City Research Online

City, University of London Institutional Repository

An Open Platform for Personal Health Record Apps with Platform-Level Privacy Protection

P. Van Gorp[a,*], M. Comuzzi[b], A. Jahnen[d], U. Kaymak[a], B. Middleton[c]

[a] *Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands*
[b] *City University London, United Kingdom*
[c] *Partners HealthCare and Harvard Medical School, MA, USA*
[d] *Public Research Center Henri Tudor, Luxembourg*

Abstract

One of the main barriers to the adoption of Personal Health Records (PHR) systems is their closed nature. It has been argued in the literature that this barrier can be overcome by introducing an open market of substitutable PHR apps. Subsequently, the requirements for the underlying platform have already been derived. In this paper, we argue that our recently proposed, cloud-based PHR platform satisfies these requirements better than its alternatives. The so-called MyPHRMachines platform leverages Virtual Machines as flexible and secure execution sandboxes for health apps. There are no impediments to pushing hospital- or patient-generated data to a MyPHRMachines instance, nor do we prevent patients from sharing data with their trusted caregivers. External software developers also have minimal barriers to contribute innovative apps to the platform. They are only prevented from pushing patient data outside a MyPHRMachines cloud. We demonstrate the potential of MyPHRMachines by presenting two externally contributed, VM-based apps. Both apps provide functionality that goes beyond the state-of-the-art in their application domain. Yet, they did not require any MyPHRMachines platform extension. The apps also have partly overlapping functionality, which illustrates how PHR functionality can shift fundamentally from platform-provided to market-driven functionality.

Keywords: Personal Health Records, Apps, Architecture, Trust, Privacy

1. Introduction

Without the participation of the patient, a health care provider cannot effectively treat (or prevent) disease-causing behaviors. The doctor-patient relationship is therefore gradually evolving from a paternalistic approach to a more participatory model [1, 2]. Houston and Ehrenberger argue that a key factor for successful patient participation is information sharing: not only do patients

---

*Corresponding author
  Email address: p.m.e.v.gorp@tue.nl (P. Van Gorp)

require good information to care for themselves but also to effectively communicate with their physicians [3]. Empowering the patient with information is particularly important since information exchange between different caregivers is very limited [4], especially when thinking beyond local business networks (such as the Partners HealthCare system in the US state of Massachusetts or the The Eye Care Network in the Netherlands [5, 6]).

The two key stakeholders in this scenario, i.e., patients and their physicians, are quite willing and capable to share information: already before the turn of the millennium, for instance, various online surveys demonstrated high adoption rates of e-mail as a patient-provider communication medium [7]. E-mail information sharing, unfortunately, has several limitations: most notably, message exchanges are completely ad-hoc, which makes it very hard for patients to build and maintain a longitudinal record of their health data, use the integrated record to effectively care for themselves and share all their health data effectively and securely to their caregivers.

To overcome these limitations, Personal Health Record (PHR) systems have been proposed by various authors and companies [8]. PHR have many societal benefits, such as to empower patients in the management of their own health and to foster interoperability among health care providers, possibly reducing the overall costs of diagnosis and treatment [9]. Policy makers, therefore, have repeatedly called for technologies that "enable patients, doctors and other health care providers to access personal health records securely through the Internet, no matter where a patient is seeking medical care"[10, 11]. Unfortunately, PHR adoption levels are very low due to privacy concerns as well as the lack of convincing medical and business use cases. The US department of Health and Human Services, for instance, has invested hundreds of millions dollars with the expectation that "once the market has structure, patients, providers, medical professionals and vendors will innovate, create efficiencies and improve care" [10].

One of the reasons for the low adoption of PHRs is their lack of openness at the platform level. Mandl et al. [12] have addressed the issue by looking at positive and negative experiences from various health record projects. The authors conclude that PHR technologies should go beyond the "conventional" requirements for Electronic Health Record (EHR) technologies, i.e., beyond interoperability, security, and privacy. PHR systems should support open innovation and, therefore, they should (a) reduce impediments to the transfer of data, (b) they should provide substitutable "apps", and (c) they should allow competition and "natural selection" for high-value, low-cost software components. Regarding substitutability, the authors clarify that it should be possible to combine components from different vendors and there should be no impediments to replace software components over time [12].

In this paper, we propose the use of MyPHRMachines, a PHR platform that satisfies the above requirements. The platform is unique in its openness: not only does it have the least possible impediments to the transfer of data, it is also unique in its guarantee that the platform design *prevents* apps from violating privacy requirements. These properties are based on the use of Virtual Machines as flexible and secure execution sandboxes for the apps. To show

the effectiveness of the approach, we discuss externally contributed apps for Radiation Exposure Measure (REM). As we will show later, radiology and, more specifically, REM, is a typical application scenario that can benefit from an open PHR platform.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the shortcomings of current PHR platforms with regards to openness. Section 3 describes the MyPHRMachines platform. Section 4 presents and gives the motivation for the REM application scenario, while Section 5 describes the REM apps in MyPHRMachines. Finally, 6 discusses the contribution of the paper by providing a link also to the PHR literature.

2. Openness of PHR Platforms

Opening a platform enables its owning company to strategically open to outsiders aspects related to the development or commercialization of the platform [13].

There are broadly two different approaches to opening a platform. The first entails giving up some *control* over the platform, whereas the second entails only granting *access* to the platform to outsiders [14]. When a company devolves all *control* over a platform, there is no longer a single party who controls its evolution. In terms of PHR platforms, this would mean for example that the development activities for a platform are opened up to the open source community, or to selected commercial software vendors. The Indivo platform is the primary example of this form of PHR platform openness [15]: starting from a development project at the Harvard Medical School and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the project was opened up to the open source community as well as to Google, Microsoft and other commercial players. The second form of openness (granting *access*) implies that the platform owner maintains control over its core development, yet calls for the market to provide complementary innovation around it. Apple's App store is a well known example of this approach, where the company not only preserves control over the platform's development, but even controls the transactions on the platform. Microsoft HealthVault is a well known PHR platform that is open to apps from third party developers while Microsoft controls the core platform [16].

When aiming at developing an open PHR platform, the novelty of our work is in the latter category: we provide *app developers* with open *access* to the app platform but we control the platform to guarantee that patients can blindly trust the platform in the protection of their personal data. As illustrated below, other PHR platforms are either (1) completely closed or (2) pose too tight restrictions on the type of data that can be managed by the platform. In the latter case, technical guarantees regarding the *prevention* of data abuse are completely missing. Therefore, for those PHR platforms that grant app developers access to deploy their apps, access is only granted to trusted parties that can be held liable in case they are found to violate their promises to the platform provider and end users. MyPHRMachines makes such app-specific trust considerations irrelevant, since technical privacy protection measures are

already implemented at the platform level. Consequently, a MyPHRMachines-based App store can be opened up securely also to non-trusted app developers.

PHR system architectures can be classified into provider-tethered and free-standing ones [17]. For the provider-tethered variant, the PHR system is essentially a portal extension of the Hospital Information System (HIS). Typically, HISs only contain data from one health care provider or institution. Examples in this category are EPIC MyChart [18] and MyHealtheVet [19], tethered from EPIC EHR and the HIS of the US Department of Veterans Affairs, respectively. Free standing PHRs are stand-alone PHR platforms, which can store data generated and provided by various health care institutions or by the patient. Examples in this category are HealthVault and Indivo version X [15]. In principle, this classification only clarifies which stakeholder controls the PHR platform (a single health organization versus an independent party). In practice, it turns out that so far all tethered PHR systems are completely closed while some free-standing PHR systems make their platform accessible to external app builders. Still, there are fundamental issues even for these free-standing solutions. Below, we discuss some of those issues for the cases of Microsoft HealthVault and Indivo X.

Microsoft HealthVault provides a set of libraries (e.g. for Java and .NET developers) to Create, Read, Update, and Delete (CRUD) all types of data in the HealthVault system. The libraries are based on a Web service API. Similarly, Indivo X enables external software to perform CRUD operations on its health data through XML-based standard data models. Indivo X is also integrated with SMART [20], a more general solution to support the exchange of health data among health institutions. SMART provides an OWL-DL ontology to semantically annotate health data. Unfortunately, for both platforms, two of Section 1's requirements are not satisfied:

1. existing platforms do not *actively prevent* apps from violating end-user privacy requirements, and
2. existing platforms pose *impediments on the transfer of health data*.

The first issue relates to Mandl et al.'s "conventional" requirements for EHR systems, while the second one relates to their extra requirements for openness.

The privacy issue is caused by the fact that neither HealthVault nor Indivo X apps are executed inside a controlled ecosystem. Instead, app code is executed on third party infrastructure and if users grant an app access to load PHR data then that data can travel freely to the servers of the app providers. Then, in terms of liabilities, the platform providers (Microsoft and others) push responsibilities to the app builders and the end-users. This implies that (1) all app builders need to provide a terms of use agreement that promises that no patient data will be abused and (2) end-users need to review and consent such agreements for each and every app. While such agreements, of course, can protect end-users ex-post (e.g., legally) they do not physically prevent app providers to maliciously use the PHR data behind the scenes. Also, for app builders with no interests at all in patient data, this need for app-specific data use agreements forms an undesirable barrier to entering the app market.

The second issue (i.e., impediments on the transfer of health data) is caused by the fact that data can only be stored on the HealthVault or Indivo X based servers if it strictly conforms to the data formats that have been selected by the platform providers. This is a fundamental limitation since it prevents a market-based evolution of such formats. As a practical example of the impediment, we observe that it is impossible to store radiology images at the level of the Indivo X platform and the European deployment of HealthVault. A practical negative consequence is that, for example for Microsoft HealthVault, many third party apps store data outside the platform's data repository. More specifically, there are various third party HealthVault extensions that do store radiology images. Yet, this content is stored on third party servers. That is in conflict with the substitutability of the PHR apps, since only the apps from that third party can then access the radiology data. Over time, platforms such as Indivo X and HealthVault may catch up with such example limitations but we argue that fundamentally, there will always be medically meaningful data for which the competitive app market moves ahead of platform-imposed standard data formats.

In the remainder, we explain how MyPHRMachines overcomes these issues.

3. MyPHRMachines as an Open and Trustable PHR App Platform

In this paper we focus on the aspects of MyPHRMachines that make it an open platform. Other details about MyPHRMachines can be found in previous work of the authors [21, 22, 23].

MyPHRMachines is a cloud-based PHR system. It gives patients convenient access to remotely running virtual machines (VMs), which give access to all their PHR data. VMs are the MyPHRMachines-specific *"app"* technology. VMs run as a service on a trusted and powerful hardware infrastructure and fulfill the role of app containers. We informally define apps as light-weight applications that provide very focused functionality (as opposed to monolythic information systems). MyPHRMachines apps can be accessed from regular computers and from tablets or mobile phones.

Section 3.1 summarizes the technical architecture of MyPHRMachines, while Section 3.2 discusses specifically the privacy protection as a service enabled by the design of MyPHRMachines. An example app, i.e. a radiology image viewer, is presented in Section 3.3. While that example app has been contributed by the MyPHRMachines platform developers, the two apps from Section 5 are provided by third parties. Section 3.4 briefly explains the process of deploying new apps to MyPHRMachines.

3.1. Technical Architecture

MyPHRMachines has a layered architecture and reuses various robust components such as an industrial-strength hypervisor and an open source data cloud with interfaces to commercial data clouds. The platform is extremely flexible with regards to PHR data formats and middleware and it makes apps available as a service via thin client technologies.

Figure 1: Layers in the architecture: apps run as a service on trusted infrastructure.

Figure 1 shows the MyPHRMachines architecture. At the highest aggregation level, MyPHRMachines comprises a client layer as well as a server layer. The server layer is further decomposed into an execution layer and a storage layer.

MyPHRMachines relies on thin clients: a client should be able to (1) access the app store, (2) run a viewer to work with remote VMs and (3) to up- and download PHR data via the *data cloud* components. The three arrows leaving the *Browser* component in Figure 1 show that any device with HTML and Java support already support the above three functions without any MyPHRMachines-specific software installation. The *Native RDP Client* represents native client software required to support function (2) by non-Java enabled clients, e.g. clients running iOS, which does not support Java at the time of writing. MyPHRMachines, in fact, relies on the standard Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)to view remote VM sessions. The *Native Own Client* and *Dropbox* clients support function (3). For its data cloud functionality, MyPHRMachines relies upon off-the-shelf software from the mature OwnCloud project [24]. Besides providing secure storage within the MyPHRMachines infrastructure, the OwnCloud component also enables users to plug in their DropBox or Google Drive for mounting less sensitive data [25] (see the link connecting elements of *Dropbox* to the *Private Data Cloud*)

In the Storage layer, Figure 1 shows also the *Private Network Folders*. While the private data cloud requires an ad-hoc, virtual network to the OwnCloud server that runs within the MyPHRMachines infrastructure, these mounted folders are accessible even to VMs that have no network interface at all. Although the OwnCloud server is residing in a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ [26]), protected by a firewall, it is not as secure as the mounted folders mechanism since in theory an app could hack its way from the ad-hoc network to the OwnCloud server and then to the public internet. This is impossible for VMs without a network interface.

The execution layer of the MyPHRMachines server contains two components: the *Web Portal* (or *AppStore*) and the *Hypervisor*. The web portal manages the access control of users to apps. This can be therefore seen as the *"app store"* of MyPHRMachines. The app store also communicates with the Hypervisor, which is a generic piece of software to start, stop, and clone VMs and control their Internet access. MyPHRMachines currently uses VirtualBox as an off-the-shelf hypervisor heavily used only in other industries (e.g., banking). Finally, messages between the app store and the hypervisor are delivered via SSH, a secure and stable communication protocol.

Patients can communicate with their health providers in two ways: first, they can delegate the remote access to a VM and, secondly, they can share the raw PHR data using the underlying data cloud. This private data cloud provides file sharing features similar to DropBox and Google Drive but also ensures that the physical location of the data is by default within the trusted MyPHRMachines infrastructure. This feature was added to MyPHRMachines recently (i.e., after the publication of our previous work [21, 22, 23]). It relates in general to removing impediments to the transfer of data between trusted parties (cf., the criteria from Section 1). Among others, it enables patients to grant their GP a copy of specific PHR files if they are needed for the sake of accountability. Also, thanks to the mature OwnCloud sync client, patients can conveniently upload new PHR content (e.g., a copy of a new radiology CD).

Open innovation is supported by MyPHRMachines by the fact that any health care institution or software provider can contribute a new app by remotely cloning an existing VM image, installing the new software remotely, and publishing it to the app store. App developers can choose between accessing health data files directly from the VM file system or accessing data through a more heavy-weight Application Programmer Interface (API). The platform is flexible in that any kind of middleware that runs on an operating system that can be virtualized can also be used to build apps.

VM sessions in MyPHRMachines are stateless, meaning that in general data that is written to the local disk of a VM will be discarded upon VM shutdown. This enables app developers to realize updates of their VMs without having to worry about migrating patient-specific VM sessions. MyPHRMachines does enable apps to create or update data persistently in a patient's PHR. This is realized by means of a writable mounted folder in the patient's VMs. Additionally, data can be persisted via the private data cloud.

3.2. *Privacy Protection as a Platform Service*

MyPHRMachines protects privacy as a platform service. As indicated in Section 2, no other platform provides technical mechanisms for this, while this is seen as essential in the context of the requirements discussed in Section 1. This subsection clarifies that, in contrast to the novelty of having this service, its implementation is relatively simple to realize, given the architecture described in the previous subsection.

MyPHRMachines can provide a privacy protection service thanks to its very design, which is based on the principle that software should be moved to data

rather than vice versa. Once all software is available in the MyPHRMachines private cloud, apps no longer need access to external Internet services. The MyPHRMachines execution layer therefore enforces that published VMs have no network interface with Internet access. Even if a malicious app developer, for example, installs malware in a VM, such malware will fail to push data outside of the app container.

PHR platforms lacking the ability to completely block Internet access by apps have to rely on complex analyses of the data streaming out of their ecosystem (e.g., has the patient approved access to the data by the app builder? Is the app builder's server properly authenticated? Is traffic properly encrypted? Can the data pass over servers that are subject to the US patriot act? Etc.).

Note that MyPHRMachines *does not* guarantee privacy protection in general. In particular, since MyPHRMachines aims to reduce impediments to the transfer of data, patients can choose to use the OwnCloud component in combination with a US-based cloud storage provider (e.g., DropBox), and therefore be subject, for instance, to the NSA scrutiny. Yet, MyPHRMachines *does* guarantee that PHR data is protected from app builders (and their governments). This implies that when a MyPHRMachines cloud is deployed on EU infrastructure, the NSA could not force US-based app builders to give access to PHR data on which their apps are applied. This example implication is of high political relevance in current times.[1].

3.3. Example App: Radiology Image Viewer

Radiology tests are often repeated due to the loss of a test result or due to inconvenient provider access to the images. Besides being inconvenient and unhealthy for patients, this also represents a waste of insurance and taxpayers money. In order to avoid this waste, insurance companies can simply provide their patients free use of a specialized Microsoft Windows app (virtual machine) in MyPHRMachines [21]. As illustrated below, that is sufficient for giving any specialist convenient online access to a patient's radiology images.

Ge et al. have recently published about a novel portal prototype to store and share radiology images under patient ownership [27]. The MyPHRMachines radiology image viewer app presented here provides the same functionality as that prototype but (1) the implementation of the MyPHRMachines app is simpler and (2) the app is substitutable. The implementation of the app is simpler since it reuses viewer software that is already embedded in the patient's radiology CD. Moreover, the functionality to give a physician access to the viewer is implemented at the MyPHRMachines platform layer. The app is substitutable since anyone can install a more advanced viewer to a new VM and offer that to other MyPHRMachines users.

Figure 2 shows tablet and laptop access to the image viewer app in MyPHRMachines. As explained in Section 3.1, the laptop provides zero-install access to the specialized app (since the app viewer relies on HTML and Java only). The

---

[1]See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/

Figure 2: MyPHRMachines demo app: basic radiology image viewer in a specialized VM.

tablet is an iPad (for which Java support is not available). Hence, it relies on a native RDP client for working with the remote VM. Interestingly, multiple such RDP clients are available regardless of MyPHRMachines and our radiology viewer app. Therefore, also at this level, MyPHRMachines supports substitutability. From the usability point of view, the use of a native RDP client does require users to enter the address and port on which the remote VM is running. Android tablets (which do support Java) do not have this potential usability barrier. Readers are encouraged to visit the companion Web site `https://sites.google.com/site/myphrmachines/` for hands-on access to this demo. The demo provides anonymous access to a dummy account for which multiple radiology CDs have been uploaded to the PHR.

The delegation of access to radiology images does not require any app-specific implementation since it is supported by a generic MyPHRMachines platform feature, i.e. the app store portal (see Figure 1). That portal enables patients to delegate access to any of their active VMs. More specifically, for every active VM, patients can generate an automatic e-mail message which enables the recepient to log in to the remote VM without signing up for a MyPHRMachines account [21].

3.4. Contributing a new App to MyPHRMachines

The aforementioned companion Web site of this paper will be maintained to provide up-to-date instructions for contributing new apps. In this paper, we abstract from the rather volatile user interface details and focus on the conceptual workflow for deploying new apps to MyPHRMachines. Technical details have been published before [22, 23], so we omit them here.

Figure 3 sketches the key activities related to new app provisioning. The diagram is based on the industrial standard notation for modeling business processes [28]. The upper box shows tasks that are executed by representatives of an external software vendor while the lower box displays tasks that are executed

by employees of an organization that offers the MyPHRMachines platform services. The current deployment of MyPHRMachines is maintained for academic demonstration purposes only. However, anybody can contact the authors for leveraging that demonstrator infrastructure.

The workflow model shows at its top left an empty circle with thin edge, representing the process start event. The first task in the process (i.e., *"Request VM Clone"*) is executed by the app builder. As explained in Section 3.1, the web portal enables such app builders to request a clone of an existing virtual machine. The two external apps presented in Sections 5.2 and 4 are based on clones of Windows and Linux virtual machines respectively.

MyPHRMachines VMs are organized in groups. This is important since otherwise all apps would be visible in one global namespace, which would not scale. Each group has at least one administrator. The "Group Admin" lane in Figure 3 models the tasks that should be executed by such administrators, in the context of the new app deployment workflow. The dashed arcs between different lanes represent messages that are sent by the MyPHRMachines portal. The workflow can only proceed from one task A to a successor task B if (1) A is completed and (2) for each incoming message flow in B, a message has been received. Following this semantics, Figure 3 sketches that the app builder can only deploy his binaries to the cloned VM after the clone request was approved by an administrator, and after that administrator has moved the cloned VM to a private group. The purpose of such group is to contain virtual machines that are not yet appropriate for display in the app store.

Figure 3 includes three tasks that are labeled *"Test VM"*. The tasks are in the lanes of the app builder, an alpha tester and a beta tester respectively. All testers use exactly the same software (i.e., exactly the same VM configuration) yet their VM instances will be initialized with their own test data. Each tester can upload test data using the same functionality that end-users use to upload PHR data. If either the alpha tester or app builder think the VM is not ready yet for a release to the app store, the workflow moves back to task "Deploy Binaries". Upon each entry of that task, the app builder gets private and mutable access to the VM configuration. When completing the task, the VM configuration is saved such that each tester and subsequent user will start from the same software configuration context.

When the app builder decides to publish a VM, a group administrator moves it to a public group. Finally, the VM is made available in the app store. Optionally, a quality check can first be performed by platform maintenance staff. The workflow from Figure 3 focuses on the general case. MyPHRMachines manages the access rights and stakeholder notifications for the various tasks. Also, the system supports variations to the basic workflow.

4. Radiation Exposure Monitoring

This section introduces our application scenario of Radiation Exposure Monitoring (REM). We first discuss the need for REM in Section 4.1 and then pro-

Figure 3: Workflow for contributing a new app to MyPHRMachines.

vide more technical details about the measurement of radiation exposure in Section 4.2.

4.1. The Need for Patient-Level REM Services

X-rays have been officially classified as a carcinogen by research agencies and prevention centers [29, 30]. The presumption is that significant increase in the population's cumulative exposure to ionizing radiation will cause an increased incidence of cancer years down the line. We cannot take a passive data collection and prevention approach, since "Radiation-induced cancers typically do not occur until 1 or 2 decades or longer after exposure." [31] The largest epidemiologic study so far shows a statistically significant increase in cancer at radiation dose estimates in excess of 50 mSv [32]. Many computed tomographic (CT) scans and nuclear medicine studies have effective dose estimates whose cumulative doses easily exceed this level [31]. Related knowledge is gradually expanding, among others via international cohort studies [33]. In the meanwhile, "the current annual collective dose estimate from medical exposure in the United States has been calculated as roughly equivalent to the total worldwide collective dose generated by the nuclear catastrophe at Chernobyl" [31, 34, 35].

REM aims at monitoring the level of exposure to ionizing radiation by patients. Over the last decades, significant progress has been achieved by monitoring mean exposure values against so-called Diagnostic Reference Levels (DRLs). Rehani for example shows that initially some countries had very disturbing high exposures whereas results were more harmonized after alerting these issues and acting upon them [36]. This is all however at the national policy level and the exposures for individual patients are not yet properly governed. The current absence of patient-level monitoring mechanisms means that individual patients

that receive dangerously high exposures will remain un-noticed by today's radiology information systems. To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not received formal research attention yet, but one can easily conceive high cancer risk scenarios.

From a hospital informatics point of view it is indeed challenging that patients are likely to undergo scans at different health care institutions during their life. In contrast, organizing REM support around the patient is very natural: patients can track exactly the number and type of scans they have undergone. We argue that patients should therefore be empowered with PHR based REM application software. That would enable them to monitor their radiation exposure over time and discuss it with their caregivers. This patient empowerment enables doctors to make better risk assessments and specialize the diagnosis and treatment plan.

Large radiology technology vendors are aware of the aforementioned issues. However, Brosky has recently clarified on a professional radiologist community website why it is unrealistic that they will provide integrated REM services soon [37]. The author describes the results of a European vendor-oriented integration workshop. Although various vendors are offering standard-compliant dose reporting products, these products are deemed to fail on today's market. On the one hand, there is a vast installation base of legacy products that (1) do not support the standard reporting interfaces and (2) that are not expected be phased out. Moreover, even when a standard-compliant reporting system is used, healthcare administrators still need to configure (or program) the data transfers between local and centralized REM systems. At the recent European integration workshop, only one of eight participating companies provided *"a full-scale dose information reporter that enables a healthcare system to look into the accumulated data and extract actionable information."* [37]. Other vendors indicated that *"If we build it now, no one will buy it"*.

4.2. Calculating the Cumulative Estimated Dose of Radiology Absorption

There is a key difference between the radiation exposure from the various imaging modalities and the actual amount of radiation absorbed by a patient. The latter is dependent on the amount and properties of each tissue encountered by the X-ray beam. As it is not practical to insert radiation detectors into each organ of every patient, absorbed radiation dose is measured only directly in extreme cases of oncology treatment. Therefore, there is a great need to support the accurate *estimation* of absorbed radiation doses.

Promising results have been achieved in the area of automatic CED calculation. More specifically, recent software programs enable the automatic extraction and analysis of dose-related parameters from image meta-data. So far, these programs have only been used within complex pipelines. For example, Jahnen et al. [38] use such an extraction component within the PerMoS chain, which is primarily designed to monitor DRL conformance at the governmental level. Aware, inc, provides a chain that also relies on a central dose index registry. The Aware chain does include components at finer granularity levels: it provides support for monitoring the conformance of individual technician

and physicians and also aims at risk management for individual patients [39]. However, for monitoring patient-level exposures, the Aware chain assumes that all hospitals visited by the patient push their data to the central registry. As clarified by Brosky [37], this is unfortunately not realistic.

At the core of the aforementioned chains are however extraction and analysis components that would provide patient-level CED calculations if they are provided with patient-level data. In this paper, we use MyPHRMachines to provide patient-level data securely to the extraction and analysis components of PerMoS and Aware.

5. REM Apps in MyPHRMachines

We have deployed the two alternative CED management components of the Tudor and Aware chains apps in MyPHRMachines. Both apps visualize received dose values in a patient-centered representation. In the following, we first discuss the input format requirement of both apps. We then discuss the key functionalities of the individual apps. Finally, we reason about the implications of having these two demonstrators.

5.1. App Input: DICOM

The DICOM standard defines a *file format* for storing radiology data on physical media (e.g., CD ROMs) as well as a *communication protocol* for transferring images from/to remote servers.

File Format DICOM prescribes a standard format for storing radiology images. Additionally, the standard prescribes how to store information *about* the image *data*. Such information is called *"metadata"*. Besides standardizing metadata for characterizing the patient (e.g., name), the standard also prescribes metadata fields for storing technical equipment and machine parameters (e.g., scanner model, scan length, scan modality and scan location). When using full digital equipment, dose information is stored explicitly in DICOM fields too. For older equipment types however, such information is missing and therefore the aforementioned simulation methods need to be employed. The first app (MyPHRDoseReporter) supports full digital equipment as well as legacy equipment while the second app only supports full digital equipment.

Communication Protocol The second app includes a VM startup script that automatically collects all the user's radiology data and sends that via standard DICOM protocol messages to the Aware REM server that is running locally in the remote VM.

From an end-user's perspective, the second aspect is an implementation detail. What does matter for end-users is that both apps require input data stored in the DICOM file format.

Modality	DICOM Identi- fication	Dose Figure	Meaning of Dose Figure	Extracted (X) or Calculated via Simulation (S)
Computed Tomography	CT	CTDIvol	Computed Tomography Dose Index, Volumetric	X if available, S otherwise
		DLP	Dose Length Product	X if available, S otherwise
Digital Radiology	DR	DAP	Dose Area Product	X
Fluroscopy	DF	DAP	Dose Area Product	X
Angiography	XA	DAP	Dose Area Product	X
Mammography	MR	MGD	Mean Grandular Dose	X

Table 1: Dose figures for the different modalities in MyPHRDoseReporter.

5.2.   Tudor App: MyPHRDoseReporter

MyPHRDoseReporter is an application that supports the visualization and management of medical images. The application integrates various open source libraries from the Public Research Centre *"Henri Tudor"* into a patient-centered app. The app supports both the construction of a personal radiology record as well as the inspection thereof. Regarding record building, the app can import data from (virtualized) patient CDs. The app can harmonize input data in order to overcome differences in the implementation of the DICOM standard by different scanner manufacturers. Regarding inspection, the app supports both the interactive viewing of radiology images as well as the calculation of estimated dose values for various modalities and machine brands.

The app can manage inputs from various radiology imaging modalities, as illustrated by Table 1. Based on an inspection of all images in a patient record, the app generates a tabular overview of the received dose. The *Computed Tomography* (CT) modality involves rotating beams, while the others involve unidirectional beams. The *Computed Tomography Dose Index volumetric* (CTDI-vol) value is used as a dose descriptor per CT volume. One CT scan consists of multiple such volumes and each volume can differ in beam intensity. The *Dose Length Product* (DLP) is used to quantify the complete dose for a CT scan. In CT, doses are taken directly from the DICOM metadata (if available) or from a Monte Carlo simulation-based application otherwise (i.e., from CT Expo [40]). For Diagnostic Radiology (DR), Fluoroscopy (DF) and Angiography (XA), MyPHRDoseReporter computes the *Dose Area Product* (DAP). DAP describes the dose quanity per square centimeter. For Mammography (MG), MyPHRDoseReporter extracts the *Mean Glandular Dose* (MGD). The MGD is the mean dose to the glandular tissue of the scanned breast. As most MG machines are full digital, no Monte Carlo based simulation methods are implemented for this modality.

All metrics from Table 1 are well known to radiology specialists. Moreover,

specialists tend to use their own reference values for these metrics, depending on hospital protocols as well as national guidelines. Therefore, MyPHRDoseReporter simply presents the raw metric results and leaves the interpretation of the data to the app user. In the long term, the following issues need to be tackled:

1. understanding which dosimetry concepts are of relevance to patients,
2. understanding which dosimetry concepts are useful for radiology nurses,
3. understanding how the degree of uncertainty can be properly presented.

These issues are the subject of ongoing research at Tudor. In future versions of the app, we may (1) include appropriate reference values in the output report (2) aggregate Effective Dose (E) values (3) compare the received individual dose to easy understandable facts and (4) add support for additional modalities like Nuclear Medicine activities. Among others, the app will have to take into account the current age of the patient (and compare it with the scan date in the DICOM data).

5.3. Aware App: MyAccuradREMServer

The Aware Accurad REM Server is a software suite that has been designed for empowering radiologists with REM support. The server is typically connected to all radiology equipment of a hospital and additionally it should be connected to the servers from other hospitals. One server typically contains the data of all patients that are known to the hospital. The MyAccuradREMServer app is a patient-centered VM deployment of such a server. The patient can access all calculated dose figures himself and/or delegate access to a specialist.

In contrast to MyPHRDoseReporter, MyAccuradREMServer does not provide simulation-based estimations based on the DICOM data from legacy scanners. However, it does provide a more convenient user interface. Besides providing convenient table and graph filtering widgets, the Aware app provides workflows for defining and monitoring radiology protocols.

Figure 4 shows the app's visualization of various cumulative dose results for a dummy patient. Among others, the figure shows that the cumulative dose is displayed per target region (head versus lumbar spine).

5.4. Results

From a results perspective, we stress that (1) both apps have been developed and deployed by stakeholders outside the MyPHRMachines project and (2) none of the two apps requires any extension to the MyPHRMachines platform. This illustrates that the platform is indeed open to external functionality. We also stress that the apps consume data in a format that the platform is unaware of (i.e., DICOM content). This is in contrast to the requirements that other app-oriented PHR platforms (e.g., HealthVault and Indivo X) impose on input and output data formats. Beyond the PHR context, both apps demonstrate that an open, patient-oriented approach to Health Informatics may empower caregivers with functionality that is not available in their own enterprise systems. For the

Figure 4: Aware's MyAccuradREMServer app in MyPHRMachines.

example apps discussed in this paper, patients can indeed present cumulative dose reports to their radiologist that in general cannot be generated by the enterprise system that is used by this specialist: even hospitals that have a state-of-the-art REM server typically still lack integration with other hospitals (cf., Section 4.2). Therefore, exposures from tests in other hospitals would not be taken into account. Therefore, the REM analysis would not be as complete as one that is based on PHR data.

6. Discussion

This section discusses how this paper relates to the PHR literature. In particular, Section 6.1 discusses the advantages and potential pitfalls of using VMs as a more general PHR platform technology. Section 6.2 focuses on literature on PHR adoption barriers and facilitators. We include that section to clarify how we have leveraged adoption studies from other PHR systems in the design of MyPHRMachines.

6.1. Strengths and Potential Pitfalls of Using Virtual Machines as Apps

This section discusses the key strengths of the VM-based architecture as well as pitfalls that should be avoided by app developers. The key strengths of the architecture are its flexibility and trustability. The flexibility strength is illustrated best by the DICOM viewer example: no programming was needed to deploy an off-the-shelf DICOM viewer into MyPHRMachines. This flexibility is in strong contrast to PHR architectures with restrictive APIs (such as Indivo X [15]), which would require a significantly higher effort to build and maintain the apps described in this paper. The trustability strength follows from the aforementioned platform feature that makes it impossible for apps to send patient data to external servers.

The flexibility strength, however, comes with a pitfall: since the MyPHRMachines platform does not impose the use of standard data formats, a naive use of the platform would result in patient records full of syntactically or semantically incompatible fragments. When app developers are aware of this pitfall, we argue they could turn it into an enabler: app developers can deploy apps to translate health record fragments into a proprietary format (or in the format of a deprecated standard) or into the latest standard format. We argue that again the ability to obtain such functionality from the App market makes the architecture more scalable than architectures where only the platform owners can provide data conversion functionality. Also, the fact that MyPHRMachines does not impose any data standards does not prevent anyone from using standards: in this paper, for example, we leverage DICOM as a standard for storing radiology data.

Another pitfall along a similar direction is that MyPHRMachines app developers would re-build low-level functionality rather than reuse middleware features provided by platforms with heavyweight APIs. Instead of making this mistake, app developers should install inside their VM any meaningful middleware they can afford. For example, developers of diabetes-specific apps may

want to deploy SMART middleware to their virtual machine [20]. This would provide them (among others) with libraries to deal with lab data coded using the Logical Observation Identifiers Names and Codes (LOINC) standard.

The MyPHRMachines trustability strength also comes at a cost: by blocking general Internet access for patient-instantiated VMs, apps cannot by default leverage public Web services. This is unavoidable if one aims at fully dependable, platform-provided privacy governance of patient data. The example apps from this paper do not require such services. For the sake of generalizability, we briefly discuss how MyPHRMachines does support such services in apps that need them. MyPHRMachines enables providers of stateless Web services to deploy their service in long-running VMs inside the MyPHRMachines cloud. Such VMs can be made available securely to patient-specific VMs. In fact, the OwnCloud service discussed in Section 3.1 also runs in a long-running VM. In some practical cases, providers of very popular web services could refuse to offer their service in this way. If in those cases, the provider of the public web service is considered trustworthy then VMs can be given controlled internet access to a specific domain. Careless use of that platform feature is however a pitfall that would cause confusion about the trustability of MyPHRMachines apps.

6.2. MyPHRMachines and PHR adoption barriers

In relation to the issues described in Section 2, McGraw acknowledges that today's PHR systems too often impose consent contracts that jeopardize patient privacy [41]. The author calls for more reliable privacy measures. Kahn et al. also alert that providers of PHR software services are not necessarily subject to US privacy laws and therefore are not as trustworthy as conventional care providers [42]. Another study by Witry et al. also reveals concerns about the consent contracts imposed by today's systems [43].

MyPHRMachines provides privacy at the platform level, making "app"-specific privacy contracts irrelevant. According to McGraw, that should bolster trust in such systems and promote their adoption [41]. Patel's survey [44] clarifies what type of privacy threats patients are really concerned about: it turns out that 94% of the surveyed patients have no privacy concerns towards their physicians [44], while respondents do have significant privacy concerns towards insurers, employers and the (US) government. To the best of our knowledge, no scientific studies have been conducted to analyze whether Patel's results are valid beyond the US context. Therefore, it remains unanswered which company or organization provides the right trust level for providing the MyPHRMachines platform professionally at a European or global scale. However, the key contribution here is that if within a specific context, one trusted party offers the MyPHRMachines platform then all the untrusted parties (e.g., the aforementioned insurers and employers) can effectively deploy apps to that ecosystem. Especially if patients do not trust their data to the app providers, the MyPHRMachines platform *guarantees* that apps *can not* send data to the untrusted party.

Kahn et al. conclude that the key technical adoption barrier for PHRs has been that patients had to provide a lot of information manually, using tedious (and error-prone) web forms [42]. Moreover, many studies report that

doctors are concerned about patients being too poorly informed to understand the meaning of their PHR data [45, 46]. Family physicians interviewed by Witry et al. therefore viewed potential in PHRs as a backup source of medical information secondary to the patient's medical record as opposed to a tool for patient self-care [43]. Also, a physician from that study expressed that *"For quality and efficiency it is worth it"* and *"It is worth it to give it to people for free. You'd save the (US) government money.".* We argue that the data entry problems reported by Kahn et al. primarily apply to PHR applications for manually entering dietary information etc. In the context of this paper, we envision that in the long term, data is pushed automatically to the PHR once it is produced in a hospital (or once a copy arrives at a patient's GP) or by devices. In our radiology use case, we expect at this point that patients upload the content of a radiology CD. Patients have a good incentive to upload the data, as they then do not have to worry anymore about preserving the physical CD. The MyPHRMachines platform also provides technical interfaces (beyond the scope of Section 3.1) that enable hospitals to send the radiology data directly, which saves them the time and costs of creating CDs and sending them to patient homes.

Another study concludes that family physicians are quite open to sharing information with patients, as long as the related information systems are easy to use and as long as their value to the practice of medicine has been demonstrated [46]. Regarding usability, we have also taken into account study results by Witry et al. [43]: the authors conclude that physicians are generally concerned about the time it takes to log into a PHR system and lookup specific information. We have taken this concern into account by enabling patients to (1) collect specific information as preparation for a time-critical doctor meeting and (2) provide one-click physician access to that specific information, as explained in Section 3.3. Regarding medical relevance, we stress that the REM apps provide unprecedented support for personalizing patient safety in radiology (cf., Section 4.1, which stresses the importance of REM in the context of cancer prevention).

7. Conclusions

We have demonstrated the potential of a recently proposed PHR platform in terms of its openness. The so-called MyPHRMachines platform satisfies criteria that had been identified previously by Mandl et al. yet for which the existing platforms suffered from weaknesses related to the types of data supported as well as to the way in which they handle data privacy. MyPHRMachines leverages Virtual Machines as flexible and secure execution sandboxes. We have demonstrated the flexibility by showing that without any changes to the base platform, external developers could deploy apps that deal with data that cannot be handled by the repositories of other PHR platforms. The privacy strength follows from the platform design: the virtual machine sandboxes reside in a private cloud and app is not allowed to push data outside its sandbox. In our future

work, we will evaluate MyPHRMachines in a controlled clinical setting. More-over, our example apps will be refined and new demonstrators will be designed, among others using data from various types of devices.

Acknowledgements

References

[1] J. Katz, The silent world of doctor and patient, Free Press, 1984.

[2] J. Katz, A. Capron, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, Johns Hopkins paperback: Medical Ethics, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002.

[3] T. K. Houston, H. E. Ehrenberger, The potential of consumer health informatics., Semin Oncol Nurs 17 (1) (2001) 41–7.

[4] B. A. Eckman, C. A. Bennett, J. H. Kaufman, J. W. Tenner, Varieties of interoperability in the transformation of the health-care information infrastructure, IBM Systems Journal 46 (1) (2007) 19 –41. `doi: 10.1147/sj.461.0019`.

[5] Partners Healthcare, Company information, `http://www.partners.org/ about/company-information/default.aspx` (Jan. 2013).

[6] Oogziekenhuis Rotterdam, The Eye Care Network, `http://www. oogzorgnetwerk.nl/` (Jan. 2013).

[7] K. Siau, Health care informatics, Information Technology in Biomedicine, IEEE Transactions on 7 (1) (2003) 1–7. `doi:10.1109/TITB.2002.805449`.

[8] D. F. Sittig, Personal health records on the internet: a snapshot of the pioneers at the end of the 20th century, International Journal of Medical Informatics 65 (1) (2002) 1 – 6. `doi:10.1016/S1386-5056(01)00215-5`.

[9] D. C. Kaelber, S. Shah, A. Vincent, E. Pan, J. M. Hook, D. Johnston, D. W. Bates, B. Middleton, The Value of Personal Health Records, Healthcare Information & Management Systems Society, 2008.
URL `http://www.citl.org/`

[10] HHS Press Office, Secretary leavitt takes new steps to advance health it – national collaboration and RFPs will pave the way for interoperability (Jun. 2006).
URL `http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/2005pres/20050606.html`

[11] P. C. Tang, T. H. Lee, Your doctor's office or the internet? two paths to personal health records, The New England journal of medicine 360 (13) (2009) 1276–1278. `doi:10.1056/NEJMp0810264`.

[12] K. D. Mandl, I. S. Kohane, No small change for the health information economy, The New England journal of medicine 360 (13) (2009) 1278–1281. `doi:10.1056/NEJMp0900411`.

[13] M. Katz, C. Shapiro, Technological adoption in the presence of network externalities., J. Political Econom. 94 (2) (1986) 822–841.

[14] K. Boudreau, Open platform strategies and innovation: Granting access vs. devolving control., Management Science 56 (10) (2010) 1849–1872.

[15] B. Adida, A. Sanyal, S. Zabak, I. S. Kohane, K. D. Mandl, Indivo X: Developing a fully substitutable personally controlled health record platform, in: AMIA 2010 Symposium, 2010.

[16] Microsoft, HealthVault, `http://www.healthvault.com/` (Jan. 2013).

[17] D. C. Kaelber, A. K. Jha, D. Johnston, B. Middleton, D. W. Bates, Viewpoint paper: A research agenda for personal health records (PHRs), JAMIA 15 (6) (2008) 729–736.

[18] Epic, Personal health records (phrs), portals and mobile applications, `http://www.epic.com/software-phr.php` (Jan. 2013).

[19] U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, My HealtheVet, `http://www.myhealth.va.gov/` (Jan. 2013).

[20] K. D. Mandl, J. C. Mandel, S. N. Murphy, E. V. Bernstam, R. L. Ramoni, D. A. Kreda, J. M. McCoy, B. Adida, I. S. Kohane, The SMART platform: early experience enabling substitutable applications for electronic health records, JAMIA 19 (4) (2012) 597–603. `doi:10.1136/amiajnl-2011-000622`.

[21] P. Van Gorp, M. Comuzzi, MyPHRMachines: Lifelong personal health records in the cloud, in: Computer-Based Medical Systems (CBMS), 25th International Symposium on, 2012, pp. 1 –6. `doi:10.1109/CBMS.2012.6266378`.

[22] P. Van Gorp, M. Comuzzi, A. S. Fialho, U. Kaymak, Addressing health information privacy with a novel cloud-based phr system architecture, in: SMC, IEEE, 2012, pp. 1841–1846.

[23] P. Van Gorp, M. Comuzzi, Lifelong personal health data and application software via virtual machines in the cloud, IEEE Journal of Biomedical and Health Informatics PP (99) (2013) 1–1. `doi:10.1109/JBHI.2013.2257821`.

[24] F. Karlitschek, et al., Owncloud sync clients (Oct. 2012).
URL `http://owncloud.org/sync-clients/`

[25] F. Karlitschek, et al., Owncloud feature: External storage (Oct. 2012).
URL http://owncloud.org/features/

[26] E. Maiwald, Network Security: A Beginner's Guide, Second Edition, Essential Skills Made Easy, McGraw-Hill, 2003.

[27] Y. Ge, D. K. Ahn, B. Unde, H. D. Gage, J. J. Carr, Patient-controlled sharing of medical imaging data across unaffiliated healthcare organizations, J Am Med Inform Assocdoi:10.1136/amiajnl-2012-001146.

[28] Object Management Group, Business Process Model And Notation (BPMN) Version 2.0, http://www.omg.org/spec/BPMN/2.0/ (Jan. 2011).

[29] International Commission on Radiological Protection, Radiological protection and safety in medicine, Ann ICRP 26 (1996) 1–47.

[30] World Health Organization – International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), Evaluations of carcinogenicity to humans, list of all agents classified by the iarc monographs (Oct. 2012).
URL http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Classification/ClassificationsAlphaOrder.pdf

[31] E. S. Amis, P. F. Butler, K. E. Applegate, S. B. Birnbaum, L. F. Brateman, J. M. Hevezi, F. A. Mettler, R. L. Morin, M. J. Pentecost, G. G. Smith, K. J. Strauss, R. K. Zeman, , American College of Radiology white paper on radiation dose in medicine., J Am Coll Radiol 4 (5) (2007) 272–284. doi:10.1016/j.jacr.2007.03.002.

[32] D. Pierce, D. Preston, Radiation-induced cancer risks at low doses among atomic bomb survivors, Radiat Res 154 (2000) 178–186.

[33] H. El-Saghire, V. Charlot, H. Thierens, M. Arlette, U. Oestreicher, U. Roessler, U. Kulka, M. Gomolka, C. Lindholm, S. Haghdoost, F. Marie, J. Hall, E. Pernot, A. Kesminiene, S. Baatout, EU EPI-CT project: biomarkers of radiation sensitivity for children, Posters of the 4th MELODI Workshop (2012).

[34] UNSCEAR, Annex D. – exposures from the chernobyl accident (1988).
URL http://www.unscear.org/docs/reports/1988annexd.pdf

[35] F. Mettler, Magnitude of radiation uses and doses in the united states: Ncrp scientific committee 6-2 analysis of medical exposures, Presented at: Advances in Radiation Protection in Medicine (Apr. 2007).

[36] M. Rehani, IAEA – the initiatives in international setting, Workshop of the European Medical ALARA Network (Jul. 2012).

[37] J. Brosky, Radiation reporting tools stalled in uncertain euro markets, AuntMinnieEurope – Community Internet site for European radiologists and related professionals in the medical imaging industry (Apr. 2011).

URL   http://www.auntminnieeurope.com/index.aspx?sec=sup&sub=ris&pag=dis&ItemID=605015

[38] A. Jahnen, S. Kohler, J. Hermen, D. Tack, C. Back, Automatic computed tomography patient dose calculation using dicom header metadata, Radiat Prot Dosimetry 47 (2011) 317–320. doi:10.1093/rpd/ncr338.

[39] Aware, Inc., White paper: Radiation exposure monitoring (2011). URL http://www.aware.com/medical/whitepapers/download_rem_wp.html

[40] G. Stamm, H. D. Nagel, CT-expo – a novel program for dose evaluation in ct, Rofo 174 (12) (2002) 1570–6.

[41] D. McGraw, J. X. Dempsey, L. Harris, J. Goldman, Privacy as an enabler, not an impediment: building trust into health information exchange., Health Affairs 28 (2) (2009) 416–427. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.28.2.416.

[42] J. S. Kahn, V. Aulakh, A. Bosworth, What It Takes: Characteristics Of The Ideal Personal Health Record, Health Affairs 28 (2) (2009) 369–376. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.28.2.369.

[43] M. J. Witry, W. R. Doucette, J. M. Daly, B. T. Levy, E. A. Chrischilles, Family physician perceptions of personal health records., Perspect Health Inf Manag 7 (2010) 1d.

[44] V. N. Patel, E. Abramson, A. M. Edwards, M. A. Cheung, R. V. Dhopeshwarkar, R. Kaushal, Consumer attitudes toward personal health records in a beacon community., Am J Manag Care 17 (4) (2011) e104–20.

[45] E. R. Weitzman, L. Kaci, M. Quinn, K. D. Mandl, Helping high-risk youth move through high-risk periods: personally controlled health records for improving social and health care transitions, Journal of Diabetes Science and Technology 5 (1) (2011) 47–54.

[46] G. L. Yau, A. S. Williams, J. B. Brown, Family physicians' perspectives on personal health records: qualitative study, Canadian Family Physician 57 (2011) 178–184.