grasping Herder's arguments requires coming to terms with his writing style that involves both discursive *and* his gestural characteristics. Kant's writings, whilst admittedly quite dense and in many cases awkward, obfuscatory and cumbersomely constructed, rely on the discursive style to transmit his argument – on the precision of the meaning of the text, as it is written, in a linear manner with a start and end point. Herder's works in contrast are characterised by an almost unrelenting use of a number of different dialectical movements, emotive language, a lack of texts that focus on specific themes, and the multiple-layered structuring of the texts themselves. His careful use of specific words, which are linguistically particular to the German language during that period, but are not always connected to, or relatable to each other in the English language (either grammatically or conceptually) in the same way, as well textual linkages through the *spelling* and compounding of particular words that he plays off against each other, are used to propel the reader of his works both forward and backwards across his texts.

This can be seen most clearly in his use of sarcasm to critique the arguments of his contemporaries. Without grasping the complexity of his approach in his native German language, this could be read as an argument in support of the stance he is mocking, rather than a feature of his gestural style which tries to move the reader to his perspective after moving the reader back and forth between different and often opposing positions. A careful re-presentation of Herder's argument requires the use of a number of translations and critiques of his writings in their original language to avoid missing, misinterpreting, or misrepresenting his arguments and the interwoven nature of both his

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190 The two fathers being Immanuel Kant and Johann Georg Hamann.
191 See especially *A Metacritique on the Critique of Pure Reason* (1799) and *Calligone* (1800).
192 See especially his *Letters for the Advancement of Humanity* (1792 & 1793-7a, b & c).

writings and the concepts he develops. His purpose in writing this way, using the discursive contents of the texts, the gestural context of the texts, and the interplay between them that arises from a repeated engagement with his writings over time is to reveal new links that change the nature of earlier dynamics and meanings (i.e. not specifically just the dialectics he produces, but how each is changed through the process). The difficulty of engagement with his texts is further compounded because of the practical reason that a number of his texts have either not been translated, or the translations are of questionable accuracy[193] [194].

Thirdly, in the previous chapter I for the most part relied on the arguments of Kant himself, which was presented in an ahistorical sense with little secondary theorist critique[195.] My attempt was to take his works and developments *as he presented them*; fitting them together and trying to grasp the cohesive system that he had in mind, but excluding any sense of personal history or experiences that might have influenced his theorising[196]. This was partly to allow the texts and his arguments to speak for themselves, but also because *this was Kant's own desire* for how his texts should be interacted with, and they form a part of his own arguments that cosmopolitan acts should be recorded for posterity. This was one of the reasons that he spent so much time, prior to his mental decline in the late 1790's, arranging to have all of the texts that he approved of, and that he felt best represented his arguments, updated for publication

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[193] Herder's Opus Magnus, *Ideen zu einer Philosophied er Geschichted er Menschheit* (1784-91) has only been translated in full once, in 1800, by T. Churchill (1784-91c), where he names it *Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man.* Parts of it appear in a number of other books; Barnard's *Herder on Social and Political Culture* (1969) has a selection from five different books and calls it *Ideas for a philosophy of the History of Mankind,* and is my first choice of translation; Adler & Menze's *On World History: Herder, an Anthology* (1996) takes the title from Churchill, and appears to more faithfully present the emotional angle of Herder's works than Manuel's *Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind* which consists of most but not all, of nine of the twenty five books (1968).
A similar translation concern can be seen in the title of *Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung* der Menschheit* (1774). Barnard interprets this as *Yet Another Philosophy of History for the Enlightenment of Mankind: (A Further Contribution to the many contributions of the Century)* (1969) whereas Forster interprets the title as *This too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity* (2002). Evrigenis & Pellerin (2004), in contrast, title it *Another Philosophy of History for the Education of Mankind.* Barnard's translations are the preferred as they carry a more emotional angle to the title and in the body of the text that I believe more closely mirrors Herder's personality.
*Whilst *Bildung* is often interpreted to mean formation (or culturing, education or socialisation), it is both wider and contains multiple aspects to it. Further, its meaning has changed since Herder's time, and his use varies from both the majority at his time, and now. For these (and other) reasons the preferred translation texts start with Barnard. See also Section (4.1.6).
[194] Churchill, for example, translates Herder's *Kultur* into civilisation rather than culture, which dramatically changes the nature of his arguments.
[195] These were resorted to when direct access to translated texts was not possible.
[196] There is a wealth of texts that does just this, partly as a means to dismiss his works out of hand (mostly from a feminist and racial perspective), or on the other side to excuse or discount his writings on gender and race. Kant's relevance or importance often revolves around whether his position on race (racism) and gender (sexism) can be abstracted from, or are emblematic of his 'white, western universal imperialism'.

during the 1790's and into the 1800's[197].

My engagement with Herder's texts here in this way is because, for Herder, the *only* way to grasp the writings of a person, and the world they perceived and moved through, is to start at the beginning and to bury oneself into their works and life – to rely on "feeling oneself into" the person through their writings – starting with their first work, which he suggests is often the truest of the writer's productions[198]. This involves not just a) an enlarged mentality[199] of one's own thought processes to attempt to accommodate different perspectives, or b) the ability to step outside and to view the writings (semi-)objectively, but in addition c) to attempt to *adopt* the particularity, peculiarities and contradictions of that person's experiences and uniqueness within one's own mind; to step outside, and to feel oneself into the position and perspective[200] of another so that the other's notions of justice and the good life can be felt inside as if they were one's own. Further, that all three of these points need to be grasped *simultaneously*.

To engage with Herder, on Herder's terms, is to grasp not just the words that he writes, but the context and historical aspects of his world, and his unique location in them all. To connect with Kant on the other hand, on the terms that he desired, is to encounter him in an ahistorical sense, with his life and experiences abstracted from the words he wrote (or the arguments of his critics[201]) that he left to posterity. Essentially, Kant should be understood from a textually discursive perspective that ignores his life, but understanding Herder's requires the addition of a gestural engagement of his writings and life to situate him, and the trinary of gesture, discourse, and their dialectic to all be grasped simultaneously.

4.1.3 Herder's Themes

Unlike Kant or other more systematic theorists, it has been noted frequently that it is difficult to know where to start when attempting to engage with Herder's works. Morton

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[197] This is covered in Manfred Kuehn's *Kant a Biography* (2001). See especially Chapters 8-9.

[198] I touch on this process again in a number of different sections: (4.2.1) where I explore Herder on Language as well as (4.2.2) on culture. It also appears in section (4.4.2) where I expand on his idea of reflection (or *besonnheit*) as well as in section (4.6.2) on literature.

[199] e.g. Hannah Arendt's (1971) or Benhabib's (1992, p.122-3).

[200] Herder also uses the word 'transplant' and see this as an act of personal self-creation (Morton 1989, p.83). Barnard (2003) notes that Herder uses the word *Einfuhlungsvermogen* which he translates as "the capacity to feel oneself into" (p.5). He suggests that it is "a process of understanding that could at times prove superior to established methods of enquiry, to the deductive form of *a priori* reasoning and the *a posteriori* form of empirical induction. It consists of grasping connections *creatively* by bringing a combination of different modalities of the mind into play" (p.7, my emphasis).

[201] See also; Sikka (2011, p.12-13 & pp.126-159); Spenser (2015, p.370); Shoenmakers (2012, pp.29-30) and Robinette (2012, p.193)

suggests that "one reason – perhaps the major reason – that Herder has tended not to be read... is... the deceptively simple one that with him it has historically not been at all obvious where one is to begin" (1989, p.3) and he is not alone in reaching this conclusion[202]. Each of Herder's works extends far beyond their simple beginnings and their stated themes. *On Diligence in Several Learned Languages* (1764), for example, whilst ostensibly a simple essay considering whether one should learn additional languages or use translations, incorporates arguments on history, communal and individual identity, the foundations of human nature, the impact of and problems with capitalism and commerce, reinterpretations of the bible, a rejection of the belief that God gave humanity language, the purpose of the sharing of scientific discoveries, the history and philosophy of language, a critical examination of the idea and meaning of human progress, the cultural function of literature and poetry, the bordered nature of the state system and its porosity, the interplay between the unity and diversity of humanity, arguments on an essential link between language and thought, the structuring of a school's curriculum, and the ultimate purpose of education. All this, from a relatively short essay he wrote in 1764 whilst a student of Kant's in Konigsberg (ibid. pp.16-17).

Almost all of his texts possess at least this level of depth and complexity, ranging far and wide not just across different disciplines or schools of thoughts, but backwards and forwards throughout history and the text itself, using allegory, metaphor and simile, and employing dialectic after dialectic as Herder weaves between supposed opposites to shift the reader's mind into a mental state that facilitates a grasping of Herder's own intellectual processes and conclusions. Everything is interlinked in Herder's understanding of the world, and multiples of factors impact in fundamental ways on each individual topic such that for Herder, they cannot be ignored, and he explores this in literary and poetical ways, as well as in philosophical and political texts.

A perhaps unfortunate consequence of this complexity, as well as the deeply involved linguistic and dialectic elements of his writing and some problematic translations of his works, have led a number of theorists to conclude that Herder's works have no overall "system"[203]. Instead, they assert that Herder is a contradictory and confusing writer with flashes of brilliance, and suggest he is instead better engaged with second-hand rather than directly. This might be the case for a simple play-off against something like Kant's

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[202] See also Sikka (2011, p.9); Barnard (1969, p.380)
[203] See Andress (1916); Barnard (1969); Morton (1989); Norton 1991; Sikka 2011 amongst others.

Perpetual Peace or his Universal History[204]. Whilst his works were presented as fragments - as leaves and forestlets - and range far and wide, the overall direction of them shows a remarkable cohesion and consistency to a number of conceptual *themes*, based on his understanding of humanity, even if he rarely staid 'on topic'.

Herder's purpose – deliberately – was that his production of these 'leaves', 'groves', 'forestlets', ' forests', and 'fragments' was intended to be built on *and surpassed*[205]. In the preface to his *Ideas*, for example, he emphasises the unfinished and situated nature of his works, not just as he produced them, but also more widely such that:

> "He, who wrote it, was a man; and thou, who readest it, art a man also. He was liable to error, and has probably erred: thou hast acquired knowledge, which he did not and could not possess; use, therefore, what thou canst, accept his good will, and throw it not aside with reproach, but improve it, and carry it higher. With feeble hand he has laid a few foundation stones of a building, which will require ages to finish: happy, if, when these stones may be covered with earth, and he who laid them forgotten, the more beautiful edifice be but erected over them, or on some other spot!" (1784-91d, p.xvii)[206]

The words that he used to title his works also emphasise that they would be forever unfinished, not just by him, but because of his fervent belief that humanity was not, and could never be, explained by a single writer, nor could it be narrowed down to a single universal system or indeed perfected; since "what is best", he argues throughout his writings, "differs over time" and is always relational (Herder 1784-91a, p.307).

Another theme that extends throughout his works[207] was his 'Anti-dualism', in that he "attempt[s] to mediate between apparently mutually exclusive opposites such as unity and diversity, the universal and the particular, individual freedom and determinism" (Spenser 2007, p.81)[208]. He believed that humanity had no defined end point, and that it is, by nature, neither perfect nor perfectible, and so cannot be tied down to a single

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[204] Although I would disagree here as well, as he clarifies and compiles a number of his more political arguments in his *Letters to Humanity* (1793-7).

[205] Strikingly, this is entirely the opposite perspective of Kant, where his recording to posterity seeks to reinforce their importance throughout time, due to the 'objectively true' nature he ascribes to pure reason and his own deductions. Kant uses history to ahistoricise his works.

[206] This translation comes from the Churchill (1800) version, hence the somewhat old-fashioned language style. The use of 'man', given that Herder's wife was his principle editor, and his much more inclusive, although still problematic approach to women's social position, suggests that using human, human being, or perhaps person, would convey his meaning more accurately.

[207] See sections (4.2.2.3) but also especially (5.5.1) where I develop this theory further and apply it directly to contemporary cosmopolitanism.

[208] This is distinct from a Derridian deconstructive approach.

universalising principle or theory, whether as a product of singular monist system, or from a binary of opposing aspects and their synthesis. His 'overall system' is contradictory only if approached from the assumption of binary oppositionalism, and crucially, only if the approach relies on a Hobbesian assumption of inherent human selfishness. Whilst Herder recognised the value of both universal approaches and particular experiences, these do not sit in direct opposition to each other because they are interwoven into each other, and are an intrinsic part of human existence, through history, which maintains the tension and distinction between diversity and unity that stems from his idea of reflection. His 'system' is one that exhibits and expresses his key themes and concepts throughout his works, but cannot be reduced further, other than that his understanding of humanity was "to be what one should be... exactly the enlightened, informed, fine, rational, educated, virtuous, joyous human being which God demands" (Herder 1769 pp.364-5[209], cited in Norton 1991, p.70). What that means is, or should be, determined and re-determined by each individual, as expressed by their own particularity, not by a universal system representative of a single dominant group or cultural norm, just as it cannot be understood only from a singular particular experience.

Later Romantics such as Fichte and Novalis took on Herder's concept of the nation as an organic (animal) being, in the singular, with certain groups in society representing biological equivalents[210]. Herder by contrast made use of a number of different metaphorical concepts and styles when discussing humanity. His purpose was to use metaphor to help the reader grasp the meanings in his texts, which he considered a natural function[211] of language that helped to situate the reader into the position of the writer. For this reason he make frequent use of the idea of flora in both the singular and plural, rather than 'a fauna' in the singular. This allowed him to indicate that, for example, his 'forest' (humanity) could imply that each leaf (person), each tree (community), each grove (nation), are all a part of a multi-dimensional whole, and yet at the same time unique elements in their own right. Whilst individual trees grow, develop, change and then die, so too do groves grow, develop, change (or 'die'), and whilst a forest also grows, develops and changes, it always remains a forest, yet the forest is constantly in a process of change. His use of such imagery, especially the use of

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[209] See Herder's Sämmtliche Werke Vol.4 (1878).

[210] The brain for scholars, the military as the limbs etc. But many romantics essentialise the metaphor from *like* an organism to "*in fact* an organism" (Barnard 2003, p.54).

[211] Boes disagrees with position, suggesting that "For Herder, metaphor is an attribute of divine language" (2012, p.52), but Herder makes clear in his *Essay on the Origin of Language* (1772) that language is entirely human in origin – although the capacity to reflect *is* of divine origin. Boes is incorrectly referring to Herder's constructed language through reflection rather than *natural language,* with divinity. I discuss this in section (4.2.1).

plurality in relation to his imagery, was indicative of an idea that for a forest (humanity) to exist, it *requires* all of these smaller constituent elements, all the way down to the individual, unique leaf – and that as a whole, all the trees are dependent on each other for their naming as a forest. But whilst there is a hierarchy in this conceptual *naming*, with smaller elements making up a larger element, it is of a markedly different nature to the use of a body or a mechanical system, and allows for uniqueness to be expressed at all levels, as it is exists not as in an ahistorical timeless always, but as always becoming.

4.1.5   Humanity

This section establishes Herder's understanding of humanity, because it relies on his developments and arguments on language, culture, and history. Essentially, his determination of humanity is developed from these themes rather than the themes being determined by the definition. These developments establish part one, humanity as process, and part two, humanity as project, as distinct, but co-dependent. At the same time, to order and explore them in this way requires understanding what Herder means by humanity as *humanität.*

Herder weaves his vision of humanity from the moment of conception, emphasising an inherent uniqueness of each and every individual, firstly in rejection of Locke's epistemological assumption of a *tabula rasa*" (Barnard 2003, p.122). Yet at the same time he incorporated (Locke's) environmental factors as *Klima,* which starts in the first moments after birth in the earliest teachings by the child's nurse into a particular framing of life-perception. The goal of his works was not the abrogation of one's individuality through the adoption of a moral code identical to all others, but of the fulfilment of life through living, experiencing and being, as a process of endlessly becoming oneself, as *humanität.*

As a function of this framing of humanity, Herder decided, given his awareness of the co-constitutive nature of language through culture, to introduce a new word - *humanität* to the German lexicon - rather than attempting to repurpose the already existing *Menschheit*, which during his time implied a *passive* sense of sympathy and caring. This allowed him to "distance[s] himself from anything that might weaken or sentimentalize the quality he captures with the word "humanity." (Adler & Menze 1996, p.105). With his creation of the word *Einfuhlungsvermogen* (empathy), he was able to connect *humanität* to the ideas of "*humankind, humaneness, human rights, human*

duties, human dignity, love of humankind” (Herder 1793b, p.105, his emphasis). He achieved this by linking it to what he believed was one of the earliest recorded expressions of humanity, during Roman times, where obeying the laws of the land would make one “*just*, but not thereby *humane... the man of nobility, who on his own did not make use of these rights where they were not fair... as a human being, was *humanus*, *humanissimus*, not only in... conversation and social discourse, but also in matters of business, in domestic customs, in the entire sphere of conduct” (ibid. p.109). This idea of fair, for Herder, was not simply a deduction sourced from reason abstracted from emotionality, but as a greater part of the expression of humanity as an *art* which comes from *love* of humankind, *in* its historically and culturally situated setting. It was the combination of, essentially, justice as fairness cultivated from justice as caring[212]

Sonia Sikka (2011, p.20) notes that Irmscher (1994, p.205) provides a “helpful statement” of Herder's multiple elements of *humanität*, at the same time suggesting that his third point moves too far towards the idea of the sublimation of individuality, something which I agree is not entirely accurate for Herder. As a result, my own definition of Herder's *Humanität* varies slightly from his:

> 1) The general nature of humanity as unique, individual beings who each determine themselves through besonnheit (reflection)[213].
>
> 2) The expressions of the possibilities of this general nature, in their historical[214] and culturally[215] unique, situated settings.
>
> 3) The historical task of the co-evolution and co-constitution of *volker*[216], involving the diversity *and* unity[217] of individuality in a world community characterised by solidarity[218].

The development of humanity then, for Herder is, as Adler puts it, “a goal in itself” and as a consequence, “the process of human history has no end” (Adler 1994, p.63).

This human process does not happen of its own accord simply by respecting and following these three definitions though. Rather, there is an essential educational

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[212] This obviously connects to my critique in Chapter two of both Thomas Pogge and Seyla Benhabib.
[213] See Sections (4.2.1) and (4.2.2).
[214] See Section (4.2.5).
[215] See Section (4.2.3).
[216] See Section (4.2.4).
[217] See Sections (4.2.6) and (4.2.7).
[218] Irmscher's (translated (Sikka 2011, p.20)) points are:
(1) The general nature of man as a being that determines itself
(2) The particular realization of the possibilities of this general nature in a specific historical situation
(3) The historical task of the co-evolution of nations, involving the sublimation of individuality in a world community characterised by solidarity (Irmscher 1994, p.205).

component, because the human being must firstly be understood as a holistic being, and *educated* as such (Andress 1916, p.126)[219]. Only if that is established can the direction of human progress and change (whatever that may be at that point in time and space) proceed in accordance with *humanität*. These determinations are the expression of our holistic natures, and these expressions of *humanität* are established from "self- and other- feeling" that arise from reflection as it is undergoes processes of internal "expansion and contraction" (Herder 1778, p.214). These feelings through expansion and contraction in turn come from reflection, based on the "noblest cognition", *love*: "To love the great Creator in oneself, to love one's way into others, *and then to follow this sure pull* – that is moral feeling, that is conscience". (ibid. my emphasis). Humanity then, for Herder, is not a passive expression of love or sympathy towards the other. It is active because it requires movement - *action* – that pulls us, in a historically and culturally situated way, based on an understanding of the holistic nature of human beings, and it requires the development of reflection, which in turn requires language and thus community to function.

Humanity as *Humanität* is thus both a process and a project. It is a process of situated *being as becoming*, as well as a project to cultivate the opportunities for *being* in a holistic way, in the process of situated *becoming*. But neither "cold speculating reason" nor responding to "every insistent knocking and welling of your heart" (Herder 1778, p.215) allows for the expression of this *humanität*. Only both aspects of cognition understood as one wider sensation-cognition suffice, but this is not to say that the ideas of cognition and sensation themselves do not help in their holistic cultivation. The same process of reflection allows us to think of a multitude of 'internal mirror-created aspects of cognition-sensation' that can be considered and explored as distinct cognitive concepts such as emotion and reason. These multiples of concepts, though, are still a *single holistic capacity* of the totality of the human mind, and thus of human nature. *Humanität* as a process is then self-formation, or *bildung*. It is the process of being oneself in an unending process of becoming oneself, exercising one's power as, and through, *Besonnheit*. To do so is, for Herder, 'human perfection' - not as a perfect expression of one's being, or a perfect end point of being - but in the human (and thus flawed and particular) process of becoming. Just as this is human perfection, so too is the perfection of all humanity therefore possible. Not as a state of being, but a 'place' where "*humankind is engaged in eternal progress and striving*" (Herder 1793a, p.104).

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[219] See Section (4.3.1).

Humanität as a project is essentially then, in the Herderian sense, the manifold practical ways in which humans contribute to and assist themselves and the other in their endless becoming through situated living. Herder explains this most clearly in "The Character of Humankind" where he states:

> "7. To provide for and to facilitate in each individual case the *mutually most beneficial impact of one human being upon the other*, that, and that alone can be the purpose of *all human community*. Whatever interferes with, hinders, or voids this purpose is inhuman. Whether the human being lives briefly or for a long time, in this estate or that, he is meant to enjoy his existence and to convey the best of that existence to others; to that end, the society that he has joined is meant to assist him." (1793, p.100, his emphasis[220])

Both process and project are involved in, and therefore fundamental parts of, a human's education in the singular, and the multiple pluralities that humans experience in their becoming.

4.1.6   Bildung and Tradition

These two aspects of humanity can also be understood as the twinned ideas of Herder's understanding of *Bildung* and tradition. Herder, as has already been noted, repurposed words, created new ones, and introduced foreign words into his arguments when needed, and this also holds here. The idea of *Bildung* that Herder encountered was itself a repurposing of its early Enlightenment meaning, where it was used "primarily in theological contexts" (Boes 2012, p.47) and was closely associated with the development of the soul to a more divine state. The shift was generally understood to have come from Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury – specifically from the translation of his book *Soliloquy*. It was from Shaftesbury, through Winkelmann (Horlacker 2004, p.416), whom Herder had great admiration for, that he received the meaning of *Bildung*. It had at this point altered from a mostly passive and primarily mystical sense, and "moved into the realm of active striving, as the process through which the soul grappled for its proper form. The importance of this process of secularization... allowed the term *Bildung* to gain a previously unprecedented level of conceptual depth" (Boes 2012, p.48). Boes also goes on to point out that *Bildung* gained it's "foremost expression... in the work of Johann Gottfried Herder" (p.49), but it also influenced Christof Weiland, who in turn "introduce[d] the philosophical idea of cosmopolitanism into the German discussion" (ibid.) between 1774 – 1780, long before

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[220] Herder lists 36 points detailing the character of humankind (1793, pp.100-104).

Kant's own engagement with and repurposing of the term.

What Herder did was firstly to link *Bildung* to history, and the idea of *bildung* for him was the main purpose for writing his *Ideas* as "the universal history of the *Bildung* of the world" (Herder, cited in Boes 2012, p.51). *Bildung* from there became intrinsically linked to culture, expressed through the collective identity of a *volk*. Humans for Herder are always already bound into communities and cultures, and he placed great importance on the role of both cultural education and tradition in the development of the individual. *Bildung* is from this the process of cultural education and cultivation involving the active exercise of specifically human, reflective faculties (Sikka 2011, p.7) in a situated setting. This process for him is one determined and presented not as an absolute concept from an authority in a top-down manner, as is usually the case, but rather as an interactive dynamic where the process of learning and development occurs in both directions, and across society, extending in all directions.

Bildung is most often now perceived to mean a particular *state* of a person's accomplishments. Essentially, in the modern sense, the state determines the parameters of what defines *bildung* because the state is involved in the practical project of the education of its citizens and subjects. For Herder, though, beliefs and customs are ongoing *processes* of change and development, with each term involving its own immanent dialectic. A *volk* or community's culture is both the product of *bildung*, and the producer, in an ongoing, organic state of change, as it exists as a part of its own continual recreation. Barnard refers to this process as "building up" (1969, p.388; 2003, p.145), and Bohlin uses both cultivation and formation (2008, p.1). Whilst in some respects these are reasonably accurate, Herder's frequent use of organic, flora-based metaphors, and his rejection of mechanistic approaches to human living suggest instead that Sikka's use of "cultivation" (2011, p.7) more closely aligns with his arguments.

Tradition is also used in a different way by Herder, not as a *set* of beliefs and customs, often institutionalised through the apparatus of a state, but rather as the idea of "passing on" through *bildung*. It is *also* a process - "an ongoing intergenerational transmission" which from Herder's perspective should happen absent the authoritative determination of and by a state, but rather be continually recreated by the *volk* themselves. Tradition is determined by the people as a community or *volk*[221], through the ongoing process of

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[221] *Volk* for Herder refers to a community, or communities, of any size, that has the collective self-identification of themselves as a specific *volk*, and acts according to that relationship. See sections

bildung, which is culturally situated, geographically unique, and historically moving through time. From this, tradition is the practical indicator of *change* not stability, and because it proceeds through history, it is a process of change. If the *volk* are both willing and able to express their *humanität*, then this change is progress – and also always and inevitably its own "immanent dialectic" (Barnard 2003, p.147) that both moves towards and away from *humanität* along its path of history[222]. Tradition is, from this respect, a cultural indicator and expression because it is produced by the activities of a *volk* as it grows and changes from the activities within, via *bildung*, as well as from its inter-*volk* interactions as individuals and peoples interact with each other. The whole world then, in Herder's view, is "a school in which each must learn and cultivate that *humanität* which is inherent, in embryo, within him... The vehicle of education is tradition – the accumulated and transmitted experience of the race[223] – which is brought into contact with the innate powers of the learner" (Herder, cited in Morton 1989, p.9)

Since Herder places the source of culture in the human capacity of *besonnheit*, his concept of the process and meaning of culturally and historically situated reflection is essentially *bildung* in itself, which incorporates the first two points of the definition I gave for *humanität*. Tradition involves the second and third points. From this, *humanität* as process is the combination of Herder's *bildung,* and tradition.

Part 2: Humanity as Process

4.2.1   Language

"Without language man can have no reason, without reason no language"
(Herder 1772a, p.137)

This section examines Herder's approach to language, and how he links language to thought, culture, and identity. Whilst Herder's writings explore a number of themes in some detail, both language and history represent two core aspects of his overall work. Human nature gives rise to a capacity to reflect, and from this language arises.

The first, or natural, language of humans consists of those expressions that arise from surprise, pain, and other intense emotional experiences and are a 'universal' language of emotions which all humans share with each other and with animals[224]. It comes from

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(4.2.4) and (4.3.4).
[222] See also section (4.2.5).
[223] The use of the word 'race' here indicates the human race *as a whole*, and not a subset of humanity culturally constructed as different 'races'.
[224] More specifically, this is a language that we also have in common with animals, which Herder

those expressions which are forced from us "*at the first moment of surprise, without deliberation or intention...* these utterances are a form of language, the language of emotions, expressive of the original force of nature" (Herder 1772a, p.118, his emphasis). This language is in many respects a universal possession. We can be emotionally affected by the vocal expression of emotions regardless of where we might encounter them, whether it be the "primitive wailings of the aborigines" or the "discordant yell expressive of the love and kindness of the Indians" (p.123), we are affected by the emotions that these vocalisations represent and can recognise them because we all share this common language.

The second language[225], which Herder devotes considerably more time to, contains his reasons for determining that the creation of language is a human act, which comes about as a result of our lack of clear and prominent instincts directing humans in any particular ways. Because of this lack of pre-supplied direction, in contrast to other animals who possess prominent instincts to direct them in specific ways, humans must instead *chose* a direction. From this, humanity is defined by choice and thus *freedom* - to choose - is an essential and original aspect of human existence. To choose also requires the capacity of *Besonnheit*[226] (1772a, p.154) - a fundamental and according to Herder unique aspect of human nature - which allows us to 'step outside ourselves' and consider a circumstance in detail, whilst we reduce external input and our own personal desires from the data that is being considered[227]. This reflection requires language in which to frame and clarify our thoughts, and is driven by a *need* – an emotional drive produced from *Empfindung* (sensation) (Sikka 2007a, p.33) that makes us *want* to use reason, expressed in our need to reflect on the situation. The choice being made matters in some way, and so it is driven by our emotions, at the same time it requires direction,

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suggests is understandable depending on how close to 'human' the animal is. Apes and monkeys, for example, share this language most with humans, with other hot-blooded animals like cats and dogs less so, extending outwards and fading over 'genetic distance'. (1772a, p.118).

This also suggests that humans possess a truly universal comprehension of language - the expression of emotions from sensation, now called Ideophones (See Haiman's *Ideophones and the Evolution of Language* (2017), but also Armoskaite & Koskinen (2017)).

[225] It is helpful to think of these languages as 1) Naturally expressed language and 2) Naturally reflected language. Each of them is *natural* because each of them relies on natural human capabilities. Their differences are that one is sourced from emotions that are 'forced' from us, in the absence of reflection, but which reflection then builds upon. The other does not have this forced aspect, and is sourced through reflection. Both languages rely on sensation and thus an emotional core element to trigger either the emoting, or the reflection.

[226] See especially Sikka (2011, pp.162-165), but also Spencer (2007, p.90) and Speck (2014, pp.49-50)

[227] This process also forms a part of the action to 'feel into the mind of another'.

Whilst Herder does believe that other animals can consider options and weight up choices, the human ability to reflect allows for something fundamentally different to occur – firstly, to create a mirror of ourselves in our own mind which we enter into dialogue with it, and secondly to create the image of another that we can insert our mirrored self *into*.

which reason provides, just as this process cannot occur without the mental capability to pause, reflect, and mirror, in our minds. From this scenario, Herder links language to thought and emotion to such an extent that he argues we cannot think beyond the basest of emotional experiences without language, and *all* thought incorporates emotion.

Crucial to this process was not just that it allows us to feel our way into the other, but that it is the process by which we are human because:

> "As long as the human being, this marvelous riddle of creation, reflected upon himself in his visible state, and in so doing measured himself against that which dwelt within him... he was oppressed by a feeling of *frailty*, of *weakness* and *disease*... this perception by itself led to *humaneness...* to the compassionate feeling for the suffering of others, to the taking part in the imperfections of their nature, with the accompanying effort to cope with those imperfections, or to assist in overcoming them" (1793b, p.107, his emphasis)

Reflection, considering, thinking on, awareness of, ideas about, self-awareness and self-restraint etc. - all translations of Herder's *Besonnheit*, is the fundamental factor of Herder's arguments and it is from this capacity that all of human learning comes from. It produces not just compassion for others, but also a desire to better oneself *and* to help others; to not just be human, but to be humane, and act humanely.

This capacity, and its moral injunctions, for Herder, *define* human nature and any creature, if it possesses it, *is human*, regardless of external form or ability to communicate externally. The existence of the structure (language) that thought requires for it to occur provides us with the tools we need to reflect, and the deeper our understanding of language's complexity and expression, the more tools we have to reflect with. Each reflection on a topic, subject or situation gives us empirical examples that allow us to understand a thing more fully, but also, crucially, contributes to the ongoing capacity to reflect in general, and our ability to define ourselves in relation to what we are considering or encountering. An education that focusses on developing only specific parts of our mind's capabilities like reason, emotion, or wit etc., rather than a holistic education which trains the mind as a whole, unbalances this ability to reflect and skews it in a particular, and for Herder unwanted, direction. This influences not only later reflections, but, throughout communication with others, impacts on how our *volk* and others in turn reflect. As a result it distorts or 'deforms' the processes of *bildung*, culture and tradition.

The ability to frame that choice, and the possible paths that are erased or emphasised because of one particular framing over another, is influenced by the elements that have gone into the creation of the language that is being used to reflect, and the unique attributes and experiences of the person reflecting. It also, if it is going to be communicated to an other, needs to be understood by that other, and developed further, and so language requires a community of people by which it is co-created and shaped. This original language was neither created with a structured grammar, nor was it a construct of philosophers. It was rather a primitive construct, haphazard, filled with synonyms and metaphors from nature, and based on the social and geographical environment. It was more 'natural' in that need determined the time and place of a word's creation, just as it determined its changing and repurposing. It was also more closely connected to our emotions[228] and the first language we all share in a way that more developed languages, with more precision, structure and complexity, are not (1772a, p.119). This organic language could not be developed without reason, and because of this language is the "external characteristic of our species just as mind is the internal mark" to such an extent that should another being develop language as a way to communicate with itself, "he would have inwardly been a speaking man who was bound sooner or later to invent also an external language" (1772a, p.140). Language is created to communicate with *ourselves* in our own minds, and *vocalised* to communicate with others.

From this Herderian perspective, language acts as a border beyond which we cannot think or understand. It limits our ability to express ourselves, just as it gives us the tools by which to express ourselves beyond base emotional outbursts of sound. It further shapes our understanding of our own expressions and experiences because without the construct we cannot think the thoughts that we think. Because language is created from the particular environment and experiences and chain of development that it has received from previous users of the language, it is nuanced and directed in particular ways, as a somewhat chaotic melange rather than a carefully constructed logical system. It is culturally determined before our entry into life, which in turn is influenced by the environment that humans are a part of. It is then constantly recreated and redirected as its use and its meaning changes over time (1769b, p.253). From a complex mixture of

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[228] These first words were linked closely to our sensate selves, often as "singing speech" (1769b, p.254) but because language is a human construct that is essential to but can only approximate thought, it is filled with synonyms, similes and metaphors that rely on the particularity of the person's reasoning and reflecting that created it in its original context.

physiological reasons, changing environmental condition, changing needs and interests, and a need for greater precision, words change meaning, are created, reorganised, introduced from different languages, and fade from use over time (1772a, p.166).

Through Herder's connection of language to thought - that we think in language - our facility with language determines our ability to create the constructed image of ourselves and others inside our minds, and it determines the boundaries beyond which we have no ability to enunciate or articulate our thoughts and experiences; "If it is true that we cannot think without thoughts, and learn to think through words, then language sets limits and outline for the whole of human cognition" (1767-8, p.49). Our first constructed language[229,] which we are exposed to from the earliest moments of our lives, embeds deepest into our cognitive processes. How extensive the language we then have access to and have experience with, limits that which we can articulate, to such an extent that "a people has no idea for which it has no word." (Herder 1784-91 p.437, paraphrased in Sikka 2007a, pp.293-4).

Two important parts of his analysis of language is that, firstly, different expressions of language complexity is *not* a function of 'race' and as a result families, cultures and *volk* are not racial in nature. Herder makes clear that the concept of race is not a biological category, but was rather formed by western Europe's move to categorise those of different cultural, geographical, and ethnic backgrounds as *lesser*. Primitive is primitive for Herder, wherever it occurs, regardless of skin colour, social or geographic environment, and this understanding of primitive is based around the level of emotive to reflected language (1772a, p.121). Because of this primitive 'status'[230] of language, primitive cultures have more in common with each other, regardless of physical features, social similarities, or even geographical location. The second part of this analysis is that the more primitive the language, the harder it is to translate into writing because language in these early stages is based more closely on our passions and speech, which, whilst 'generally' understandable from an emotional perspective, is harder to transmit through written form because the emotional-instinctive content is so high in relation to the reflected-constructed side. As a result we can usually grasp the base emotional aspect instinctively, but there is simply not enough on the constructed side to allow a comparison through reflection between constructed languages to occur.

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[229] Herder calls this our mother tongue because the first person we learn language from is the one who nurses us – traditionally the mother (or another woman taking on caring duties) (1772a, p.164).

[230] I am using these ideas of primitive, status etc. as somewhat loose and nebulous terms here.

The further we are from communication that incorporates these natural sounds into our own lexicon, the harder it is to reach back and grasp them.

Whereas Kant excludes language from his analysis of reason, Herder argues that reason can only ever be expressed through language. Reason is intrinsically to language, and reason is therefore already always biased - it can never be 'pure'. Neither the products of language nor the theoretical constructs we create in our minds are immune to the influence of language. In Herder's view, there is no such thing as *a priori* other than '*being*' and the human capability of reflection (Sikka 2007a, p.37). It is never possible to have pure reason *of any kind*[231] and it therefore made no sense to prioritise the idea of it[232] (Herder 1784-91; Sikka 2007a). The development of language through unique geographic, cultural and familial environments inevitably contribute to the development of individuals shaped and influenced by these environments. Language is an inherent predisposition of humanity, and was spontaneously created by the action of reflection "on sense experience (and not *a priori*)" (Herder 1772a, pp.149&154), through the creation of symbols to represent concepts and define difference, but the spoken language could only develop through communication with others, through the interplay of unity and diversity between people either individually or culturally. As a consequence, Herder rephrases the Cartesian understanding of identity, individuality and consciousness ("I think, therefore I am") and dramatically asserts **"I feel my own self! I am!"** (Herder 1769, cited in Norton 1991, p.42).

4.2.2 Family

Our first encounter with language, outside of its mythical beginning at the dawn of humanity, is when we are born into the family environment, where language already exists. Those who raise us are the first to educate us in the ways of its "logic" (Herder 1767-8, p.48) and we "enter the world, and in doing so, I enter a world of instruction; so did my father; so did the first son of the first ancestor. And as develop my thoughts and transmit them to my descendants, so did my father... we are all his sons: with him began race; he originated language and instruction. He began to invent; we invented after him" (1772a, p.171). Communication, for Herder, is an act of continual co-creation – we *become*, in communication, which is itself a process, and we recreate language through our use of it both internally and externally. This dynamic of being taught and teaching

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[231] Whilst Herder acknowledged that Kant's Critique of Pure Reason significantly reduced the number of elements that could be attributed to pure reason, Herder believed that *nothing* could be attributed to it.

[232] Herder did though spend considerable time and effort engaging with it, in his attempt to counteract the influences of Kant's critiques when he published his *Metacritique.*

is, in Herder's view, a debt to nature that we pass on to our children, and as a result, it takes on a positive *emotional* aspect to it. Rather than a simple medium through which we communicate, Herder presents language as a fundamental part of our life and an act of creation that is produced through our encounter with ourselves and the world. He gives it emotional significance because we are taught it by our parents, whom we love; he gives it add purpose because of what we gain from it, and this purpose expands because it allows us to become an active part of the family where our emotions are first expressed. Language is something precious because it also represents a chain of creation extending back to the origins of the species. It is therefore bound up in the "spiritual heritage of the family, since it is through the language of the parents that a given mode of thinking is perpetuated" (1772a, p.163).

A child's first interactions with language is a powerful and ongoing experience. The importance of these earliest moments to the child, who is learning *for the first time* has a strong emotional engagement with language, and the cognitive processes it is involved with allows us to enter into living and being. Thus "every word we learn during this early phase carries with it secondary associations which we rekindle in our minds every time we use the word. Frequently it is these secondary ideas which sway the mind more powerfully than the main concept... and essentially determine the character of which we earlier termed the family or kinship mode of thought" (1778, p.229). As a result, "the infant imperceptibly absorbs the emotional flavor given to them by his parents. He repeats therefore with every newly acquired word not only certain sounds but also certain feelings" (1772a, p.163). Not only are emotions an intrinsic part of the creation of language, they are also a feature of learning it, of our process of reflection when we use words to think, and when we communicate with others. This emotional flavour will, in Herder's views, influence the rest of a child's life, and we will always be influenced by the emotional tenor of communication because of this link.

The family system in which this education occurs is one that is supposed to be filled with "learning in the easiest and most natural way" where one gains "the ideas of the father [and] the precepts of the mother". Underlying this is the idea that in that home there is no greater wisdom than the parents', no kindness more kind, and no system more perfect that this "government in miniature" (1772a, p.163). It is here that the cultural, spiritual and religious heritage of the family is passed down from parent to child. This dynamic is replicated in all families, and "the rank of the fathers, the region,

the way of life, the activity and experience; all these determined the germ of learning and the manner in which it was passed on" (1780, p.230). Language represents the unique ways in which the family interacts both with the world around them and each other, so there is a common style of linguistic use, but each individual still speaks, strictly speaking, their own language (1772a, p.165). Each individual is a unique individual, such that "no two words in one language [are] ever spoken in quite the same way by two different people" (ibid.).

Because of this process, language represents for Herder an expression of a person's connection to something that both precedes them and will continue long after they are gone. Any writings by that person, if it is *genuine* representation of that person's views, thoughts and feelings "presents to the public... a part of his soul". It provides, in Herder's view, a window into the past and a snapshot of the heritage that that person shared in and contributed to. and as a result it is "the singular and the greatest benefit of printing, which otherwise would have brought as much harm as usefulness to literary nations" (1784, p.111)[233]. Family, the culture that the family is involved in the co-constitution of, as well as the *volk* they are a part of, are intimately tied together through language. Culture is expressed and constantly re-expressed through language, and language is in a constant process of growth, development and change through its cultural use. This dynamic between language and culture means that any literature produced in its mother tongue would bear the imprint of that culture's way of thinking at the time of its writing (1767-8, p.50), and provide access for the reader to the 'spirit' of the age that it was produced from.

The family is also a part of a larger cultural system primarily because humans *require* communities for their historical and ongoing practical survival, due to our physical weaknesses and needs (1772a, p.161). As Herder puts it, "Man is not the Hobbesian wolf, not a lone creature in the forest, as Rousseau would have it; for he has communal language in which to communicate" (1772a, p.167) and in so doing emphasises both the essentiality of community to human existence and that language acts not only as the link between people in a community, but *is* in some important respects, the community.

4.2.3 Culture

> "In what does true culture consist?
> ... in cultivating morals and customs" (1769c, p.92)

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[233] This links to Herder's critique of commerce, which I explore in section (4.3.5).

As has been suggested previously, Herder saw the family, and as a result culture, bound to language. This influences the working of the mind since it was only *through* culture that language could grow; from the interaction with the near other (one's family), and then expanding out to the more distant other (one's tribe/community/*volk*/other *volker*). Herder was firm in his belief that all of humanity, no matter their geographical location, skin colour, or capabilities, are a part of the human race and have the capability to express their own unique *humanität*. All humans as a result always share a common base emotional language and a common system (reflection) for constructing language. No matter the 'distance' (1772a, p.170), there are always elements of commonality between different groups of humans. Their movement over time, the springing up of different communities and *volker,* are to Herder's way of thinking, necessary and unavoidable manifestations of humanity expressing itself. Because of this shared origin, and because all humans share in the capacity of *besonnheit*, cultures that developed, extending all the way back to the earliest point in humanity, shared a common heritage which has grown, split, separated, and reformed. Since language is the common link that all cultures share, which is produced in the reflective process, *besonnheit* is a path not just to consider our present circumstance, or to hypothesise the future with, but to grasp the history and nature of humanity itself.

It is not just the structure of the medium[234] itself that determines this though. What is passed along the medium is essential as well. Shared stories, religion, mythologies, beliefs, histories, customs and practices that are a part of the structures of history also serve to cultivate their senses of group affiliation, as well as through the variations and shifts in the telling of the tales adding their own influence on the content and context of their communication. Radically for his time, especially given his status as a Christian preacher, Herder held that religions, myths and beliefs are produced through reflection on the unknown – and "whether we laugh at Greek mythology... yet each of us, perhaps, makes up his own. The people[235] have mythology of a thousand things"[236] (1769c, p.75,

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[234] Morton refers to Herder's use of language as a 'veil of language' but also argues that nothing is behind the veil. My use of the word medium is used in a similar way. There is nothing that contains the medium. The medium *is* language as it is used, and does not exist in its absence, just as removing the veil, or medium, removes language and thus ends the possibility of meaning (1989, p.70). The veil metaphor is also a feature of Wittgenstein's works.

[235] Barnard (1969) interprets this as "common people", which at the time of Herder's writing was the direct translation of *volk*, but Eggel (2007) notes that Herder's deliberate repurposing of the word shifted its meaning. Barnard himself later changes his view on this, locating the term not in the 'common people', but in the 'not-property-determined middle classes' (2003, p.29).

[236] This links to Kant's argument on the 'need to believe' (see section (3.2), but whereas for Kant it must be deduced through pure reason, for Herder it is an essential function of our human need to understand. We create meaning through reflection. Whether it is true or not is almost beside the point that it has meaning to us. It reflects us and as such, if we communicate our beliefs, gives others insight

my re-translation). He even went so far as to argue that the bible itself should be taken not as proof of god, but rather as proof of the human tendency to mythologise (1769d, p.95), and a demonstration of our need to find meaning in life. As a result, the bible, as well as all other religious literature, represent the quest of different peoples to find meaning "in matters of their creation" (1769d, p.83). This then suggested to Herder that early religious books should be considered "mythological national songs of the origins of their most ancient memories of note" (p.85). These religious texts, and indeed the Bible itself are "thoroughly human. The thought and the word, the sequence and the manner of representation, all are human. A human soul produced each thought written down". These texts as a result provide an insight into the experiences of humans in the 'dawn' of humanity[237] - and if the words written down are true to them and deeply felt by the person writing them – if the words are an expression of their *humanität*, they provide a means for us to grasp the historically distant other through reflection, and to better understand and express our own *humanität*.

Crucially though, culture is not simply a single thing that can be pointed to and identified as being a part of a single culture. For Herder, culture is always *multiple*. He identifies sailors and herdsmen, families, tribes and even philosophers possessing their own cultures, as well as nations like Russia possessing "various levels of culture" (1769c, p.93)[238]. Because of this sense of plurality from a common source, every community was and is both a part of something larger than itself, and yet at the same time also unique in its own experiences of existence. *All* humans share multiple cultural artefacts and concepts in common with each other (because of their common source), as well as unique elements intrinsic to only a single person, family, community or nation (because of their particular development over time, and how/when they were linked to other cultures and people's environments). Because of these similarities humans are not bound to a specific unchanging culture, nor does Herder suggest that humans should be tied into a single culture that is directly equivalent to a *volk* - because a *volk* can and usually does contain multiples of cultures - but rather than these natural and ongoing links to multiple cultures and levels of cultural experience problematizes attempts to essentialise the idea of culture into a fixed shared-experience identity. Yet because language is the common thread and medium for a group of people, it embeds in them tendencies to rationalise, emote, and express, in similar ways, even if not in the same

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into us.

[237] Herder uses the phrase "the Morn" here, which I am re-interpreting as 'the dawn'.

[238] Herder also notes here that Russia is constituted by *multiple nations,* as well as different provinces and capitals possessing *spirits*.

directions. As a result, this produces not just collective recognition of them from outside the group that they share a commonality with, but within the group because their form of communication is one that they are co-creators of, and they recognise each other's relationship with their community.

This cultural affiliation and perception process inevitably influences us in ways that deny the possibility of total and unrestrained freedom, individuality, and atomisation for an individual, but at the same time the individual could not come to be or to act with 'freedom' without these processes. For Herder, freedom can only come from cultural, family, and *volk* relationships and circumstances, and the expression of freedom is slanted along familial, cultural, linguistic and *volk* lines as a result. Even if that expression is a rejection of those links and ties, it is still influenced by what is rejected. Just as for Herder's utter rejection of the concept of pure reason, and the illogic of it in his framing of human existence, so too did it make no sense for him to conceive of human individuality and agency outside of language, culture and community. These are all an intrinsic part of *every* individual's life story and of humanity as a whole.

This is not to suggest that human development *within* such boundaries was limited. In his aesthetic philosophy he insists that each human soul *and* body[239] is unique in and of itself (1769b, pp.192-197), just as every *Klima*[240] was unique, and every experience of humanity historically situated. From these base elements, the infinite variety of humans and humanity come from the interplay of all of these characteristics: cultures, family, language, body-mind, soul, and the physical environment. Between them they nudge, shift, influence, direct etc. human cultivation, as well being influenced by interactions between other *volk*, without determining precisely how influential they will be, what aspects of the individual are being nudged, or even what direction it will progress in (regardless of intent), or of what aspects influence more or less. Whilst there will always be influences drawn from specific cognitive tendencies, comprehensions and inclinations, their expression and understanding nevertheless remain infinite in their possibilities. These occurrences, repeated throughout humanity, create a fabric of multiples of quasi-distinct cultures with blurred 'boundaries' producing identifiable but not totally distinct forms of communication in dialect, language, and through complex cultural identities. They blur into each other in a complex interweaving as individuals, cultures and human groupings interact both internally through reflection and externally

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[239] By body he refers to both physical and mental characteristics.
[240] Climate, in a wide sense.

through communication, influenced by *bildung* and through a process of tradition as change and growth.

A number of contemporary theorists have engaged with Herder, attempting to define whether he was a cultural relativist, essentialist, pluralist or multiculturalist, or indeed an anti-dualist (Spenser 2007) or cultural communitarian (Whitton 1988). All of these angles for interpreting Herder's perspective on culture contain some connection to his arguments. He was a relativist because he believed that cultures should be recognised as their own distinct form of human living searching for their own happiness. Judging other cultures should occur based on how they hold to their own cultural ideals, rather than simply from an outside perspective that uses the judging to pass moral pronouncements on their fitness to the category of human. He was a cultural pluralist because, although distinct cultures are a rare thing in his view, there is a constant and ongoing dialogue between these different cultures within a *volk*, just as this extends beyond culture to different *volk*. In addition to this, Herder becomes more relativist the further removed cultures are from each other in their respective 'ages'. Primitive cultures are more closely relatable to each other, whereas Herder veers to relativism in the exploration of primitive cultures in relation to his own developed nation perspective, just as he becomes more relativist the more historically distant a culture is.

There are also, of course, strong communitarian aspects to his arguments although there are still significant differences between his position and that of Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre (Spenser 1996, p.246). Herder's main direction is better understood by framing his arguments using the idea of "*inter-*" to community, culture, *volk* and state, facilitated by a (mostly) passive *liberal* government lens (see Section 4.3.4). Herder focusses much of his writings on inter- dialogue, exchange, and action, rather than simply reifying and fixing culture as timeless features living side by side and relying on tolerance to ensure a peaceful co-existence.

The point of his idea of, and focus on, reflection was to emphasise first that humans are always already a part of communities and cultures, but the point of *being* was in the development of their reflection, which served to cultivate a unique individual in the process of constantly becoming themself. Only through an acknowledgement of and critical engagement with one's own situated experience could this occur, because only then could one engage with it in relation to the situated experience of the other, whether that be through a physical encounter with another, or through the literature that the other

has produced. The process of mirroring oneself in one's own mind *requires* a deep level of understanding of oneself *as* a situated emotional-rational-reflecting being. The purpose of living and *humanität* was to engage across cultures and through time to learn more about the other *and* oneself, and through that encounter to become more what one is in an active process of being, in relation to the other. 'Being' as a process requires its enactment, both as an though process and its physical expression in the world.

But at the same time Herder also maintained a universalist aspect alongside his relativism[241]. Throughout his works he constantly responds to inequality, and frequently passes biting ethical judgements on the practices of *all* cultures and societies. This is not just as a necessary part of his dialectical analysis where he both complements and critiques the cultures he examines, but also more widely because there are moral norms that Herder *does* believe are needs, or requirements, common to all humanity. Whether it be his analysis that "Rome began its career in heroism... and what were the consequences of their exertions? Ravage and destruction" (1784-91d, p.410) or that alongside Greek philosophy and nobility, and "quiet industry, simplicity and true friendship, steadfastness" it presided over the ill-treatment of "helots, pelasgians, colonies, foreigners, and enemies" (p.375), Herder's arguments were cross-cultural moral critiques, focused on "practices that lead to or result from a severe inequality of power between individuals and groups, where the well-being of those who are oppressed by this inequality are harmed" (Sikka 2011, p.18).

Freedom, equity, agency and capability are core critical angles that he uses in his cultural arguments. Whilst he does without question display what would now be considered sexist attitude towards women (and indeed racism towards other ethnicities), he also points out their unequal or unfair treatment, based on these same principles, and he uses the example of the treatment of women as a weather-vale to highlight inequality in different cultures. He also, more importantly, and in contrast to Kant, maintains that women *are* human, they *are* co-creators of culture and traditions, they *are* a part of a *volk*, they *are* a part of humanity, and they *are* able to contribute in and to the progression of *humanität*. They can do good, possess morality, and indeed should have access to books and education. Their learning environment should also not be one isolated from men and whilst he does say that women should *not* be taught philosophy, he makes this same point for men – because he makes a firm distinction between

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[241] Both Michael Morton (1989) and Sonia Sikka engage with this aspect directly and in some detail, but I restrict myself to Sikka here, as I return to Morton in section (4.3.3) to develop his arguments on unity and diversity.

philosophy and "healthy reason". The latter is something which all men and women can and should possess and express.

Herder does also conform to the widely held view that women should have their own focus of attention – the home and the hearth essentially - as well as implying that women are more connected to, and should be educated more, in the aesthetic areas. But what is most important is that Herder opposed and criticised anything that he perceived prevented or hindered this process of *bildung* as *humanität*, and thus the principles of freedom and agency and the opportunity to develop one's capabilities to reflect. Whilst he had clear blind spots (not just towards women, but also in comments he makes about Africans and other ethnicities), his overall principle was entirely inclusive of *all* humanity. All humans, no patter their culture, location, ethnicity or gender, have the capacity to cultivate and express their *humanität* and he was also, as Scrivener points out, far more inclusive than most of his contemporary scholars towards different ethnicities, genders, and ways of living.

4.2.4   The Volk

The existence of the idea of, and one's relationship with, a *volk* is in Herder's understanding a result of all of these linguistic, familial, and cultural interactions that connect together to form a common framing of themselves as a people-nation. It is formed by a sense of, and expressions by, those within the nation that they *are* a co-constitutive part of that nation and is as a result ongoing cultural processes of co-creation. Their common languages, multiple levels of cultural connections, as well as shared stories, mythologies, and (religious[242]) beliefs and practices all serve to connect the members of the nation to each other. The nation is co-constituted and its passage through time is conditional on those people who inherit in some way their membership in the nation desiring to be a part of that nation, and choosing to continue forwards together as a *volk*[243]. The nation in the Herderian sense *is* the *volk* - the people – not an aspect of or construction of a state, or defined by a bureaucracy. Nor should it be determined or given credence by those outside the state, although their impact on this self-belief has, given the interwoven nature of human existence he sets out, an impact.

Although it was possible for a nation to also be a state, the creation of a government

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[242]   Whilst religious beliefs are a large part of this, and of crucial importance from Herder's perspective, they are not the entirety of belief.

[243]   Herder uses the example of the Jewish nation to explain this (Barnard 2003, pp.17-37).

from the cultural experiences of the people of the nation, rather in a bureaucratic and mechanical state defined way would, according to Herder, produce a stronger sense of mutual inclusion and equality, as well as allowing a greater degree of cultural change through tradition, in addition to which, this informal expression of a collective relationship allows for a higher degree of individual individuality. This notion of the nation as a people, through culture and language as a process, does have related types of restrictions that a state or system would place on it though. This is because the government typically locates membership of the people through a state-determined (or influenced) shared cultural heritage which has historically been directly related to *blood ties* – we inherit membership through family and a biological connection. But there is no direct equivalence between blood and culture in the Herderian sense, because a shared cultural history does not require blood relations. What it requires is *time, location,* and *desire* – to essentially be formed, or at least to spend a good proportion of one's formative years[244], in the culture(s), to become a part of the culture(s). As a result *any* outsider, regardless of blood or relation, would not be a member of this *volk*, just as any person raised within the cultural area with a desire to be a part of that culture *would* be a member of the *volk*. This link to childhood[245] is crucial to Herder's concept because of the way in which language, family and cultures interact with and shape each other.

By this point though – because of the ongoing historical development of *volker* - Herder concludes that language is now less influenced by the geography or climate that a person is situated within than it is from "*internal* factors such as dispositions and attitudes arising from relations between families and nations. Conflict and mutual aversion, in particular" (1772a, p.167). Whilst language originally came from a 'natural' process, each child born into the family, their cultural experiences, and the *volk* all affect the remembrance of its past, the direction it travelled, and its future direction. Alongside this, attempts to codify, clarify, and produce greater precision in language led to an ongoing movement from a primarily organically cultivated language with a large degree of emotional expression, to a language more logically structured, but historically less nuanced.

Whereas before, in our historical past, *volk* were (in theory at least) often separated, and defined themselves in geographically distinct ways with only limited interaction

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[244] Given that Herder sees cultures arising through work-life practices like fishing, shepherding, or even professions like academia, as well as living experiences more broadly, this idea of formation might well be considered something one could 'work oneself into' should this also align with one's wider living experiences connecting to these professions (moving to a fishing village, becoming a sailor etc).

[245] i.e. one's formative years, spend as a co-constitutive member of the *volk.*

between them, their reconnection was driven primarily by trade, where the interplay was reversed. Here, different approaches to life interacted through, at least initially, the medium of "greed, and its consequence, economic imperialism" (Herder 1764, p. 157)[246]. Herder at this point raises issues of structural and economic inequality between different nations[247] that must be guarded against. The purpose of coming together was not to amalgamate into one culture or to assimilate, but instead for cultures to stand out in stronger relief to each other as they slowly developed along their own paths whilst sharing knowledge. Mutually influenced and connected, yet still distinct and 'unique'.

His concern here is not that change can or could occur – Herder "largely sees cultural interaction as a good thing" (Sikka 2011, p.7), but what he does have concerns with is the *nature* of that encounter, when enacted through asymmetric power dynamics. Economic imperialism is clearly one his main concerns[248], but he extends this more broadly to *any* unequal power relationship that allows one side to influence the other in an unbalanced way. One of the primary uses of his process of reflection was, according to Barnard, to induce a "concerted effort of nurturing a reciprocal sensitivity that would enable people to extend their capacity for experiencing the pain and humiliation of the deprived and marginalised in this world as if it were their own" (2003, p.12). This focus on their suffering and experiences of inequality and marginalisation is an essential aspect of Herder's works. It is the primary way by which his universalising aspects are expressed and engaged with: their relative lack of equality, freedom, and agency. It is also, from this sense of vulnerability, a way in which humans should come to terms with our imperfect nature, our ability to choose, and our common heritage as humans.

As well as this, through reflecting in such a way, it allows a mirror to be held up against one's understanding of the *volk* that they are a part of, against that of the *volk* they are reflecting on. This allows each *volk* to "gradually rub off their sides against each other, and at last there come into being some common endeavours of several peoples" (Herder 1793a, p.102). This process, crucially, comes from recognising marginalisation and inequality – pain, suffering, and humiliation – of the experiences of people, effectively, at the bottom. Only by recognising the negative dialectics that come about from expressing *humanität* can a *volk* progress and change in accordance with the process of *humanität.* Herder is not so much suggesting that nations will become like each other, but rather that the coarser elements which produce conflict and discord – the jagged

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[246] See also Morton (1989, p.54).
[247] Nations as a plural concept, not just multiple different nations.
[248] I explore this again in section (4.5.1).

edges - will be worn away through their interactions, both in our own minds, and the practices of our families, cultures and peoples in the living world through living. The *volker* learn from each other, and reach common understandings and crucially recognise desires that can be achieved together. There are essentially now multiple levels of co-constitution occurring at the same time, not just at the point of a 'physical' interaction, as one mirrors, oneself, and the interaction with the other are affected, but also from communities and *volker* interacting with each other. This suggests an image of pebbles on the beach slowly wearing each other smooth but still remaining distinct. Their distinctness is refined, clarified through the interaction, rather than the boulder of "economic imperialism" simply grinding down all the pebbles in its path to individualised motes of dust.

The interaction between different cultures and *volk* is, generally speaking both a good and necessary thing for Herder - and it *inevitably* comes with negative consequences. It is a dialectical relationship in which each grouping of people experience both gains and losses. So long as the losses and gains are relatively evenly balanced on both sides, and they come about from reflection in the process of *humanität*, then this, for Herder, is a part of a natural human dynamic. Unequal interactions though, such as was the case of Germany's sense of national inferiority and its fragmented political and cultural existence that led it to try to assume the 'nature' of France through the importation and attempted replacement of its cultural norms, created instead an artificial environment that was inauthentic for the people who experienced it. This also applied to his critique of European's interactions with the rest of the world, where these power dynamics were even more pronounced. The point of the *volk* was not to copy or impose its will on another, but to *learn* from an other, as the other learned from them about their own flawed expressions of humanity – with both *volk* altering in the process through shared cultural and intellectual experiences, knowledge and trade, and internal reflection. This counted not just for encounters with *volker* in the present, but also with encounters which continue through, and occur throughout, history. The point of this encounter was not to attempt to emulate a historical nation like the ancient Greeks, but rather to learn about what made them 'as themselves', and through this, to learn what makes us our selves, for one's self, one's cultural and familial experiences, and one's own *volker*.

The consequences of Herder's analysis of language, the family, cultures, *volk*, and the purpose of humanity, is that he concludes "we are born to create human happiness" (1775a, pp.330). But happiness was not a permanent state for him, to be reached in a

Kingdom of Ends as 'eternal contentment' from doing one's pure reason deduced duty, such as Kant suggested, rather it was the "simple, deep, irreplaceable feeling of existence" (Herder 1784-91 p.331, cited in Sikka 2011, p.57). *Being* is the experience of humanity – that irreducible and unique *a priori* that tells us we are alive - and *becoming* is the process of humanity. It is through this, as well as through the exercise of one's powers (Sikka 2011, p.76) that our happiness comes about. Again, reflection is the key to happiness because *being* is not an isolated internal self-awareness. It is a process that requires an engagement with ourselves and something else, whether that be in our own minds or in a physical way. He addresses this point in *Yet Another History* (1774a, b & c), in response to the question "Which Was the Happiest People in History?" where he concludes that "*each* people meet with such a moment, or there never was one" (1774a, p.185). Each culture *must* have its own intrinsic value and as a result "Each nation has its centre of happiness in itself" (1774b, p.297). Because humans are shaped by their familial, cultural, environmental and linguistic processes it is not possible to suggest that happiness can be a singular universally definable constant (1774b, p.296) and also, through this dialectical lens, he rejects the idea that the progress of history "must [invariably] lead towards greater virtue and individual happiness" (1774a, p.187). Happiness for Herder is a unique experience that occurs in the course of human life in *perpetual motion* rather than an end goal to exist within, in *perpetual peace* (Sikka 2011, pp. 44-83). Happiness, for Herder, is a unique experience. Just as language and culture slants the development of groups of humans in particular directions, so too is happiness coloured by them "for if human nature... is a flexible clay for... needs, and pressures... even the image of happiness changes with each condition and region[249] which, though, all shape themselves according to land, time, and place?" (1774b, p.296).

Herder's approach extended much further than simply acknowledging that happiness is relative to the individual and their cultures. He also asserted that "Each man has his own perspective, and consequently so has each assembly of even the most enlightened men. The perspective determines both the questions posed and the solutions proffered. *Hence they cannot but be biased*, and the public, society and posterity, as the umpires" (1780, p.240, my emphasis). Bias, for Herder, is *the* natural state of experience, not just for the individual[250] but at every level of human experience and interaction, whether that be in

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[249] This section is in brackets in the quote: "for what is this image ever but the sum of "satisfactions of wishes, achievements of purposes, and gentle overcoming of needs".

[250] Herder goes so far as to state outright that his own dedication to the priesthood was a direct result of these childhood prejudices; "From this also resulted my early dedication to holy orders. Beyond a

the living, or in their recording to posterity. It is this that provides his justification for asserting that we are all culturally situated and, even if our lives are not determined by, they are indelibly stamped by our relationship to our language, family, culture, and *volk*.

Since biases, and indeed prejudices, are natural to the human condition, they are as a result neither good nor bad in their own right[251]. Although he most often refers to them in a negative way, Herder does see times when they can be of benefit. Firstly, when there is conflict or disagreement, prejudices provide a cohering effect on a *volk* allowing them to "converge upon their centre, attach[ing] more firmly to their roots"[252]. Secondly, because prejudice, in relation to the negative dialectical aspect of western universalism stands *against* the "thousand evils [that occur] in their name" which promotes bloodthirstiness and avarice alongside its stance in favour of "liberty sociability and equality" that also atomises humanity into individuality absent culture (1774b, pp.219-20). Interestingly, this also suggests an innate and natural dialectical fracture point of *any* universalising tendencies or their expressions[253].

Once again, this is where the function of reflection comes in – to reveal those biases and prejudices for what they are, both in ourselves and our *volk* - particular ways of seeing and experiencing the world that are a (dialectical) function of living in the world. To attempt to resolve them, or at the very least when examining other cultures and peoples, it requires us to "lay aside our proud prejudices and consider the nature of this region with as much impartiality as if there were no other in the world"[254] Herder's approach is pluralistic here, but he also frames his analysis around inequality and unfreedom. When we connect this to the metaphorical closing of borders around a *volk*, and receding into the background the oppressions that results from asymmetrical power relations between different *volk*, this allows, at an intra-*volk* level, a community driven reflective practice that mirrors the idea of our unoppressed selves against the image of the *volk* that oppresses it. Just as it works for the individual, so too can it work for a *volk* community.

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doubt, local prejudices of my boyhood played a large part in this; but so, with equal certainty, did my impressions of church and altar" (1769c, p.69).

[251] Herder refers to prejudices in negative (1793a, p.103), positive (1774a, p.186), and neutral ways (1769c, p.71) in his works.

[252] I develop this aspect of Herders work in more detail in chapter five, where I connect Benhabib's concern with cultural identity fixing with Herder's own arguments.

[253] See also section (2.4) on James Ingram.

[254] Herder makes this statement in his *Ideas* (1787-91c, p.178) in the chapter on *The Nature of the African People* and continues "The [African], whom we consider a cursed son of Ham and the image of the fiend, has equal right to call his cruel despoilers albinos and white satans who so degenerated only because of a flaw of nature, just as several animal species living near the North Pole degenerated to whiteness". See also (1784-91d, p.148).

This section explored the inter-woven nature of Herder's analysis of language, family, culture and *volk*. It established that, for Herder, everything is incorporated into our cultural experiences, whether it be the language we speak, the cultural norms we incorporate into our way of living, or even how we perceive and experience happiness. Most crucially, is that this same claim allows him to establish what we would now consider structural bias as an inevitable dialectic of our situated living experiences.

4.2.5   History

Herder deviates sharply from his contemporaries when it comes to the idea of a linear progression of history to a utopian future, and this idea is one that he chides his contemporaries with, in the titling of his essay "*Yet Another* Philosophy of History, For the Enlightenment of Mankind: A Further Contribution *to the Many Contributions* of the Century" (1774a, my emphases). His view on history was an expansion of his view on language and culture – of the development, growth, and changing of humanity, of cultures and nations, in a multitude of forms and styles. Each formulation of humanity experiencing itself as it bursts into life, grows and decays, splits into parts. It incorporates new ideas, concepts and cultures before new variations in turn develop and decay, springing from and connecting to each other in a myriad of ways.

Herder entirely rejects the idea that scientific and intellectual progress, or legal developments, justify an assumption of moral progress, not least because the moral centre of a *volk* is a dialectic of both the good and the bad that produces its own particular prejudices. He also splits off scientific and moral progress from humans progressing through time in a historical sense, emphasising instead deliberate positive activity *towards* human progress, rather than assuming humanity is moving in an inevitably forward motion regardless of aim or purpose in the manner that Kant and others suggested. Human moral progress, in the individual, can only come about from experiences in the particular through reflection – and this is not reliant on any form of scientific or intellectual production. In the collective, this comes about from reflection on the interaction with other cultures and *volk* which might be *instigated* by imperial greed (Morton 1989, p.54), but need not occur only from this. Any encounter, with another *volk*, either directly with, or through a historical engagement, can trigger this.

He uses a number of different metaphorical constructs when discussing history[255], but

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255 For example, "We live in a world of appearances, where one phenomenon follows upon another and

the overall imagery suggests deliberate human progression is reminiscent of travel on a boat[256], tacking back and forth against the wind – with each tack producing dialectical aspects of both progress and regression. The wind, in this metaphor, could be composed of multiple actions and attitudes that work to stupefy or hinder humanity's predisposition to reflection, whether that be through unfair economic practices, racist attitudes, arrogant and aggressive nationalism, religious persecution, through a focus on teaching philosophy to children before they are 'ready' or by prioritising reason or universal norms over reflection and empathy. The metaphor of the boat struggling against the wind to advance also implies that we are all within the boat and we are all, whatever the gender or relative position in a community, actively involved in working towards its progression. External changes in the wind and currents, and internal struggles within the boat between different occupants, can and do cause the boat to change direction. This struggle, both within the boat and without, is an inevitability of humanity's movement through time and if considered from a moral perspective, requires the active involvement of all humanity to progress. But crucially, there is no fixed end point that can be known because progression always comes with regression. It is ultimately, in Herder's view, in the hands of God. Thus there is no pure direction or route that can avoid regression because it is outside the possibility of human knowledge[257].

As flawed, fallible beings, humans cannot know with absolute certainty which combination of which biases, perspectives and prejudices[258] will constitute a movement in a certain direction, because we cannot know how these ideas will spin off and be used by others to create new perceptions of the truth or the right, or be incorporated into political and cultural elements and artefacts. Herder's dialectical approach to cultures and history were designed to show that in each moral progression there is regression, whether it be in his assessment of the Romans, Greeks, Phoenicians or Egyptians historically or contemporaneously when he considers the Chinese, Indians, Arabs, Americans, Africans or Europeans, as a whole, or as individual nations. Each of these expressions of humanity in the particular produces their own 'goods' and 'bads'. This

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one moment is annihilated by the next; everything in the world is bound to the wings of time, and movement, change, activity, are the very soul of Nature" (1769a, p.97).
He also often makes use of the idea of a seed and tree, but also of the life-cycle of a human, and of fauna based metaphor and similes.

[256] This metaphor also functions analogously to critical approaches to cosmopolitan education. See Oakshot (1989, p.23, cited in Hansen 2011, p.93).

[257] "there [is] a great, divine plan for the whole human race which not a single creature can survey" (1774a, p.215).

[258] In their good, bad, *and* neutral expressions.

was also the case for his own era, where he argued that the European call for a universal understanding of humanity and brotherhood, justice and morality, had resulted in the oppression, enslavement and murder of entire peoples and the production of an arrogant cultural and racial elitism that was used to justice these actions and their own superiority. Rather than simply progression, there is, instead, "*line*[s] *of... progress* not as straight, nor as uniform, but as stretching in all directions, with all manner of turns and twists. Neither the asymptote, nor the ellipse, nor the cycloid can portray the course of nature" (1793a, p.101, his emphasis). For Herder, firstly, the purpose of life was being in the process of becoming. There could be no final conclusion to this journey, nor should there be, because then there would be no further change and becoming. Secondly, because everyone is unique not just in their individuality but in their multiple collectivities, no one location of being, created by humans, could ever accommodate all particularities. As a result, there can be no one true direction because experience, happiness, being, and thus progress, are always in the particular.

Just as there is no 'true' direction for the progress of moral humanity that we can determine in advance (because we cannot know what prejudices and inclination will contribute in what way to produce what dialectics) so is there no 'true' history which we can reflect on because these same prejudices and biases are a feature of our own analyses of history itself. Our own experiences and perspective, whether they be Hume's writings on (British) history or Plato's on statecraft and philosophy, each reflects their own prejudices in their approach to and understanding of history (1767b, p.29-30). Any attempt at a systematic understanding of history produced from a single perspective, whether that be an individual or *volk*, is inevitably a system *from that perspective*, reflecting *that* interpretation on history. This production of a system of history involves a second layer of judgment beyond what is 'fact' such that it is, according to Herder, the works of a "*creator*, *genius*, *painter*, and *artist* of history" (p.26, his emphasis) because the links between cause and effect have to be inferred "and the art of inference utilised is no longer history, but philosophy" (p.31). We discover philosophy by expressing our humanity *through our reflection*. When this is directed at history, it produces anthropology-that-is-philosophy.

Whilst Herder sees this production as essential, it carries with it its own dialectic because the more the system is extended, the more "an extensive string of events be tied together with reference to one purpose, within one scheme, including the correspondence of the parts, the danger is so much the greater that this system, shaped

according to the measure of one mind, will not be in every respect simple and clear history" (ibid.) What Herder is trying to suggest here, although somewhat cloudily[259], is firstly that data and inference, if they are not made distinct in the production of texts on history, lead the reader along that person's belief. Secondly, given Herder's previous arguments, this is ultimately unavoidable, given both the writer and reader's own particularities. Any products of 'history' "ought to be accepted as a self-examination to determine to what degree a reader, even in a history of art, has the twofold obligation to believe and to examine" (1767b, p.32). With the level of examination determined by the level of bias/inference which the writer makes clear is *their* bias/inference, and that which is unconsciously so.

But given all this, the point I raised previously concerning an underlying universalism of freedom, agency, and cultivation holds true here as well. Herder's own analysis of history is ultimately the beginning of an attempt to identify and indeed create a tentative *and flawed* system[260] by which to reflect on human nature, firstly through the collection of "data from the history of the ages; each will yield to me the picture of its own customs, usages, virtues and vices, and its own conception of happiness" (1769c, p.89). His focus here is on "the human soul and its manifestations on this earth; its strains and stresses, its hopes and satisfactions, its influence on a man's character" (ibid.) that contribute not just to the unique experiences of humanity through the ages, or the instances of genius expressing, or of power wielded by individual beings, but in the expressions of human collectivities as they live out their lives in their own quests for happiness.

The exploration of history is, as a result, a means to an *end*, which is the moral development of the individual and all groupings which they are connected to, through reflection as the expression of our humanity, just as *all* historical exploration, at all times are means to ends. Through the chain of humanity, we are therefore in this exploration both means and ends for ourselves, just as they were for all those who came

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[259] This may be a product of the translation.

[260] This comes out in his critique of Hume and other historians (1767b, pp.24-32). The flawed aspect is similar to Ingram's use of 'false universals' that he takes from Judith Butler (2.4). See Section (5.2.1). Herder continues this angle when he states that a number of questions need to be considered when approaching this: "What is human happiness? How far does it exist in this world? Considering the great difference of all the beings upon earth, and especially of man, how far is it to be found in every form of government, in every climate, in every change of circumstances, of age, and of the times? *Is there any standard of these various states?* And has Providence reckoned on the well-being of her creatures, in all these situations, as upon her ultimate and grand object? All these questions must be investigated, they must be unravelled through the wild whirl of ages and governments, *before a general result for mankind at large can be produced.* (1784-91d, p.xvi, my emphasis).

before, and will be for those who follow after us. But more than this, Herder's approach "aligns the history of the human race with the development of nature while subsuming both under the higher concepts of *bildung* and *humanität*" (Adler & Kopfe 2009, p.33). Exploring history is to become involved in this process through reflection, and thus has a *moral* component for Herder. In common with Kant, Herder held to the same idea of means and ends, but whereas Kant, because of his progressivism, sees people from the past as merely a means to an end, Herder's moral understanding of it identifies the past experiences and lives of people as both means and ends in their own rights.

4.2.6 Progress and Change

This exploration of the past allows for an understanding of the origins of *volk*, as well as the myths and religions of their times, but it also "brings to light about the most ancient history of the world, its migrations, languages, customs, inventions, and traditions, the more likely becomes, with every new discovery, *the single origin of the whole species*" (1774c, p.3). This revelation came about for Herder through identifying that every culture and *volk* had "*received seeds of culture, language, arts, and sciences from elsewhere*" (p.21, his emphasis)[261]. All of humanity's expressions, no matter how distant, are linked to each other because "*the whole chain of culture, derives from one common source*" (1772a, p.170, his emphasis). All human experiences, throughout history, are therefore something we can relate to, and thus we can learn from them. Through reflection, we can not only grasp ourselves and the other more clearly, we can also incorporate into ourselves those aspects which can contribute to our own process of being. This applies not just in the individual, or their family, but also to the *volk*, and ultimately, all of humanity.

But Herder also cautions that attempts to recreate that culture in one's own time, or to "dwell... in wistful dreams of foreign lands from whence they seek hope and salvation" was not the purpose of history, but would instead "reveal the first symptoms of disease, of flatulence of unhealthy opulence, of approaching death" (1774a, p.187). We can learn from the past, but we cannot recreate the past in the present and should not attempt to do so. Just as dwelling in the past or attempting to recreate it was problematic, so too was the universalisation of a particular experience, or attempting to project that across space

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[261] In this particular case his analysis also revealed that "the Greeks received all this as if they never had [received it], that they endowed it with an entirely new nature, that in every way the "beautiful" in the truest sense of the word was most certainly their work". This claiming into oneself of past cultural creations was for Herder a crucial part of the organic development of a people.

and time. This was something Herder felt his own age was particularly responsible for when he suggests that "the general, philosophical, philanthropical tone of our century wishes to extend 'our own ideal' of virtue and happiness to each distant nation, to even the remotest age in history" (1774a, p.187). This was true not just for morality or 'virtue', but also on the aesthetic level, which was equally problematic because "Nothing is more dangerous than transforming a delicacy of our taste into a universal principle and making it into a law; one good aspect thereby results in ten precarious ones." (1769a, p.98). No matter the norm, whether it be morality, progress, reason[262], taste, or beauty, attempting to universalise them is *always* problematic. Even if something good could come from it, much more would be "precarious". At the same time the *process* of developing understanding, through reflection, was for Herder universal, even if all of the empirical elements (including the body-mind), would always be unique.

His view of human progress was one in which he rejected the idea of previous generations and cultures existing merely to serve as platforms for latter generations to build upon. He instead placed intrinsic value on all cultures and communities that had existed in past and present ages as unique expressions of humanity. Herder argued in sharp contrast to Kant that, when we consider the universal, and the people within it, "Is not everything a means to a million ends? Is not everything an end for a million means?" (1774a, p.214). Each and every culture is both a means and an end in its own right (p.194), and so cannot exist merely for its own purpose or for another wave that follows afterwards. Rather, humanity is connected in their individuality, and their collectivities, as expressions in a chain "twisted and tangled a thousand times... each link in the chain has its own place... but it [is] unaware of the end to which the chain finally attaches... everyone is under the illusion that he himself is the centre, is sensitive to everything around him only so far as... it directs its rays or its waves towards this centre (1774a, pp.215-6). Every person, and every people, are the centre of their own universe, just as each people find their own centre of happiness and so their own ends. But they are also at the same time a part of everyone else's universe, at different points on a chain that extends throughout history into the past, and into an unknowable future.

For Herder, human existence at all levels is a part of the process of progress and change, whether that be in language, family, culture or *volk*, or in history. The point of reflection, or of the "reflexive mind" is that it "governs the succession of ideas, it

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[262] He argues instead that "Universal human reason, as we would like to understand the term, is a cover for our favourite whims, idolatry, blindness, and laziness" (1778, p.223).

operates even in his most sensual states... it is an essential trait of the human mind, to learn nothing for one moment only, but to connect everything with what it already knew, or to store it up for future associations" (1772a, p.156). We are in a constant state of trying to fit what we learn to what we already think we know, as a cumulative process of growth and change, rather than by instigating abrupt and radical changes (either through the external revolution of a state, or the internal revolution of our sense of self) in what and how we know the world. Essentially, our current being as becoming is a growth from our previous being as becoming which (should) have come about through reflection. As a result, we are "always in the state of development, of progress, of becoming" (ibid.). This becoming is one that needs, in Herder's view, to occur based on his underlying universal moral goods of freedom, agency, cultivation, through situated experience. Ultimately, change is the primary state of human existence at all levels, but change as a consequence of reflection was the purpose of *humanität*.

As a result, change should always come from below, because only from below would it be an expression of an individual's agency and freedom, but change was also always dependent on their cultivation, and thus their experiences and perspective as members of multiple groupings. It has to come from the individuals contributing, developing, growing and changing their *volk* in an organic way through their own reflection, just as an individual's perception of an experience of a volk is changed by their membership of a *volk* that each individual impacts on it through the progress of tradition. At the same time that individual, and all individuals involved in these processes, continued a feedback mechanism by which their culture(s) organically changed over time.

Part of the issue that Herder had with the idea of European progress, and especially the writings by many of the philosophers of his time like Kant or Fichte on the idea of progress more generally, was not just that they assumed progress, or promoted their own version of virtue universally, but that their own versions were overwhelming in the promotion of a scientific, rational, mechanical system that relied on a Westphalian state system. This for Herder would inevitably lead to the *deformation* of the cultures and *volker* they encountered, and indeed of the European nations, not only because the encounter was inevitably negative for the non-European culture, but because their emphasis of only one aspect of the mind – reason and rational thinking – unbalanced the progress of human existence and experiences for all involved (Gjestal 2017, p.177). I made the point in section (4.2.1) concerning language, and how it developed from

common emotional expressions that, if reason was used to re-organise it would lead to an emotional distancing of the people who use it from the expression of their emotions through language, and this applies here too. The overemphasis of reason, instead of emotion-reason as one, as well as the ongoing mechanistic reconstruction of western societies, which justified at least in part the idea of a linear progression, also produced the same problems. The hindering of organic growth and change that for Herder is an essential part of our humanity.

This is not to say that Herder believed reason was not an essential part of progress and change, nor is this to say that Herder saw all cultures in an absolutely equal way. He gave the development of reason a place of importance in the development of language and history, just as he placed Europe at the top of this development - just as he placed Indians at the top of their development of the *feeling* of humanity. Herder's issue was the primacy that Europe gave to reason, not that it wasn't important or indeed fundamental to any attempt at progress and change. Reflection, after all, is the key process that he relies on. *Bildung*, needs reason to work. His critique of Europe was driven by his identification and rejection of the arrogance and superiority of the European based on their privileging of the development of reason and not his rejection *in toto* of the European. In *Yet Another Philosophy of History*, as elsewhere in his works, he levels attack after attack on a Janus-faced European attitude:

> "Ideas of universal love for humanity, for all nations, and even enemies, are exulted, whilst warm feelings of family and friendship are allowed to decay. Principles of liberty, honour and virtue are commonplace; they are loudly acknowledged... whilst at the same time lying in chains of cowardice, shame, servility and miserable desultoriness.... Is this then the ideal state into which we are being fashioned, to which all Europe... increasingly aspires?" (Herder 1792, p.200)

This critique, perhaps more than any other, presents most clearly his rejection of a 'Kantian Cosmopolitanism' based on an ongoing universalisation according to overarching concepts, and aligned him much more closely to the kind of cosmopolitan ideals represented by Christof Wieland and Georg Forster (even though he disagreed with them in a number of other areas). He describes the actions and attitudes of Europe towards the rest of the world and themselves as one where reason was deliberately split off and placed in opposition to the sensate self, which was itself best represented for him by the works of Kant.

This oppositional nature, rather than a move to a more active striving for their balanced harmony, prevented a more educated and technologically advanced Europe from experiencing *humanität* as a process of *bildung*. It prevented them from acting with emotional kindness and respect; essentially, of expressing their *humanität*. Instead, it relied on a Kantian post-rationalised duty, stripped of emotional character or, as was far more often the case, it moved straight to forcing the rest of the world to endure blatant condescension, imperialism, colonisation, exploitation, slavery and repeated acts of cultural and ethnic genocide. Herder deduced that Europe's philosophical prioritising of reason, which led to their determination of what it meant to be human, and from there to the development of a racial hierarchy and the subsequent exclusion or only limited acceptance of non-white people, was the underlying source of such atrocities.

> The existence of each human being is woven together with his whole species. If our concepts concerning our destiny are not pure, what is the point of this or that small improvement? Do you not see that this sick person lies in infected air? – save him from out of it and he will get better automatically. In the case of radical evil, attack the roots; they bear the tree with its top and twigs. (1793-7c, pp.422)

Whilst Europe might appear to some that it was ahead of all others, this meant nothing more or less than it was just one of a multitude of waves. Whether it was at the peak, ascending, descending, or in the trough, peaks and valleys which occurred in other times and places, humanity's moral progress was by no means assured "a quiet progress of the human spirit towards the improvement of the world". The assumption of this was "hardly anything more than a phantom of our minds" (Herder 1774a, pp.187&195). This rejection of the primacy of reason was driven by his belief that humans and his vision of *humanität* was of humans in touch and balanced by their sensate-reasoning selves. Europe's actions and the path they were following was, by Herder's own measure, *inhuman* because it actively did harm to the rest of humanity, and hindered their own opportunities to progress and change as holistic beings (1793a, p.100). Kant, Fichte, Condorcet and others, in their presentation of history as moral progression, suggested that the history of humanity could be characterised as having passed through specific ages, or stages of human development, something which Herder explicitly repudiated. Their reason for doing so was to unquestionably situate the peak of that progress in Europe (Kant 1784; Condorcet 1795; Fichte 1804-5 (1847) etc.[263]) and their

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[263] Kant and Fichte, as well as Voltaire and Weiland, all located the peak of this moral progress in their own professions, and by extension in themselves. Herder's response to this was that "the philosopher

focus on human progress was directly equivalent to what Herder refers to as a "dry and cold reason" (1774a, p.276).

Herder also had sharp words to say concerning Kant's incorporation of selfishness by Providence for moral progress (Kant 1795, pp.108 & 124). Selfishness was not, nor should it ever be, a positive element. Scientific progress, trade and commerce *did not* equate to moral progress and his response to this was characteristically biting:

> "Who is there who would not shudder at this misanthropic impudence? To be sure, we are, even in our stupidities and deeds of vice, tools in the hands of Providence – however, not to our credit, but perhaps precisely in order that; through a restless and hellish activity; poor amidst the greatest wealth; tortured by desires; enervated by luxurious sloth - we might die in a nauseating and slow way from this stolen poison.... if no other path than this can the nations experience salvation and solace, should one not here feel most painfully sorry for *our whole species?* (1793-7c, pp.382-3, my re-translation, his emphasis).

Herder and Kant's respective approaches to progress and change can be summed up quite simply here. Kant asks, in his essay *An Answer to the Question, what is Enlightenment* (1784a) "If it now asked whether we at present live in an *enlightened* age, the answer is: No, but we do live in an age of *enlightenment*" (p.58, his emphasis). For Kant, an Enlightened Age is the end goal of his system[264]. The Age of Enlightenment is the period of movement towards that goal. Hence the question assumes the point is the final Age state, not a process, and represents his final era of Perpetual Peace within his Kingdom of Ends. For Herder, by contrast, there could be no end goal due to the dialectical nature of humans and cultures, where both advancement and regression are bound in to each other. There could never be such an age, but there could be an ongoing Age of Enlightenment, where all humans are able to actively engage in a process of becoming through being.

4.2.7   Unity and Diversity

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is never more of an ass than when he most confidently wishes to play god; when with remarkable assurance, he pronounces on the perfection of the world, wholly convinced that everything moves just so... that each generation reaches perfection in a completely linear progression, according to his ideals of virtue and happiness. It so happens that he is always the *ration ultima*, the last, the highest, link in the chain of being" (1774a, p.214).

[264] Although Kant also acknowledges that humanity may well never get there, the end goal is *known* and the purpose is to strive for this end state. The age of enlightenment is the refining of the process by which to reach his Kingdom of Ends.

Leading on from my exploration of Herder's position on history, and progress and change, is his idea of unity *as* diversity and more generally in response to the philosophical problem of 'The One and the Many'[265]. So far the focus of this chapter has been on emphasising change, under the understanding that difference is the primary point of experiencing being, and through the process of being, happiness is experienced. In this, I have identified Herder's emphasis on this reflection process producing greater relief between the self and the other, not just in an individual sense, but also more widely in terms of culture, *volk* and language.

Reflection's purpose for Herder was to "extend... one's capacity for experience, beyond the structures given in one's native situation – not merely quantitative but qualitative[266]" (Morton 1989, p.18), but as Morton goes on to point out, Herder has a concern that it is possible to get lost in this process, losing one's sense of self in the constant, ongoing encounters with the other. Morton suggests thinking of it through the metaphor of the wave/particle duality of light, which incorporates both elements, but expresses only one at a time, as a particle, as ourself, as a wave as a part of a unity, which maps onto the idea of the One and the Many. Essentially, light is/are wavicle; always both singular and many *at the same time*, although the perspective we examine light from determines whether we see it as one or many. To be subsumed through reflection means to become one *of* the many, but only from the loss of the dual positionality as the One *and* the Many. Diversity is lost as a result and this is Herder's main concern that he engages with in his dual use of discursive and gestural writing in his leaves, fragments and groves, as well as being the main method by which he considered language in his essay *On Diligence in Several Learned Languages* (1764)[267].

Herder's emphasis on the necessary uniqueness of each and every individual is at the heart of the issue of what is traditionally thought of as the opposing forces of diversity and unity. To incorporate them as he did required a conceptual shift so that instead of

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[265] Unity and Diversity in Herder's works is the topic of Michael Morton's book (1989), and I draw heavily from him in this section.

[266] It is this qualitative aspect that require more than simply an enlargement of thought.

[267] This dynamic also occurs not just in the consideration of the origin of language, but also from an engagement with literature as the *belle lettres*. Through reflection, we can "cultivate and mould [ourselves, and] ...walk among statues as in a world of original ideas of beauty rendered sensuous: that shall be your first academy." from this, we can therefore:
"Behold: multiplicity on a single ground, in a single continuum, in a single patch of light and shadow. So here you shall study the concept of unity and diversity as ordinance, as juxtaposition and composition. Here you will find these concepts smooth and perfect, in the whole and in its effect, in its groups and figures, arrangements and contrasts, light and colors; everywhere there is one fable and one world of visible diversity and unity" (1769b, p.288).
"How beautiful the human soul thereby becomes! Unity in its foundation, thousandfold diversity in its development, perfection in the totality!"(1769b, p.198).

thinking of them as an "antinomy between the ideas of cultural and individual autonomy on the one hand and development and realisation of universal humanity on the other", we should conceive and resolve them "through their reinterpretation... in terms of history[268]" (Morton 1989, p.11). This reinterpretation, for Herder, requires us to proceed through *language* which is to say that reflection is the process, language is the medium through which thought *passes*, and the history of language and thus culture and humanity is the setting that is used to resolve this seeming contradiction. Through this method, which he re-presents in his style of writing not just in *On Diligence* but elsewhere[269], his interpretation of humanity and nations, and his analysis of thought and language are, as Morton puts it "The genuine equilibrium between the One and Many [which] can be sustained only if the uniquely individual character of each of the elements of the Many is developed in a way that appears to render impossible their ultimate assimilation into a single all-embracing One" (p.43). This 'uniquely individual' person is the ultimate purpose of Herder's approach to education. The balance between the Many and the One can *only* be maintained if education is directed towards the cultivation of individuality over conformity, through reflection in a situated existence.

This starts at the very beginning of his understanding of a child's life because "The human being's soul, is by nature, unique, and from the youngest age a person has already developed a sense of self, a concept of the other, can distinguish between sameness and difference, has an understanding of figure, form, magnitude and distance, grasps the concept of past and present time, of the *one* and the *more-than-one,* and judgement" (1769b, pp.195); all before a single word has been spoken. Indeed Herder presents the accomplishment of the child as far in excess of all the abstractions that the philosopher could create. This process of sensation and experience, reflection, interpretation and judgement relies on both the sensate and rational working together, such that:

> "With repeated, identical sensations the infant forms his first judgement: that
> they are the same sensation. This judgement is obscure and must be so, for it
> shall endure for a lifetime and remain a permanent basis in the soul. It must
> therefore have the strength and consistency, as it were, of an inner feeling; and
> so it is preserved as sensation. In the manner of its origin it was already a

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[268] Morton notes that Hegel, following Herder, achieves this shift "at the expense of history" rather than *through* history (p.11). Herder's system is open ended (from a human perspective), whereas Hegel's is closed (p.143). Marx's works, by contrast, are a project that attempts to close the circle.

[269] For example *Fragments* (1767c) and *Yet Another* (1774a, b & c). The dialectical aspects are generally speaking more pronounced in his earlier works, but evident throughout.

judgement, a result of combining several concepts; but because the judgement emerged through habit, and the habit of immediately applying that judgement preserved it, the form of its origin grew obscure and only the content remained; it became sensation" (p.194)

The first part of this interpretation of the development of a child is that experiences – sensations - are necessary to trigger this cycle and Herder's development on education that I examine in more detail in section (4.3.1) follow this principle. The most important task is to harness the child's innate curiosity and enthusiasm, to help to induce deep emotional experiences of a positive nature that connected to the child through *all* of their senses and which stay with the person all their life, acting as a well-spring from which they could reconnect to earlier memories of happiness. The secondary aspect to this was that this process would help to train, through experiencing and then reflecting, the child's understanding of their own emotions and sensations. It was only as the child grew, only after the child had that developed somewhat, that a more formalised ability to reason was to be gradually developed.

To hold on to one's own perspective, with all its partiality, whilst enlarging one's own mind to grasp the differences and similarities between the two experiences, to attempt to construct in one's mind the thought processes of the individual writing the texts, all whilst in addition stepping away from both perspectives to attempt a neutral stance. Only then, in Herder's view, is it possible to make the imaginative leap necessary to encounter a writer in a 'true' way that grasps the spirit of their essence and particularity, as the mind makes leaps that connect both the rational and the emotional, whilst embedded in the writings of the author. This "living reading" is, for Herder, "the only reading, and the deepest means of education" (1778, p.218) and is the main path by which empathy can be developed. This process has three aspects: mental enlargement of one's own perspective to try to fit the other's view and ideas into it; stepping outside in an attempt to take an objective view of both the other and one's self; and trying to intuitively 'feel through to the other' to grasp the author's 'essence of being'.

Herder's response to The One and The Many predated Kant's own solution in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. Tellingly though, because Herder's conclusion is linked to the cultural and historical specificity of language and the uniqueness of each individual's thoughts and experiences, the answer in this framing is always different (Morton 1989,

pp.171-2), and thus requires a never-ending multiplicity of experiences to give life to each individual person's response to their own dialectical becoming. It is this necessary multiplicity of difference that gives rise to the importance of change, creation, growth and decay, whether it be the development of the mind or the body, cultures, communities and societies, or of humanity. His theory of humans was as sensing beings (Herder 1778, pp.187-243) inculcated into a culture through rearing and language, and so both given agency and opportunity, and inevitably constrained. At once of individuality as One-of-Many, and yet also of humanity as One: encapsulated in the "twin themes of *particularism* and *cosmopolitanism*" (Morton 1989, p.18). But crucially reinterpreting this idea of cosmopolitanism not as "an empty formula" (Barnard 2003, p.40) of rationality, but instead "mediated by a cultural framework" that rejects the idea of the entirely self-made and atomised individual (Gjestal 2017, p.184).

Part 3: Humanity as Project

"Education must lead the individual to express himself, for in this expression of himself he was to realize his nature and destiny" (Andress 1916, p.137-8)

Part two of this chapter explored *humanität* as process, and established the interwoven nature of Herder's view of humanity, where change is the primary 'state' of this existence, and our natures are unique, yet indelibly influenced by our familial, cultural, historically situated perspective, and our self-determined *volk* identity through language. Each human is unique, and in possession of the capacity for *Besonnheit* – reflexivity – which when engaged with through *humanität* as process, is *bildung*.

From this, the passive feeling of sympathy that we might have for another is transformed through *bildung* into *Einfuhlungsvermogen* – empathy – which allows us to feel our way into the *being* of another, as well as grasp ourself more closely and clearly. The result of this ongoing process of *humanität* is the original meaning of empathy, which carries with it a moral drive to both *express* our humanity, and *act* upon the knowledge we gain from this multi-factored, multi-layered process. How we act, if it is in accordance with *humanität*, is on one hand to cultivate ourselves. Yet at the same time to make use of, and contribute to tradition as the vehicle of our situated heritage by expressing our *humanität* – as a process of becoming. To facilitate the opportunities to develop, and express this capacity for others, so that they too can act in accordance with *humanität* in process. These cultural and *volk* processes require, for Herder, an educational-political project – *humanität* as project - to develop *volker*-driven

governments that would best facilitate an individual's capability to, and opportunities for, the situated activity of *bildung*.

Part three firstly considers the practical aspects of Herder's writings on education before elaborating on the three stages of human development during the schooling period (as child, boy/girl, and youth). In (4.3.1) I go on to examine some of the elements that constitute Herder's development of education in the schools he managed. I touch on his ideas on teaching language, religion and history. Because of the importance that language and literature has in Herder's process of *Besonnheit*, I discuss his *belle lettres* (4.3.2); what constitutes them, as well as some of the implications that arise from their use. This then leads to discussing particular aspects of his critique of philosophy, philosophers, and the university (4.3.3).

Section (4.3.4) explores the purpose and reasons behind some of the practical implications of government and the sciences that are explored at universities, as well as his views on commerce's influence on the expression of our *humanität.* Free speech is also a feature of this section before I move to an inter-*volk* and inter-state level (4.3.5). I finally play off Herder's dispositions against Kant's propositions, and examine his idea of patriotism before touching on his critique of colonialism.

4.3   Education

As with much of Herder's works, his educational-political project is diffusely spread across a number of the texts (both published by him, or made available some time after his death), in contrast to other political and philosophical theorists from the Enlightenment period who produced and published works that specifically addressed this issue. Rousseau, for example, provided us with *Emile* (1762), Pestallozi wrote *How Gertrude Teaches Her Children* (1801) and even though somewhat flawed[270], we have Kant's *Lectures on Pedagogy* (1803). All of these texts are widely known and have experienced a wealth of critical examination in a variety of languages, across a number of different disciplines (Although Pestallozi's has been for the most part restricted to the history of education). Herder's writings on education were eventually compiled and published as volume thirty of Suphan's *Sammtliche Werke* in the late 18th century. They feature written addresses to his pupils and staff, details of his ongoing struggles to increase his teacher's pay, to provide them with bursaries to purchase additional books,

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[270] (Louden 2007/2013, pp.434-436)

as well as his attempts to develop vocational schools for the poor and the orphaned, as well as expanding the resources available to the schools in Weimar that he was responsible for, in addition to writing children's text books. The most recently publish book that directly engaged with Herder's texts on education was J. Mace Andress' *Johann Gottfried Herder as an Educator* (1916). Andress notes that Herder "concerned himself personally with courses of study, methods of teaching, the training of teachers, better school equipment, better libraries, the specific aim of various studies, etc. The reform of the Weimar gymnasium was probably his greatest piece of school reorganization" (p.4). Andress' book also contains his expositions on, and translations of, a significant number of passages and texts from this Suphan book, and as a result, I draw on this book to a significant degree in sections (4.3.1) and (4.3.2). Yet at the same time, the translation issues that I discussed in section (4.1.2) also applies here, so they are supplemented by, or in some cases rejected[271], in favour of his other, more recently and more accurately translated texts that touch on education.

Given the profound level of importance that Herder placed on change, cultivation, the process of living, and the interwoven nature of existence, it should come as little surprise that this determined not just the need for a mostly passive and flexible institutional system for the *volk*, to allow for the growth and change of a people over time, but that this system should serve the people and not rule or order them. His educational project was also both designed to be active in the cultivation of the reflective capabilities of the pupils, in service to *humanität* as process, whilst resistant to specific cultural moral norms. In Herder's view, we receive from and co-create with our families, communities and *volk* the basics of language, morality, culture and tradition. The school serves to actively encourage and balance the development of reflection, and contributes knowledge which helps both understanding, and practical skills for the pupil throughout their life.

Herder's approach to education relied on his understanding of humans as physical and situated beings, who gradually develop over time, as well as basing his understanding of the way to proceed in education on a physiological and psychological understanding of the human body and mind. From this understanding, Herder suggested that humans experience a layering effect of identity and knowledge as the mind and body grows and develops from childhood to maturity. This led him to conclude that the human body also

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[271] Andress makes a number of translation assumptions similar to Church (1800) in *Ideas.* For example *Kultur* is translated as civilisation, rather than culture (e.g. Andress 1916, pp.196 & 214).

develops in stages, and its capabilities, both physical and mental, followed this pattern (1769c, p.77). The opportunity to easily learn, and the best time to establish a strong, moral, situated and individual identity was at the beginning of a life where love, curiosity, activity and discovery would drive this process. As a result, the Kantian idea of a personal revolution of the self during late adulthood, where a person can suddenly, through an internal revolution, become a morally acting being was for Herder to fundamentally misunderstand both the psychology and physiology of humans, as well as the profound impact that situated living exerts on humans both individually and collectively. The kind of approach that Kant exemplified[272] was considered by him both unrealistic and unlikely to be successful. Herder's approach was instead designed to promote for as long as possible an environment that would delay the inevitable "*ageing of the human soul*" (p.70, his emphasis) but this approach was to be determined by empirical observations, not a universal norm produced from abstract philosophy.

This first stage of human existence is characterised by curiosity and "active unrest" (Andress 1916, p.142) which requires the use and cultivation of *all* of the senses (Herder 1769c, pp.80 & 83). The purpose of this is to allow each child to "act of himself and according to his own motive, which is curiosity", and experience "diverse, tangible and vivid sensations perceived in the most uniquely individual manner" which would help to "produce original men" (p.83). This must be led and guided, but in a relatively passive way, without imparting one's own prejudices or biases on the child, but also serving to avoid "foreign motives" like vanity (p.82). This process makes the individual the creator of their own understandings, and because these experiences engage all the senses, it occurs in a holistic manner. To permanently, or for a long period, deny a child the opportunity to "exercise one's faculties" (ibid.) – something that is evident and necessary in Kant's perception of the need for the disciplining of a child (See section 3.5.1) - would lead to a fundamental and irrevocable loss of the ability to use those senses to their fullest extent (p.80), something that can momentarily occur if a child is forced into "long periods of abstract thought" (ibid.)[273].

But Herder also acknowledged that there were both positive and negative effects to his approach. On the one hand, the more potent these experiences are stored in one's

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[272] See sections (3.5) and (3.6).

[273] Given Herder's frequent comments throughout his writings about "grammarians" who force their pupils to endure long hours of learning on abstract thoughts – and of how he believed that having to endure this himself had permanently harmed his ability to express and experience in a holistic manner, it is unsurprising that he would take this stance.

memory and 'soul' the longer they will endure, but on the other hand the more we recall specific experiences the more their recollection becomes a habit, which slowly hardens over time (p.86). This process could be slowed down though if the child had more, and more varied, opportunities for the ongoing stimulation of their senses, driven by their natural curiosity. The overall purpose of this relatively free period of exploration, discovery and sensate experiences is to establish in the child the understanding of themselves as creators of their own knowledge and even more importantly of their own understanding. Learning for the child would then, in Herder's belief[274], spring from curiosity and "become a pleasurable activity, a joy, a delight" (p.81). Herder even goes so far as to suggest that "everyone should really invent their own language, understand the idea underlying each word as if he had discovered it himself" (ibid), replicating his own arguments in *On Diligence* on the origin of language and the process of choice and freedom through reflection.

Herder's second stage is adulthood, where "the strong sallies of his imagination are stifled; he learns to adapt himself to the ways of others, and at the same time to distinguish himself from themselves" (1769c, p.78). The mind gradually "becomes closed" (p.85) and at this point, according to Herder, the person finds it easier to apply the ideas, techniques and experiences that had formed whilst young rather than their creation. Encounters with the different become more and more difficult to process and incorporate into oneself and there is a marked tendency to revert to what we already know and believe. This stage is, according to Herder, the time when a person "can be a true philosopher of action, of wisdom and experienced" (p.78).

The third and final stage was old age, where "The old man is a prater and a philosopher of words... this is the age of rest... the mind is scarcely open to new impressions any more and little disposed to new experiences" (p.78-79). One thing that can be clearly seen from this is a direct contrast between Kant's perspective and his own. Whereas Kant imbues this third stage with gravitas and moral right, Herder sees this as the least active part of one's ongoing cultivation. Since *humanität* in the individual is a process and activity of cultivation, old age is when humanity for the most part reverts back to earlier expressions. Part of the purpose for the wide range of experiences he encouraged for the child was to delay the onset of this phase because of its tendency to delay the progress of tradition. At its worst it would be a hindrance to, or even rejection of, the

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[274] Herder had not yet, at the time of writing, had more than a few years of teaching experience, and the teaching he had given was at a lower social level, with less ability to influence teaching practices.

need to perceive tradition as a process of change through time.

This understanding of human nature, and the purpose of education within a situated setting, also carries with it the reality for Herder that "tendencies or talents slumbering in the heart therefore, may never become actual accomplishments" (1774a, p.184). With every step along the path of a human's life, choice and the freedom to choose collapse alternate paths of opportunity, and shift and change the ways we develop as humans. Each choice is both agency and denial but by basing it to a large extent on the pupils themselves, as they grow up, Herder establishes a sense of freedom, choice, agency, individuality and personal responsibility for one's own choices in this approach to education. The attempt by the teacher in the school to avoid overt bias, and to try to prevent attitudes like vanity from appearing, minimise overt cultural influences and the number of paths collapsed. Yet at the same time the first teaching occurs in the home by the parents who establish "*the formation of a kinship mode of thought* by virtue of the manner in which education is first transmitted... *the development of language* which constitutes the medium of this transmission... is [also] intimately bound up with the spiritual heritage of the family, since it is through the language of the parents that a given mode of thinking is perpetuated" (1772a, p.163).

The way we think and the paths we follow are as a result not something we have total control over, because our individuality is constrained; "although admittedly... it *is* the deepest self *in us*, [we are] not as autonomous, voluntarily choosing, and unbound as is believed." (1778, p.212). Our reasoning is always already partial because it develops in a particular setting. Reflection guided by *humanität* provides a way for an individual to recognise this partiality at the same time affirming one's individuality by acknowledging that "[t]he more deeply someone has climbed down into himself, into the structure and origin of his noblest thoughts, then the more he will cover his eyes and feet and say: "What I am, I have become. I have grown like a tree; the seed was there, but air, earth, and all the elements, which I did not deposit about myself, had to contribute in order to form the seed, the fruit, the tree."" (pp.213-4). Extending this metaphor further, incorporating *bildung*, the tree also affects the air, earth and elements, shaping in turn that which shaped it, affecting the plants around it because no tree grows in isolation.

The difference between a tree and a person, though, is that a tree has a 'natural' instinct, but a person, in Herder's view, is characterised by the *freedom* to choose – to affect their

own cultivation. Even if they have no choice over the seed's constitution, and they do not have complete authority over the air, earth and elements, they still have influence. Herder's holism – of the total development of all aspects of the tree - and his arguments that each person, each culture, each community and each *volk* has its own inherent worth, as well as his arguments against asymmetric power dynamics, lead him to the conclusion that cultivating the capability of reflection is the best way that the person can express the "worth and beauty of free human nature" (Herder, cited in Andress 1916, p.122). This allows the individual to see both the necessity of partiality and situated living and to make choices from that awareness - and to become, if they chose, "a *nobler*, *freer* soul by his own exertions" (ibid, p.124).

But Herder was also responding to a wider belief that education should be primarily concerned with "good knowledge of the exact sciences, instruction, enlightenment, clarification and the polishing of manners" (1774a, p.204) – reminiscent of the kind of approach to education that Kant favoured. From Herder's perspective, this approach did not have the capacity to "change or develop dispositions", nor was the current direction of Germany, or the Enlightenment more generally, interested in "restoring or creating afresh the attitudes... whereby alone it is possible to build a 'better world'" (ibid.). To achieve this better world required, in Herder's view, an emotional-rational education because humans are more likely to be swayed and moved by emotional appeals to our sensibilities than by logic or reason. Without an education in sensation and 'taste', we are less able to experience our lives in a holistic way that incorporates both aspects as one, and vulnerable to emotional influence. Pupils, as a consequence, needs to have instilled in them "the gentle feeling of the beautiful and the good accompanied by reason and choice" (1775a, p.331). From this, if "reason... joins with inclination and habit to form a universal taste of life... that is... education" (p.332) a harmony of all the pupil's "powers" allows us to be active in our education so that we can cultivate ourselves rather than simply being formed by others.

4.3.1 Schooling

Herder's writings on schooling were in response to three main aspects of education. Firstly, the existing schooling of his time, where he recognised problems and positive developments in the formal teaching dynamic between teacher and pupil, the systematisation of the knowledges that were being taught, and the contents of the topics themselves. Secondly, he addressed what he felt needed to change, and in what ways, to

promote the capacity of, and opportunities for, *bildung* on a practical level. Finally, he explored what would be the ideal way of continuing this transitional period into a process of ongoing development and change.

The existing schooling situation was a mostly static and one-sided determination of particular types of knowledge deemed appropriate by special interests (mostly clerical and aristocratic) that funded the schools, and the teachers taught *at* the passive student. They focussed on learning Latin (religion and history) and French (literature and science), neglected the German language, and this education came with a yearning for 'never existing, better pasts'. It also involved, in Herder's view, high levels of abstraction and advanced levels of knowledge that were for the most part useless or incomprehensible to the pupil. These schools were "a dusty prison into which the children are driven as young cattle into a dark cave only to break joyfully away from it as soon as escape is possible" (Herder, cited in Andress 1916, p.121). This involved among other things an overworked teaching staff, limited resources, a large amount of rote learning, abstract and complex topics that had little relevance to the majority of the pupils, very large classes where the students were treated as a mass rather than individuals, and a high drop-out rate between the stages of schooling.

These schools were designed primarily for those who aspired to be scholars themselves, which made them for the most part useless to the working people – and effectively removed all the working people from further or advanced levels of education due to their lack of relevance. The working classes, from Herder's perspective, needed not just better education in the subjects they were taught, but also additional education in practical subjects through the establishment of 'industrial schools' for those who made their living in the "manual arts". What was also required though, to facilitate this, was an establishment where teachers could be taught to more effectively teach. Through Herder's ongoing efforts, he managed to establish both an industrial school for the workers and a seminary where the top students, older people (ex-soldiers etc.) and teachers could develop their teaching abilities.

The role of these teachers was not just for the existing political/social system. Herder very specifically insisted that they should:

> "[w]ork not for the present alone but also and mostly for the future; not for the world as it is but also as it is to be; not for our city or country alone, but for the welfare of youth in all lands that have been given into your keeping. Comfort,

strengthen, and encourage yourself with the thought that your arduous profession is no private work but a universal, public, eternal work, a work which concerns the city, country, posterity, where seed continues to sprout with developing reason, continues to grow with increasing knowledge and humanity, yes, which wins new strength in every new field, and bears new blossoms and fruits. Keep yourself removed in all your work from private opinions and from all private anxieties. You are destined to pass away but the school will remain" (Herder, cited in Andress 1916, pp.212-3).

Thus, Herder's vision of education was, as Gjesdal suggests, "an education to a pluralist – cosmopolitan, as Kant would put it – commitment" (2017, p.177) that allowed for the development of his own version of moral cosmopolitanism (Spencer 2015, p.370) as *bildung*.

Given the importance that Herder gave to language in much of his writings, it should come as no surprise that this was a focus for him in schooling as well. There were two main issues he felt he had to respond to, with the first being more practical, yet still political and cultural – the general perception of the German language at that time. It had "little or no standing among scholars and men of letters. It was thought to be almost impossible as an exact and refined instrument of thought. The Latin tongue alone was the language par excellence; and German was relegated to the common people as a kind of vulgarism" (Andress 1916, p.185). Language in Herder's view was a crucial part of the cultural heritage of a people, and the medium through which tradition was transferred. His work on this, not just in the schools he managed, but also in his involvement with the *Sturm und Drang* movement, the poetry he translated and produced, the folk tales he gathered, and his linking of language to thought, helped to shift this perception of the German language during his lifetime.

But more than this, and a topic that he considered carefully and detailed in *On Diligence* (1764) was the question of learning languages, and/or the use of translations. The conclusion he reached in the essay was that both can and usually are of use, but the deeper reading requires the ability to read the original tongue because it is in that original language that the fullest encounter with the writer is possible. Since *besonnheit* requires the multiple movement and mental creation of the self and the other, the other cannot be created authentically if the language is not there as well. Language, after all, in his view, carries with it the imprint of the culture and history of the *volk* that each person was a part of. This led Herder to conclude that a more expansive engagement

with different languages is essential for *humanität*, and thus must be an important part of a pupil's education.

Secondly, as has already been discussed in section (4.2.1), the progression of language through time from the origin of humanity had slowly shifted from a predominately emotional character to a much more formalised and structured system of communication. The production of the written word reduced this emotional aspect still further because whilst it allowed for the transmission of information across the world and through time, it also created a barrier between the person writing and the person reading, which would not be there in direct discourse. Herder's approach to the teaching of language was in part an attempt to counteract this impact, and re-imbue language with at least a part of its original emotional nature. This required the active development of the capacity for speech, since this was the route by which our thoughts flowed. It should "possess not merely tone, but character. As music has a scale on which the voice must be practised so that it will ascend and descend, so speech has extensive riches in sentiments, sorrows, beliefs, convictions, and emotions of the soul which are to be expressed most vividly, naturally, and pleasantly." (Andress 1916, p.186)[275]. In addition, whilst reading silently offered a way to develop our capacities to understand language, reading out loud allowed for this capacity to be extended into speech as well, and brought the reader closer to the writer. This reading, Herder suggested, should occur "with understanding and feeling", making use of "stories, fables, history, conversation, soliloquies, poetry, odes, hymns, comedy, and tragedy" that would be sourced from local works, as well as classical and religious texts - ideally those that were considered *belle lettres* (see section 4.3.2).

When it came to religion, Herder also took a somewhat radical view of its teaching, because "Religion to him was not a mental state of mere belief, knowledge or emotion, but one of action" (p.170). Just as for the teaching of language, the texts explored also needed to be understood and for them to matter to the practical circumstances of the pupils being taught (p.168). Religion was also *multiple*, in that, linking back to section (4.2.3), religion was a manifestation of each *volk's* quest for understanding. God had revealed himself to different people, at different times, in different ways, and was as a

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[275] State-provided speech therapy courses make explicit the differences in speech styles between men and women. Higher levels of intonation and inflection that those assigned female and are expected to express, and that those assigned and raised male on the whole speak in a far more monotonous way. Cultural norms affect overall pitch, range and frequency which men and women from different cultural groups, as well as different languages and nations, speak at. The way we speak is culturally determined, and the median frequency we speak at is influenced, *but not determined by*, our biology.

result represented in different religious texts, as well as being worshipped in different ways. Given his standing as a preacher, Herder took a radical stance on religion because he "refused to believe that God had revealed himself but once, and that his words, as inflexible as cast iron, were necessary for salvation. God was revealed to him not only in the scriptures but in the various manifestations of history and nature." (p.171).

Herder *was* after all a Christian – and he believed that the teaching of Jesus, as well as the writings in the bible were the best expressions of religion that humanity possessed. But his focus on the teachings of Jesus was not simply to replicate them in the present, but rather that they should be *adapted* for the present era (Herder 1769c, p.90). He even went so far as to argue that "[t]he *religion of Christ*, which was represented by Himself, taught by Him and practiced by Him, was this *humanity*. It was nothing but this; but it was this also in the widest sense, in the purest source, and in the most effective application. Christ knew for himself no nobler name than when he called himself the *son of man*, that is to say, a human being" (Herder 1793a, p.103, his emphasis). By emphasising both the human aspects of Jesus, and noting his use of "practised" and "application", Herder presents religion as a *human* centred activity.

When it came to studying history and geography, Herder's approach was to firstly introduce the pupil to individual stories from a number of different cultures, times and locations, and then to slowly expand this to incorporate cultures, *volk* and the process of history as a "state of becoming" (Andress 1916, p.172). To study history was to study humanity, and with the right texts, produced as *belle lettres*[276] – as authentic, true produces of a writer's beliefs – they could contribute to the cultivation of our own *humanität.* What he wanted to show and for the pupils to learn, was firstly not just the famous figures and their achievements, but also their failures. Alexander the Great, for example, should be shown as "Alexander the conqueror of the world, the drunkard, the cruel, the conceited, and Alexander the protector of art, the patron of science, the builder of cities and empire" (p.174). Through and in history, we can and must "learn to admire, learn what to admire, to love what should he loved, but also to hate, despise, and abhor what is hateful, despicable and abhorrent[?]—otherwise we should be deceitful murderers of human history" (Herder cited in Andress 1916, p.175). Secondly, it should explore "the life and the achievements of the common people" (p.173) as well as how the arts and sciences developed over time. Geography came hand in hand with history, as the "home of man" and should extend beyond simply the recitation of "facts" to

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[276] See section (4.3.2).

"their explanation" which the pupil was expected to be involved in. Initially exploring those things which "grow out of the child's interests" (p.182) before developing them further and then linking them to history more directly.

On a practical, structural level, Herder's response to the existing situation of formal education[277] was to reformulate it so that it established three basic groups of pupils; infants, boys[278], and youths. The first stage harnessed their natural curiosity and desire to be active, focusing on the development of an infant's perception and feeling – their sense experiences from the immediate environment they start to develop their active reflection from – as well as teaching in natural history, stories from history, catechism, proverbs and German poetry. The prominence of history is notable here. The second stage harnesses the boy's imagination and the subjects taught become more inter-related. Science was introduced, natural history became natural philosophy, maths was linked to physics and the historical stories expanded to the histories of peoples, related to geography. Religion was also connected to humanity, and movements were made to cultivate ideas of universal humanity. The third stage moved the youth to the use of their reason and their study becomes more scientific in nature, incorporating natural history and natural philosophy. Maths becomes more scientific and systematic, and history and geography led to politics, industry and culture. Religion and the study of humanity was finally 'elevated to philosophy' as a combination of all the studies that the pupil has engaged with (Andress 1916, pp.199-200).

This system also reflects Herder's understanding of the human capacity of *Besonnheit* - reflection – where he presents the process of reflection as the tripartite product of imagination and sensation through language (1765, p.11). Imagination is particularly relevant here because it is the key ingredient that allows for the mental leap he perceived necessary to truly grasp the unique personality of an individual that we "feel our way into" when we read their works or encounter them in person. Using simply sensation (i.e. the empirical) and reason (i.e. logic) is not enough. *Besonnheit* for Herder is the ordering of imagination and sensation not as philosophy or logic, but as "healthy understanding"[279], which requires reason as/in/through language and as a result is imperfect 'logic'. Herder's *Besonnheit* requires, essentially, an engagement that

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[277]   He was a superintendent, and director, of the Weimar schools from 1783 to his death in 1804.

[278]   Girls were not taught at the schools he managed, although the teachers trained in his seminary were also expected to teach girls.

[279]   This is also translated to "true understanding", and a similar pattern follows his use of "healthy reason" and "true reason". True and healthy reason are not 'pure', they are linked to *Besonnheit*, just as true and healthy understanding are its product.

recognises the fragmentary, and often illogical and contradictory ideas that imagination 'resolves' beyond what reason and empirical analysis can deduce. In this, Andress is incorrect to link to philosophy here without also making explicit that Herder rejected the general direction of abstract philosophising that was occurring during his time. By contrast, Herder makes clear that *his* philosophy is both conceptually different and practical in nature - it serves the purpose of humanity, which is why he both refers to it as "healthy understanding", and repeatedly asserts that *all humans*, at all times, in all places, no matter the culture or *volk*, can use healthy reason. This is what he believed philosophers should be focusing on helping to develop, instead of excluding themselves from the people and producing illusory mental constructs and transcendental *a priori*'s.

Our imagination is cultivated by "*sensuous cognition, the wit... the sensuous appetites, enjoyment, the passions and inclinations*" (1781, p.338) something that Herder sees as being ordered by "the *belle lettres*". Along with "our inclinations and desires; they are the lens reflecting truth, which is revealed to us mortals only as appearance; they are the artisans who order the ground of our souls, so that truth and virtue may be made manifest to us. There is scarcely more that can be said in their favor; there is no higher endorsement." (p.339). It is for this reason that Herder focuses so much on "Languages and poetry, rhetoric and history" in the previous two stages of teaching because "they are *humaniora, sciences and exercises that develop the feeling of humanity within us*" (p.345, his emphasis).

4.3.2   The Belles Lettres

The *Belle Lettres*, for Herder, occupy a unique position of importance. They cultivate the "so-called lower faculties of the soul" (1781, p.338) as well as "exert[ing] the finest and best influence on the higher sciences[280]" (ibid.). Because of Herder's belief that "all the powers of the soul are only one power", and that all the powers of the mind are only one power as a holistic whole, this means that the *belle lettres* contribute to, and are necessary for, *all* aspects of human existence and the development of *humanität*. They "order the ground of our souls, so that truth and virtue may be made manifest to us. There is scarcely more that can be said in their favor; there is no higher endorsement." (p.339). *Belle Lettres* should contribute to *all* aspects of a pupil's education, and they should also be introduced *before* our encounter with the "higher sciences". Further, Herder also asserts that the highest science of all is the "art of living" (p.337). This

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[280] The 'Higher Sciences' during his time typically referred to philosophy and theology.

suggests that for him, the higher sciences are in this respect the humanities – broadly speaking - which the pupil is introduced to in the first stage of their education.

Given the importance and impact that Herder sees the *belle lettres* exerting, or needing to exert, on humanity, he is quite specific that not all texts, whether they be on history, writing of poetry, novels, or whether they are considered a part of 'the classics' etc., are *belle lettres*. A *belle lettre* is a text that a writer produces "in which he dwelt for years as in the property of his spirit and heart, an author such as this, I say, for better or for worse, in a way presents to the public with his book a part of his soul" (1784a, p.111). It must have been created as a true expression of the writer, in their own process of *humanität*, and whilst the pupil's encounter with them must "*precede the higher sciences*" this must happen in such a way that "*truth underpins the former also*" (1781, p.342, his emphasis). The *belle lettres* are simply, and precisely, only those texts which "develop the feeling of humanity within us" (p.345).

Translated texts are, given what has been discussed so far[281], not the best way to experience this, according to Herder, because they do not provide the same impact as engaging with the text in their original language. The language, after all, carries familial, cultural and *volk* 'signatures' that situate the writer in a unique way, but their relationships are altered through translation, just as their situation cannot be fully grasped without a wider understanding of the culture, environment, and the 'spirit' that most drives their *volk*. The pupil's encounter with the *belle lettres* is from this limited to the languages that they can read and write. In the earlier stages, this would most likely be in German, but given that Greek and Latin were also widely taught, and French was privileged so much at that time, texts from these languages were often a part of a pupil's education. To read the stories of the Romans in Latin, or of the Greeks in their own tongue, allowed the student to "gain an entrance into the ideal world of the Greek [or Roman] thought and civilization" (Herder, paraphrased in Andress 1916, p.196). Reading aloud helps because the words are externalised and encountered again in our minds through hearing. The cadence and flow all contribute to an active (as well as physical) encounter with the words of the author in a way that reading in one's mind cannot provide because spoken language carries an emotional aspect that was itself embedded in ourselves as children. The focus that Herder gave to developing one's capacity for speaking in a more melodic and emotional way expands the interaction and impact of the *belle lettres*

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[281] See sections (4.2.1) & (4.3.1).

For Herder, engaging with *belle lettres* through *Besonnheit* should allow us to "walk in the spirit of our ancestors", but how and in what way they make our own "ideals, feelings, and aspirations... purer, better, higher" (p.197) is indeterminate. It does not mean that we will learn the same things, nor does it tell us how our *humanität* is cultivated. These are both necessarily vague and ambiguous, because their purpose is in Herder's view ultimately not scientifically justifiable. Firstly and most importantly because *Besonnheit* relies on *imagination* to work – but unlike the Kantian use of imagination in judgement, which functions by universalising the particular through reflection (Kant 1790). Herder's is a step 'beyond' logic applied to the empirical. It relies on the leap outside logic and sensation to connect fragmentary, illogical and contradictory elements at multiple levels, not just of the author of the text or their situated reality, but also of the mirror-image of the reader. The 'image' of the other is not a cohesive or singular holistic whole. It is not a single spiderweb explaining the complex interconnected individual or culture encountered, it is multiple spiderwebs that may connect, yet do not do so in a logical, coherent or consistent fashion, and which changes over time. Imagination allows us to somehow bring all of this together in the process of *Besonnheit*. The multitude of threads that make up our nature, experiences, and understandings start and stop, reverse, and act in illogical ways in the multiple patterns of our humanity that form a singular person. As a result, the product of this is a human, or a culture, or a people, that cannot - *and should not ever* - be universalised. This contradictory, confounding, and unique individual, not just as a seed but also as a result of their cultivation into a tree ensures that every encounter with a *belle lettre* will be unique to the individual.

The ultimate point for Herder in all of this, as has been mentioned previously, is that the individual cannot be subsumed or lured into wanting to become that which they encounter. The pupil must "not... lose his own individuality through this study nor was he to imitate the Greeks; he was to learn how to live in the spirit of the ancients. He was to find the secret as to how he might develop *his own* humanity" (Herder paraphrased, Andress 1916, p.190, my emphasis).

4.3.3   *Philosophy, and the University*

So far, this chapter has noted in a number of places the problematic relationship that Herder's had with philosophy. "Logic" philosophy that attempts to establish, or which

contained, "comfortless, far-too-universal rules" were not just a problem for him but, following on from Rousseau, something he considered a danger to the people[282]. But unlike Rousseau, who simply rejected this type of philosophy, Herder cuttingly noted that Rousseau himself needed the training of a philosopher to develop his own critique and justification of the dangers of this type of philosophy. From this, Herder argues that, firstly, philosophy as *"healthy understanding"* is the only thing that can counteract the damage that analytic philosophy has caused on both education and the people at large. Secondly, he shows that this type of philosophy not only counteracts the harm that logic philosophy has caused to the people, but is also good in its own right *for* the people.

Whilst Herder accepted that "philosophical thinking is a perfection" (1765, p.10), he was also responding to a situation where philosophers were for the most part socially isolated from the people – what we would now think of as the ivory tower. Herder referred to them as "a troglodyte-people living in caves" (p.7), which hindered their ability to *bildung*. The result of this increasing social distancing and philosophical abstraction was that their thinking was of no benefit to the people because they no longer saw themselves as an integral part of the people (p.29). But this lack of *bildung* also influenced the cultures and traditions of scholasticism itself – reducing or preventing their own cultural norms from progressing and changing. They were instead, more and more, taking the position that they were a people *above* the rest due to only a single aspect of their capabilities – their intellectual/reasoning capabilities. This was ably demonstrated, Herder believed, by the continual arguments by philosophers that they were the highest source of morality, good, virtue, and then projecting that standpoint as the ultimate universal norm: "As a rule, the philosopher is never more of an ass than when he most confidently wishes to play god; when with remarkable assurance, he pronounces on the perfection of the world, wholly convinced that everything moves just so... that each generation reaches perfection in a completely linear progression, according to *his* ideals of virtue and happiness. It so happens that he is always the *ration ultima*, the last, the highest, link in the chain of being" (1774a, p.214). This was Herder sniping not just at Immanuel Kant, but also more widely at those who followed the Wolffsian tradition of philosophising.

Herder argued that they should make their philosophising *useful* to the people, rather than simply producing generalised "[m]oral theory [which] does not teach new rules, nor old rules better" (1765, pp.13-14). Universalising formulas from transcendental

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[282] i.e. all "those who are not philosophers" (1765, p.7)

nothingness, or universalising their own particularities were used to justify the exclusion of different peoples from the category or capacities of humanity. To become useful to the people they would have to actively develop their *humanität*, which required in turn their interaction and involvement *with* the world and *with* the people within it (p.10). This would entail accepting the situated nature of their own existences and contribute to the processes of culture and tradition through which *humanität* in general would spread; to essentially "be a human being" (p.15). Practical philosophy was essentially the point of philosophising – as "healthy living" which would help to cultivate their humanity – so it also needed to recognise our holistic nature, something which Herder believed the *belle lettres* were perfectly suited to contribute to. Indeed Herder made the argument that philosophising as "healthy living" and the *belle lettres* had an almost symbiotic relationship with each other, such that if the importance of one faded, this would inevitably negatively impact the other.

With regards to the university more generally, Herder had already in part promoted a closer series of links between schooling and universities, as well as with the public (1780, p.242). On a practical level, he expressed this through his promotion and establishment of both technical colleges and a teacher-training school but he also developed this angle further by arguing for a more inclusive and interconnected educational system, where the schools fed into what we would now consider further and higher education that served local community interests, as well as their respective province and the *volk* more generally. This would lead to the creation of "one Academy of Education" where "[e]ach faculty would also serve as a practical academy to meet the specific needs of the locality", and a "university course would then not last for two years, but for as long as it takes to become ready for the business of life" (p.243).

4.3.4   Government and the State

There is a certain irony in Herder's criticism of the works of other philosophers who situated the best and the true and the good in their own profession, as the moral 'saviours' of humanity, since this is something that Herder was, at least in part, also guilty of. From as early as 1765 he hinted in his journal that he would have to become political and act on his beliefs, and then later, he constructed the idea of the "aristo-democrat" - those who would "spread the gospel of *bildung*" (Barnard 2003, p.33) to "improve the state from below" (Herder 1765, p.25) – something which Herder clearly tried to achieve in his own life. Just as with Kant's moral-cosmopolitan men, Herder's

aristo-democrats would take on the responsibility of educating the people, just as both Herder and Kant enacted in their own lives. Kant's approach was to argue for the independence and freedom of each citizen, within a loose moral community of other elite ethico-civil individuals, under the absolute rule of a civil constitution designed to direct the asocial sociability (i.e. the fear and desire) of its male subjects and non-moral citizens towards commerce[283]. Herder's was instead of all beings expressing their freedom and humanity, as a part of an active, situated, social life for the collective good.

Herder's approach at the national level was also similar to his approach to the family, just as it was similar to his approach to the *inter-volk* and inter-state realm. The community was an expansion of the family, just as the *volk* was an expansion of the family - different in magnitude, but not of kind. As a result of this framing, a social contract is not required because the cultural dynamics come from, essentially, the ideal family type[284], which is based on love, mutual care, and acting together as and when there is a need. The government of the *volker* serves in this respect to supplement rather than replace this weakening emotional connection and closeness with "rules of conduct" (Sikka 2007b, p.536) but whilst Sikka goes on in her article to suggest that these rules "...*mimic* sympathy" I believe it would be more accurate to suggest instead that they are designed to mimic *empathy*. In relation to Herder's view on the distinction between them, sympathy is passive[285], whereas empathy in his framing carries with it a moral imperative. It is a product of *besonnheit* that requires both expression and action, whilst sympathy does not.

Given Herder's views of the importance of holism at all levels, the rules of conduct in the family and community, whilst perhaps unwritten or formalised, would be known, just as they would be different for each person in a family and each person in a small community. In their uncodified state, these rules also have more freedom to shift and change over time, thus allowing progress and change in a 'natural' way. As the relationship gets more distant though - at the governmental level of a *volk*, with multiples of cultures and communities - the awareness of the rules of different cultures are less likely to be known in their specificity by all of the people. We have less of an

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[283] See Section (3.4).

[284] This links to section (2.2) where I considered the ideal family from Rawl's Theory of Justice.

[285] Kant makes a similar point concerning sympathy (See section (3.2.3)), but Kant's emotional-moral aspect is *only* in the sharing of the feelings of the other. The duty to act can only be good and moral if it is a pure moral deduced action (sympathy *supplements* the need to act, but must not replace the duty, or the determination of how, to act). Herder's emotional-rational *besonnheit* requires expression and action (Sikka 2007b, p.537).

emotional connection, and less ongoing involvement, and so rules are created to *emulate* the emotions and rules that we already know for those closest to us. It is vital that this balanced emotional-rational level be maintained, because Herder's inter-*volk* interaction requires "*a common feeling* [to] gradually awaken, so that each can feel itself to be in the place of the others" (Herder 1793-97, cited in Sikka 2007b, p.536, his emphasis). The language he uses is the same as for the process of *besonnheit*.

Herder also, preceding Karl Marx's arguments, perceived the *volk* to be a "single class", no matter the social standing of any individual. Yet the "*Pöbel*" (Herder, cited in Barnard 2003, p.30), who are roughly the same as Marx's *lumpenproletariat* that are spread across all of society, and have no sense of collective identity or will to contribute to the common good. Whilst Marx later essentialised them as the "scum on the streets" and "parasites", treating them as failures in and of themselves, Herder viewed their alienation to be a failure *of* the political and the cultural. Their state, nation, communities, cultures and families had failed to cultivate them, as well as failing to provide them with the agency and opportunity to express their "divine and noble gifts, allowing [them instead] to turn to rust, thereby giving rise to bitterness and frustration" (Herder, cited in Barnard 2003, p.34). Their alienation from the wider culture, community, or the *volk* was instead "that they lived, from their childhood on, in a society beset by misfortune" (Herder 1793a, p.100). This was a failure of the state's government and the people themselves to accommodate, facilitate and cultivate their inclusion.

The purpose of Herder's aristo-democrats (as *reluctant* politicians and statesmen who cannot wait to give up their power) was to serve a cultivational-educational purpose and the role they would take is in some ways similar to Kant's cosmopolitan men. This was obviously, at least in part, a response to the existence of the rabble, but also more widely to facilitate the possibilities of *bildung* – their *humanität* as process. Kant's moral-religious-cosmopolitan man by contrast is a much more restricted, and restrictive, category, focusing its actions on the intelligentsia, and carrying with it both a specific moral imperative *and* a morally superior stature, political influence and capability reliant on the necessity of the paternalistic state system that it promoted. All this whilst distracting the masses with economic commerce and basing the true measure of their deeds and progress in the laws that were created to regulate their societal existence. Herder's aristo-democrats by contrast worked on a cultural, educational and *volk* level,

ideally absent a fixed and mechanistic state system. Part of their purpose was to help in the education of the working classes, "to a point where their leadership would be unnecessary" (Spencer 2012, p.171). Whilst Kant believed that humans would always need a master because of their asocial sociability, Herder believed that humans do not need, but will always have, a master *if* they are in a state system. The point of *humanität* was to grow up – to become an adult and act with responsibility, care, and decency - and this was the ultimate purpose of his aristo-democrats, as political actors as well as cultivator-educators (p.172).

Humans, though, whilst ideally not having a master, have in Herder's view always had a government, whether it be the "mild government of father and mother" (1780, p.229) or that of a despot (pp.232-235). Government was a natural feature of human social existence, just as family, culture, tradition, community and language are, and given the interwoven nature of human existence, Herder posited that all of these elements influence how, why, and in what direction the exploration of the sciences follows. When he examined this, he started with an exploration of paternal and despotic governments, and, in his usual way, points out both their benefits and flaws. He links paternalism to the development of "the most necessary kinds of human knowledge, and of religion" which closely follows the pattern and dynamics of the family itself – and is "the most perfect that can be found". The paternal government for Herder is essentially the family enlarged, charged with religious and mythological features. It is founded on love and emotional content, which culminates in *the volk*. Despotic regimes by contrast come about from ambitious leaders who "drive[s] the defenceless shepherds themselves like sheep before him and gradually begin to treat children like slaves" (p.231). In time, "the people become accustomed to bearing his yoke... in time the man becomes a god... a father a sultan" (ibid.).

Three aspects to his presentation of the construction of government, and its interactions with the people and education, are of significance here. Firstly, whilst he claims that the paternal government is "the most perfect", he also refers to the people in a paternal government as *children* when he moves on to discuss despotism. The shift between the two governments changes the nature of the existence of the people from childhood to servility/property, but this is also dialectical. He initially uses the example of Islam and argues that their dominion and rule was despotic, but he also asserts that "I know of no finer book than the Persian Valley of Rises by Schich-Sadi... Its moral is true, simple,

noble, elegantly dressed and, if I may say so, human with a spark of the divine" (p.232), and Herder then goes on to suggest similar for Moses and the Jewish nation. Secondly, the cultural production of religion, mythology and superstition are, as was noted in section (4.2.3), products from the dawn of humanity in their desire to find meaning, so Herder also situates paternalism and intellectual education in the historic past, both of which are intrinsic to religion and spiritualism, just as the *belle lettres* can arise within despotism. All of the despotic regimes he mentions are religious in nature, and whilst they may initially promote learning and education in theology, this is over time stifled because the existence of the people is based on ownership and dominance, not freedom (1780, p.235). Third, he argues that the ongoing development of government from its simplest paternal and caring expression to despotism occurs because there is a shift from a parental figure to a sovereign ruler.

In a family structure, children 'gain' their freedom (whilst still expressing this freedom in situated ways) by becoming adults. The sovereign, though, is an institution of a different type. Because of the religious connotations of his position, it moves him to a conceptual realm beyond, above and outside humanity and the people, and this shifts the relationship between them from children, who grow up under the guidance of parents and in the love of a family into their freedom, to the worship and/or servitude of the people who can never become the equal of their god or sultan and who are never free from his sovereignty. Free constitutions, in contrast to despotic governments, were "the only government under which nature, true proportion and balance is maintained" (ibid.), and this time Herder uses the example of Greece to elaborate his arguments. The ending of Greece as a free domain, and thus its natural proportion and balance (and as a result its own version of 'perfection'), commenced when "a law was... promulgated that no one should publicly teach philosophy without the permission of the senate" (p.239).

The next iteration of governments were, for Herder, republics, with each variation exhibiting their own educational tendencies. Republican democracies, for example, promoted the "popular sciences" of "poetry, oratory, popular philosophy, and those area which appealed to the eye or ear" (p.249). A republican aristocracy, but contrast, would focus on more abstract sciences like politics, philosophy and history – and a hybrid of the two would produce a mixture of them. Essentially that the "spirit of the people" influenced the direction of the exploration of the arts and sciences. Whether that be the commercial spirit of the Dutch moving them towards focussing on the sciences most

related to trading and commerce, or that "a republic based on warfare" would be most interested in the martial arts and sciences, and the 'art of war'. Both republican democracies and aristocracies feature the types of sciences that Herder himself was most interest in, and his *belle lettres* are also heavily situated in the sciences produced in them. Between them they provide the best grounds for the cultivation of *bildung*.

There is one quite curious element that does require additional discussion her – because Herder calls his archetypal *bildung* cultivators *aristo-democrats.* This is clearly a melding of these two types of republics, yet Herder was vehemently opposed to monarchies (he was censored repeatedly for expressing this view), just as he was opposed to any form of hereditary system that allowed either influence due to birth, or assumptions of a superior character. There was, as Barnard notes, a shifting in his position from 1765 onwards, where he initially believed it was possible for monarchy and aristocracy to co-exist with the Enlightenment of the people (2003, p.34). Herder's use of the name aristo-democrat is not to imply that they are a part of the aristocracy, even though he does see a need for them to take on the roles of statesmen and politicians, but rather that they are a product of a hybrid aristocratic-democratic state, where the sciences most related to the cultivation of *humanität* were encouraged.

This was the practical situation for Germany during Herder's time and the main concerns that he expressed in his *Dissertation*[286] concerned the biasing that arises if sovereigns and princes have authority over the hiring of teachers and academics, as well as exerting influence over education and particular sciences at university level. His fears were of a similar nature to Kant's (see section 3.5) but whereas Kant argued for his second choice of independently run schools, Herder proposed that his interwoven educational system should for the most part be determined by each province and city, who he felt would be best able to determine what practical education was needed by them for their inhabitants. His concern was not just that education was too abstract and did not serve the needs of the people, but also that "Governments in recent times have especially affected the sciences by encouraging their practical, mechanical side... substantial developments in the sciences have received their impetus from military leaders and the art of war... Less equivocal has been the contribution of the arts of peace, especially to the development of the practical sciences". This had expanded in combination with the growth of "Academies of economics [who] compete with each

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[286] Herder write effectively an extended footnote addressed directly to the members of the German Academy. (1780, pp.240-244)

other" that "one could almost call our century the economic century" (1780, p.243).

The direction of education had been towards competition, between different faculties or universities, as well as their use by various princes and rules, rather than cooperation. Scientific developments were also harnessed and promoted by economic and political elites, for their own interests and glory. Alongside these, the political sciences strived for "more clarity, order and security of the affairs of state", and the legislation they produced had as a result has been forced to "strike a note of humanity and conviction" (p.244). This had produced, in the international arena, what Herder believed was something unique to his era: "Gross infringements of international law now are so much more publicly apparent and have to be camouflaged by governments in terms of truth, justice and humanity – a think which previously was both unheard of and uncalled for" (ibid). The 'economic century' had both produced in greater numbers these gross infringements as well as influencing their responses – governments and states were forced to use the language of truth, justice and humanity to mask their lies, injustice and inhumanity. From this 'mischievous' use of moral language, Herder suggested that the actual increase of "wisdom, kindness and *real* love of humanity" (ibid. my emphasis) would make "whole sciences and professions" more useful, more united, and would be able to "root out old prejudices and use enlightenment to increase kindness and happiness" (ibid.).

Beyond an educational system that facilitated the use of *besonnheit* was a need for "*Nihil Obstat*, the licence to pursue a good thing, above all, freedom of thought." (1780, p.245). Only a space where free dialogue and communication could occur, absent the censor, would lead to the "free investigation of the truth from all sides [which] is the sole antidote against delusion and error" (1793-7a, p.370). But this was not meant to assume that a single truth was the ultimate goal of this process. Truth is always situated and particular in Herder's view, and whilst one culture, age, *volk* or time may have their own views on what is true, human existence as a historical process meant that there is never one ahistorical truth. Only in an environment with the freedom to speak and publish one's thoughts would these multiple truths be available to be learnt from. Contrasting truths allowed for the purification of "human cognition" (ibid.) through reflection, and so we can learn from them, just as publications by "deluded persons" allowed for the arising of "a new view of the truth". Censorship has no *legitimation*, when it is carried out, because it is the will and the view of censor, not of the *volk*.

(p.372) but more than this, censorship denies the future the opportunity to know, explore, accept, or reject, the truths from the past. But Herder also imposes a crucial corollary to this freedom of expression: – should there be unrestricted freedom of speech, it must also as a consequence deny the author anonymity (p.373).

This "Freedom of thought is the fresh air of heaven in which all the plants of a government, especially the sciences, thrive best" (1780, p.247) and to both accommodate and facilitate this, the government "should be almost neutral in his preferences in order to encompass, tolerate and clarify the opinions of everyone in his state and direct them to the common good" (ibid.). Herder was essentially arguing here for a type of liberal-democratic government, based on the principles of tolerance, as well as, through the provision of its educational system, a responsibility to "arouse and encourage the activity of humans in keeping with their diverse tendencies, sensibilities, weaknesses and needs" (1793a, p.104). This "almost" though, still imposes a limit on freedom of thought, "where it publicly stops the wheels of the state, licence defeats its own principle" (1780, p.245). This justifies the government taking action to restrict or prohibit activities, professions and sciences that it believes would have this impact. But whilst it has this right, it also has the responsibility to not make these decisions merely because they would *change* the nature of the government, and their decisions must be made with an awareness that it does not know 'the truth'. Whilst they might be interpreted as 'harmful', this could simply be because the government was not as accommodating as it believed, or because the people's negative biases and prejudices, rather than their humanity, drove the argument that these activities, professions and sciences should be prevented. What should then occur is the enactment and process of *besonnheit*, carrying with it the awareness that this *will* change – that the people's understanding of *humanität* changes over time - and this future *humanität* cannot be deduced in advance.

Whilst the idea of the nation is often equivalenced with the state, or folded into one as the nation-state, for Herder these are fundamentally different concepts and he was, on the whole, antagonistic to the idea of a state (Barnard 2003, p.10). Firstly, because the state's artificial construction cleaved through cultural connections and reformulated them into a system that served the dominant individuals of the state and their continuing dominance. Secondly, he took this position because the Westphalian state system was one that reified a particular conception of sovereignty and the state. The purpose of the

nation-state became its continuing existence and as a consequence, particular ideas of the nation, specific purposes for the inhabitants, and particular ways of living were promoted or prevented. This led the people in a direction that, from Herder's perspective, 'warped' their 'natural' growth and change, instead reifying particular aspects, and the promotion of specific types of formulations of myths, mysteries, morality and religions as well as specific educational practices. Third, this was a problem when linked to the idea of property rights, western imperialism and the liberal ideas of philosophers like Adam Smith, John Locke and Immanuel Kant, because they restricted the rights and opportunities of communities, peoples, and nations to seek out and create their own system of government that they felt would work best for them, and for that system to be respected by external institutions. Instead, the western European concept of the state served only, in Herder's view, the needs and desires of the powerful within the western European states, and only when formulated in a specific way.

4.3.5   Commerce and International Interaction

Commerce was, for Herder, as with much else, its own dialectic. As I mentioned in section (4.2.4), economic imperialism had brought different *volk* into contact with each other, but this also allowed for the exchange of knowledge and *belle lettres* in the service of humanity. But this occurred in an unrestrained way and asymmetric way, which resulted in the 'deformation' of the people's cultivation, for both peoples. This was most visible in Holland, which in his view had "only one driving force – the commercial spirit... the spirit of a new European economy" (1769c, p.97), where even morality was for sale. This spirit was one he believed, if unrestrained, would "kill[s] or restrict[s] the spirit of valour, of great undertakings, of true statesmanship, wisdom, learning" (p.99).

In contrast to other theorists' views on human history and established ideas of property and human nature, whether it be Locke's idea of humans as traders, Hobbes' views on our supposedly selfish nature, Kant's deduction that we should act on the assumption that humans *might be* selfish, or Rousseau's position that we were originally atomised individuals in a state of nature, and contaminated by society, Herder believed these earlies stages of humanity were "characterised by creativeness and action rather than by acquisitiveness and the desire for private possessions. Hence pride in the former constitutes a far greater point of honour than the distressing pride in property of later

and more spineless periods" (1772a, p.168). Their views[287] had collectively contributed to the dispossession of "religion... spiritual freedom and human happiness" and replaced it with "fear and money" and the worship of "Mammon as our sole god" (1774a, p.207). This problem, he believed, was the responsibility of governments, in this case specifically the post-Westphalian state governments that promoted "international trade and the rivalry of interests between nations" (1780, p.244). The dialectic of Europe's "philosophical, philanthropical tone [which] wishes to extend 'our own ideal' of virtue and happiness to each distant nation, to even the remotest age in history" (1774a, p.187) under the banner of "mutually brotherly assistance, and the common interests of all countries" (p.209) had resulted, as he sarcastically noted, in "three continents... devastated, yet policed by us; we in turn are depopulated, emasculated, and debauched as a result. Such is the happy nature of the exchange" (ibid.). What was most needed from a government was to give the *volk* the opportunity to counteract the desire for competition over cooperation, and imperialism over brotherhood.

Economic imperialism, and the European determination to universalise their particularities were, in Herder's view, responsible for death and destruction on a global scale, as well as deforming *all* of the cultures and traditions involved in the encounter. Whilst good could come of it – his dialectics work in both positive and negative ways – their actions were inhumane and neither could nor should be condoned or relied upon. To rely on them, as Kant did, to justify both his own system and the permanent need for a sovereign, was for Herder not only to view the people who suffered as merely a means to an end, but would also negatively impact on the cultures, traditions, and peoples of the world. It denied the people their right to determine their own freedoms and happinesses. The establishment of international law, international trade agreements and institutions to regulate them, were in consequence little more than the enforcement of European ideals and ways of life on the world – something that was inhuman – and demanded reparation from the European states to the peoples they had harmed.

Herder proposed instead a gentle and fluctuating development of alliances that arose and subsided as each need arose and was dealt with, but a strictly formal 'cosmopolitan' approach would only come together in times of significant threat when, for example, one state was acting aggressively towards another. His international relations proposal, set out a series of "dispositions of peace" (1793-7c, p.404), appears to have been written at least indirectly in response to his Kant's *Ideas for a Universal History with a*

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[287] i.e. Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau and Kant, amongst others.

Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784b), and is detailed in one of his *Letters on the Advancement of Humanity* (1973-7c)[288]:

> *Herder's Dispositions* (pp.404-409)
>
> 1. Horror of War
> 2. Reduced respect for heroic glory
> 3. Horror of false statecraft
> 4. Purified 'patriotism'
> 5. Feelings of Justice towards other nations
> 6. Concerning presumptions in trade
> 7. Activity

Herder's use of the word *disposition* here is telling, because they are directed for the most part inwards, at the people themselves, that would influence an *ongoing* and intra-*volk* attitude, rather than an end point that can be clearly defined. The first three concern attitudes towards war, heroism, and the excuses and lies that leader use to justify conflict, territorial expansion, and economic gains. The fourth disposition, purified patriotism, concerns instead the perception of the people themselves, based only on themselves and not in relation to others. Essentially, the same principle guides the closing of borders and recentering in the face of threat – to 'centre around our prejudices' and re-establish a people's sense of itself as a people. It called not just for a clarification of this sense of self, but for it to occur as *besonnheit*. It also asserts that "with this feeling there is necessarily bound up horror and contempt for every invasion of [our] people into foreign lands... for every empty aping and participation that disturbs our business, our duty, our peace and welfare" (p.406). The point of this was not merely for a people to think and reflect on the appearance of the nature of a community, but to reflect on the good, the bad, and the ugly that the people represent and enact to themselves and others. Only then does this allow for the same kind of consideration to be given to other states. This again follows the idea of expansion and contraction that is a feature of Herder's reflectivity. We contract into ourselves to reconsider ourselves, to then expand to carry that to our consideration of others. This then leads us to contract once again, with each expansion and contraction bringing new ways to understand and see ourselves and humanity in the eyes of another's humanity - not simply to compare and decide that "we are more humane".

Whilst disposition four is focussed more on the contraction aspect of reflection, disposition five is directed towards the international arena, but once again in a limited

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[288] Letter 119.

sense. The expansion aspect of *besonnheit* carries with it the recognition of others' humanity – from our own "feeling of *frailty*, of *weakness* and *disease*... this perception by itself led to *humaneness*... to the compassionate feeling for the suffering of others, to the taking part in the imperfections of their nature, with the accompanying effort to cope with those imperfections, or to assist in overcoming them" (1794a, p.107, his emphasis)[289]. When we see another people "disparaged and abused" this should – must - "gradually awaken a *common feeling* so that every nation feels itself into the position of the other one" (1793-97c, p.406-7, his emphasis). This comes about in recognition not of the best attributes of a nation – their bravery, strength or honour – but from common feeling of weakness, vulnerability and suffering.

The sixth disposition is at least in part a rejoinder to the British Empire's assertion that it ruled the oceans, as well as a suggestion that our humanity should drive our trade for "*reciprocal prosperity*" (p.408), not our greed, and as with the fifth disposition, we have a responsibility to act, based from the abuse and suffering that other people experience. The seventh disposition returns to considering war – this time as a critique of a 'warrior caste' but Herder also makes use of the example of the Indian peace accord which he discussed in a previous letter (118) that was developed by the Native Americans, and which he calls "*On Eternal Peace*[290] *(an Iriquois arrangement)*" (1793-7, p.400-403). His purpose here is not to suggest that their treaty was a model to be guided by, where one of the three tribes would 'become the woman' and stand between the two other tribes to ensure peace, but rather that the purpose of this treaty was to *teach and cultivate* people in the other two tribes. Not only is Herder situating peace as a primary purpose of inter-volk interaction, but he is also elevating the actions of non-western people to a teaching position in relation to Europeans.

4.4   Conclusions

This chapter has, through an exploration and critical engagement with Johann Herder's works, identified the importance of his idea of *Besonnheit* - the *reflective* capacity, which establishes one as human. It is through reflectivity that firstly internal communication, and then external language arises, and it proceeds out of our engagement with the physical, sensate world, through reason. Using reflection, and in the case of Herder, the process of examining his writings, is according to him the most important way in which we learn both about ourselves and the other. When *besonnheit*

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[289] See also section (4.2.1).
[290] Once can see, again, the aping of Kant's Perpetual Peace language here.

is engaged with for the purpose of *humanität* though, this is education in the deepest sense. Within his re-framing of the idea of *humanität*, as a process of becoming, reside *bildung* as self-formation as a process of being and living, and tradition as a constantly changing intergenerational passing on one's particularity. His educational project is the means by which *bildung* can be cultivated and tradition can continue.

Chapter 5: Anti-Dualist Cosmopolitanism

Contents

5.1   Introduction

This chapter firstly brings together and clarifies the arguments that I engaged with in chapters one and two (5.2). I then incorporate the arguments of a selection of educational theorists who have explored the idea of a cosmopolitan education (5.3). This analysis reveals the surprising closeness of their approaches to Herder's own, the importance of compassion and the imagination, and the problems of economism and bureaucracies. I then turn one final time to Kant (5.4), clarifying the problems immanent in Kant's hierarchical and binaried cosmopolitan scheme in relation to the findings from the previous section and contemporary cosmopolitanism more broadly.

In the final section (5.5) I argue for a 'nonbinary' approach to cosmopolitanism. I turn to Herder (5.5.1), examining in more detail the problematic nature of the chained opposing binaries in Kantian, and contemporary, cosmopolitanism. I argue that Herder's particularity, and his anti-dualist approach, allows for multiples of moral, social and cultural framings to exist in a way that Kant's is deliberately designed to prevent. I then consider, in relation to university education, his arguments, and the importance of his approach to history,, as well as the roles that reflection and the imagination could play in such a setting. In the final section I set out L.H.M. Ling's Daoist trialect, and suggest that such an approach, as one of a multitude of approaches in a Herderian Nonbinary Cosmopolitanism setting, is not just possible, but necessary.

In the introduction I touched on the current situation with regards to cosmopolitanism. Firstly, the triple 'streamlining' of political cosmopolitanism that has occurred through the selectivity of contemporary theorist's approaches to the concept. I then considered

the dominant historical narrative of cosmopolitanism before discussing the multiplicity of often contradictory meanings, perspectives and attitudes given to Cosmopolitanism outside of the political angle. In response I suggested that cosmopolitanism could perhaps better be understood, or accommodated, in a 'particularity framing' (1.2). As a result of the political aspect of cosmopolitanism, interpreted as primarily a global concept, two distinct types of cosmopolitanism are produced. Firstly a top-down project relying on universalisms, institutions and bureaucracies, and secondly a bottom-up individualism process designed to project a variety of *national* universalisms, emphasising the importance of similarity *over* difference (1.3).

In chapter two I explored the writings of Thomas Pogge (2.1), Seyla Benhabib (2.2), and James Ingram (2.3) which resulted in four main discoveries. Firstly, that their arguments position contemporary cosmopolitanism as a *struggle* between the particular and the universal that relies on a Kantian framing not only of cosmopolitanism, but of universality and particularity, and human nature as well. Secondly, this establishes the essentiality of conflict at the core of contemporary cosmopolitanism, between two chained series of concepts that work as an antagonistic binaried structure at multiple levels of human experience and existence. On the one side, dominant, is a chain of related terms that reinforce and support each other. This links the universal to the generalised other, (justice as) fairness, equality, objective, reason, public and male, to which can be added white, cisgender, heterosexual etc. – the core chained concepts of (Kantian) cosmopolitanism[291]. Placed in opposition and always submissive to the universal is the particular, which is linked to the concrete other, (justice as) care, bias, subjective, emotion, private and female, which also implicitly includes non-white, intersex, transgender, homosexual etc. Third, my analysis revealed that underlying contemporary political cosmopolitanism is not just the core belief in selfishness, but the *necessity* of this assumption. This comes from Hobbes, but is reframed through Kant's belief in 'asocial sociability', which underlies both the norms of cosmopolitanism and, due to the dominance of western universal narratives, its responses as well. And fourth, the premises of Kantian Cosmopolitanism affects the possibility of resolving (historical) injustices in the theorising of cosmopolitanism.

In section (5.3) I incorporate the works of a selection of educational theorists and philosophers who have specialised in, or explored, the idea of a cosmopolitan education.

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[291] Essentially, any dominant-prized attribute or characteristic, for example cisgender, able-bodied, neurotypical, heterosexual, allistic etc. might in theory be added to this chained series.

With David Hansen's works, I highlight both the surprising closeness his arguments have to to Herder's, and his interpretation of a cosmopolitanism that explicitly rejects Kant's universal morality and hierarchical principles (5.3.1). Mark Bracher's arguments on a cosmopolitan eduction sets out the problem of relying on sympathy and empathy, from a rationalist approach absent emotions. These issues require a shift both to the concept of compassion, and the necessity of the breaking down chained and reinforcing binary logics (5.3.2). In (5.3.3) with Hannah Spector I explore the importance of imagination, and the problems of a universal economistic narrative that both constrains the productive imagination, and distances morality from education through the increasing importance of institutional approaches and bureaucracies.

I then turn once more to Kant (5.4), clarifying the problems immanent in Kant's hierarchical and binaried cosmopolitanism, and as a result of contemporary cosmopolitanism more broadly.

In the final section (5.5) I argue for a 'nonbinary', or multi-structuralist, approach to cosmopolitanism, presenting Ling's Daoist approach international relations (5.5.1) as one way to avoid a dominating system that plays off the universal against the particular. I then return to Herder (5.5.2), drawing on his approach to language and translation to further justify my 'turn to Herder'.

5.2   Reviewing Contemporary Cosmopolitanism

Chapter one (the introduction) set out three main issues with the contemporary understandings of cosmopolitanism. Firstly (1.1), I considered the contemporary history of cosmopolitan theorising, and how the increasing selectivity of historical texts considered relevant had narrowed down over time to Immanuel Kant as the best exemplar of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism. From a diverse exploration of the idea by a number of his contemporaries, to the overwhelming dominance of Immanuel Kant's texts, this reduced still further to a small selection of his 'most pertinent' international political texts before being filtered still further, through Nussbaum's contemporary 're-incarnation' of cosmopolitanism in 1994. Secondly (1.2), I considered the multiples of meanings attributed to cosmopolitanism, which I suggested can be mapped onto two broad approaches to cosmopolitan theorising – the universalising, and the particularising, which align with two different histories. The universalist history is narrow, dominant, and accords with, roughly speaking, the Greek inception, the Roman

development, the Kantian revolution, and the contemporary era through Nussbaum to Held and Archibughi. This sketch widens, and strains beyond the principles of Kantian cosmopolitanism the further one moves from a strict universalist position most exemplified in the political and philosophical theorising of cosmopolitanism. As it moves towards a particularist approach, it is eventually forced to avoid entirely, or give only lip-service to Kant, his works, and his overall concept of cosmopolitanism.

Finally, I considered the politics of a cosmopolitan education in relation to the needs of the Westphalian state in a nationalist environment of unceasing competition for political power (1.3). Those within the state are bound into competition for power to represent the state and so cosmopolitanism as an educational ideal – most typically represented as an idea that downgrades or dismisses entirely the importance of the state, state identity, or local affiliation in favour of a borderless universalism – is less than desirable. It places cosmopolitanism in permanent opposition to national particularity. I then briefly explored the question of how we consider the idea of cosmopolitan in the framing of it as a top-down project, or a bottom-up process.

In chapter two, I focused my exploration of cosmopolitanism on the writings of Thomas Pogge, Seyla Benhabib and James Ingram, as contemporary exemplars of three different approaches to the political theorising of cosmopolitanism. I identified that they each establishes in their system, at some point of group interaction, the pre-eminence of the universal *over* the particular.

For Thomas Pogge (2.1), this occurs with *any* group, with his splitting of essential (universal) and additional (particular) rights, although he relies on the grounding of particularity and the primacy of emotions (following on from Rawls' philosophical developments) - of justice as care - within the family, before layering universality on top. Pogge's approach to the universal nature of cosmopolitanism extends much further though, establishing an interchangeability of individuality, and positioning both group affiliation (of any kind) and choice-less individualities as little different to lifestyle choices that can be taken up, put aside, or swapped in and out at will. His position, through the adoption of Rawls' philosophical premises, establishes a gendered 'male archetype figure' in the home as the head of the household, and the ideal characteristics of this figure as; justice as reason; rationalism and individualism.

Putting oneself 'into the place of', a common feature of cosmopolitan discourse is, in this framing, based on emotional association and closeness - love and feelings of affection - that are extended outwards as we find echoes and variants of these original (familial) connections in those we encounter as we take on more roles throughout life. But at the same time it rejects emotionality at all other levels of association and interaction. Pogge's assumptions and arguments concerning (cosmopolitan) education are as a result public, generalised, justice as reason(able) and universable in nature at all levels. Justice as care (and its chained concepts such as particularity), whilst emphasised and essential in the home environment, and in the connections formed between others, is still subordinated, depoliticised, and essentialised, in part because of the Rawlsian establishment of the male head of the household in a nuclear family environment and his decision to remove the private from the political when it comes to gender dynamics. In addition, because of the privileging of the universal over the particular, there is an ahistorical element that, through Rawls, is unable to process historical inequalities that require redress. Whether it be through race, gender, or (dis)ability, there is a clear and prominent desire by Pogge and Rawls (as was also the case with Kant) to shift these claims to secondary, adjunct concepts, or to dismiss their relevance altogether.

The next section (2.2) examined the arguments of Seyla Benhabib and the struggle she engages with between the particular and the universal, through her framing of the concrete and generalised other, seeking a way to find some way to balance and incorporate them both into her understanding of cosmopolitanism. There is as a result a greater accommodation for particular experiences, incorporating both the immediate family and a wider community, through webs of interlocution, but the further out this extends, the more particularity and concrete dynamics are expected to move towards (or be rejected in favour of) the general and universal. This occurs primarily through her use of reversibility as the means to balance the concrete and generalised other concepts, but there are problems to this approach in two main ways. Firstly, because of her approach through reversibility, it is difficult to see how they can be considered conceptually different (i.e. both concrete, and particular), and thus either in need of, or able to be balanced. Secondly, because it positions the one reversing into a position of power and so reinforces existing power dynamics. I then argued that Benhabib's approach widens the boundaries of the generalised other, but does not do so for the concrete other. Perversely, as a result, this strengthens and widens the generalised other category rather than supporting her desire for parity with the generalised other.

Unlike Pogge, where the switch between the particular and the universal is at the border of the parents-children (but primarily mother-child) bond in the nuclear family, Benhabib's is at the limit of the webs of interlocution – the point at which the concrete is unable (for whatever reason) to interact in concrete ways with the other, and for that engagement to occur repeatedly, over time. Education's purpose, for Benhabib, by contrast, is an explicit rejection of the Kantian principles of education and universalism, emphasising the formation of a person *in* and *as* a part of an emotional human community characterised by a mixing of formal and informal education and culturing. For all other group dynamics though - cultural, societally, at the state level, or globally - whether in relation to the inter-dynamics between groups, or in appeals to hospitality through cosmopolitan right, the universal is favoured by Benhabib over the particular.

Benhabib's arguments in relation to culture, because of the underlying issues with the reversibility argument, thus emphasises generalisability over particularity at all levels. Cultures are forced to move towards the dominant's norms, not least because claims for recognition have to be framed in the language of the dominant group(s) of a state. There is the possibility of successfully resolving, *within* immigrant and marginalised indigenous communities, particularity inequalities relating to issues such as the lesser status of, and treatment of, women, but this process also, as a consequence, reinforces the chained elements connected to universality in the dominant group(s) that hold political power. This approach emphasises the lesser importance of the concrete other in relation to the generalised norm, within the wider (nation-state) polity. In addition, when considering choice-less individualities such as variant sexualities, disabilities, or neuro-variances, the increased dominance of the generalised position acts as a limiter, rather than a facilitator, of the institutional and social acceptance of the 'utterly other'. Benhabib reinforces still further the emphasis of the generalised over the concrete when she considers the issue of Kant's cosmopolitan right, since she sides firmly with justice as reason over justice as care. As a result, her arguments on the importance of ongoing democratic re-iterations express as the different, and other, conforming to the similar, and self, and ultimately rejects the equal validity of the concrete other.

In James Ingram's case, he takes the universal as 'always already there' and thus must always be responded to, introducing as a result the inevitability of an ahistorical binary between the dominant universal and the submissive particular. From his perspective,

cosmopolitanism has always carried with it the scent of, and tendency towards, imperialism because of the desires of dominant and powerful groups to universalise their own particularity, and to enforce that particularity-as-universality on others. Cosmopolitanism as a project has as a result always had this issue, and from this, cosmopolitanism has in one way or another always been both complicit and active in the historical oppression of others. Because of this, Ingram re-frames it as 'cosmo-politics', and recasts the idea of it as a group challenge from below against a *false* universal - to then be re-conceptualised as a new false universal upon its successful challenge. The importance of perceiving it as a new false universal, rather than through Benhabib's idea of democratic iterations is at least in part because of Ingram's incorporation of the issue of "sustained difference" from Badiou, something which universalising norms are unable to subsume and thus 'horrifies' those who promote it. As a new false universal, the universal both must change, and must be perceived as always already false.

Cosmo-politics then, for Ingram, is the process of resistance enacted by oppressed groups, rather than a normative or institutional project, but it becomes a part of the normative and institutional project through its challenge, and upon its success, when it's needs are incorporated into the new false universal. There are though some significant unresolved issues with Ingram's approach to groups – not least because he suprisingly hesitant in making clear whom/what are able to make appropriate claims. In addition, the determination of an appropriate claim against the universal must be either defined, or accepted, by the representatives of the universal because of pre-existing power hierarchies. In addition, Ingram's arguments, unlike Benhabib's, fails to consider intra-group interactions that emulate external power dynamics. This gap in his arguments allows for the construction of a new false universal that is most palatable to the already dominant – i.e. the least different, the least cosmopolitical and least able to process the existence of the utterly other. From this, the likelihood of a lesser 'universal iteration' in a 'Benhabbian' sense – the influence of the dominant ensuring accommodation *within* the existing principles of the universal - rather than a conceptually new false universal which breaches, fractures or shatters the previous, seems considerably more likely.

Extrapolating from Ingram's arguments, a cosmopolitan education that would best facilitate the ideal of Ingram's approach in the stronger sense (i.e. if internal social dynamics are incorporated) firstly require a particular focus on the education of the dominated group that appeals to the language of the universal against the imperialism

and inconsistency of the expression and application of that universal. Secondly, and even more importantly given the asymmetric power dynamics, education of the dominant group so that it is able to recognise, accept, and incorporate the falseness of its own universality - and its consequences - so that it might be more easily 'claimed' against[292]. Finally, that the encouragement of dominated group, group identification, and crucially both the right, and ability, to temporarily 'close its borders' is not only important, but an essential part of this process.

Between the three theorists explored there was a commonality of the framing of the dynamic between universalism and particularism as; contestatory, a fight, competition, conflict, or struggle, which occurs in the social sphere at one 'level' or another. Claims against inequality manifest as an adversarial process of some kind, whether that be through discourse, consensus, or more explicit (and perhaps, at its most drastic, physical and violent) resistance. For Pogge, following on from Rawls, the contest is expected to occur through existing legal and formal institutions, systems and processes, and as a result, the bureaucratic systems established by the dominant political order. This is a descendent of Kant's own belief that moral progress is tracked through legal development – which also emphasises the importance of the already dominant's system of discourse to justify the particular *within* the universal. The universal is reinforced through the claims of the particular, and its articulation is refined through pre-existing bureaucratic norms. For Benhabib this is framed for the most part in cultural and discourse terms, following a similar universal-particular dynamic to Pogge's, which again reinforces the universal through the claims of the particular. Because of the state's role in moderating the discourse, it experiences this same bureaucratic and structural articulation in its new iterations. With Ingram this provides the label he uses of contestatory cosmopolitics and his attempts to relabel the universal as a false universal. Struggle, for both Benhabib and Ingram, is essential to their arguments; so much so that their arguments do not work without the concepts of structural inequality and suffering to respond to, whether that be through democratic iterations or Cosmo-political moments and processes. For Pogge, by contrast, direct struggle for the accommodation of difference is avoided though the more prominent legal claim to the universal - because the legal is already a number of steps removed from the site of struggle in the social and cultural realms.

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[292] Herder's *Belle Lettres* (4.3.2), as a way to cultivate compassion and a collective sense of humanity through shared experiences of vulnerability and suffering play a similar role to Nussbaum's liberal arts education approach (2.4.3). See also section (5.3.2).

What also became evident in my analysis of their respective arguments was the prominence of Kantian arguments. For Pogge, (partly) through Rawls, this was perhaps most clear, and can also be seen in the normative assumptions of human selfishness, as well as the gendered and privatised nature of the nuclear home. In Benhabib's case, her favouring of Kantian logic and structure in the case of cosmopolitan right, where she turns away from the concrete other, and for Ingram, in his perceived need of a cycling between top-down and bottom-up approaches that re-affirms the pre-eminence of the universal over the particular.

5.3.   *Cosmopolitanism Education*

In this section I examine a selection of theorists who have been involved, from a specifically educational perspective, in the theorising of a cosmopolitan education. I explore the works of David Hansen (5.3.1), Mark Bracher (5.3.2) and Vicki Spencer (5.3.3) where I collectively highlight how their own arguments mostly cohere around the same struggles between particularism and universalism that are emblematic of the theorists I examined in chapter two. What also quickly becomes apparent is how far removed they are from Kant's own scheme – at almost every level – although there is still a tacit acceptance of Kant's specifically international arguments. By contrast, Herder's position and arguments, which I set out in chapter four, are eerily close to their own. Emotions are an essential part of their approaches, establishing that approaches to a cosmopolitan education in the contemporary era reject Kant's own approach, in favour of Herder's.

For David Hansen (5.3.1) this closeness is most marked, to such an extent that ideas like Herder's interpretation of tradition is effectively reproduced by Hansen in modern form, just as is the case for his use of, and the importance of, metaphor and language. Hansen's use of literature mirrors Herder's use of *belle lettres*, and his idea of reflection appears as virtually a modern day version of Herder's own works. Hansen also, interestingly, suggests a re-framing of cosmopolitan to mean 'inhabitant of the world', rather than citizen, which firstly provides a gateway from which to slip away from the historical presentation of cosmopolitanism as a binary/dualistic system for humanity alone, as well as a rejection of statist language which the concept of citizenship implies.

In section (5.3.2) we encounter Mark Bracher, whose approach features a need to distinguish between passive sympathy and empathy, arguing that cultivation of compassion – a higher order concept for him than empathy, is the only cognitive structure that triggers the kinds of response that cosmopolitan theorists believe is fundamental to a cosmopolitan orientation. Bracher notes the failure of contemporary cosmopolitan theorists to move beyond merely asserting that sympathy or empathy evolves into action through an engagement with literature, which he approaches from a cognitive science perspective. He still uses literature, but also makes use of concepts like 'cognitive schemas' and 'faulty prototypes' - sourced from psychology and cognitive theory - to set out his arguments. His approach suggests that specific aspects of our thought processes produce biases against the other, which links to the way in which we see the humanity in the other. Bracher presents the same dynamic of internal reflection between the self and other as Herder does, using different terminology, and argues that an emphasising on a shared human experience of unjustified suffering over and/or before particularity is approached is the critical aspect from from which to distinguish and clarify the different ways humanity expresses.

When I turn to Spencer, I focus on her exploration of the productive and reproductive imagination. This aspect touches to the heart of Herder's use of *besonnheit*, (just as it is a key aspect of Kant's arguments on judgement). The critical difference between their approaches is that for Kant it is an empirical exercise of reason that taps into the 'mystery' of imagination, whereas for Herder it is both empirical, and the holism of reason and emotion, that produces imagination. I then examine Spector's response to educational economism and bureaucratisation, which, through Arendt, identifies the growth of moral irresponsibility through increasing bureaucratisation, which her cosmopolitan education is designed to confront, as well as her use of Kantian arguments, which I critique.

I previously noted that Herder, far more than Kant, is seen to better express a moral and cultural cosmopolitanism that cherishes difference in his arguments[293]. These three educational theorists establish, between them, that Herder's approach to education *also* aligns with, and better exemplifies, contemporary understandings of a cosmopolitan education.

5.3.1   David Hansen

Hansen's work is quite explicit in its purpose in that it is a response to increasing globalisation in an ever-increasingly interconnected world. He argues that we need to be "openly reflective to the larger world, while remaining loyal reflectively to local concerns, commitments and value" (2011, p.*xiiv)*. Hansen moves to incorporate the complexities that many of Herder's works also focused on, in this case as a guide to teachers, (which is also, it should be noted, the case for Kant's approach). What is perhaps most telling about this book though is the way in which Hansen almost deliberately avoids making use of Kant's own works. There is no mention of his writings on pedagogy, and on many occasions he makes entirely the opposite argument to Kant's. When, for example, he states that "A cosmopolitan compass does not provide a fixed moral latitude and longitude" (p.49)[294] he positions his understanding of cosmopolitanism in direct opposition to Kant's own rigid universal morality, and, likely unknowingly, taps into the same kind of language that Herder uses when discussing the idea of human progress.

Instead, possibly because of the shrouded nature of other Enlightenment cosmopolitans beneath Kant's shadow, Hansen draws on other writers and philosophers such as Michael de Montaigne (pp.26-27)[295], Maire le Jars de Gournay (pp.29-31), Rabindranath Tagore (pp.39-40) and Confucius (pp.22-24) – as examples of a pluralist and particularist approach to cosmopolitanism. These people would likely never have considered themselves cosmopolitan in a Kantian way (p.69), rather, their approaches are far more reminiscent of Herder's own attempt to delicately balance universalism and particularism through his approach to unity and diversity and The One and the Many. Further, he uses not just their written works, but their lived experiences as well, again in sharp contrast to Kant's own determination to exclude his own personal life from the history books so that his works could be presented as universal ahistorical texts applicable to all ages.

Hansen frames his own version of Herder's approach to the One and the Many in somewhat different terms but it serves as the central thesis to his book - the idea of "moving closer and closer *apart* and further and further *together*" (p.3, his emphasis). Closer and closer apart occurs through the recognition and respect for distinctive

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[294] There are numerous instance where Hansen asserts an understanding of cosmopolitanism that is diametrically opposed to Kant.

[295] Herder also engages repeatedly with Montaigne's works in a similar way (1766a, p.33; 1767a, p.43; 1769, p.184; 1768, p.169; 1775a, p.327; 1778, p.219; 1781, p.346 etc.)

differences, but the framing suggests a double gesture. Closer and closer implies a move to similarity, yet in combination with further apart to emphasises distinctiveness. Because of this, it gestures to a shared closeness that clarifies our difference, just as Herder suggested with his example of pebbles rubbing together. As understanding increases these differences are both clarified and brought closer to oneself but difference is not removed, rather these differences are enunciated more clearly at the same time that the humanities of different people are expressed and connected to. This process closely resembles Herder's *besonnheit*, because Herder also focussed on a shared humanity first, from which our own biases are brought into sharp contrast with the other. It is only from seeing the other as human that this can occur, and this dynamic in Herder's framing occurs not just in the singular, but for entire peoples as they reflection upon the other.

At the same time, through this process, shared experiences create a shared history as they travel further and further together. This shared history is the primary means through which Herder talked about tradition, as a process by which the individual learnt and was cultivated into a society (1764, p.10). At the same time that the individual, and all individuals involved in these processes, continue a feedback mechanism by which the cultures they are a part of themselves change over time, organically. In combination with Herder's understanding of *humanität* as the combination of tradition and individual creativity, his approach again appears remarkably similar to Hansen's own.

Hansen makes the decision to re-interpret *kosmopolites* as 'inhabitant of the world' rather than the more traditional 'citizen of the world' (2011, p.45) and in so doing he moves in two ways from a hard interpretation of cosmopolitanism. First, is the explicit move from an understanding of it as a from a predominantly political and international scheme presented by writers such as Held and Archibughi, to the subjective questioning of "how are you inhabiting your world"? (pp.45-46). Secondly, his retranslation moves it from an implicit statist norm granted by a sovereign that has the power to deny citizenship. This second move also carries with it the recognition of habitation over legal recognition of citizenship. In addition, whilst citizenship is and can only be granted to humans, habitation does not impose a species limit, nor does it require either sovereignty or legal recognition.

In tying this to questions of culture, Hansen again emulates the arguments of Herder in

his understanding of culture on three levels: sociolinguistic communities, social practices, and individuals (p.65), seeing their interplay through a respect for tradition, but not as 'traditional'. Hansen uses the writings of Montesquieu here, and his interpretation of the interaction between the local and global to support his position. Somewhat problematically though, is his uncritically use of Montesquieu, which ignores both his desire to codify and quantify (from an objectivist and universalist perspective) different political governments and human expressions, and his determination of variance due to simple environmental (climate) factors. Herder, who also draws on Montesquieu in this responded by arguing "[that] I simply cannot accept that some such general concept as, for example, fear, honour, or patriotism, is inseparably linked to given degrees of longitude and latitude" (Herder 1784-91, p. 325n). His argument is one, I suspect, that Hansen would also follow.

The alignment between Hansen and Herder also extends to their views on literature. Hansen's engagement with what Herder termed the *Belle lettres* raises "educational questions" (2011, p.73) of a similar style that Herder sought to answer, just as the process of engagement with a person through their text "do[es] not imply a person must abandon original orientations even though they do necessitate a degree of metamorphosis" (p.72). Engaging with literature as a way to change our perspectives of our own situated existence through the exploration of another's is a theme that both share.

I do not wish to belabour the point further with regards to the remarkable similarity between Hansen and Herder's views on education, so I will end this section with a quote from Hansen that I believe both clearly represents Herder's perspective and definitively rejects Kant's own purpose for education:

> "to me, the educational priority in places of learning is coming into the world: becoming an inhabitant, becoming at home, cultivating roots in, and consciousness of, the stream of human meaning-making across time and space. This orientation fuels the core value of reflective openness to the new and reflective loyalty to the known. Without the orientation... they may, paradoxically, render education into a mere means to an end, which is the very antithesis of learning to inhabit the world" (p.113).

5.3.2   Mark Bracher

This section examines Bracher's approach to cosmopolitan education. I firstly set out his basic understanding of the underlying issues that impact on the perception of the other as equally and fully human. Drawing on Lazarus and Lazarus' works, Bracher argues that a disposition towards openness is not sufficient in and of itself to motivate action for the benefit of others. Compassion understood as "being moved to distress by another person's suffering, *and wanting to help*[296]" (Lazarus & Lazarus 1994, p.125, my emphasis) is required, which itself relies on three specific judgements that he draws from Nussbaum's *Upheavals of Thought* (2001). Bracher then continues, arguing that it is the information that goes into the construction of each person's cognitive schemas that determines whether these three judgements can collectively be confirmed – and only then will compassion be experienced. Essentially, a) how the image of 'The Human' is constructed, developed and cultivated in our minds, b) how closely and rigidly this conforms to our image of ourselves as 'The Human', and c) how broad the knowledge structure is. All three affect how, and whether, we see the other possessing a common humanity to us. The degree of overlap - when we can see the humanity in ourselves and the other - influences the degree of compassion, or whether it can be triggered at all. Resolving, changing or 'fixing' faulty schemas involves repeated work to break down the habituated binaries that are constructed in the logic of self/other as a method of comparison and the implicit hierarchies carried within it.

Bracher takes a pragmatic approach to cosmopolitanism and education, attempting to set out in practical terms "1 the specific behaviours that constitute cosmopolitanism... 2 the capabilities and habits of mind and heart that enable and motivate these behaviours... and 3 the types of educational practices that foster these cosmopolitan capabilities and habits of mind and heart" (2013, p.3). He concludes that cosmopolitanism entails helping others who are in need, no matter who or where they are, which in turn involves assisting others in danger or distress, intervening against active and passive distress, and acting to diminish the suffering of others, regardless of colour, class etc. From there, he turns to a consideration of what prevents these sentiments from expressing, because simply having a disposition of openness to others does not automatically provoke the action of trying to help others when they are suffering.

This then leads to a distinction between sympathy, empathy, and compassion. Bracher

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[296] This echoes my discussion of Herder's argument in sections (4.1.4) where he defines the wanting to help as 'conscience' rather than conflating both aspects into compassion.
See also (4.2.1) where he links it to shared experiences of suffering.

concludes that compassion, produced from three specific judgements, which he draws from Nussbaum, is the most crucial of these, and they in turn rely on three key pre-requisites that are require before the sentiments can lead to action. "1 that another person has a serious need or is experiencing significant suffering; 2 that the other is not responsible for this suffering or need; 3 that the other's well-being overlaps significantly with one's own (Nussbaum 2001, pp.306-321[297], paraphrased in Bracher 2013, p.7). Whilst empathy can facilitate or contribute to this process it is not, according to Bracher necessary, nor is it enough by itself – compassion can be expressed without empathy, and *only* compassion triggers a positive, moral response. These three points can also, interestingly, be shortened to 1) it is unreasonable 2) it is unfair and 3) it could have been me. In this respect, Bracher is arriving at justice as fairness, and Pogge/Rawls' position, through Nussbaum[298].

From there, Bracher turns to an examination of how the judgements themselves are formed, which requires the use of the idea of 'cognitive schemas'; "general knowledges structures that comprise multiple types and forms of knowledge concerning a particular category" (2013, p.11). It is these knowledge structures which determine what we perceive, how we perceive it, what we are able to infer, suppositions we draw, what we look for, what we remember, what emotions we have in response to them etc. Essentially, how these knowledge structures are created determines whether, how, and how much, we see ourselves "linked to others through a shared humanity" (Monroe 1995, p.105). These knowledge structures are also constructed, tellingly, from multiple binaries. Bracher perceives in this that the more a person approaches from a 'universalist' perspective, which Phillips and Ziller suggest focusses on "similarity rather than difference" (1997, p.420)[299,] the more likely a positive response will occur. It is from this that Phillips and Ziller then go on to argue that "universal orientation avoids the first treacherous act in interpersonal relations, that is, the separation of the self and other, *which tends to be followed by an invidious comparison of self and other, to justify the separation...* the foundation is set for *conflict rather than accord*" (Phillips and Ziller, 1997, p.430, my emphases).

Whilst Bracher emphasises the universal aspect in his arguments, from the phrasing that

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[297] Nussbaum in turn draws on Philoctetes and the Aristotelian tradition (2001, pp.304-306).
[298] See also section (2.2.3)
[299] Their use of 'universal' is somewhat different to how it has been used elsewhere in this thesis, as it implies for them an orientation towards the descriptive category of 'Human' that all (or at least more) humans fall into, rather than a prescriptive system that all must conform to.

Phillips and Ziller use, this suggests that the crucial issue here is the comparative aspect that *tends to be followed*, which comes from the separation of self and other (because distinguishing the self from the other is both necessary and inevitable). There are two key aspects to this that I want to focus on here. Firstly, that it is from this *tendency* to envy that conflict rather than accord arises. In chapter three, when I set out Kant's construction of the 'civilised man' and 'the state', it was clear that for him comparison is produced by a fear of inadequacy in a hierarchical sense – thus it is already in some sense antagonistic and unavoidable by all bar his cosmopolitans. This conflict is unavoidable for Kant and so must be harnessed and repurposed towards economic rivalry. Herder, by contrast, is almost pluralistic in his wariness of comparison between either peoples, and their moralities (or indeed in relation to individuals), other than in the express service of *humanität.* Herder is seeking *commonality* and connection through other-self-perceived suffering and the development of compassion – essentially the accord that Phillips and Ziller refer to. Emotions for him are both necessary and intrinsic to the process, and whilst conflict might drive forward progress, this is something we should be ashamed of and try to avoid, rather than relying on and taking advantage of. In addition, this idea of humanity is a category that is only awarded to a select group of people in the Kantian system based on education, privilege, race, gender, class, and opportunity, whereas in Herder's it is an innate capacity and capability that all humans possess, and can express in their actions. Secondly, the use of the word "invidious" contributes to an underlying selfishness that establishes, in this 'tendency', a narrative of selfishness that again ties to a Hobbesian approach.

What is of particular interest here is not so much that Herder's approach once again aligns with Bracher's cosmopolitan approach much more closely than Kant's, but that Herder's approach is aimed directly at subverting this *tendency*, that Bracher passes by without comment. Herder rejects a moral comparison in a negative, selfish sense, instead emphasising how we express our *same* humanity in *different* ways – which he then turns inward to a self-critique of our own normative assumptions on what defines our own humanity and ourselves. Effectively, using Bracher's language - how we hold to unconsidered knowledge structures that are revealed in different ways by our interactions with differently othered others who we interact with, and then reflect upon. Herder's approach is to see the humanity of the other in ourselves, and the humanity of ourselves in the other, thus providing multiple links of commonality or 'unity in diversity', at the same time insisting that every expression of humanity is dialectical and

so carries with it its own flaws in *both* the self *and* the other. This, for Herder, is his attempt to prevent the suggestion of a (false) pure idea of humanity that could be reified, and to mitigate these tendencies and invidiousness justifications.

What also stands out when Bracher uses the example of western vs African in the sequence of "civilised/uncivilised, cultured/barbaric, rational/irrational, adult/childlike, humane/savage" (Bracher 2013, p.16) is the similarity to the two chained concepts that form the Kantian, and contemporary, cosmopolitan binary system of universal/particular, justice/care reason/emotion etc. that I discussed in section (5.2) One side is good, and 'us', the other side is bad and 'them', but because a binary meta-system already exists, the only response possible is to alter the individual binaries rather that the series of chained concepts collectively. This binary dynamic also plays a part in the construction of stereotypes and prototypes, which humans use unreflectively as short-hand interpretations for different types of humans.

Bracher groups these concepts into two categories, which he argues define either how one is animalised, or dehumanised. The first functions around a distinction between uniquely human qualities vs animality as "cognitive sophistication, culture, refinement, socialisation, internal moral sensibility, industriousness, inhibition, self-control". The second establishes whether or not someone displays human nature "interpersonal warmth, drive, vivacity" (Haslam 2006, pp.256-257; Bracher 201, p.14-15). Searching for and perceiving industriousness or self-control in the other, we can see them as 'human like ourselves', but what this also does is reinforce industriousness as the idealised norm. This carries its own problems when we consider, for example, disabled and neuro-diverse people whose sense and expression of control might differ widely from 'the norm'. Just as disability might hinder or deny the possibility of being 'industrious' in a traditional western sense - and industriousness itself is a concept that carries with it economic expectations. How we understand industriousness is its own cognitive schema that might carry with it ideas of factories, productivity and business in a western industrial setting.

What is also exceptionally curious, although not explicitly discussed by either Haslam or Bracher, is the *gendered* nature of these two categories. The first are qualities more related to reason and the restriction of emotion, whereas the second are indicative of emotional expression and social interaction. By implication then, the first defines the

human *quality* as a male vs animal, and the second defines human *nature* as female vs emotionless (i.e. the *absence* of emotion, not its restriction). From this can be seen an echoing of Kant's own arguments on the distinction between the beautiful (women) and the sublime (men) that are respectively of nature and reason[300].

The final aspect I want to explore from Bracher is his use of the words *disposition* and *proposition*. In the previous chapter, in the section on international interaction (4.3.5), I went into some detail with Herder's dispositions, and also in chapter three (3.6.3) on international propagation for Kant. Kant's Propositions are of course well known, but their choices in the use of these words is telling. Disposition for Herder is focused on an internal attitude or orientation that is the holism of reason and emotion, and proposition for Kant is a statement, that also expresses a moral judgement. At the beginning of this section I noted that Bracher's point about disposition was that a disposition to openness was not sufficient to promote action. When he uses proposition later on in his book, in relation to the arguments I have set out of his thus far, this time in relation to the category of human vs animal, he suggests that "even if westerners subscribe to the *proposition* that Africans are fully human, their perceptions, judgements, emotions, and actions (including public policies) regarding African will still be distorted by the implicit conviction, based on these various prototypes, that Africans[301] are not *fully* human. The various forms and elements of the prototypic African will continue to operate implicitly, beneath the threshold of consciousness, and will *override* Westerner's conscious, propositional knowledge and produce distorted, dehumanising perceptions, judgements, emotions and actions regarding Africans" (Bracher 2013, p.20). Essentially, disposition without a moral angle does not achieve compassion, just as proposition without a dispositional approach that incorporates a moral angle emphasising our shared humanity through suffering cannot resolve these underlying biases.

What clearly comes across in Bracher's deduction of the way to initiate a response to the suffering of the Other is that Kant's approach is the opposite to his. Bracher, from his exploration of empirical studies on how to achieve his goal of action establishes that Kant's desire to develop the art of education to the science of pedagogy would have required the opposite approach to Kant's binary reason vs emotion system. Imposing a duty in the absence of emotions does not facilitate the perception of others, either across

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[300] See section (3.3.4)
[301] There is also an unspoken gendering when Bracher refers to Africans here – it is African *men* that he is implicitly referring to. There is a lack of awareness of the intersections of race and gender here.

race or gender, as our equals because it does not incorporate an emotional strand that is required to engage with the human nature of the other, nor can it trigger a shift from sympathy to compassion. From my exploration in chapter three of Kant's arguments, and especially in relation to his comments on the Tahitians this is, perhaps, Kant's point – to him they are *not* morally equal and so should not be seen as equal.

In this section, my exploration of Bracher and his approach to activating a response to the suffering of others requires a focus on a common humanity, and an emotional connection, as well as judgement of the veracity of their suffering. From his cognitive schemas, the knowledges and 'facts' which prevent seeing the other as human and inter-connected with the self can be responded to through a careful engagement with literature that switches around the binaries that go into the various levels of Bracher's arguments. Repeatedly approaching these problem areas allows over time for the breaking down and reconstitution of the schemas which unconsciously positions the Other into categories of inhumanity and/or animality.

5.3.3 Hannah Spector

I now turn to Hannah Spencer and her approach to cosmopolitanism and education. There are two main areas that I examine here. Firstly, her writings on imagination, and secondly, on bureaucracy. From the first, which she progresses from Hannah Arendt's partial writings on the topic, as well as Justine Greening's arguments, Spector links the restriction of the productive powers of the imagination during the contemporary era to the rise and domination of educational economism, which she argues has altered and redirected the path by which people imagine, into an economistic framework. For the second, her critique of bureaucracies, following on from Arendt's own works, suggest that bureaucracies and institutions distance the individuals who work in them from that which is institutionalised and bureaucratised. As a result, they are distanced from a sense of personal responsibility, which also both influences and limits the expression of their morality outside the institutional environment. To her own critique of global economistic dominance influencing the future direction of imagination in the schooling environment in economistic and the contributory effect bureaucratisation, I respond by arguing that this is *also* a feature of both the theorising, and attempts to introduce institutional systems – as they impact on the ability to imagine cosmopolitanism in ways outside of universal, binary, and institutional ways.

Spector argues that, to date, there has been little exploration of imagination within the theorising of education. Whilst imagination is often used and considered in everyday language, it means very different things, to different people, at different times (2017, p.39). It is considered obscure, and the most mysterious of the cognitive faculties –it cannot be accurately defined - although it can be explored and elaborated upon in numerous ways. For Kant, the imagination serves as the bedrock from which genius develops, but it must also be "tamed" because it is also linked by him to excess and the extreme (1798a, p.290). It must therefore be "cultivated *only* for the advantage of understanding" - it has no value in and of itself (1803, p.461, my emphasis). For Herder, by contrast, imagination cannot be cultivated only from understanding because it plays a constitutive role in the creation and use of language itself, which we all experience at the beginnings of our lives. Because of its link to his view of language, and thus its shaping thought and expression, as well as providing a link to a shared cultural heritage, this nudges the direction of imagination according to a person's cultural, social, and environmental experiences. Imagination lies at the base of all that humans can achieve because without it we cannot think. It is through its use – through imagining and the carrying of this imagining outwards - that we become co-creators of our cultures and traditions. Reason manifests *because* of the imagination, and so expresses 'afterwards'.

Egan (1992), one of the few educational theorists to have engaged directly with the topic of imagination, suggests that imagination is linked to freedom, because, as Spector goes on to paraphrase; "it is through the capacity to imagine other worlds, or to imagine something not present, that one can "become an autonomous thinker"" (cited in Spector 2017, p.39). The imagination allows us, in the case of Bracher earlier, to imagine a shared humanity with the other through literature, allowing for the development of compassion, and because of this, imagination is often linked to the moral and ethical. In addition it has an aspect of spontaneity and uncontrollability which "blossoms under conditions of freedom", but also withers away for the weak and vulnerable in highly controlled societies (p.42). There are clear parallels to Kant's approach which directs the majority towards economism and positions the imagination *inside* his framing of cosmopolitanism, through discipline during childhood. Imagination, as Spector notes, can also be directed, channelled, and used for dark purposes. It can show and enhance our humanity as well as displaying and furthering one's inhumanity. Czobor-Lupp also notes that Herder, presaging Arendt's arguments, made a similar critique of what he calls "despotism" when he warned of "the political danger that could arise when deceit or

despotism abuses imagination by 'rendering the limitless ocean of the human fantasies and dreams subservient to its purposes'" (Herder 1800[302] p. 201, in 2012, pp.57-8).

This, for Spector, is one of the main problems with the current situation in education because "the curriculum and pedagogy are being systematically controlled and financially exploited by the developing educational-industrial complex" (p.43). Education has become a means not so much of enlightening, cultivating, or developing (and whether the imagination can or should be 'priced' and thus have 'value'), but for financial security, passing the next test, ticking a box, and employment. The globalisation of education, alongside the globalisation of the economy, has filtered outwards and downwards in a variety of ways and established the primacy of the instrumental ideology of "economism" (Talavera, 2014) and the ongoing re-creation of the individual's identity. From this, Spector notes that the increasing regulation of teaching has led to a decrease in the freedom of teaching, other than when it follows an economistic requirement. This results in the downgrading of the perceived value of, and the opportunity for, spontaneity. The longer this continues for - the more economistic education becomes socialised and historically normalised at the educational and societal level - the stronger the influence and directing capabilities of economism on the imagination itself. From this, the weaker a person is within the system, the more that person's spontaneous imagination to think outside the system is affected[303].

Spector then turns to Kant's classification of the two types of imagination: productive and reproductive, which he develops in his *Critique of Judgement* (1790). Within such an environment as Spector considers, the productive imagination is hindered, but the *reproductive* imagination, which is derived from and remains closely linked to the existing social setting, still has an outlet. This reinforces the existing framework in which thinking is condoned, and restricts production from outside the framework. Spector in this is directing her understanding at both the dominance of economism in education, as well as in consideration of Arendt's own writings on Nazi Germany, but it also has wider implications.

When I reconstructed Kant's political scheme through the lens of education, I noted firstly in section (3.2.1) that the potential of a child's imagination is closed off and

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[302] This translated text is in the bibliography under the original (German) publication date of (1784-91d).

[303] In a post-colonial context, see Franz Fannon's arguments on the impact of colonialism reshaping the boundaries of self-perception of the black man (1961). His response was that only through violence and the destruction of the colonial framework could new realities of imagining be realised.

directed towards Kant's own hierarchical and exclusionary perspective of the meaning of humanity. The discipline they endure turns them away from their own animality, towards the service of humanity's progress. Secondly, in section (3.5.2), I highlighted that Kant's desire for his cosmopolitans to be able to find any skilled end is only applicable *within* his cosmopolitan framework. In my analysis of Kant's political scheme, his educational system can *only* facilitate the reproductive imagination. It must function within the constraints of an ahistorical cosmopolitan morality and thus is not productive because it is, necessarily and perversely, the contradiction of "both free and *of itself conformable to the law*" (Kant 1790, p.71, his emphasis).

In addition, the mostly forgotten side of Kant's political system is that the education of the masses is deliberately different - purposefully functionalist and economistic by design to encourage cooperative competition and economic interdependence - and it falls within the same universals that Kant's cosmopolitans are disciplined and cultivated into. Geniuses, in the Kantian world, occurs *outside* the boundaries of cosmopolitan education, in, as he puts it a 'mysterious' way, something his educational system is deliberately designed to prevent due to its closed-system nature which saddles the imagination in the service of cosmopolitan either through universal economism for the majority, or universal morality for his elite. From this perspective, the development of the art of education to the science of pedagogy tries to close off the possibility of a productive imagination. Encountering the other, from a different social sphere, society or state is translated through the belief that these social differences are merely illusions that 'all' understand as such.

Herder, by contrast, argued that genius always carries with it social implications because it is developed within, and expresses aspects of, the *volker* that it arises from. This means multiple moral avenues, and further, it *requires* a historical approach through tradition that *relies on* change and multiplicity. Herder believed that genius has cultural, family and community dynamics, but 'his systems' - his *volk* - his cultures - his 'monads' - have windows. Whilst imagination is inevitably constrained (i.e. all is re-productive), the windows, and his approach to history, provides ever-changing routes by which it will always be limitlessly variable. There is not one sphere of universal morality, but rather multiples of endlessly varying spheres of morality, and thus endlessly varying re-productive imagination expressions. Imagination on the one hand serves as a source of inspiration and a way in which to understand the expression of humanity for a *volk*

because the imagination is not outside the social life. On the other, in his view, it also reveals a *volk's* inhumanity if produced within an environment of unfreedom. Inhumanity is the prevention of change, or the constriction of change along narrow or dominant-group determined paths whereas for Kant this prevention is necessary for humanity's progress.

Returning to Spector, the result of these changes to the educational environment is that it "undermines teachers' and students' capacities to develop meaningful learning experiences that value history, culture, community, and individuality" (2017, p.46). Whilst this is in some ways a reasonable critique, economism in its latest guise - neoliberalism – more and more requires the commodification of a person's history, culture, community. They are not so much lost as economised and individualised. This historical normalisation can also be seen from a (post/neo) colonial perspective, because the commodification, or what is often called 'cultural appropriation' of an other's history, culture, community, and individuality starts at the margins of society (whether that be globally or with a nation state). What for a marginalised group of people is a 'fetish', symbol, or cultural artefact that contributes to a group's identity, strength and cohesion, under economism becomes a financial opportunity, individualised as a culturally meaningless affectation for those who are outside or less marginalised. The problem that Spector sees as a relatively recent shift in the US should instead be considered a part of a much older and longer shift that has built up and slowly increased firstly through colonialism and the 'civilising mission', and later via global schooling, starting at the margins 'out there', through ideas like western-driven development studies, 'world education' and the imposition of western capitalism that, from Ingram's perspective in his critique of Nussbaum[304], serves to embed western values and ways of thinking in their search for a 'better' life.

Turning now to Spector's analysis of bureaucracies and institutions, the same logic of economism's impact on the imagination also has an influence on bureaucracies more generally, and equally profoundly. One critique that Herder made concerning bureaucracies was their development into mechanisms of state power, combined with the ideal of sovereignty. This was in part due to the distancing of the people from the activity of, and responsibility for, that which was bureaucratised (1774a, p.197), as well as creating a culture of bureaucratisation. This is also an area that Spector shows concern for when she argues, following on from Weber, that "Bureaucratisation is a

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[304] See Section (2.3).

multilayered socialisation process that has a variety of implications beyond utility or desire for efficiency" (Spector 2019, p.504). It also affects how responsibility is understood and interacted with. Biesta (2006) suggests that responsibility is essentially ethical in nature, and drawing from Arendt's own arguments, this is especially so when it comes to education because it is "the point at which we decide whether we love the world enough to assume responsibility for it" (Arendt, cited in Biesta 2006, p.147). But more-so, this kind of responsibility is more than just not economical in nature, it "excludes and *opposes* calculation" (Biesta 2015, p.70, my emphasis).

The ongoing bureaucratisation of education at state level upwards, under economistic terms is then, according this, not just an abrogation of responsibility, but *unethical*, and at its most extreme leads to 'I was simply following orders' and the banality of evil. It is, tellingly, also the murder of the moral person *in* the bureaucracy itself (Arendt 1973, cited in Spector 2019, p.4). Bureaucratic socialisation leads, according to Spector (as well as Arendt, Weber and Biesta), to the bureaucratisation of *irresponsibility* (p.13) through the instrumentalisation of responsibility. Counter-intuitively, the more efficient the bureaucratisation of responsibility becomes under an economic rationale, the more morally irresponsible it becomes (p.14). Hierarchies, institutions, and bureaucracies are by nature discriminatory. The more efficient they are, the more discriminatory they must become. These two points link together in a cumulative way; economistic norms restrict the productive imagination, and redirect the reproductive imagination in economistic ways, and increasing bureaucratisation leads to the abrogation of responsibility, and thus morality, within the structure of education through greater 'efficiency' and economic pragmatism. Between them, they impact on every aspect not just of the sphere of education, or the link between morality and education, but the entire social sphere of human existence and experience.

This section (5.3) has examined three prominent theorists in the (sub) field of the theorising of cosmopolitan education. From David Hansen I take on the re-interpretation of cosmopolitan to mean inhabitant of the world, which allows a distancing from not just the political and institutional aspects of much of cosmopolitan theorising, but also for a potential broadening of its theorising beyond anthropocentrism. From Mark Bracher, his distinction, and development of a practical means of cultivation compassion, from which cosmopolitan actions can occur, establishes the essentiality of emotions in cosmopolitanism, the first step of which

requires a focus on a shared experience of human suffering that each possesses. In addition, the two binary ways in which others are Othered – from man to animal, and man to woman, the distinction between disposition and proposition, and the different ways in which their injunctions of orientation and judgement fail to establish cosmopolitan foundation and actions, all reinforce the necessity of a correction to the faulty biases and assumptions that prevent triggering the emotional response of compassion. When I turned to Hannah Spector, it revealed her cosmopolitan analysis of the impact of economism on the imagination, and of bureaucracy on morality and responsibility. Between her two points, they highlight the existence of an ongoing and profound social reconstruction of the imagination and morality, which establishes an institutional framework that is difficult to break through. From all three theorists, they also establish the binary nature of cosmopolitan theorising from an educational perspective, which I respond to in the next section.

5.4   Returning to Kant

In this section I return to my arguments from Chapter three, firstly touching on my reconstruction of Immanuel Kant's interwoven political, religious, philosophical, social and educational system. Secondly, I explore some of the complexities and issues that arose from my approach to Kant's overall political, cosmopolitan system, and the underlying norms, logics, and arguments that went into establishing them, in relation to my arguments and findings in chapters one and two. Thirdly, I more explicitly connect my argument concerning Kant to the arguments of Hansen, Bracher, and Spector, to elaborate upon the inherent problems with a Kantian approach to contemporary understandings of the importance of compassion, the imagination, and bureaucracies, to cosmopolitanism and education.

Chapter three explored in detail the educational thread that extended throughout Kant's works, as well as the universalised particularity of his cosmopolitan project. The results of my analysis was the identification of the importance of an educational system for his elites, designed to pre-empt, in part at least, the influence of human selfishness (asocial sociability), projecting from the base emotions of fear and desire. Secondly, the deliberate redirection of selfishness towards economistic concerns, facilitated by global commerce that positions the non-western world at the bottom of a moral, economic hierarchy. Thirdly, I noted the essentiality of hierarchies of power and exclusions that flowed most prominently along gender, race, social capital, age, and class lines to

establish his political system. Finally, that the consequence of these exclusions and hierarchies, linked to the ahistorical nature of his universalism through the international system, reifies, joins, and locks into place these existing hierarchies and binaries.

The two emotions of fear and desire, expressed in Kant's arguments on asocial sociability, are rooted in the possibility of a Hobbesian premise of innate selfishness and his own conclusions on human nature. This fear justified Kant arguing that 'man needs a political master', establishing an eternal need for a sovereign. His arguments on the importance of recording to posterity allow for the projection of his assumed norms forwards through time, influencing future social dynamics towards his cosmopolitan ideals, and embedding the belief in innate selfishness into the need for an international system to regulate and redirect its effect through commerce. These linked ideas, in consequence, reside within the arguments of Pogge, Benhabib and Ingram, not least because in Pogge's case he outright accepts the same normative assumptions on human nature, but also because the need for the universal is premised in Kant's arguments on the selfishness of humanity, in addition to the absolute danger of emotions and the illusory nature of particularity. His hierarchical system excludes those he perceived to be the least rational and human – women, and people of colour - and the politics of his cosmopolitan system is essentially the struggle between two elite groups of educated people who are cultured, civilised, educated, and in possession of socio-econo-political power. The first (and larger) elite group lacks a moral education of a universalised nature and the second are his underdog heroes – philosopher educators – uniquely able to countermand and resist, even if only in part, the lures of temporal life. They alone recognise their duty to fight to steer higher education and other elite educated people in the direction of 'truth'.

Kant's pacific federation, republication system, and cosmopolitan right, were all designed both to respond to selfishness, and to emphasise the universal, at the same time they *require* selfishness to justify their need, and to drive through progress. Thus selfishness is an essential, ahistoricised principle of Kantian Cosmopolitanism[305] that is firmly established in his religious works, and projects outwards through the rest of writings. This religious core justifies itself through a series of circular arguments concerning progress, a state and civil society perceived in quasi-religious ways, as well as the acceptance of a specific type of human as 'natural' and from these, the eternal

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[305] This is not to say that Kant's arguments and texts are solely 'responsible' for the universalisation of selfishness, not does this imply that *only* selfishness is at the core of his works.

danger of emotions and particularity. Kant's awareness of the socially constructed nature of human existence (which influenced his decision to teach geography and anthropology throughout his career), was set out in his various empirically focussed texts[306], and established the necessity of his own developments on (pure) reason, judgement, and morality. This determined the measures needed to produce his vision of cosmopolitanism, starting with the use of discipline in education to enclose moral and social norms within the cosmopolitan sphere of universality.

Alongside this was the importance of developing the art of education into the science of pedagogy. This would produce three distinctly different educational systems that, firstly, provided a home environment where women were educated to perceive themselves as inferior. Women would serve solely as means to the end of humanity, through the institution of marriage, in the service of humanity's future as broodmares and the educators of their daughters. They are a permanent moral lesson; an always weaker antagonistic 'opponent' that men could continually test their virtue against in a struggle over their own animal desires and weaknesses. Secondly, to produce workers with a leaning to universalism disciplined into them at a young age, malleable enough to turn their abilities to whatever needs supported the pragmatic desires of the (non-moral) intelligentsia, which would in turn contribute to the global expansion of western capitalism and moral dominance. The second educational system both relies on, and reinforces selfishness through economism, continually leading to increasing levels of economic inequality and suffering, though absent war and military strife. Thirdly, for the education of elite boys to a cosmopolitan morality, who take on the duty of educating the intelligentsia (and more specifically the emulator elites) towards truth and the service of humanity, encouraging them to establish laws facilitating ever increasing commerce. His political scheme, capped with his international political propositions and pacific federation, was by necessity a social, political, economic, and educational project designed to re-engineer human interaction in a way that would facilitate the establishment of global laws and processes, eventually binding all of humanity into specific ways of thinking, acting, moralising, doing and being.

This scheme established a permanent hierarchy which institutionalised a specific way of perceiving human interaction through asocial sociability - struggle, conflict, and contest – which morally justified suffering and increasing levels of inequality to achieve legal advancement, by which progress could be measured. Finally, it awarded the 'full' status

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[306] *The Beautiful and the Sublime* (1764a), *Anthropology* (1798a), *Physical Geography* (1802) etc.

of human to *only* to a small and select group of moral philosophers and self-manifesting geniuses, although given the internal nature of morality, and the perceptive aspect of recognising morality in others, this category is porous and diffuse. Telling apart the three categories of the intelligentsia between cosmopolitans, cosmopolitan emulators, and non-cosmopolitan socio-econo-political influencers, as well as the distinction between male subjects and citizens is subjective[307]. By contrast, his arguments required the denial of the non-white races from any claims to the possession of morality, the removal of all bar the Asian race from the perceived capacity to develop and make use of empirical reasoning, and the explicit rejection of agency and morality for all women. The categories of black, brown, and woman are as a result sharp, clearly defined, and eternal, within his system.

As a result of their collective reliance on specifically Kantian cosmopolitan principles and norms, Pogge, Benhabib, and Ingram's arguments, all contain within them these same underlying logics that exist in Kant's own structure. Pogge's and as a result Rawls' closeness is clearest, and their responses to challenges that produces an interesting aspect of the theorising of universal cosmopolitanism. When Kant was challenged on race by Georg Forster, his response was the recognition of the inimical nature of slavery through Cosmopolitan Right – a lesser subsidiary concept to his core arguments, which was moderated further by its emphasis on the morality of white people over the suffering of the black people enslaved. Pogge's response to the claims of disabled people on institutional injustice and provision produced, in similar fashion to Kant's, an additional rights response – giving them guide dogs rather than (or in addition to) changing the accessibility of traffic lights so that they would also work for disabled people. When Okin challenged Rawls on gendered political inequality within the institution of the household, his (indirect) response was the deliberate removal of gender inequalities in the home from his updated institutional system.

As with their theoretical constructs, so too is there a marked tendency, (as I argued earlier in relation to the incorporation of difference, for state systems that prioritise generalised, reason, universal etc.) to act as limiters to the inclusion and acceptance of difference rather than as facilitators. This is not just for disabled people (2.2.2) with variant needs, homosexual or bisexual people (2.3.2) who experience and express choice-less individualities within a state, but also more widely for any marginalised

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[307] Kant recognised that there was a level of ambiguity to the categories of subject and citizen, within a state with a civil constitution, *for men.*

group with both perceived difference and at the lower ended of the binary. Their challenges to the universal are, as was the case for Kant, Pogge and Rawls, sidestepped or redirected into lesser theoretical structures because universal systems are unable to accommodate sustained difference and particularity. Inevitably as a result they are incapable of resolving historical injustices and inequalities. Benhabib's attempt to balance the generalised with the concrete is in this respect conceptually similar to Ingram's cyclical movement between the universal and particular through cosmopolitics. Ultimately, the problem here is the production of a universal system that cannot help but ahistoricise itself - because it is in the nature of universal systems to be ahistorical.

Another aspect of Kantianism that can be traced through to contemporary arguments is in the perception of cultures either as illusions that can be taken up or cast aside at will, or through the lens of always struggle and conflict. Pogge aligns with the former here – merging together a variety of different forms of human groupings into a single conceptual bag that all compete on the lesser additional rights level (again with little accommodation towards historical or existing inequalities). Ingram reluctantly accepts the latter and attempts to reverse-engineer it into a(n always on the) bottom-up cosmopolitics. Benhabib takes both aspects, although in her case time features more explicitly in the democratic iterations she argues for, slowly shifting the marginalised culture into the greater cultural polis, towards universalism and cosmopolitanism. There is a tendency towards ahistoricism 'over time' for Benhabib and Ingram, either in the slow democratic iterations creeping forwards, or in the cyclical swinging between the universal and particular. These tendencies cannot, as a result, but essentialise both the positive and negative aspects that make up their respective systems. All claims against them, or indeed interaction within them, have to be linguistically framed in a such a way that they conform to the concepts and structures inherent in the universal.

These positive and negatives are, as I noted previously (and which are also a key feature of Bracher's arguments), formed into two individually reinforcing chained series of concepts that work to reinforce a binary logic across multiple concepts. Firstly, the universal, general, justice as fairness, objective, reason, public and male, to which could be added white, straight, cosmopolitan etc.. Secondly, the particular, concrete, justice as care, subjective, emotion, private and female, which also implicitly includes non-white, and communitarian. Each link in the chain reinforces those it is connected to, and the

chain as a whole, just as the antagonism and contestatory nature of the binary reinforces the importance of the opposing side *as* the opposite. The ahistorical nature of the universal establishes this binary as a permanent unchanging feature of human existence. Due to the prominence of Kant's cosmopolitanism, each element of his hierarchical and exclusionary political system is mutually reinforcing and these underlying antagonistic binaries and concepts are all carried through to contemporary cosmopolitan approaches that make use of the universal nature implicit in his works and its thumbnail history.

The situation is such that, considering Kant's works more directly, simply rejecting a belief in God, for example, is not a solution to the role that God plays in Kant's arguments and political system, because God is part of his interwoven structure that incorporates the principles, actions, and influences of Nature and Providence, as well as relying on the distinctions between good/evil and bad/better. This requires a response – and the provision of alternative reasons – to replace those concepts that Kant makes use of in his arguments to justify his cosmopolitan project within a binary logic dynamic. Whilst God, Nature, and Providence might be dismissed as irrelevant to the modern secular era, the same processes (can) instead latch onto ideas like 'fate', human 'nature', and (an ultimately unquantifiable) belief in progress that would rely on democracy vs authoritarianism, capitalism versus communism, and universal human rights versus parochialism. Different elements in this chained binary system mutually reinforce the structure of binary logic itself such that engagement with the universal ultimately justifies the need for the universal. The removal of God, religion, Nature or Providence, extends far more widely than simply stripping small sections from his arguments on Perpetual Peace (1795b). It requires the reconsideration of other aspects of his works such as his justification for asocial sociability, a gender hierarchy, the need to believe, progress, commerce, and emotions, not least because Kant justifies asocial sociability, and the dynamics of his ethico-civil communities, in his religious texts.

In a similar way, If his construction of the idea of pure practical reason (and thus his justification for the promotion of universal morality) is a point of disagreement, then this wholesale impacts on the entirety of his moral educational project, which in turn affects his religious arguments, the hierarchy he reinforces with the antagonistic male-female binary in the home and in society more generally. Even more profoundly, this then fundamentally changes the category of 'human' in his works as well as the importance of empirical reasoning. This in turn affects the role of emotions in theorising and actualising cosmopolitanism. Rejecting one aspect of his racial arguments – for

example by taking the position that there was 'value' in the lives of the Tahitians, or that there is some kind of inherent value in tribal communities in the Amazon, ripples outwards into a critique of his grounds for pure practical reason as a moral argument concerning one's duty to humanity at large. It also breaks the core of his argument on the fundamentality of asocial sociability, and the necessary international developments needed to move towards his Kingdom of Ends.

Alternatively, if more laws are not or should not be considered the main measure by which to judge humanity's moral progress, then this lack of significance of such laws impacts on the whole structure of Kant's cosmopolitan vision and the arguments he constructed to justify its importance. If instead we consider a category such as *relative* inequality, or even happiness(!) as a surer indicator of human progress and moral development than law, this then echoes throughout his arguments. This affects not just the political, but also his philosophical and religious arguments too – and extends to his assessment of human nature and intellectual and emotional development.

The selective use of Kant's works requires responses to all of the ways in which other aspects that we might disagree with impact on the elements of his works that might be considered by us in our theorising of cosmopolitanism. To argue that Kant's perpetual peace or cosmopolitan right are systems that we should work towards or make use of requires both an engagement and resolution, rather than avoidance of the other, often far more problematic, aspects of his system that determine his arguments on perpetual peace and cosmopolitan right, as well as the reinforcing chained binary that establishes universalism as the level where it must be engaged with.

Bracher's solution to the issue of these hierarchies, as it pertains to the translation of empathy and sympathy into acts of compassion, is to try to avoid the tendencies of (invidious) comparison by focussing on the universal through similarity, to see the best of the other's humanity reflected in ourselves, followed by unity and integration (2013, p.14). The problem here is that whilst it engages with the problem of binaries, it tries to resolve them by moving the recognition from the negative to the positive side of the binary. In addition, avoiding this invidious tendency does not resolve the underlying emotional issue of the negative aspects of fear and comparison that premise both Kantian and contemporary cosmopolitan theorising. Whilst he argues that compassion can be triggered by sidestepping the issue and drawing on (Rawlsian) justice as fairness, it reifies the grounding of Kantian asocial sociability rather than trying to counteract it.

When we connect the Hannah Spector's approach to Kant's argument, and the elements he constructs to make his system work, aspects such as her critique of economism are in direct contradiction to Kant's reliance on commerce. When Spector firstly notes the increasingly pragmatic nature of education, and secondly that increasing levels of economism have led to the increasing bureaucratisation of the "economic-industrial complex" - and thus the increasing immoralisation of education, this has a direct impact on the possibility of the development of Kant's moral men. The heroic struggle between these men, against the needs of the state that has bureaucratised and neoliberalised its own home - academia - has stripped away the moral component that Kant relied upon to make his educational arguments, and thus his cosmopolitan vision. The battle for a Kantian cosmopolitan future appears to have been comprehensively (and perhaps inevitably, given his support for commerce) lost. Kant's reliance on international institutional systems is affected by this same bureaucratisation issue – the immoralisation of cosmopolitanism through their unavoidably bureaucratic natures.

The dialectic between the establishment of a binary logic which favours universalism alongside international political and economic systems also leads to, through their influence on education, a "self-imposed... limit to agency" (Spector 2017) that undermines the free imaginative capacities of those who are raised in an economistic educational system set up to privilege the universal over the particular in a competitive either/or binary. This Kantian international system, linked as it is to an international political system and global institutions, as well as global commerce and an international economy system[308], not only reinforces asymmetric dynamics between different groups at the state level and lower, but established a global binary system, which all lower level interactions are forced to respond to and/or accept.

The Kantian system, as I set out in chapter three, only allows for the development of imagination *within* his cosmopolitan system, but it also sharply restricts access to those who have received an education in virtue. In many respects this is, in broad terms, the path that education took through the two centuries following his demise. The harnessing of education for the explicit purpose of solidifying the people of a nation into a state institution, under a binary logic of us/them, connected to the developing sciences was,

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[308] Linking Kant to international economy I believe falls in line with his favouring of commerce and trade as the means to establish a global system by which to establish universal norms of morality. The struggle between his moral men and emulators seems to have been one not only that he was responding to in his system, but also one that his system relies upon to drive forwards progress.

as Popkewitz suggests, emblematic of much of western Europe and the US (2007). It was used to socially re-engineer or erase undesirable social, cultural, and personal traits, as well as whole societies and cultures. An economistic education was essentially the education Kant prescribed to his non-elite subjects, something which was replicated across the wester world, for the express purpose of the state's economic success, and whether we accept his gendered and racial arguments or not, the bulk of humanity experienced one version or another of this economistic education alongside the advent, establishment, and normalisation of global capitalism. Effectively, the world became re-conceived through opposing binaries.

In this section I have argued that the primacy of Kantian thought has given prime position to the institutional and international political dynamics of cosmopolitanism theorising. Along side his hierarchical and exclusionary politics, this establishes an implicit binary within cosmopolitan theorising, and a universalised, ahistorical framework that reinforces a binary framing of cosmopolitanism. The ongoing theorising of cosmopolitanism in binary terms, and its enactment in institutional ways, each serve to reinforce the framework in which cosmopolitanism fits within, and encourages both binary approaches to imagining cosmopolitanism, as well as the importance of rational over emotional interactions with cosmopolitanism.

5.5   *Nonbinary Cosmopolitanisms*

In this section, under the broad banner of 'nonbinary' cosmopolitanisms, I firstly explore in more detail Herder's arguments in relation to the theorists I have previously engage with in chapter two. I then draw on Herder's approach to language and translation to support my 'turn to Herder' in an explicitly nonbinary cosmopolitanism. I then engage with Ling's trialectical, Daoist approach to world politics which draws on similar language to Herder, from a non-western perspective.

5.5.1 Turning to Herder

Kant's cosmopolitanism, as I have touched on previously, establishes a binary with clear borders, which he sets hard limits between. His distinction of bad to better as distinct from evil to good is only one of a series of such opposing binaries. It sets the binary as the structure. Herder's system, by contrast, does not have a border that is a barrier – his monads have windows. The border, whilst defined, serves, for Herder, as a feature of

besonnheit – a place we extend from and contract to as we reflect. It is not fixed, and information and change flows in a way that Kant is uncomfortable with.

Only Ingram's framing of cosmopolitanism in chapter two, through his reinterpretation of false universals replacing false universals comes close to responding to this wider binaried situation, but his response – whilst in some ways both reasonable and perhaps even necessary, cannot help but reinforce the binary logic because it is forced to use the framework of universalism to reject and replace universalism. Linking this to Herder's view on language, the medium of Ingram's dialectic is universalism and so what is produced cannot help but also be universalist in nature, and thus it is always a movement from a false universal towards an (in theory) more universal false universal. The fundamental problem with this is that other universals are also involved in the process. As I noted when examining Benhabib's recourse to a larger institution (a larger generalised) in the case of the First Nations situation (See section 2.3.1), the recourse to the 'universal, justice as fairness, reason, male, general' of Canada because of structural sexism within the 'universal, justice as fairness' of the First Nations, does not resolve sexism. It rather exchanges it for the sexism of Canada. The binary between the particular and universal is maintained, and the interconnections of justice as fairness, generalised, universal, male, public etc. are reinforced.

In each of the theorists I explored in chapter two, there is the presumption, or the explicit assertion, of particularism, care, etc. within the family and home. This then, at one point or another encounters the universal, and in each of their schemes, it must give way, which involves the reinforcement of the universal over the particular. For Pogge, it features a political engagement and moral diversion for additional rights, in Benhabib's case the universal enforces its dominance at the social and cultural level, and for Ingram, more broadly, at the post-structural level. What Ingram's approach does allow is not just the reversal of focussing on inequality rather than equality, but more importantly, it incorporates an inwards turn and temporary hardening of marginalised group identity, which also features in Herder's arguments. This inward turn allows for the re-establishment and firming of that which makes the group the group, and activates a collective response to the universal, but because of the existing universal dominance, the response is required to come in the language of the universal, which also influences the internal dynamics of the group. Herder's framing by contrast requires responses in particularities, i.e. multiple different framings, in line with his resolution of the One and

the Many, that expands the imaginative boundaries outside a single limiting Kantian universal because each case has different boundaries at multiple levels, not defined by institutional and political (and by implication economic and bureaucratic) universalisms. It does, to be sure, rely on a thin moral (cosmopolitan) universalism, but it is the bureaucratic, institutional, and political, that are deliberately avoided.

At the heart of this binary system though is not a single binary. It is two chained, and opposing, binary 'knowledge structures' as Bracher might put it. Each link represents one aspect of these knowledges with one side dominant that links to universal, generalised, justice as fairness, equality, objective, reason, public and male, to which can be added white, logic, and cosmopolitan. The other 'submissive' side incorporates particular, concrete, justice as care, bias, subjective, emotion, private and female, which also implicitly includes non-white, and communitarian. If we then link this to the impact that economical norms, in conjunction with the institutional and bureaucratic, these three features allow for the whole dominant chain to reinforce its own chained logic.

A nonbinary meta-framing of cosmopolitanism, based on this, would in turn prevent the dominance of binaries, whilst accepting that binaries are one lens by which to understanding inhabitation of the world. But more than this, a move from binary framing to a wider nonbinary framings would by necessity need to reframe, avoid or *reject* the dualisms already inherent in cosmopolitan approaches where the dualistic, or binary framing of cosmopolitanism enclosed all into particular vs universal, fairness vs caring, public vs private, mind vs body, reason vs emotion, white vs non-white, the west vs the rest, subject vs objective etc. etc. which is emblemic of contemporary cosmopolitan theorising at the international (utopian realism) relations, political theory, philosophical, and social and cultural levels.

Whilst there is a considerable amount of literature concerning how or where to position Herder's works between relativism and pluralism. Spencer (2007) makes the interesting point that Herder should more rightly be seen as an anti-dualist. His position and approach features a blurring of monist, pluralist and relativist arguments such that the title seems somehow appropriate for a theorists who argued of both the danger of single systems developed by dominant groups, and against the possibility of an over-arching system ever being discoverable. But more critically, he attempts to weave a path between particularism and universalism that both incorporates and rejects both positions. His approach was a form of cultural pluralism, alongside emotional

(happiness) and virtue relativism (Sikka 2011, pp.35-39) underscored by the argument that humans are always already and cannot help but be intrinsically a part of cultures and society. That our understanding of ourselves and the world around us is therefore, always already partial because of the way in which language, as a cultural artefact, is a subjective medium that we cannot remove ourselves from. Partiality is therefore, according to Herder, always already the foundation of human existence.

Herder held that whilst there is a broad approximation of being (human nature) that can be identified, in part at least, there is not and can never be a single system of living (human experiencing) due to human 'plasticity' and natural cultural and environmental variability. 'Truths' that can be discovered are always subjective because understanding is always both relative, relational, and historical. He reproduces this in multiple ways; through the presentation of his works as 'fragments', 'ideas', 'leaves' and 'forestlets', his use of poetical-dialogical-dialectical language, and in his philosophical theorising. His arguments, though, do still rest upon a monist grounding of what is 'good' in that he is always consistent in his rejection of hierarchies of power between individuals and groups (Sikka 2011, p.18) and as such his underlying universal good is a qualified 'freedom', broadly defined, along with an inherent capacity to reason and love, language and a drive towards *humanität* (p.21). The rest of his epistemology falls roughly in line with contemporary pluralists, with an underlying monist foundation of universal values in conjunction with cultural plurality, he approaches from a perspective which underlies his approach to all cultures and societies (not just non-European ones). From this stems his belief in the importance of cultivating individuality through emotional and intellectual education as he attempts to weave a path where both particularism and cosmopolitanism can, to put it in Hansen's language, be woven together as they move closer and closer apart, and further and further together (2011).

I now want to turn to some specifically university educational practices that are prevalent in the teaching of political (and international political) theory. Firstly, the use of history, which then leads to secondly the framing of the teaching of theory in a modular educational system. Each of these feed back into the other, but I will start with history as this was a crucial aspect of Herder's works.

On a purely pragmatic level, history, and historical narratives, matter. They are a common tool in education, frequently used to introduce and situate both political

thinkers and theories into their relevant context. The incorporation of Herderian cosmopolitanism into the historical narrative of cosmopolitanism problematizes its overly simplistic, sanitized and very western 'thumbnail sketch' that Inglis so ably identifies (2014b). It adds a second equivalent strand, allowing Confucius to be played off against the Greeks and Romans, Spinoza, Michael de Montaigne and Maire le Jars de Gournay vs the universal natural rights cosmopolitans, before reaching the Enlightenment. This then sets Herder against Kant, as well as producing a historical strand from Herder's theorising which "would lead through Goethe, Hegel, and Marx to the Frankfurt School and the post-structuralist reaction to French Marxian theory; through Romantic psychology to Freud and the psychoanalytic dimension of post-structuralism; from the experiments of the German Romantics to the rediscovery of the ruses of writing in Nietzsche and Derrida" (Noye 2014, pp.113-114)[309]. In addition, because Herder argues that any history told is inevitably history *from that perspective it* reinforces the necessity of multiple historical (and divergent) narratives in education.

As I set out in section (4.2.5), Herder's method of exploring a topic is an intermingled discursive and gestural manner, but the teaching of theory rarely engages with or makes use of such a method. Instead, the principle technique is to provide a relatively linear trajectory for a theorist or theory, within a relatively linear modular format. A historical setting is provided, and the lecture, seminar or topic is 'top'ed and tail'ed' so that the pupil engaging with the subject can always know where in the narrative of the topic or theory they are. This method, crucially, follows a Kantian pattern that, as I suggested in (4.1.2) relies on the precision of the meaning of the text, in a linear manner with a defined start and end point. Further, this method follows a progressivism pattern, also emblemic of Kantian cosmopolitanism. The issues that Spector refers to in her articles exemplifies the problems such a teaching pattern contributes to – the restriction of the imagination (2017). The progressive method, because it is forced into a modular, discursive, progressivistic formulation, directs the imagination along those lines, into a framework that is modular, discursive, and progressivistic. The 'universal' nature of this method, a mainstay of modular courses and teaching, within the university reinforces the (obviously subtle, yet significant) directing that occurs. This is compounded with the increasing costs and reduced time that significant numbers of students experience whilst working to support their education. When there is less time for reflection, less importance placed on its necessity, and less emphasis on the crucial role of the

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[309] See also Kleingeld's exploration of Georg Forster's cultural cosmopolitanism, Novalis' Romantic cosmopolitanism (1999a), and Walker's treatment of Thomas Paines as a cosmopolitan thinker (2000)

imagination, these compound to produce the critiques that Spector, Biestla, Hansen and others all level at the neoliberal university environment and contemporary teaching practices more generally.

This is also the case in the typical teaching of international relations theory. It tops the module by establishing theory as a tool, critique or attitude (Zalewski 2010, pp.340-353) before starting with the most important theories: realism and liberalism. This establishes the pragmatic and universalist theories as *first* and *foremost*. The critical and emancipatory theories are then presented, later in the module, *within* the framing of this universal. It produces an intellectual binary between, essentially, the dominant pragmatic and the submissive moral. Given the addition of the inevitable tailing off of student attendance during the latter part of the term, the critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches encountered are of secondary significance. The boundaries of thought are already suggested by the structure of the module, and the order in which the subject is engaged with.

Following a Herderian path, requires us to take into account the fragmentary nature of the works and arguments of these theorists. To incorporate both the good and the bad of their works and try to feel one's way into the positionality of the theorist. If it comes about as *besonnheit*, then its purpose is not just to grasp the who, what and why of the theorist, but of theirs and our humanity. Not just because of the good in either of us, but more importantly the vulnerability and suffering we have experienced, and our engagement with these topics should have an accepted and important emotional component. This then emphasises the importance of imagination, necessary for the 'leap' beyond the logical and empirical to feel oneself into their position of being and becoming. Our encounter with these topics and theorists would be political, moral and emotional.

5.5.2 L.H.M. Ling and Daoist trialectics

In this final section, I go into more detail of L.H.M. Ling's approach to international relations. She approaches, as the previous section notes, as a "subaltern woman" and suggests, a trialectical interpretation which still uses the self and other, but incorporates the internal dynamics of the play off between the self and other within oneself as yin-yang. She argues that "To put it bluntly, we need pre-Westphalian trialectics to emancipate us from Westphalia's border-binaries so we can arrive at a more democratic,

less violent post-Westphalian world politics" (Ling 2017b, p.475). Ling's approach is a broader response to international relations in general, rather than my own towards cosmopolitanism, but the principle is similar. Only by breaking the borders of the western binary which sources it's arguments on a Hobbesian logic (p.478) of selfishness, and relies on the "gendering [of] borders and borderlands... [and] racialis[ing] them" (p.479) can this be achieved.

L.H.M. Ling presents an interesting example of this in her review of Linklater's *Violence and Civilization in the Western States-System* (2016). Her abstract to the review sets out what she sees as significant problematic aspects to his work:

> "Given the gravity of these concerns, I decide to write this review as a personal journey. It allows me to speak honestly and from the perspective of a caring friend. After all, the West lives in me just as I live in the West. But – and this is the point – my experiences as a subaltern woman necessarily lead to different interpretations and understandings of the West... Too often, Westphalian IR marginalises, truncates, or dismisses difference under calls for 'rigour' or 'parsimony'. Instead of abiding by these predetermined parameters of discourse that invariably shape its outcome, I resort to the art of play" (2017a, p.622)

Her review then continues with inter-spiced rhetorical questions[310], internal musings, sarcastic quips[311] and 'fourth wall' reflections[312]. This approach is reminiscent of Herder's writing style (although Ling is considerably less sarcastic and biting). It is both revealing in its emotional and personal nature, and it incorporates vulnerability and fear, as well as a host of other emotions.

Kenneth Booth's article *Security and Self Reflections of a Fallen Realist* (1994) follows a similar style to Ling's. Their articles bring into academic texts reflection as an essential part of their theorising, and theorising in general. Not just in the hidden background that contributes to the production of their articles and books, but at the forefront, as a integral aspect and driver of their works and arguments.

Ling's "Trialectical Alternative" draws from Daoism, and breaches the boundaries of

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[310] "So far, so good, I mutter to myself. Who could disagree? But an eyebrow begins to arch as I continue reading" (p.622)

[311] "How white of them. I cannot help this slip into a contemporary colloquial expression. It's a person-of-color thing. Still, it's indicative." (p.625)

[312] "For this reason, I write this review as a personal journey. Rather than resort to the usual academic convention of couched phrases that say little but reveal much, I want to share my honest reactions to what I am reading. Not only is honesty the greatest form of respect, but it is also high time I voice myself to the discipline." (p.635)

dualism because there are not two opposing concepts, but a range of inter-related concepts that mix and mingle. Dao "continuity produces multiplicity and change: 'Dao gives rise to continuity/Continuity to difference/Difference to plurality/And plurality, to multiplicity'. And reciprocity facilitates continuity despite change: 'Multiplicity gives rise to plurality/Plurality to difference/Difference to continuity/And continuity to the dao" (p.481) and prevents a simplistic break down into opposing camps because the overall dynamic is circular without two dominant poles. Yin-yang relies on inter-relatedness, of connections and relations that ripple out through ideas like border and boundaries. This resembles but is not identical to Kant's 'bad to better', absent an opposing, ideal category of 'good'. From bad to better is a relational scale that, absent good and evil, establishes relationality as the only means by which to understand them.

5.7   Conclusions

This chapter has explored the relationship between Kant and Herder's approach to education and cosmopolitanism, as it applies to contemporary approaches.

By engaging in detail with Immanuel Kant's works, it revealed the cosmopolitan educational theme that extends throughout his works, and, alongside his religious, nature, and pure reason developments, establishes the particularity embedded within the purpose and design for the setting out of his cosmopolitan vision. In addition, it set out the political structure by which his hierarchies could be seen to function, and support, his political project. In chapter two, Kant's binary logic, and Hobbesian assumptions come through, causing Thomas Pogge, Seyla Benhabib, and James Ingram to all, perhaps unwittingly, grounding themselves into their own arguments. This led to the exploration of an alternative, and highly contemporary theorist: Johann Herder, who argued for an anti-dualist approach for his own version of cosmopolitanism. His focus is on reflection, language, and humanität as a process of becoming, in marked contrast to Kant.

This final chapter examined the works of contemporary educational theorists of cosmopolitanism, identifying their essentially Herderian understanding of cosmopolitan education, and determining that Kant's works were not only opposition to their own positions, but in the case of Hannah Spector's argument, when connected to Kant's own social reconstruction of the civil state, are an implicit rejection of his political and cosmopolitan project.

Appendix 1: Main Bibliography

I have departed somewhat from the traditional way of referencing Herder and Kant (See Appendices 2 and 3). Due to the historical aspects of this thesis, as well as the translation issues especially for Herder's texts, I have listed them according to their original publication date, rather than by their translation and re-publication dates.

The collected texts by Kant and Herder are listed as edited books, rather than as a single book consisting of multiple texts. For example, *Kant, Political Writings (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought)*, has separate entries for each publication of Kant's, as well as an entry for text written by the editor(s).

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