# Don’t be antisocial

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**Abstract**

This chapter asks one main question - what exactly is ‘social’ in social media? By focusing on the deviant side of social media – The Antisocial – the chapter amplifies the things we take for granted in these platforms, and how they are constructed rather than ‘naturally’ existing. The chapter focuses on two avenues: antisocial behaviors and antisocial design. With antisocial behaviors the chapter examines two types of behaviors, one, people or bots who act in what is considered to be malicious to others such as trolling, spamming, and spreading misinformation. The second group of antisocial behaviors is about people who go against the connectivity ideal of social media and practice various types of disconnectivity such as unfriending, unliking or disconnecting, temporarily or permanently. In the second avenue, the chapter focuses on antisocial designs that can broadly be called dark patterns because these are intentional interventions in social media’s interface to create a specific social behavior. These dark patterns come in the shape of showing specific metrics, algorithmic ordering that is presented as ‘organic’, and terms of use. What these two avenues show is that nothing is inherently ‘social’ in social media and highlights the importance in examining how different mechanisms make it seem naturally produced.

**Introduction**

Social media have become an inseparable part of our lives, whether we like it or not. But one of the things that many of us take for granted revolves around what exactly *is* ‘social’ in social media? What does being social mean within these platforms? Who gets to decide, influence and shape what is social on these platforms? And how do they make specific behaviors or feature design social? This chapter aims to address these questions and

A good way to interrogate the social is by exploring how the antisocial is created. This approach was also used by scholars such as philosopher Michel Foucault and anthropologist Mary Douglas, who examined different cultures and spheres of life by focusing on the 'deviant'. By focusing on the abnormal they aimed to show how the norm and normal were constructed, who were the main people or organizations involved in these processes, what were the purposes and motives behind them, and what strategies did they use. For example, Foucault (1973; 1975) focused in his research on the way the mad, the sick, the prisoner, and sexuality have been constructed through various discursive practices (measurements, architecture, training, institutions) to shine a light on our understanding of the normative forms of these life spheres. Similarly, Douglas (1966) famous research from the 1960s on dirt shows how different cultures used 'unclean' and 'dirty' to construct different norms and values. Douglas shows that dirt is 'matter out of place', and that dirt represents disorder in specific cultures, times and places. That means that 'dirt' goes against an order (conceived as 'clean' or 'pure') that was promoted as the ideal norm and value, and it constructed by powerful institutions and people.

What Foucault and Douglas show is that nothing is abnormal, bad or negative, but rather, that social constructions turn specific behaviors objects and spaces as such because it serves a specific purpose. Importantly, those who create these deviant manifestations hold powerful positions in society in establishing specific ways of thinking, acting and organizing. In other words, the social and antisocial are intertwined, they complement each other so that specific orders, norms, and values will be developed, maintained, managed and controlled. The premise of this chapter is that nothing is inherently social or antisocial but the strategies that make them one or the other create a specific kind of mediated territory that aims to shape us in particular ways. The questions in this chapter aim to challenge things that we take for granted about the platforms we use every day. They are meant to push us to peel off the

layers of design and interactions and try to figure out how things that look natural and objective to us became this way. This chapter will explore two ways in which social media platforms construct and enact what is the antisocial: practices and interface design. In each dimension we will focus on what are considered to be antisocial behaviors, features, design and metrics, and importantly, what do they say about how the 'social' is conceived. As Nick Couldry and José van Dijck argue in regards to examining social media:

> It must mean at least researching how social media platforms (and the plural production cultures that generated them) have come to *propose* a certain version of "the social," and how users go on to *enact* it. It must also mean researching how this social/media dialectic is generating *ethical or normative* concerns, how a more effective ethics of social life *through* media can be developed, and registering the fractured spaces from where alternative proposals of "the social" might be built (Couldry and Van Dijck, 2015).

This chapter focuses precisely on the type of sociality that platforms *propose* but argues that it is more than just proposing, many time it is more about forcing, controlling and covertly influencing how we perform and understand the social. One of the main challenges of writing and doing research on media and technology is the fact that everything changes so fast. Like other writings on social media, some of the examples in this chapter may not exist by the time you read it. But the examples here are meant to point to broader questions about how media and technology companies shape, manage, control, and influence the options of living on the platforms they develop. In short, this chapter is about power and agency.

**Practices – Behaving antisocially**

Social media platforms gradually entered our lives from 2004, and people developed different kinds of relationships with them and in them. Throughout time every social media platform, from Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and TikTok, has created rules about the things you

cannot do. These things change all the time but in this section we will explore what types of behaviors are forbidden or hidden on social media and what does it say about the values of these platforms. These practices can be broadly divided into two main groups: the first is practices whereby people or bots operated by people act in what is considered to be malicious behaviors towards others such as trolling, spamming, and spreading misinformation. The second group is practices whereby people go against the connectivity ideal of social media and do various disconnectivity actions such as unfriending, unliking or disconnecting from social media temporarily (digital detox) or permanently.

*Stop harassing me*

Antisocial behaviors conducted with or in media have been an ongoing phenomena which received many names throughout the years: hackers, trolls, harassers, spammers, pirates and scammers. An example of this can be seen in one of the earliest guidelines for email etiquette, written in 1985 by Norman Shapiro and Robert Anderson. They wanted the new technology of email to be used in an efficient, productive and appropriate way, so they suggested people to 'avoid responding while emotional', and 'if a message generates emotions, look again' (Shapiro and Anderson, 1985). This was later called 'flaming' as Esther Milne (2012) shows, and was considered to be 'antisocial behaviour'. But as Milne shows in her work on early email communication practices, 'flaming' has many meanings that revolve around the normative way of behaving on the internet.

Specific people and organizations have taken or given the authority to categorise what is an appropriate online activity to construct what they perceive to be the normative behavior on the internet. A good example for this are hackers, who trick, manipulate and challenge the way media works, but often get framed as bad actors, malicious violators, and sometimes even terrorists. Digital anthropologist Gabriella Coleman (2014), argues that what computer hackers do is reorder a network infrastructure, meaning that they challenge, object and

negotiate the intended use and structure of media networks. Hackers behaviour can only be interpreted in relation to what is expected from us to do with media - to obey and follow specific rules to make things 'work properly'. Therefore, calling specific behavior as antisocial is a powerful instrument to draw boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate behaviors of actors who are participating in this mediated space.

Similarly, trolls, are often considered to be deceptive, disruptive and manipulative – They ruin the order of the 'normal' internet. However, as Whitney Phillips argues (2017), trolls are not that radically different from sensationalist corporate media, for the former trolling is part of a leisure activity and for the latter a business model. Trolls, as she observes: "are quite skilled at navigating and in fact harnessing the energies created when politics, history, and digital media collide. In short, rather than functioning as a counterpoint to 'correct' online behavior, trolls are in many ways the grimacing poster children for the socially networked world" (Phillips, 2017, p. 9). What Phillips emphasizes is that trolling is not one type of behaviour, but a spectrum that spans multiple types of behavior that can be more or less aggressive, and be continuous or momentary. Some trolls work individually, some work in groups, but self-defining trolls would act as such as a way of self-expression of their identity. Trolls, as Phillips argues, are motivated by lulz which is enjoying or laughing at someone you dislike bad luck.

Similarly, as I argue about spamming, it involves many types of behavior and it is difficult to distinguish between spamming and 'normative' behaviour by advertisers or even the platforms themselves. For example, as I show in my book Media Distortions (Carmi, 2020a), Facebook offers the option to buy Likes and at the same time calls click-farms, which are factories that employ either humans or bots to click on things for a cost – spam. But one of the best examples is about the way the World Wide Web functions and how one type of spam get legitimised whilst the other criminalized. The web is funded by advertising, which

is based on surveillance over people's behaviour across time and platforms (Zuboff, 2015). This data is then collected and packaged and repackaged as profiles and segments to be sold through real-time-bidding between multiple data brokers. The tool that enables this surveillance exploitative market is web-cookies. Web-cookies were made possible by the digital advertising industry after severe lobbying to legislators in the European Union and internet standard bodies such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (I.E.T.F.). Their aim was to make a distinction between legitimate unsolicited bulk communication (web-cookies) and an illegitimate one (spam). As I argue:

> Framing spam as dangerous was a good diversion that allowed the cookie campaign to pass without objection. This was achieved by portraying spam as a form of communication that was not requested, sent for economic purposes in covert ways, which had the ability to track people and invade their private space while exploiting their data. The exact same definition, however, can also be applied to cookies. It is just a matter of which economic purpose is considered to be the legitimate one. In other words, spam and cookies are the same communication practice (Carmi, 2020a, p. 143).

Once more as these scholars show, the main purpose of defining and constructing specific behaviors and content as antisocial comes from platforms aim to make more profit. Whether these are hackers, trolls, or spammers – maintaining the business model is the strongest drive for making a distinction between social and antisocial. In the next section we will explore how people themselves make actions that go against these aspirations.

*I don't like this anymore*

When social media took over our lives they started to shape new kinds of expectations from people. The experience of always being 'connected', always being available and having to 'share' every details of our lives were portrayed as an emancipation for the 'user'. Finally,

people were able to share their thoughts without the old media gatekeepers. But along these portrayals of democratising media and expression of the people, at the same time, many people did not feel 'empowered' by having to constantly be online and sharing a lot of information about their lives. Therefore, some people started to develop different practices of resistance to social media, by leaving, disconnecting or pausing their participation in various degrees.

So what are disconnections? Ben Light and Elija Cassidy (2014) argue that they can come in many shapes and forms such as unfriending, logging off, removing timeline content, untagging content and disconnecting from apps. Light and Cassidy also argue that disconnections can happen with humans and nonhumans: "Disconnectors are those human and non-human actors that engage with us and engage us in disconnective practice. Disconnection Modes refer to the varying natures of automated and manual disconnective activity we undertake with SNS. Importantly, these modes can be enacted with and by those actors we might see as non-human" (Light and Cassidy , 2014, p. 1173). Disconnections are a way to disrupt the always connected 'nature' that social media inscribed in their design, it goes against the way we are shaped into sociality.

Leaving Facebook, as Eric Baumer et al (2013) describe, can take several practices such as leaving, limiting use, deactivating and deleting their accounts and resisting joining to begin with, or non-use as Baumer et al. call it. The main motivations for these disconnection practices are concerns around privacy, data use and misuse, decrease in work productivity, and social and professional pressures. Because being online on social media has quickly become a norm, when people decide to disconnect their behaviour can be perceived as antisocial. As Baumer et al. highlight "social pressures can similarly stigmatize non-use as a deviant behavior; one would leave Facebook only 'if something was wrong.' Just as various pressures can lead to non-volitional non-use, such pressures can also lead to non-volitional

use" (Baumer et al., 2013, p. 3265). Social media norms of what it means to be social can create pressures on people who defy, challenge or refuse to accept them.

Many people, as Pepita Hesselberth (2017) argues, feel uncomfortable with the ubiquitous presence of networked devices that demand that people will always be connected and available. Disconnectivity, as she shows, has also been discussed as a form of media resistance under the conditions of neoliberal reform. These discourses, then, go against the cultures of connectivity which are presented to us as if there is 'no outside' of them. As José van Dijck argues ironically in her book on cultures of connectivity, "[o]pting out of connective media is hardly an option. *The norm is stronger than the law*; if not, it would be too hard for any regime to control its citizens" (Van Dijck, 2013, p. 174). Norms of social media's ideal of sociality engineer society.

Social media platforms have become a nuisance, interfering in multiple spheres of our lives, as Tero Karppi (2018) argues in his book about disconnections. As he observes, "disconnections, per se, are important and even elemental. Disconnections, in our network culture, take different forms: a break, a manifesto, an act, a form of resistance, a failure. They express the vulnerabilities of social media and bring us to the volatility of social media business models based on establishing, enabling, and sustaining connectivity" (Karppi, 2018 p. 2). Karppi highlights that disconnection becomes a problem for social media platforms, who want to keep people who use them more engaged since this is their core business model. Therefore, as Karppi argues, social media platforms aim to control people's experience and at the same time to keep value and attention in the system.

Some people choose to disconnect only temporarily. As Ana Joge (2019) says in her examination of Instagram interruptions, such temporary disconnection are attempts of people to self-manage themselves and maintain their wellbeing. As she observes, people feel overwhelmed by the acceleration of time on social media, therefore, temporary interruptions

allow them to gain control and have a better experience when they come back. However, Joge emphasizes that digital disconnections have become a performance of people which ultimately conforms with social media's connectivity values. People who use Instagram and perform a 'balanced' way of life, also judge others who do not act this way. This kind of behavior reinforces the ideas that people are individually responsible for their social media use, and if they feel unwell from it is their fault. Such performances, as Joge argues, also do not advocate for alternative platforms or to force social media platforms to be accountable for the way they impact people.

Finally, as researchers, journalists, policymakers and activists relying on what social media platforms also has huge consequences of what we can know, ask and examine. As Nicholas John and Asaf Nissenbaum (2019) show in their paper, it was impossible for them to get data from multiple social media companies about people's disconnectivity patterns. This is dangerous, as they argue, because it means that the theories and insights that scholars produce is shaped by what is available to them and hence leans more on notions of positivity and connectivity. As they observe, "any theory of social life that ignored phenomena such as breaking up, quitting a workplace, changes in taste, or dropping out would at best be partial, and any methodology that a priori rendered such phenomena invisible would surely be discounted. However, unfriending, unfollowing, unliking, leaving a group, muting a conversation, and more, are all meaningful social actions to which SNSs' APIs are blind" (John and Nissenbaum, 2019 p. 9). By hiding disconnectivity from people and researchers, as John and Nissenbaum argue, social media platform misrepresent all facets of our social and antisocial engagements, It is precisely how we should examine, understand and perform what is meaningful to us – the social – that social media companies want to shape, control and manage.

## Dark patterns

In the sections above we have talked about what kinds of behavior are considered to be antisocial and what does that mean about social media's political economy, norms and values. But behaviors are not the only thing that can be deviant, different kinds of design can also have different norms and values engineered into them. That could be from interface design, to features offered, colors of buttons or text, language used and metrics. These deviant designs can broadly be called as dark pattens. Dark patterns is a concept that was coined by Harry Brignull in 2010 to represent deceptive interface designs. What dark patterns mean in our context is that the design of social media can nudge and sometimes force us to do specific things. Dark patterns influence what we can and cannot do and consequently also shape how we understand these environments.

In this section we will focus on three main interface designs that constitute dark patterns and what kind of norms and values social media intend for us to perform and understand by designing them: Metrics, newsfeed and terms of use.

### *I'm counting on this*

Media companies have been using metrics for years. Companies usually used metrics along with advertisers for different purposes – understanding how many people watch or read their content, whether it is cinema, radio, newspapers or television. This has been called audience measurement. It has been important for media companies to understand that for various reasons, but the main one is to match audiences to advertisements according to these metrics. As Joseph Turow argues "[w]hen the internet came along, media buyers saw its interactive environment as terrific terrain for expanding their numerical understanding of audiences—and for using the measures and labels directly to sell products" (Turow, 2012, p. 20). But social media took metrics a step further and started to design different metrics that enable people to indicate if they like, share or comment on something. These new metrics quickly

became a social value to assess popularity, reputation, status, and worth. Nancy Baym (2014), for example, examines how social media metrics affect the music industry and specifically the relationships between the fans and artists. As she argues, these metrics are not real representations, they skew the way algorithm work to amplify (sometimes through bought likes) or demote specific behaviors:

> the more a post or user receives comments, likes or follows, the more likely algorithms are to make them visible to other users. To some extent, counts reflect opaque algorithmic decision making as much as they reflect expressions of interest. Another skew in social media counts is that they are designed to reflect only positive affect, another element of the politics of platforms (Baym, 2014).

Importantly, as Baym shows, Facebook only enables 'positive' interactions, these can be expressed through the 'Like' button. Such platform affordances flatten our experience in, and understanding of sociality in these mediated spaces. Similarly, Benjamin Grosser (2011) has shown in his net art project, the Facebook Demetricator, the politics of metrics on Facebook. The Facebook Demetricator is a browser addon which removes the metrics the platform shows on its interface such as friends, pending notifications, events, friend requests, messages/chats waiting, photos, places, and others. It also removes the timestamp, meaning when the post or comment was created. Grosser created this feature to examine how interface designs influence our behaviour and persuade or pressure us to act in specific ways. He emphasises that:

> Not all metrics collected by Facebook are visible in the interface, however. This raises the question of what specific metrics Facebook reveals to its users and which ones it keeps to itself. How do these hidden and revealed metrics differ, and what drives the company's decisions to show or conceal data? (Grosser, 2011).

Grosser tested the Facebook Demetricator on several people who installed his plugin and experienced Facebook without metrics. The results were that people engaged less and felt less pressure to do so. That means, that the interface design of metrics are meant to push people for more engagement. In addition, the timestamp, as Grosser shows, presents an engineers and ideological prioritization of the new, creating a sense of urgency to not miss anything that has happened on the platform. He points four strategies Facebook metrics employ: competition, emotional manipulation, reaction and homogenization. Through these strategies Facebook prescribes, structures and manages social interactions, while suppressing, hiding or not enabling others. But beyond that, Grosser argues that the broader picture is that the metrification of our interactions and relationships make us understand our digital lives in a market narrative.

In addition to shaping and controlling how we behave, metrics, as Benjamin Jacobsen and David Beer (2021) show also influence our memories. They show how quantifying memories affects memory making and memory practices in what they call quantified nostalgia, the way: "metrics are variously performative in memory making, and how regimes of ordinary measures can figure in the engagement and reconstruction of the digital past in multiple ways, shaping both how people engage with it in the present, how they remember it, and how they feel about those automated memories" (Jacobsen and Beer, 2021). What they argue is that quantified nostalgia is a way for social media platforms to produce an ideal type of memory that is meant to raise these feelings with the person using them. In this way, social media platforms try to shape our feelings and emotions and in turn our behaviors towards a specific sociality, in their case – one that evokes more engagement and hence more profit. Another design feature that has managed to conceal the way it influences us because it looks objective is the 'newsfeed'. In the next section I will examine how it continuously changes

according to social media platforms economic incentives, despite their 'antisocial' impacts on people.

*Nothing is organic in this feed*

Many people open their mornings and finish their days by scrolling on their news feeds. That is the space social media companies turned into your daily updates of everything that is important to you. From news articles, to posts from your friends and family, status changes, groups on stuff you care about like protests and LGBTQI rights, and onto advertisements from brands you liked, you get a feed of what is relevant to your profile. Or at least, that is what social media platforms claim they are doing. Many people still think that algorithms are objective and hence think that what they see and engage with on their 'feed' depends on what interests them, what 'the algorithm' thinks is best for their personalized experience. But as this section will show, constructing the notion of 'organic feed' is a calculated strategy meant to hide the politics and economic incentives that stand behind the ordering of your feed.

Various scholars have exposed the way algorithms are bias, from Eli Pariser famous book on Filter Bubbles (2011) showing how algorithms and their ideal way of ordering through personalization puts people in 'filter bubbles' where they engage with people and content that they agree with rather than being exposed to diverse opinions. Other scholars like Virginia Eubanks (2018) and Safiya Noble (2018) show how algorithms and automated decision making discriminate the poor (in Eubanks' work) and women of color (in Noble's work). In addition, Anna Jobin and Malte Ziewitz (2018) talk about how metaphors like 'organic' hide the way Google search is influenced by economic incentives and fuelled by a two sided market whereby "users search for useful information, advertisers search for users". As these works show, algorithms are far from being neutral or objective and as a society we need to have a better understanding of the entities, organizations, political and economic incentives behind them.

Newsfeeds are built from algorithms, and while they can amplify and prioritise specific things, they can also demote, decrease, filter and disable specific behaviors that the platforms that develop them consider to be 'antisocial'. As I argue elsewhere "platforms don't just moderate or filter 'content'; they alter what registers to us and our social groups as 'social' or as 'experience.' Their design influences behavioral patterns across different conversations, groups, and geographical areas, with different frequencies and paces" (Carmi, 2020b). That means that behaviors, content, and interactions that can harm the business model of social media platform are categorized as antisocial and the design of these platforms will use any interface option available to them to remove those things.

A great example for that can be seen in the way Facebook has been conducting endless experiments on its newsfeed algorithms, as the *New York Times* journalist Kevin Roose (2020) argues. A particular interesting experiment was to understand how to promote what they define as 'civility' where they reduced content on people's newsfeed that they defined as 'negative. The outcome of that, however, was that with that algorithmic tweak people were less likely to come back to the platform and hence Facebook decided to reintroduced 'negative' content. What these moves suggests is that although decreasing/removing negativity from people's newsfeed has a better impact on people's wellbeing, because they engage less with platforms social media platforms cannot afford to integrate this change. Sociality in this case has to include negative impacts on people's lives because they help the platforms make profit, which is, as this experiment shows, the strongest value. Negative, or antisocial content in this case, are therefore an essential part of social media companies' business model.

As this experiment shows, there is a delicate balance that platforms have to maintain between their desire to make more profit by people who are engaging more on their platforms, and spreading negative and potentially harmful content, which can also include

disinformation and misinformation. As journalists Jasper Jackson and Alexandra Heal (2021) from the Bureau for Investigative Journalism showed, the platform enables creators to make a profit from spreading misinformation about the Covid-19 pandemic. These tools are, for example, via 'fundraising' or the 'shopping' sections where these Pages can sell different related products. As Jackson and Heal observe, Facebook profits from popular individual and brans spreading misinformation because it take between 5-30% on its 'Star currency', which is a tool that enables fans 'tip' creators who stream live videos. But ultimately Facebook benefits from people who keep on engaging with misinformation because they stay logged into the service and this experience exposes them to more advertisements. Of course, Pages that spread misinformation is against the company's policy, but when it comes to enforcement it seems that platforms are more lenient, especially when it means they make more profit. So although social media platforms have rules about harmful content, they still prioritise it on their newsfeed because content that is emotional drives more engagement and hence profit.

Some of these filtering and removing content that goes against the platform's rules is not conducted by algorithms but rather by commercial content moderators, as Sarah Roberts coined them (2019). These are workers who are usually hired by third party companies to filter and remove content or profiles/P that go against the platforms' rules. These rules can vary between profanity, inciting hate and pornography. But as scholars who investigate their roles argue (Gillespie, 2018), since they work behind our screens, most of the times we have no idea what they take away and how does that affect how we behave and understand these platforms. Some of the disputes revolve around the fact that the values of the company are to make profit and hence any content that might upset advertisers, such as women's nipples and nudity (Myers-West, 2017), will be removed from the platform to maintain the economic circulation. As Roberts argues:

> The internal, extremely detailed policies by which the commercial content moderation workers adjudicated content were not available to the public but, rather, were treated as trade secrets to be used internally, and ultimately functioned in the service of brand management for MegaTech… It could also trigger difficult questions about the values undergirding those policies, a fact of which the moderation admins were certainly aware (Roberts, 2019, p. 93).

The purpose behind making their work hidden is to make it seem as though the algorithms are doing this work, and that this points to objectivity and neutrality of how our newsfeed order our experiences. However, the main goal is to make platforms unaccountable to the things that they remove, and design interfaces that makes our experience 'frictionless' and at the same time constructing a certain type of sociality. The rules that social media platforms make are often found in their terms of use, which are another form of dark pattern, as the next section will reveal.

*Tl:dr*

A crucial dark pattern that underpins and authorizes a lot of what we have discussed in this chapter comes from the new type of contract that social media introduced, what we all know as 'terms of use'. As Mark Lemley said about terms of use on the internet, they "control (or purport to control) the circumstances under which buyers of software or visitors to a public Web site can make use of that software or site" (Lemley, 2006, p. 460). As Lemley argues, the online environment introduced easier way to create contracts in the shape of clickwrap licenses agreements. These types of contracts are a development of shrinkwrap contracts that Lemley says were prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s and included licenses for physical copies of software. Once people loaded the software and ran the program that meant that they 'agree' to the terms of the contract. In these agreements people who visit websites sign electronically by clicking "I agree" to a set of terms which present a 'take-it-or-leave-it' kind

of situation. But as Wauters et al. (2014) argue, this "situation may tilt the interests in favour of the provider and result in a lower degree of protection for the user" (ibid, p. 293). Terms of use, as these scholars observe, help to protect social media platforms from possible threats and what they perceive as antisocial behaviour from the people who use their platforms.

We can think of social media design as a contract, as Woodrow Hartzog argues (2010). As he says "website features and design should, in some contexts, be considered enforceable promises. Code-based negotiations for confidentiality can form implied-in-fact contracts or give rise to a claim for promissory estoppel" (Hartzog, 2010, p. 1638). One of the main issues with these contracts that make them part of dark patterns is that they are long, jargon laden and they change constantly. Since people use dozens of apps, services and websites, this means that reading all the terms of use can take weeks if not months.

One of the exploitative natures of terms of use is that people do not understand what is being done with their data, even if they try. As Hartzog adds "[b]road, sweeping agreements that control the use of personal information lack the specificity to be truly effective in providing meaningful control over the flow of personal information because users often disclose both sensitive and innocuous personal information on the same website" (Hartzog, 2010, p. 1652).

Importantly, as Jared Livingstone shows (2011), people have no bargaining power around these contracts, so it is a 'take-it-or-leave-it' situation where social media platforms cement their powerful position. What terms of use do is legitimize social media platforms' behaviour through a contract that binds people in many rules they are not aware of because they have not read or understood what is written in them. In other words, terms of use authorizes social media platforms antisocial behaviour.

**Conclusion – Antisocial complex**

The social cannot exist without the antisocial, this is what this chapter was all about. While our lives become inseparable from social media platforms, it is important to continuously challenge and question what they tell us is the 'social'. This can be through specific behaviors or platform design that influences, nudges and manages our understanding, feelings and agency towards a specific kind of sociality. The type of things we are told are negative, bad, problematic, unacceptable or inappropriate can tell us a lot about what are the norms and values of these platforms. But just like society constructs specific rules and norms, so do social media platforms. These are not neutral, objective or permanent, but rather, constantly negotiated, challenged and changed according to multiple motives, mainly economic and political.

Not taking the 'social' for granted is especially important as most of our interactions happen in these platforms. Whether we are communicating with our family, friends or customers, or read about politics and engage with our local neighbourhood or politicians – it is important to understand that our social networks are mediated by biased infrastructures that want us to engage and understand our networks, ourselves and these spaces in specific ways.

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